HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA 2005

HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AOA	Agreement on Agriculture
ARI	Acute Respiratory Infection
ATC	Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
ATTF	All Tripura Tiger Force
CPCB	Central Pollution Control Board
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989
CUA	Colombo Urban Area
DC	Deputy Commissioner
DOTS	Direct-Observed Treatment Strategy
EPI	Extended Programme on Immunisation
FATA	Federal Administered Tribal Areas
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GBM	Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HDM	Health Deprivation Measure
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency virus
HSD	High-speed diesel
HYV	High-yielding Varieties
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IDU	Injecting Drug User
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IT	Information Technology
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Multi Fibre Arrangement
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MW	Megawatt
NACO	National AIDS Control Organization
NFC	Nepal Food Corporation
NLFT	National Liberation Front of Tripura
NSDP	Net per capita State Domestic Product
NSS	National Sample Survey
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDS	Public Distribution systems
PWG	People's War Group
RBM	Roll Back Malaria
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SPM	Suspended Particulate Matter
TB	Tuberculosis
TBP	Time-bound Programme
TSE	Total support Estimate
U5MR	Under-Five Mortality Rate
UAE	United Arab Emirates
ULFA	United Liberation Front of Assam
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAW	Violence against Women
WARPO	Water Resource Planning Organization
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Foreword

In May 1998, two months before Mahbub ul Haq passed away, India exploded a nuclear bomb and Pakistan followed suit two weeks later. This was what concerned Haq most during the last few weeks of his life. 'Nuclear lavas are a great international theatre and a temporary boost to the egos of short-sighted leaders, and sometimes to their nations. But, in the last analysis, they are drowned out by socio-economic lavas and the rising frustrations of the poor people,' he wrote at that time.

During the 1990s, Mahbub ul Haq was deeply involved in analysing the issues of human security and their link to human development. A considerable part of his intellectual capital was spent in developing proposals for improving human security, particularly in South Asia, and in propagating the idea of 'peace dividend'—the amount of resources that could be saved from reducing military expenditure, and using that saving for social development. Had he lived longer, Mahbub ul Haq would surely have dedicated one South Asia Human Development Report to this issue. So we have decided to do this on his behalf.

This Report is about the security concerns of the majority of people in South Asia who, for over half a century, have been yearning to live in peace and harmony within their societies and with their neighbours. But the politics, the ideologies of a minority of the population, the greed of the captains of industry and commerce, and the politics and theology of the international and transnational financial, business and trading institutions have been standing in the way of letting ordinary people live a peaceful life. The rules of the game are not being played to advance the causes of the majority. In all walks of life the rules are being bent, or broken, to enrich and empower a small minority. The ethical foundation of all the major religions of South Asia is based upon the principle of tolerance of people of all faith, ethnicity and class; justice and sustenance to the poor; and preservation of the sanctity of life. Yet this region has seen massive destruction of life and liberty in the name of religion. On the top of man-made disasters, the region has also seen major natural calamities, most recently the tsunami of 2004 and earthquake of 2005.

Seven years ago in the 1999 South Asia Human Development Report we had commented that 'South Asia remains a region divided—divided between the hopes of the rich and the despair of the poor. A region where the richest one-fifth earns almost 40 per cent of the income, and the poorest one-fifth makes do with less than 10 per cent. A region where today begins with the struggle of survival for 515 million poverty-ridden destitutes, and tomorrow threatens the future of 395 million illiterate adults. Where women are often denied basic human rights and minorities continue their struggle against prejudice and discrimination. At the threshold of the twenty-first century, this is the South Asia we live in.' Seven years ago that paragraph had encapsulated human insecurity of the region. But the sad fact is that since then nothing has changed substantially.

The Report presents an in-depth analysis of the multiple threats to human security, from conflicts in South Asia, to economic, health and environmental insecurity, to insecurity due to governance failure at many levels. All these insecurities affect mostly the vulnerable groups—the poor, the disadvantaged, the women and children. The Report contains eight chapters, in addition to the Overview. Chapter 1 introduces the theme of this

year's Report by presenting a conceptual framework for human security in South Asia. Chapter 2 analyses the inter-state and intra-state conflicts in South Asia that threaten the lives of millions of South Asians. Chapter 3 discusses the threats to economic security. Chapter 4 identifies the major health risks from diseases and lack of access to healthcare that threaten the very survival of the poor people. Chapter 5 looks at the environmental threats to human security. Chapter 6 and seven analyse the risks to the security of women and children in South Asia. Finally, chapter 8 discusses the failure of institutions in South Asia to safeguard the security of its people. The Report suggests that to sustain economic growth South Asia needs to seriously address the human security concerns of its people.

I would like to put on record my very grateful thanks to the Royal Norwegian Embassy for supporting the preparation of this Report. Without Norway's consistent support, it would not be possible for the Centre to carry on this work. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution of the Canadian International Development Agency for its support of this report. Both Norway and Canada are on the forefront of the international community in advocating for human security. We hope this Report would provide them adequate material for their policy makers. A special thank to UNDP, particularly the Director of the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, for continuing to support the Centre's annual report.

The research team at the Centre worked hard and for long hours to complete this Report. I must thank, particularly, Faisal Bari for providing valuable support at each stage of preparation of the Report. Words fail me to thank Adeel Malik who came from Oxford University during the winter holidays for helping us prepare the last chapter. The research team, consisting of Feyza Bhatti, Ali Shan Azhar, Adeel Faheem, Heike Friemert, Rabea Malik, and Shazra Murad collected and compiled data, prepared background papers, and helped at the end to put the Report together. I thank each one of them for their untiring efforts. My special thanks to two other South Asians: Jayati Ghosh, a good friend of the Centre, once again prepared a paper for the Report; and Parsa Sajid came to Islamabad for a couple of months to prepare a paper. I thank Taha Mustafa for composing and designing the Report, and Malia Asim for handling the administrative details.

Islamabad
30 December 2005

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About the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre

Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre was set up in November 1995 in Islamabad, Pakistan by the late Dr Mahbub ul Haq, founder and chief architect of UNDP Human Development Reports. With a special focus on South Asia, the Centre is a policy research institute and think tank, committed to the promotion of the human development paradigm as a powerful tool for informing people-centered development policy nationally and regionally, in order to reduce human deprivation.

The Centre organises professional research, policy studies and seminars on issues of economic and social development as they affect people's wellbeing. Believing in the shared histories of the people of this region and in their shared destinies, Dr Haq was convinced of the need for cooperation among the seven countries of the region. His vision extended to a comparative analysis of the region with the outside world, providing a yardstick for the progress achieved by South Asia in terms of socio-economic development. The Centre's research work is presented annually through a Report titled, *Human Development in South Asia*.

Continuing Mahbub ul Haq's legacy, the Centre provides a unique perspective in three ways: first, by analysing the process of human development, the analytical work of the Centre puts people at the centre of economic, political and social policies; second, the South Asia regional focus of the Centre enables a rich examination of issues of regional importance; and third, the Centre's comparative analysis provides a yardstick for the progress and setbacks of South Asia vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

The current activities of the Centre include: preparation of annual reports on *Human Development in South Asia;* preparation and publication of a journal, *Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Review;* preparation of policy papers and research reports on poverty reduction strategies; organisation of seminars and conferences on global and regional human development issues, South Asian cooperation, peace in the region and women's empowerment. The Centre also organises an annual Mahbub ul Haq Memorial Seminar and a Mahbub ul Haq Lecture.

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Overview

What is human security? How is it different from territorial security? And how is this related to human development? These are some of the questions that are raised and clarified at the beginning of this Report. The rest of the Report discusses and analyses the reality of human insecurity in various areas of people's lives in South Asia.

Mahbub ul Haq provided the most comprehensive definition of human security, that is security of income, employment, food, health, education and environment. It also includes insecurity arising from violence within the household, by the community, and, sometimes, even the state against women, children and the minorities. And this concept asserts people's rights to protection against the inefficiency and injustice of the institutions of governance.

The ultimate concern of human security is with people's daily lives and the fear of their disruption by societal injustice or natural calamities. Territorial security, on the other hand, is concerned with protecting the national borders, thus protecting people from external aggression. But, for the majority of people the huge standing army and nuclear weapons mean little if they are hungry, sick, jobless, or are violated or killed by the oppressive systems, practices, and corrupt state institutions. Thus the human security concept is concerned with protecting people from various threats in social, economic and political life, as well as threats from natural disasters. Human development, on the other hand, empowers people so that they do not fall into a difficult situation, and if they do, they are able to get out of it with minimum damage to their ability to get back on their feet. Both these concepts focus on people's lives—one to protect them, the other to empower them.

The danger and deprivation that surround the countries of South Asia from nuclear weapons, armed insurgencies, communal/ethnic uprisings, to the huge absolute number of people in poverty, health insecurity and illiteracy, pose a serious threat to people's security, the high economic growth of the region notwithstanding. Moreover, in South Asia, two massive disasters—the Tsunami of 2004 and earthquake of 2005—have highlighted the need for according primacy to human security. Traditional borders and rivalries got blurred to allow relief and humanitarian assistance to flow. When the disasters struck, South Asia's huge armies and nuclear weapons could not save people's lives; it is the efforts of other people and human security structures that were established which did.

The Report analyses the issues of human insecurity in South Asia and comes up with seven broad findings: First, all our previous reports have underlined the delink between economic growth and human development. This Report reinforces that conclusion with the additional finding that economic policies in the region have also made people more vulnerable to shocks and insecure in life. South Asia's economic growth has created some oasis of affluence and security for a small group of people. But the deprivation of a huge absolute number of people in all walks of life is creating social turmoil in many areas across the region that has the potential to lead to a bigger security threat to all South Asians unless addressed urgently.

Second, conflicts in the region, whether between states or within, are due to some deep-seated feelings of injustice and

disempowerment. Unless these root causes are resolved, no amount of money spent on military, or shuttle diplomacy, will bring peace to the region.

Third, both national economic policies and policies of global institutions of governance must combine their rhetorical commitment to poverty reduction with urgent implementation of many proposed actions. Economic insecurity is the heart of many conflicts and disruption of life.

Fourth, if South Asia does not wish to go the way of Sub-Saharan Africa, it must improve, and widen, its health infrastructure as quickly as possible before all economic and social gains achieved so far are lost.

Fifth, environmental degradation has reached to such levels that everybody, governments, private sector and civil society, has to act promptly to avert a huge disaster in the region.

Sixth, if South Asia is to claim its heritage as one of the ancient civilised societies, it has to treat its women and children the way its religions, properly interpreted, ask its citizens to do. The children and women of this region cannot fall victim to ideologues and their false interpretations of the great religions of this region.

Lastly, the institutions of governance must do its first duty—to protect and serve people. That is what they are set up to do for all the people, and not just a minority of the rich and powerful.

Large armies and nuclear weapons cannot guarantee security. Human security can only be guaranteed by addressing the root causes of conflicts.

State security cannot be achieved without ensuring the security of people. The region has witnessed some large-scale wars and many smaller conflicts. Yet in this region security of people is increasingly under threat not from outside the borders but from within in the form of conflicts within states/regions due to social, religious or communal causes. However, interstate conflicts between countries continue and contribute towards escalating defence budgets. The burgeoning nuclear arsenals have increased the stakes of violent political confrontation, without guaranteeing regional security in any way. But today, it is not just India and Pakistan that are increasing their defence spending. Sri Lanka and Nepal have also registered sharp increases in their military budgets as a result of the ongoing internal conflicts.

Increasing poverty and inequality (political, economic and social) between the ethnic, political and religious groups that make up these diverse societies set the stage for the outbreak of violent internal conflicts. Parts of Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India continue to suffer from active civil and political unrest. Bhutan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka have thousands of refugees and internally displaced people living on their soils, having been forcibly dislocated due to violent conflicts. And yet there seems to be a policy lag in establishing the connection between poverty, inequality, and social and political instability. The costs are high in terms of uprooted populations, psychological and physical suffering, economic vulnerabilities, and collapse of institutions.

Poverty and widening income inequality, food insecurity, the changing nature of employment and unemployment, against the backdrop of greater global economic integration, underline the economic vulnerability of South Asians.

Though poverty is overwhelmingly rural, a number of countries in the region are witnessing substantial rise in urban poverty. In fact, most countries have experienced either stagnation or increase in aggregate poverty levels since 1990. High level of income inequality is the major reason for the failure of South Asia to substantially reduce poverty. The characteristic feature of most economies

in the region is that the income/consumption share of the poorest 10 per cent is less than 4 per cent of the aggregate income/consumption. The growing inequalities of income are also evident in terms of the differences between sub-regions within countries. The ensuing economic insecurity has been reinforced by ethnic, social, cultural and political tensions.

The average per capita availability of food improved in all countries in South Asia between 1990 and 2002. However, there is a wide prevalence of hunger and malnutrition and the number of the undernourished presently exceeds 300 million. The crisis of food insecurity in the region is mostly related to low access rather than low availability of food. Severe inequality in land and income distribution prevents the poor from meeting their minimum daily nutritional requirements. The gender disparity in intra-household access to food exacerbates the food insecurity of women. The public food distribution system and other food distribution programmes in South Asia have mostly been inefficient and poorly targeted. It is feared that, given its shrinking natural resource base and burgeoning population, by the year 2020 South Asia would account for nearly half the developing world's under-five children suffering from malnutrition.

Unemployment rates in South Asia vary from one country to another and are generally not very high if judged by global standards. However, in most countries, during the second half of the 1990s, there was a sharp decline in the employment elasticity of output growth. Besides, the persistence of large-scale underemployment and the non-productive use of labour force have emerged as the core employment issues. The lack of political will to ratify the core International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions, and to actually enforce the labour standards, has also had profound negative implications for economic security in the region.

The ongoing privatisation process has contributed to increased inequality and economic insecurity in South Asia. Apart from the loss of employment, privatisation has raised the prices of basic services like electricity and transport. The adverse impact of the programme on the poor of South Asia has been intensified by the prevailing weak institutional context.

The increased global economic integration of the South Asian economies during the late 1980s and the 1990s was expected to mitigate economic insecurity by propelling growth in the sectors of agriculture, textile and services. So far, however, globalisation has pushed downwards the real wage rates both in the formal and informal sectors in South Asia. The overall quality of employment appears to have deteriorated as well with an increase in casual work, greater fragility of contracts and indications that day labourers find fewer days of work. Admittedly, South Asia has failed to enjoy the benefits of globalisation partly because of its inability to improve the capability of the poor through better access to education. However, one cannot overlook the serious shortcomings in the implementation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Foremost, the developed countries have failed to cut agricultural subsidies in compliance with the stipulations of the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA). In addition, the implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) and that of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have also not been extensive enough to result in any solid gains for South Asia.

Health insecurity has become one of the most immediate concerns of the majority of people in South Asia, in view of the emerging threats from HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB, imposed on a weak health infrastructure.

In South Asia, while overall life expectancy has improved, and crude birth and death rates have come down, these gains have failed to reach the poorest and the most

vulnerable in the region. Any health gains that have been achieved so far are inequitably distributed among countries in the region, and also within countries among different groups. Children and women are particularly vulnerable and at risk of poor health. They bear the brunt of these health deprivations and avoidable deaths. South Asia still has one of the highest infant and under-five mortality rates in the world.

The threats to health security in South Asia in recent years have increased from the spread of infectious diseases, particularly the resurgence of malaria, tuberculosis and more recently HIV/AIDS. Malaria re-emerged in the region in the 1980s and 1990s, when it became resistant to most of the commonly used conventional drugs. Most of the burden of malaria in South Asia is concentrated among the poorest 20 per cent of the population. Tuberculosis (TB), drug-resistant TB and TB/HIV co-infection are serious health threats for South Asia and the rest of the developing world. Though Sub-Saharan Africa has a higher incidence of per capita TB cases, it is South Asia that is home to the highest absolute number of TB cases. Among the 10 countries with the largest number of TB patients the three South Asian countries are India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Moreover, tuberculosis is a leading cause of death among women in the reproductive age in South Asia. Each year there are around 2-2.5 million new cases of TB in South Asia.

HIV/AIDS is emerging as a serious threat to South Asia with more than five million people living with the disease in the region. India is home to second highest number of HIV/AIDS cases in the world and has 97 per cent of the total HIV/AIDS patients in South Asia. The epidemic is still at an early stage in other South Asian countries with prevalence rates below 1 per cent, however, the region is termed as a low prevalence and high-risk region. The risks for the spread of HIV/AIDS in South Asia are high due to a general lack of education and knowledge coupled with poor quality of health services.

Environmental insecurity, resulting from an array of acute environmental problems, is posing a serious threat to survival and sustainability of the region.

Most countries in South Asia have insufficient water to meet domestic and agricultural demand. The situation is especially critical because irrigated agriculture has recorded massive expansion in South Asia. The irrigation infrastructure is growing increasingly old and inefficient. Water pollution has emerged as another key environmental challenge. Groundwater is becoming increasingly polluted due to over-pumping. The use of polluted water for drinking, cooking and bathing is causing diarrhea, hepatitis and outbreaks of typhoid and cholera. Regional disputes increasingly surround the limited water resources, especially in relation to water sharing in rivers that transcend national boundaries.

Air pollution levels continue to be high in South Asia rendering the inhabitants highly susceptible to acute and chronic health effects. Vehicle emissions are the leading air polluter in big cities. On the other hand, the rural areas suffer from indoor air pollution caused by the combustion of biomass in poorly ventilated rooms. The industrial sector and the thermal power plants are contributing consistently to air pollution.

The per capita energy consumption has registered an increase in all South Asian countries over the last 15 years. However, the energy needs remain heavily dependent on the biomass sources of fuel-wood, twigs, crop residue and animal waste. Resultantly, biomass fuels have become unreliable and expensive due to over-consumption. Two-thirds of the population in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, the three largest countries of the region, do not have access to electricity.

Forests are also shrinking in many parts of South Asia. Deforestation is driven by the quest for food security, demand for wood energy and timber and grazing uses. However, the prime factor remains the poor forest management that triggers large-scale illegal forest activity. The decline in forest area is threatening the flora and fauna, encouraging landslides and floods and damaging irreparably a number of sensitive ecosystems in the region.

Over the last 25 years, disasters have killed nearly half a million people in South Asia. South Asia is still in the midst of a slow recovery process from the tsunami and earthquake that it has had to encounter in quick succession. The search for environmental security is, however, not being helped at all by drastic changes in global climate that are likely to exacerbate disaster impact all over the world. Foremost among these are ozone depletion and greenhouse warming effects.

On a positive note, South Asia also has some solid achievements emanating from successful initiatives towards greater environmental sustainability in the region. However, there is an urgent need for a substantial shift in policies and priorities to make South Asia environmentally secure.

The patriarchal structure of society, coupled with pervasive gender discrimination in education, health, and economic and political participation, has increased the vulnerability of South Asian women to violence with all its horrible consequences.

Human security for all people cannot be achieved without a focus on the security needs of women. In South Asia women are denied equal opportunity to participate in education, health, economic and political spheres. Human security of women in the region is threatened as a result of their inability to enhance their capabilities and to exercise their choice. A combination of the low status of women in society and their inability to achieve their full potential manifests itself in the worst form of violence against women.

In South Asia, women face discrimination and violence even before birth in the form of female foeticide. This discrimination against women continues through the years acquiring different forms and degrees: from neglect in healthcare and nutrition in childhood to early and forced marriages in adolescence; from domestic violence to rape and sexual abuse; and from dowry deaths to unwanted pregnancies.

Violence against women in South Asia is committed in the home, in the community and by the state. While domestic violence is most common, it is also mostly hidden. Marriage exposes women to domestic violence in South Asia. It is estimated that more than half the women in the region face domestic violence of some sort. Sexual violence is the most common form of community violence in the region, while the trafficking of young girls and women is also reaching an alarming proportion. Violence against women is also perpetrated by the state usually in custodial detention, during wars and armed conflicts, and when women are displaced from their homes. The lack of implementation and enforcement of constitutional and legal guarantees of rights for women are major causes of the widespread prevalence of violence in South Asia.

The children who should always be protected are the most vulnerable ones to exploitation in South Asia.

In South Asia, despite numerous national and international laws to protect children from exploitation, children are exploited in the worst forms of child labour, including sexual and physical abuse. Most children are not protected against threats of preventable diseases. High levels of poverty make the children vulnerable to all kinds of exploitation in the society and in the labour market. South Asian countries

have failed to protect the lives of millions of children in terms of ensuring equal access to education, healthcare and protection from exploitation. As a result, one in every ten children dies before his/her fifth birthday, half the children in the region are malnourished, and half the children below the age of six, and one-third below the age of five, have micro-nutrient deficiencies.

Children in South Asia are also insecure in terms of achieving quality education, another fundamental right of children. The region has the highest number of out-of-school children in the world. The primary enrolment rates in South Asia have been improving but still not all children go to school or complete primary education. Around 16 per cent of primary age children are not in school and half of them drop out before completing grade five.

Child labour is one of the worst forms of exploitation of children. In South Asia, more than 23 million children are engaged in child labour. Some of these children are employed in hazardous sectors of the economy, or in unacceptable forms of child labour, risking their very lives in addition to harming their physical and mental development. The worst forms of child labour are prevalent in the region in the form of child bonded labour, child trafficking, sexual exploitation of children and child soldiers. In order to make the world a safer place for their children, South Asian governments must enforce the laws that are already in place and create better education and health opportunities for children to ensure a better future for the region.

Democratic governance lies at the core of securing life, liberty and property of common people.

Democratic governance can directly advance human security by ensuring access to public goods, efficient delivery of justice, and by nurturing resilience against disruptive economic and political conflicts. Democratic governance can also indirectly affect human security by providing an enabling environment for pro-poor growth, and more importantly, by empowering people through rights and freedoms to claim a better life.

Democracies are likely to avoid the worst kind of civil wars. Cross-country evidence suggests that the probability of experiencing a civil war is significantly lower in stable democracies. Democracy also offers a mechanism for conflict resolution; it lowers the intensity of ethnic conflicts by mediating costly disputes between diverse ethnic groups.

The desire for democratic governance has assumed added significance in a globalised world marked by a rising integration of trade and finance. As the world becomes more globalised, there are recurring economic and financial crises. These crises disrupt human livelihoods, pushing the poor and vulnerable communities to the margin. Only good governance through democratic institutions can protect people under such circumstances.

People are not merely beneficiaries of democratic governance—they are also agents of promoting good governance. People must shape their own environment for human security, actively participating in the formulation and implementation of strategies for human development and human security.

Chapter 1

Human Security in South Asia: A Conceptual Framework

'Human security, in the last analysis, is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a woman who was not raped, a poor person who did not starve, a dissident who was not silenced, a human spirit that was not crushed. Human security is not a concern with weapons. It is a concern with human dignity.'

—Mahbub ul Haq

Today peace in South Asia has become an imperative for the survival and development of 1.5 billion people. In 1997, Mahbub ul Haq called South Asia 'the most endangered region'. The reasons behind this were not rhetorical, but were based on a sober analysis of socio-economic and political situation of the region. The danger and deprivation that surround the countries in the region from nuclear weapons, armed insurgencies, communal/ethnic uprisings, increased power and resources devoted to armies, to the huge challenges of human development and human security emanating from deprivation and intolerance in every country and at all levels, justify Mahbub ul Haq's remarks, more so today that when he uttered those words. Hence, the focus of this Report to the issues of human security in the region. We believe that without human security, territorial security becomes ineffective and, ultimately, self-defeating.

In today's world the whole concept of security is changing fast due to both man-made causes and natural disasters. In the aftermath of tsunami and earthquake in Asia, people are increasingly realising that human security cannot be safeguarded by huge armies, or by nuclear weapons. South Asia had both, and yet a vast number of people lost their lives at the blink of a minute. Thus the prophetic words of Mahbub ul Haq haunt us today. Mahbub ul Haq passionately advocated for '*security of people, not just territory; security of individuals, not just nations; security through development, not through arms; and security of all people everywhere—in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment.*'[1]

Over the years, these words of Mahub ul Haq and his concrete articulation of the concept of human security became popular in the world and have led to a great deal of research and advocacy among the academia and the policy community. But sadly the world community has failed to give adequate recognition to Mahbub ul Haq for bringing the issue of human security to the forefront of policy debate and popularising the concept through the UNDP *Human Development Report* of 1994. With this Report we would like to set that record straight.

This chapter provides the conceptual framework of this Report by first defining the concept of human security and then linking this definition to those of human development and human rights. The chapter then identifies the areas of insecurity and their causes in South Asia. The chapter ends with the results of a survey undertaken by this Centre to assess the perception of security by ordinary citizens of South Asia.

Without human security, territorial security becomes ineffective and, ultimately, self-defeating

Defining human security

The concept of human security has acquired increasing centrality and urgency for South Asia. Two recent massive disasters have brought home the need to look deeply into this concept and to connect its relevance to South Asia's socio-economic and political issues. The tsunami that hit parts of East Asia and

There are no weapons that can protect people from hunger, disease, poverty and destitution, and homelessness

South Asia in early 2005, and the massive earthquake in Kashmir and North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakistan, in late 2005, reportedly killed 100,000 people, injured even more, destroyed property making millions of people homeless, and disrupted the life, livelihood and existence of entire regions. The immediate aftermath of the disasters highlighted the need for according primacy to human security that Mahbub ul Haq talked about. Relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction required help from other countries, including traditional opponents. Boundaries, including international borders, became porous to allow relief and humanitarian assistance to flow. Most significantly, it was not weapons that saved people, but the efforts of other people and the human security structure that was established. The flow of food and water, medicines, equipment for shelter, doctors and paramedics was what mattered and not guns. There were no weapons that could save people from the initial disaster, and there are no weapons that can protect people from hunger, disease, poverty and destitution, and homelessness.

All our previous reports focused on human deprivation and how to enhance people's capability and opportunity so that they can fully participate in the social, economic and political life in their societies. After producing eight reports on human development in South Asia we realised that we have not paid adequate attention to the issue of human insecurity in South Asia—the sudden disruption of people's lives from natural or man-made causes—'the downside of human development', as Amartya Sen put it so succinctly.[2] The worst earthquake in the history of South Asia reminded us about the 'downside risks'—about how fragile life is, especially for the poor and the vulnerable. So this year's Report is dedicated to address human security challenges in South Asia, underscoring the links between human security and human development in South Asia.

To define human security concretely we need to go back to Mahbub ul Haq's own words. He said, '*Human security is a concept emerging not from the learned writings of scholars but from the daily concerns of people—from the dread of a woman that she may be raped in a lonely street at night, from the anguish of parents over the spread of drugs among their children, from the choked existence of prosperous communities in increasingly polluted cities, from the fear of terrorism suddenly striking any life anywhere without reason. A people's concept and a people's concern, human [in]security is reflected in the shriveled faces of innocent children, in the anguished existence of the homeless, in the constant fear of the jobless, in the silent despair of those without hope*'[3] To further elaborate the concept, Haq argued that human security '*means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life…*'[4] Thus Sen's 'downside risks' had already been acknowledged and defined by Haq.

Today governments, rather than solely political philosophers and development professionals, are as concerned about people's security from such chronic threats mentioned above by Mahbub ul Haq, as they are about traditional forms of security. Even with the various political-security pre-occupations associated with the 'war on terror', the world's richest nations have steadily increased aid and set new records in terms of aid forgiveness for the poorest nations in order to protect people from risks associated with poverty, illness and other deprivations. The reason has been the connectedness of threat perceptions as very cogently articulated by the UN Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, '*Today, more than ever before, threats are inter-related and a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has never been clearer.*'[5] A global consensus has begun to emerge around the 'Responsibility to Protect',[6] associated with multiple humanitarian interventions.

The Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, built on Haq's conceptual foundation of human security by elaborating on Haq's idea of threat and protection. The Commission defined human security, '*to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.*'[7]

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan defines human security as: '*Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment—these are the interrelated blocks of human and, therefore, national security.*'[8] This definition embraces Mahbub ul Haq's definition of human security that links human security to human development and human rights.

Linking human security to human development and human rights

The human security concept, as defined by Haq, is concerned with protecting people from various threats in social, economic, and political life, as well as threats from natural disasters. The human development concept, on the other hand, empowers people so that they do not to fall into a difficult situation, or if they do, they are able to get out of it with minimum damage done to their ability to get back on their feet. Both of these concepts focus on people and their lives—one to protect them, the other to empower them. Each concept is dependent on the other; only together they can bring about a sustained improvement in human lives.

The human development concept is concerned first with building human capabilities through investment in people and, secondly, using those capabilities fully through an enabling environment for growth and employment. Mahbub ul Haq asserted that for human development to take place, economic growth is essential. But equal attention must be given to the quality of economic growth and its distribution. The links between growth and human development has to be created through investment in education, health, skill development, job creation, women's empowerment, and an equitable distribution of assets, as well as through social safety nets and political and cultural freedom. While all of these components of human development reduce people's deprivation and enhance their capability and opportunity in society, the last three—social safety nets, and political and cultural freedom—have the additional advantage of protecting people from 'downside risks', thus highlighting the critical connection between the concepts of human development and human security.

The link between human rights and human security is equally strong. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Right to Development assert that civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights, constitute an integral part of human rights. Together these two documents form the foundation for '*human rights and fundamental freedoms that are the birthright of all human beings; their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of government.*'[9] Under the overall umbrella of human rights, human development can enrich people's lives, while human security can protect those in need. And when all three concepts come together to promote, protect and reduce risks of conflicts, downturns and devastation, the potential for achievement peace is enhanced.

The Constitutions of all South Asian countries explicitly acknowledge the fundamental rights of individuals to life, liberty and basic freedoms related to speech, association and organisation. But most Constitutions go further than that. At

Human security concept is concerned with protecting people from various threats in social, economic, and political life, as well as threats from natural disasters

the level of derivative and directive principles of state policy, almost all of the Constitutions also acknowledge some responsibility of the state for assuring a certain level of nutrition and standard of living for the population. There is also certain recognition, in most Constitutions, of the duty of the state in creating and guaranteeing opportunities for income generation and employment, ensuring equity in distribution of assets and resources, creating safety nets for the destitute and indigent, ensuring access to health and education facilities, and in ensuring some parity in development on a geographical basis.

Colonial and pre-colonial history of South Asia has left important imprints on the culture, institutions, rules and regulations and socio-economic fabric of these societies

The principles of state policy do not constitute rights in the same sense as fundamental rights, but they do have the power to create obligations on the state. There are usually riders and provisos attached to these obligations, allowing some leeway to the state and creating obligations only when macroeconomic and environmental conditions are more conducive and the state can carry the additional responsibilities beyond the fundamental rights. But over the last few years additional obligations and riders have themselves become more contested. In India over the last few years there has been a lot of debate on what the principles of policy including 'the right to an adequate means of livelihood', 'free and compulsory education for all children' and 'the right to work' imply for the state. Does the state have the obligation to ensure a minimum standard of living for all people? Does it have to provide employment guarantees, and should it provide free education to all, and up to what level? There are many questions that need to be answered in this domain[10]. These issues do not lend themselves to singular answers that would please all, or that would even work across nationalities. Each nation will need to debate these and achieve a national consensus on what the detailed social contract of rights and obligations should look like. And the contract will need to be renewed with time.

Human security in South Asia

Historical background

The larger South Asian countries gained independence in the middle of the twentieth century, after almost a century of British rule. Colonial and pre-colonial history of South Asia has left important imprints on the culture, institutions, rules and regulations and socio-economic fabric of these societies. These impact all aspects of living in these societies, including issues pertaining to human security. Our purpose here is not to trace all sources of human insecurity to pre-colonial or colonial times, but to just point out the importance of historical background for some of these issues. The more important aspects in this regard are related to a) a legacy of disputes, b) religious and ethnic divisions and resulting tensions, c) the role of the military in political development, d) feudalism and distribution of income and power, and e) the administrative, institutional and organisational structures inherited by the post-colonial states.

The division of British India created a number of disputes of boundaries and over territories that continue to plague relations between and within states in South Asia. The biggest of them has been the dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The dispute has been the major cause of at least 3 wars and countless skirmishes between India and Pakistan. It has also resulted in deaths of about 100,000 Kashmiris, and it has cost billions of dollars to India and Pakistan in terms of investments in armaments and other related infrastructure. The dispute has also plagued the development of bilateral relations between these two countries in other spheres (trade, cultural exchanges, tourism etc.). It has also slowed down the development of South Asia regional cooperation (through SAARC). The disputes over Sir Creek and Siachin Glacier, though more localised, have also contributed towards tensions between India and Pakistan. Since the nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan in 1998, the potential costs from continuing

the disputes, in terms of threats of a nuclear confrontation, have become much higher. The costs in terms of human insecurity in the region are enormous.

The 'divide and rule' policy of the British explicitly encouraged, managed and exploited ethnic and religious identities of various groups in India to ensure better governance for the British. But this has left a bitter legacy for the post-colonial states. The ethnic and religious identities pre-date the arrival of the British in India, and tensions due to these divisions had erupted in violence in pre-colonial times too. But the British used religious and ethnic differences, combined with state patronage, to create divisions within the Indian society to help their own rule.

The British had a centralised system of governance, designed largely for control and administrative management that applied to almost all parts of South Asia. The resulting structure was inherited by all of the newly independent countries. Most of these countries continued using the same administrative and management structures, organisations and institutions. Even after almost 60 years of independence, a substantial number of laws and regulations being used date from the British times. Even more importantly, a lot of the administrative structures, standard operating procedures, rules of business, and organisational structures have not been altered substantially or in critical ways from the Raj days.

The British administrative structure was set up to serve the goals it had, living with the constraints that it faced. Its goals included maintenance of law and order, creation of an administrative structure that delivered control of the locals, ability to manage crises, and creation of a governance structure that would facilitate the larger goals of the empire with reasonable cooperation from the local population, and without imposing onerous conditions on the locals.

After independence almost all South Asian governments essentially adopted the same British administrative model for managing governance,[11] and in some important ways the same structures are continuing even today.[12] A number of consequences have followed from this structure. First, there is almost no local and popular participation in this model of administrative control and management. The deputy commissioner (DC) is the judicial, administrative, police, and tax authority in the area. The usual argument of separation of power and checks and balances therefore cannot be applied here. Second, there is little possibility of getting in local inputs as well. The DC, who is by default the development officer of the region as well, looks towards the province and provincial departments for providing the development plans for the area. The local government structures, now in place in most of these countries, have changed this situation somewhat, but the fact remains that the old system of governance remains mostly in tact. Third, the main objective of the structure is control and maintenance of law and order. This makes the structure good for day-to-day functioning, it makes it good for crisis management, and for ensuring law and order, but it does not make it effective for managing local development. The local needs for sewerage, drinking water, roads, electricity, sanitation facilities, and even health and education, do not receive the priority that they require. Instead law and order imperatives are likely to prevail over other concerns. Fourth, the objective of the Raj was not the development of the local population or area. The facilities, such as health and education, being provided in the days of the Raj, were also in line with their objectives. In the case of health most facilities were provided for in the urban areas where the British and their local collaborators/supporters and the local elites lived.[13] In the case of education, most facilities were in the urban areas, and most of the higher education was tailored towards producing generalists that could help the British in ruling the country.

Another consequence related to the administrative structure given above, across many provinces of British India,

The local needs for sewerage, drinking water, roads, electricity, sanitation facilities, and even health and education, do not receive the priority that they require

History is not the only cause of human insecurity in South Asia, and historical background does not pre-determine the road we must travel

was the strengthening of the local feudals and landlords. For agriculturally rich areas, including canal colonies as well as older agricultural lands, patronage through gifts of land was a powerful way of eliciting local support. In turn governance was managed through these local patrons. This not only undermined the development of a democratic and participatory governance structure, it also entrenched feduals and landlords in most rural areas of India. Post independence, some areas were able to institute major land reforms to reduce the holding and power of feudals,[14] but for others (Sindh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar) feudals continued to play an important role in post-independence political structures. Post-colonial states, especially Pakistan, have been unable to eliminate the power of the feudals from the political arena leaving indelible marks on the political developments in these states. For some of these states, the controlling administrative structures, the lack of development of grass-root level political organisations pre-independence, and the over-arching role of bureaucracies in governance, in conjunction with post-independence events, led to excessive interference of the military and bureaucracy in political affairs as well.[15]

History is not the only cause of human insecurity in South Asia, and historical background does not pre-determine the road we must travel. This is clearly demonstrated through the institutional and outcome differences within South Asia. Country specific variation in institutions is significant: India is the largest democracy in the world while Pakistan is still struggling on this count. But granting these differences, our cultural, institutional, legal and organisational heritage has strong links with where we are today.

With this history in the background, a brief analysis of the major insecurities and their causes in the region is made below to provide a conceptual framework for the chapters that follow.

The major insecurities in South Asia

Economic insecurity

Economic security is extremely important for ensuring human security. South Asia, with its high levels of poverty, lack of education and health facilities, and sufficient access to credit for the poor, offers poor economic security to its citizens. Given the initial conditions above, globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation have added to the woes of the poor, the uneducated, and the unskilled. There have been more opportunities for the skilled and the better off, but their numbers, as a proportion of the total population, are small. Lack of safety nets for poor, unemployed and unskilled complicates matters further. Those who fall into poverty and unemployment, whose skills are not in demand, or who do not have skills have no way of climbing out of their predicament as well. They are trapped in low-level equilibria. Escape from these requires outside (state) help but lack of safety nets preclude that possibility. Hence these people are forced to live with very high levels of economic and therefore human insecurity.

Almost 40 per cent of South Asia's population lives below the poverty line. There are also high levels of income, wealth and asset inequality, and extremely unequal access to and availability of quality healthcare, education and vocational training facilities. This has created a highly insecure economic environment for its population. It is the poor who are most insecure.

More than two-thirds of the population in South Asia lives below the poverty line of two dollar a day. More importantly, the severity of poverty is also high in South Asia: those who have been marginalised have been forced to survive under extremely constrained circumstances. Poor people have very little ability to absorb exogenous shocks to their income, wealth, asset-base or health. In case of an

adverse shock they usually do not have the ability to recover to the initial position. For example, if a person contracts a disease that makes him lose his job, and he does not have any savings to fall back on, he will not be able to seek proper medical care, will not be able to meet his and his family's basic needs, and will not be able to seek another job either. This can force him into destitution very quickly.

Human security has two aspects: freedom from basic needs, and freedom to develop one's potential. The connections between the ability to satisfy basic needs and poverty are clear enough. There are strong positive correlations between income levels and food intake, expenditure on health, education and other basics. The poor struggle to meet their basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health and education. But the effects of poverty are much more debilitating than that. Poverty, in terms of income and wealth, in countries that rely on private provision of quality health and education services, implies that the poor themselves and their children are forced into educational institutions that offer poor quality education, vocational training institutes that are of poor quality, and colleges and universities of poorer quality too, if they are fortunate enough to reach that stage. This creates a very uneven playing field in terms of the opportunity for the poor.

Poverty can create vicious traps for individuals as well as families. A family with limited income, say from an unskilled job, is likely to be poor in South Asia. With this limited income it is unlikely that the family will be able to save anything to deal with an adverse shock to their income (unemployment, ill-health, death, birth, marriage, natural calamities). Even without a shock, the working poor have a difficult time to meet their basic needs for survival. They are forced to settle for lower quality food, clothing and shelter, spend less on education of their children, and less on health. All of the above not only limit the future potential of every member, they limit their current ability to perform as well. Such limitations constrain the level of income that family members can generate currently and in the future. The poor, unless there is an outside intervention, are likely to remain poor across generations as well. But this is in contravention of the basic principles of human development and human security paradigm. Under the two, humans are the end of development as well as the means.

Increasing integration with global markets has some consequences on job security of local labour force. International markets demand quality and on-time delivery. The imposition of deadlines and competition reduces the ability to absorb shocks, and so firms in turn devise mechanisms to pass on these shocks to their input suppliers, e.g., suppliers of labour and raw materials. For raw material providers this is done through better inventory management systems; for labour, flexibility comes through increasing reliance on contract and daily-wage labour instead of permanent workers. So casualisation of labour has been a cross-country phenomenon for South Asia. In addition, with global integration wages for skills that are in demand at the global level increase significantly, but wages for skills that are not in demand decline, and wages for unskilled work remain low. So even if there is growth in output, it can be without significant job creation. All of the above reduce job security for labour. Permanent jobs give assurance of a certain level of income for the future. Contract and daily wage labour reduces this certainty. The uncertainty for labour becomes significantly higher since most of the South Asian countries do not have unemployment benefits, retraining programmes and other safety nets in order to protect labour from becoming redundant. Coupled with poor education and health coverage, the increasing uncertainty of labour markets can reduce economic and there by human security of workers significantly.

During the last two decades, most countries in South Asia have been down-sizing and/or 'right-sizing' their public

Poor people have very little ability to absorb exogenous shocks to their income, wealth, asset-base or health

sectors. They have also been privatising some state-owned enterprises. The importance of the public sector as an employer, has gone down in most South Asian countries. Even where the state has been hiring, it too has been increasingly resorting to contract appointments rather than permanent ones. Privatisation of public enterprises has also put pressure on workers of these enterprises. Whether they have been offered 'golden handshakes' or been removed without due benefits, or have continued in their jobs, all have lost some of the job security that is still attributable to public sector jobs in these countries.

The bulk of labour employed in South Asian countries is in the fields of agriculture, small and medium enterprises or the informal sector

The bulk of labour employed in South Asian countries is in the fields of agriculture, small and medium enterprises or the informal sector. These sectors are usually not effectively protected through labour laws. The increasing casualisation of the labour market would have had no effect on these labourers as their insecurity levels were high even before and continue to be so. But increasing globalisation has a tendency to increase income and wealth inequality in all sectors. People with physical or human assets can benefit from a larger set of opportunities available in global markets, but the poor are cut off. Furthermore, with low literacy rates in the region, very low penetration of vocational training and education in the rural areas, the bulk of the labour in South Asia tends to fall in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories only. With pressure of globalisation, mechanisation and introduction of capital intensive methods of production, wages in low skill categories have remained low, and jobs in these categories tend to be contractual.[16] Finally, lack of safety nets and lack of availability of affordable education and health facilities implies that those caught in the low level education, skill and low income vicious circle would have no opportunities to break out of their low equilibrium as well. In fact, their children would be caught in the same spiral too due to the lack of educational opportunities for them. The same dynamic would work for all people in the low income-low investment poverty trap, whether they are working or not.

The concern about food security in South Asia is also rising. At the global level it is more or less an established fact that the world has not had any major food shortages for a long time now. But it is also a fact that some countries, and some groups within countries, have faced severe food shortages from time to time. South Asia has been fortunate not to have catastrophic famine since the 1940s. But more subtle and silent impacts of food insecurity are quite pervasive. These include stunting and other impacts of malnourishment in children, and micro-nutrients deficiencies and malnourishment among pregnant women.

If global availability of food is not an issue, then the real question of non-availability of food for particular countries and groups is reduced to issues related to a) the functioning of the global food markets, b) the functioning of local agricultural and food markets, and c) the role of entitlements across and within countries. With globalisation a number of effects come through in agricultural markets. As agricultural products become internationally traded, their prices in all economies move to international levels. If these prices are higher than local ones, they benefit the farmer. At the same time these higher prices hit the consumers. If unskilled labour is abundant, as is the case in South Asia, rising food prices with stagnant wages can create problems for the poor, even the working poor. This can create significant food insecurity for the local populations, especially the poor. Research shows that even in famine-hit areas sometimes supply of food in not a problem, it is the ability of the people to pay the price of that food that is the main issue.[17]

Most South Asian countries maintain some controls over markets of major food items. These controls can be in the form of offering floors beneath prices of agricultural products, ceiling over retail prices of major items, restrictions on export/import of goods, and restrictions

on the movement and sale of agricultural goods as well. This can fragment local markets, and restrictions on the movement of agricultural commodities can create pockets of excess and/or constrained supply. Restrictions on import and export can also create national glut or shortage situations. Under some conditions these have allowed prices in local markets to move up or down substantially creating entitlement problems for local consumers. But this issue has to do with the management of agricultural markets and can be sorted out with creation of stocks, storage facilities[18] and a well-managed inventory system.

The real issue of food security has to do with the ability of the people to purchase the needed amount and quality of food items. But with the globalisation and monetisation of local economies, wages of unskilled and semi-skilled workers are lagging behind increases in food prices and/or inflation, and unemployment is a major issue in South Asia. Thus guaranteeing access to the requisite amount of food, especially for the poor, is an imperative. But the problem is compounded by lack of social safety nets, unemployment insurance and employment guarantees. Apart from the measures that ensure economic and income security, food security can be ensured through targeted feeding programmes for the more vulnerable groups. Food stamp or feeding programmes that target pregnant/lactating mothers, infants, school children, working children and the elderly could be, and in some places have been, successfully used to reduce the more pressing food insecurity issues.

Health insecurity

In South Asia, low levels of government expenditure on health has resulted in a general neglect of the health of millions of South Asians whose basic health insecurity is the issue of survival. Millions of people in these parts of the world suffer from disease, malnutrition, poor water and sanitation, and avoidable deaths. In addition to these, they also lack access to basic healthcare resulting in premature mortality. If the basis of human security is the protection of human lives then securing these lives from morbidity and mortality is fundamental. As the Report of the Commission on Human Security states, '*Health security is at the vital core of human security—and illness, disability, and avoidable death are critical pervasive threats to human security*.'[19] In South Asia, the focus of health expenditures has been on the curative rather than preventive healthcare facilities. Health expenditures have also been skewed towards secondary and tertiary healthcare instead of focusing on primary healthcare. This neglect of preventive and primary level health facilities has resulted in the spread of several diseases that could be prevented with spending little money 'upstream' rather than 'downstream'.[20]

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- Malaria re-emerged in South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, when vector control became less intensive and resistance to most of the commonly used conventional drugs and insecticides spread rapidly. Most of the burden of malaria in South Asia is concentrated among the poorest 20 per cent of the population and affects more men than women. Malaria is a significant health problem and threat in many developing countries. It is a threat to the poorest and most marginalised communities who tend to live in unhygienic conditions that offer few, if any, barriers against mosquitoes. In 2003, there were around two million reported cases of malaria in South Asia, mostly in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. While the reported malaria cases and deaths have declined drastically in Sri Lanka, the situation in Bangladesh and Pakistan has been worsening over the years. During the last decade the number of reported cases of malaria in India has remained at very high levels, though there has been a gradual decline in the reported incidence of laboratory

confirmed cases. Bhutan too has a high prevalence rate of malaria at 1.7 per 1,000. Maldives is the only country in the region to have been given malaria-free status since 1998.[21]

- Three of the 10 countries with the largest number of tuberculosis (TB) patients are in South Asia. Each year there are around 2-2.5 million new cases of TB in South Asia. In 2003, there were around 4.5 million people infected with tuberculosis in South Asia; of these more than half were infected with TB in 2003 alone.The incidence of TB has increased since 1990, which means more people are acquiring the infection each year. In 2003, 511,679 people in South Asia died from TB.[22]
- For South Asia the spread of HIV/AIDS and the still uncontrolled communicable diseases pose a double threat. Since the detection of the first HIV/AIDS case in South Asia in the mid 1980s the virus has infected more than five million people.[23] South Asia today is home to the second highest number of people living with HIV/AIDS, around 13 per cent of the world total. In South Asia the adult prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS of 0.7 per cent may seem small in percentage terms, but translated into absolute numbers it becomes more than five million people.

The healthcare system in South Asia is inequitable and does not provide the same quality of services to all

The healthcare system in South Asia is inequitable and does not provide the same quality of services to all. The poor, rural population, the less educated, women and children are especially vulnerable and ignored by the healthcare system. Regions like Bihar in India and Baluchistan in Pakistan do not have the same level of healthcare as other well-off regions like Kerala in India. Also, the level of healthcare provided by the public sector is poor as compared to that of the private sector. Most of the health services in South Asia are provided through the private sector. However, most of the poor in South Asia cannot access these facilities as they cannot afford the treatment.

- Children and women are particularly vulnerable and at risk of poor health. They bear the brunt of health deprivation and avoidable deaths in South Asia. Many of these deaths are the result of curable causes like nutritional deprivations particularly among children, and pregnancy related risks among women of childbearing age. Around one-third of children under the age of five are underweight and malnourished in South Asia. An estimated 185,000 women die annually due to pregnancy and birth-related complications.[24]
- Rural-urban gaps in health outcomes also result from the inequity in allocation of public funds. In all indicators of health across all South Asian countries, rural areas are worse-off than urban areas.

Insecurity of vulnerable groups

Women and children suffer more, directly and indirectly, in situations of poverty, food insecurity and conflicts than even men. Empirical studies show that vulnerable groups bear the brunt of insecurity in all the areas that have been identified here. Women and children also form a majority of the world's refugees. Amnesty International reports show that some of the most degrading, damaging and cruel practices in conflicts are directed against women.

The recent tsunami and the earthquake in Asia have also shown that even in natural disasters women and children can be especially vulnerable. In the earthquake the surviving men were able to move down to shelters, and have been able to go where aid has been available, some of the women have found it harder to leave their homesteads because they did not have men to accompany them, did not have transport, or they had the responsibility to look after the children. In the initial days after the quake since there were not too many lady doctors and female paramedics in the area, there were reports that injured women could not have access to medical treatment, could not be retrieved from

under the rubble and in some cases even the dead bodies of women could not be removed as family members or other females were not present. Many female-headed households have expressed their inability to reach distribution points for relief goods and aid. There have been fears of female and child abductions and trafficking from hospitals in the affected areas. There have been fears expressed that in households where the male head of the household has been killed, females are having problems holding on to their land and other assets.

But the gravest danger to women's security arises from their vulnerability to violence within the household and community. The violence against women has been a global phenomenon, but in South Asia it has special import, as it is linked to the patriarchal structure of the society and exacerbated by gender discrimination in education, health and economic and political participation of women.

The children in South Asia are also similarly insecure, from preventable diseases, to preventable exploitation in the labour market, sex trade and many other forms of child abuse, despite the national and international laws to protect children from such exploitation. Most horrible crimes are perpetrated against children throughout the region. Widespread poverty and inadequate social safety nets have left many children with no choice but to sell their bodies simply to survive. Fear of AIDS has turned many away from adult prostitutes to young children.

To ensure better security for women and children, removal of poverty, especially in its worst forms, access to quality healthcare, and education and training facilities have to be ensured. Violence against women and children has to be eradicated. Women's participation in social/political decisions has to be ensured, and their representation in decision-making bodies at all levels has to be guaranteed.

Environmental degradation

In South Asia, the majority of the population lives in rural areas, and predominantly depends on agriculture for making a livelihood. Agriculture continues to contribute a significant share of national GDP in all South Asian countries, feeds most of the population, produces exportable surpluses, and creates a large percentage of raw material for agriculture based industry. Agriculture depends heavily on weather patterns and the environment, directly through the amount and pattern of rainfall and temperature variations, but also indirectly through snowfall in the mountains that determines the water flows in the rivers.

River water is a major source of drinking and irrigation water in South Asia, and it is one of the major sources for recharging ground water as well. Pakistan and India have one of the largest canal networks in the world. Through an extensive system of barrages and dams they have also developed a fairly large water storage mechanism for managing irrigation water needs and generating electricity. Creation of these reservoirs changes the downstream marine life significantly and can impact environmental conditions in the area. Rainfall can thus have a large impact on the economies, livelihoods and security of people living in India and Pakistan. Bangladesh is also very dependent on the natural habitat for its security. Fish and rice, the staples in Bangladesh, again depend on timely rains and regular water flows. Bangladesh is also situated in an area that has been especially prone to typhoons and floods.

Water is, and has been, an important source of livelihood for the countries in South Asia, but it has also been a cause of significant insecurity as well. Deforestation leads to erosion of topsoil and silting of waterways and dams. This not only reduces the life and economic return of dams, it creates new flood patterns as well that can be quite destructive. The erosion

But the gravest danger to women's security arises from their vulnerability to violence within the household and community

Almost all South Asian countries have large standing armies, and fairly sophisticated arms and ammunition

of topsoil has significant impacts on land-sliding and flashflood activities and patterns as well. The experts believe that in the recent earthquake in South Asia deforestation and erosion of topsoil played a part in the excessive landslides that resulted in higher loss of life and property across the region.

Agricultural and industrialisation patterns also have significant impacts on the environment. Cropping patterns, inputs of fertiliser and pesticide, and use of irrigation water can impact the biological diversity and the ecological balance of an area. This can in turn have large but unforeseen consequences for life, livelihoods, and the environment in the area. Similarly industrial pollutants can have dire consequences on surrounding and downstream areas. Industrial waste can also create hazards of various forms. All of the above, if not managed properly, can reduce human security of people in the area, and at the global level.

Environmental issues have not been accorded the importance that South Asian countries need to accord them. There are significant synergies possible for South Asia in dealing with environmental issues, e.g., in managing water, energy needs, and other natural resources together, and in others, there are significant externalities of actions of one country on another. Waste water falling in streams and rivers in one country, whether it be in the form of pesticides used in agriculture or industrial waste coming from factories, travels to other countries. Flows of air pollution are even harder to control or manage within national border.[25]

Causes of insecurity

Inter- and intra-state violence and conflicts

Since the independence of South Asia from the British rule, inter-country conflicts have been common. Pakistan and India have fought a number of wars between them. The movement that led to the creation of Bangladesh started off as an intra-country conflict but quickly escalated into an inter-country one. India and Bangladesh have had problems on their borders, as have other neighbours in the region. Border demarcation disputes between these neighbouring countries have also continued to mar relations in South Asia. The skirmishes on the border have been relatively frequent. There are a number of outstanding disputes related to water distribution and access. Almost all South Asian countries have large standing armies,[26] and fairly sophisticated arms and ammunition. In fact militarisation, in terms of the size of the standing armies, the expenditure on them, and the expenditures on the purchase and development of more sophisticated weapons, seems to be increasing. The potential for conflict remains high, especially between India and Pakistan and with reference to the disputed state of Kashmir.

India has been a nuclear state since 1974, and Pakistan became one in 1998. Both sides exploded multiple thermo-nuclear devices in early 1998 to exhibit their nuclear prowess. In addition both countries have also developed sophisticated short and medium range ballistic missiles that are capable of delivering nuclear bombs. This makes the region even more dangerous. Apart from the possibility of accidents, these weapons of mass destruction ensure that a war in the region could be much more destructive than if all sides had conventional weapons only. There are some who argue that the presence of the weapons of mass destruction contributes to deterrence. But this has been strongly contested by opponents of such weapons, and the occurrence of the Kargil conflict after the nuclear explosions in 1998 does raise difficult questions for any argument of deterrence.[27] The larger debate, related to defense and military issues, though remains focused on 'national security' and not on 'human security'. Security still is construed in terms of territorial security.

Intra-country conflicts have posed even bigger problem for South Asia. While

wars and inter-state conflicts have been confined mostly to border areas or specific regions, intra-country conflicts have exacted and continue to exact a higher toll of civilian life and property. Hence their impact in reducing human security has been deeper. Almost all of the South Asian countries have been victims of such conflicts. The North-South conflict in Sri Lanka, the violence in Indian-held Kashmir, the various regional autonomy or independence movements in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the violence in Nepal are all examples of these. In addition, ethnic violence has also contributed to insecurity in the region. Hindu-Muslim conflicts in India, violence against minorities such as Christians in India and Pakistan, the Ahmedis in Pakistan, the Shia-Sunni conflicts in Pakistan are again some of the more prominent examples. There are other less violent fault-lines as well, but these too can potentially be dangerous and pose significant threats to human security in the region. These include the threats of violence from poor governance structures in some parts (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in India) and threats to ethnic identities in others (Balochistan in Pakistan). All of these conflicts, whether they have led to violence in the past or not, continue to pose significant threats to human security of ordinary individuals. Given that it is the poor who live in closer quarters to each other, depend more on state-provided security and state provided infrastructure, they are more likely to be victims if violence does break out in any situation[28].

More generally, there continue to be significant concerns regarding human rights abuses across South Asia[29]. From accusations of state backing for ethnic violence to victimisation of political opponents, minorities and ideological opponents, international and local media have continuously brought cases of abuse of power by the states to the fore. In many cases the evidence regarding state involvement has been significant and this continues to pose a very real and substantial threat to human security concerns in the region.

The issues surrounding refugees and displaced persons require special attention as well. Displaced persons, people who have been forced to move from their 'homes' for one reason or another, but who still remain within the same national borders, face major disruptions with respect to almost all aspects of human security. Their livelihoods are usually affected, they may not have access to health, education and other facilities in their newer abodes, and their communities, habitats and social/political setups are disrupted as well. They are usually the migrants in a new area and are thus the 'outsiders'.

The case of refugees, people who are displaced across national borders, is much worse: it is a case of total entitlement failure. As a refugee you are not a citizen, are not recognised as a part of the community, and even if recognised as a refugee you are forced to live in special colonies, with limited access to basic facilities and amenities, and with no ability to participate in the economic, social and political life of the larger community around you. Most countries, even when refugees are internationally recognised, do not or are not able to provide a decent level of facilities to refugees. Most refugees thus end up living in poor conditions, with low income, and poor access to basic amenities, and with low levels of access to and protection from institutions of the state. One of the most damaging aspects of being a refugee has to do with the uncertainty that these people have to live with. Pakistanis living in Bangladesh have been in camps for the last 35 years. Some of the Afghans living in Pakistan have been in camps for almost 25 years. Yet they live in a limbo as to what their and their children's future will be like.

There are common threads in most conflict situations prevailing in South Asia. In almost all cases strong articulations of alternatives, sometimes contradictory

One of the most damaging aspects of being a refugee has to do with the uncertainty that these people have to live with

The most visible failure of South Asian political institutions has been their inability to protect the life and liberty of the minorities

to each other, are present. These are based on real and/or perceived factual and conceptual differences, but differences that are strongly believed in. A large number of cases of conflict have perceived or real economic injustices as a root cause. In almost all cases the weaker side believes that it has been treated unfairly, has not been given adequate representation and share, and has not even been given adequate representation in any negotiations. The weaker side usually feels disenfranchised. In some cases the disenchantment with the negotiation process has reached levels where negotiations have broken down and violence is seen as the only alternative. In others, though negotiations might continue but the power imbalance has led to high levels of distrust for the other side. Lack of credible, independent and trustworthy third party arbiters and guarantors is also a common phenomenon.

Human security concerns demand that immediate and sustained attention be given to addressing inter and intra-country conflict situations in South Asia. They are a major cause of insecurity in the region. South Asian states will have to evolve fair, transparent and trustworthy governance and judicial institutions, involve all parties to a dispute to the negotiation table, evolve mechanisms for empowerment and enfranchisement of all groups, and ensure adequate representation of all as a starting point for relevant discussion and solution.

Indifference, inefficiency and corruption of the institutions of governance[30]

Insecurity of life, liberty and property is on the rise in South Asia as the income and voice gaps between the rich and poor widen. Crime, violence and insecurity affect the poor the most. The rich can choose to ignore this reality as they have the money to protect themselves. But the poor have to rely on the judicial system.

Institutions of governance in South Asia have failed to provide economic, political and social justice to its teeming millions who just happen to be born poor, belong to a different faith, or to the wrong gender. The last few years have seen a scale of violence, mostly targeted against ethnic, religious, or sectarian minorities, that has no historical precedent. The most visible failure of South Asian political institutions has been their inability to protect the life and liberty of the minorities. The police often fail to uphold the law. There have been numerous cases of people tortured to death in police custody.

The state has to ensure the rights of people over basic necessities (freedom from need), and it has to ensure participation of people in the decision-making process on the basis of institutions that are fair and equitable. Participation in turn creates a) a connection with the demands of the people, b) legitimacy for the decisions achieved, and c) legitimacy for the institutions and d) legitimacy for the decision-making processes as well. If the state can ensure basic needs, but does not allow participation of the people in the decision-making processes, the resulting structure cannot be very secure for the people. Economic security, without political and social security, still keeps the overall security structure incomplete.

Though levels of participation vary across countries and states, with some countries having better formal democratic structures (India and Sri Lanka) than others (Pakistan and Nepal), the important institutions that guarantee rights, and fairness and equity in the system (judiciary, police, civil administration, political institutions) fail the people in important respects. Nepotism, corruption, inefficiencies and bureaucratic delays are rampant, and most ordinary citizens, again by and large, do not have high levels of trust in these institutions. South Asian countries usually score low on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI).[31] Research also shows that South Asian countries could gain, even in terms of economic growth, if institutions were strengthened in some

areas such as banking, finance and capital markets, judiciary and policing, and regulation of markets.[32]

Governance reform, to ensure openness, participation, transparency, equity and fairness in institutions and institutional practices is both an easy and a difficult task. It is easy in the sense that a number of institution specific and general recommendations can be conjured up fairly quickly as soon as institutional analysis of the situation on the ground is carried out. Openness in institutions can be achieved by assuring fairness and merit in hiring and promotions, and by involving stakeholders in policy-making. Transparency can be achieved by increasing access to information, by mandating disclosure and by instituting audit and other post-fact checks. Equity and fairness can be achieved by moving to rule and precedence-based decision-making, and by involving stakeholders in the various checks mentioned above. But these reforms are difficult to implement as they require a strong political will.

Downside of globalisation and economic reform policies

Over the last couple of decades significant changes have taken place in the global and national markets and the impacts of these changes on economic security of the majority of population have not been in general positive. At a global level, capital has become more mobile, and higher integration of markets for manufacturing and services has meant that labour in a country has to compete globally. At the same time most countries in South Asia have also gone through significant de-regulation, liberalisation, privatisation, and opening up in almost all domestic sectors. Trade barriers have been removed or reduced drastically, export taxes have become almost negligible and even import tariffs have declined in terms of the average tariffs, the number of tariff slabs and the highest tariff rate. Effective protection to local industry has also been reduced. This has made local markets open to international competition, forcing the local manufacturers to either compete or exit the industry.

Globalisation has also pitted producers from developing countries against producers from the developed. This has become a major issue at recent World Trade Organisation talks. Europe and the United States offer significant subsidies to agriculture. Developing countries, under fiscal constraints and structural adjustment programmes sponsored by the multilateral agencies, have been forced to remove most of the subsidies from agriculture. Agriculture remains important for South Asia, as well as for other developing countries, for producing for food needs of people, making sizable contribution to export earnings, and producing inputs for industry. This is also an area where developing countries have comparative advantage. An unequal playing field across developing and developed countries puts additional pressure on the economies, particularly the agricultural sectors, of the developing economies. It makes it difficult for farmers to compete at the international level, maintain incentives for production, and maintain their level of income as well. All of these can reduce economic security of people.

Globalisation has also pitted producers from developing countries against producers from the developed

People's perceptions of human security

A perception survey was carried out for this Report across four countries of South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The main objective of the survey was to assess perceptions of people on human security/insecurity in South Asian countries. The survey asked questions on economic, social, political, health, gender and governance issues across age, gender, education, income, religion, occupation, marital status and location. A short summary of the survey findings is presented here. Detailed discussion on the data and the results is contained in the Appendix at the end of this Report.

Almost half the respondents in the survey felt that security of life constituted their main concern. This concern predominated the responses from Bangladesh and Pakistan. With increasing threats of actual and potential conflicts within and between South Asian states, including the presence of two nuclear states, the region has become extremely volatile and its people insecure. Also across South Asia significant increase of defense and related expenditures have compounded people's fears that their territorial security was being increasingly pursued at the cost of human security.

Concerns about the ability to live freely under reasonable law and order condition were also expressed by a significant percentage of respondents in the survey, although a higher percentage of people in India and Sri Lanka were concerned about the ability to live freely than in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Financial concerns were comparatively more important for people in Sri Lanka, and social harmony for respondents from Bangladesh.

Across the countries surveyed the main threats to human security in South Asia were war and social issues (civil/ethnic unrest); law and order (lack of justice, robbery, police brutality); economic insecurity (unemployment, inflation); and lack of access to better governance (lack of representation, rule of law, access to health and education).

To summarise, the top five threats for South Asia as a whole included war, police brutality, lack of political representation, civil unrest and ethic violence. At the country level rankings there were some variations in perception, with Bangladeshis giving top rank to threats from terrorist attacks, and Sri Lankans giving more importance to threats from unemployment. But on the whole, the top five threats covered the important concerns expressed across all countries. At the country level and across the various categories, the highlights of some of the main results are presented below:

Economic security

Almost 69 per cent of the entire sample of respondents who were working was completely or somewhat insecure in their employment. The variation in this category, across countries, was significant: 80 per cent of Bangladeshi respondents felt completely or somewhat insecure in their jobs, while less than 50 per cent of the respondents from Sri Lanka felt insecure.

Lack of effective social safety nets further worsens the situation in South Asia. More than 35 per cent of the respondents across South Asia feared that they would not be able to sustain even a subsistence standard of living without a job. Fear of not maintaining subsistence living standard is higher among low-income earners, the less educated, and the unskilled and self-employed respondents of respective countries. The fear was more concentrated in urban areas, except in Sri Lanka where over 50 per cent of rural respondents felt economic insecurity. In Bangladesh more than 55 per cent respondents felt afraid of not being able to sustain even their subsistence living standard.

Governance security

About 70 per cent of the respondents did not feel confident about going to law enforcement agencies, with a sizable number actually being afraid of them. Most respondents felt reluctant to interact with law enforcement agencies because of lengthy processes and corruption of law enforcement agencies.

Over two-thirds of the respondents from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh felt fear and were reluctant to go to law enforcement agencies. This was down to about 50 per cent for India and over one-third In Pakistan. Respondents from low-income groups felt more fear than those from upper income groups. However, urban respondents felt more insecure than the rural ones.

Concerns about increasing corruption were very significant. 66 per cent of respondents felt that the problem of corruption had worsened in the last five years. Over 80 per cent of respondents from India and Sri Lanka mentioned that the problem of corruption had worsened, or somewhat worsened, in the last five years. The percentage was lower for Bangladesh and Pakistan, but it was still above the 50 per cent level.

Health/Education

Almost 90 per cent of the urban sample and 48 per cent of the rural sample, and 69 per cent of the female as opposed to 59 per cent of the male sample, felt that more and higher education would lead to improvement in their standard of living. Poor health and education facilities were perceived as major threats to capability building in South Asia. 43 per cent of respondents felt dissatisfied with the quality of health facilities being provided in their area. The dissatisfaction was higher in rural areas, and among the elderly population. The Pakistanis were most dissatisfied with health facilities**.**

In India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, 100 per cent of the respondents felt that education would guarantee higher living standard, whereas over 60 per cent of the respondents in Pakistan said that more and higher education would not guarantee a better standard of living. This should raise significant concerns about perceived or real private returns to education in Pakistan.

Respondents were also asked to identify three factors that had enhanced their sense of security over the last five years. Improved housing and infrastructure, improvements in law and order, and better economic conditions were identified as the main factors at the South Asia level. But here too there were country specific variations. In Bangladesh the largest gains in terms of improved human security came from law and justice side, for example, in improvements in police protection, better law and order, and fewer terrorist attacks. For India, better sense of security was related to better housing and infrastructure, better economic conditions and better health security. In Sri Lanka the main reasons for human security improvement accrued from freedom from war, freedom to travel, better government measures for security, and from some improvements in the economic condition.

The major components of what constitutes human security have been identified at the beginning of this chapter. The major insecurities of South Asia have also been analysed in this chapter as well as, in greater detail, in the rest of this report. This survey of people's perception of security confirms our conclusion that South Asian governments and societies fail to protect the vast majority of their people from grave insecurities that arise daily in political, economic and social arenas. These states need to take these human security concerns of people seriously, in particular the concerns related to security of women, children and the socially disadvantaged people who are getting bypassed by economic growth and neglected by the social protection system.

Sixty-six per cent of respondents felt that the problem of corruption had worsened in the last five years

Chapter 2

Conflicts and Human Security

'The basic concept of security is undergoing a profound change all over the world. The security of people is moving to centre stage, with more emphasis on income and job security, environmental security, security against crime, security of both individuals and of communities. National security is still paramount, but its attainment is linked more and more with human security. It is widely recognised that national security cannot be achieved in a situation where people starve but arms accumulate; where social expenditure falls and military expenditure rises.'

—Mahbub ul Haq

The nature of war and the ways it is waged have changed since the early and mid-twentieth century when international humanitarian law, which constitutes rules of modern warfare, was drafted. Wars between states have given way to violent conflicts within borders. The majority of battles are no longer fought on borders between states by soldiers, rather within borders of sovereign states by citizens. The distinction between civilian and military spaces has been eroded and as a consequence war (especially civil war) has become more of a direct threat to individual security than it ever was. Civilian houses, off-limits under the Geneva Convention, are often targets in internal conflicts. Reflecting the shift in real world dynamics, the discourse on conflict has shifted its focus also. Concern with security of individuals is now being given paramount importance. This shift in focus extends the ambit of conflict analysis to include root causes in societies that lead to tensions, which ultimately result in violent social upheavals.

Conflicts, whether a regional war between states or civil war, are a major cause for human suffering. Conflicts lead to the erosion of human security and development by destroying life, livelihoods and violating rights. On the other hand, lack of human security becomes a root cause for violent social upheavals, increased poverty and insecurity.

The threats to human development from conflicts come in the form of increased death rates, infant mortality rates, incidence of diseases and reduced school participation rates, among many others. For example,

- During the forty-five years between 1950-1995, the number of small conflicts (wars in which 1000 or more died each year of war) rose from 8 in 1950-55 to 27 in 1990-95 and large conflicts (over 100,000 deaths) rose from 3 to 8.[1]
- 59 per cent of low-income countries have suffered armed conflict since 1950.[2]
- During 1950-95, there were between 31 and 54 internationally recorded conflicts in each year and an average of 15 major wars (more than 100,000 deaths). The majority of these conflicts were located developing countries.
- Fifteen million deaths were caused directly and indirectly by wars of all types in developing countries between 1950-1995.[3] Almost all the deaths attributable to violent conflict have been in developing countries. Africa accounted for more than half of the deaths in developing countries, almost 60 per cent in the 1990s.
- More than 50 per cent of all deaths in civil conflicts in developing and low-income countries have been civilian casualties. In some cases the proportion of civilian deaths has been as high as 95 per cent, for example, in Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.[4]

- More than 19 million people have been displaced from their homes due to conflicts in over 150 countries.[5]
- Among the ten countries with the lowest Human Development Index (HDI), six have suffered serious civil wars in recent years.
- Five South Asian countries were involved in major wars during 1960-1995, with a total of 2.6 million deaths.[6]

The drastic increase in the number of civilian casualties (estimates vary between 60 to 90 per cent of total deaths), as compared to military casualties, in recent decades is a direct result of the shift in the frontlines of war zones. Over the course of the twentieth century civilian fatalities in war have climbed dramatically from 5 per cent at the turn of the twentieth century, to 15 per cent during First World War, to 65 per cent by the end of Second World War, to 95 per cent in the wars of the 1990s. Women and children account for a majority of these casualties.

The chapter analyses the causes, dynamics and impact of conflicts on human security in South Asia. An analysis of the impact of conflicts on people's lives, the economy, social services and the fabric of society in general is presented. Any discussion on security issues in South Asia cannot be complete without analysing the trade-off between military expenditure and social welfare. Increased militarisation threatens not only the internal stability of states but also regional security in South Asia. There is an urgent need to pay attention to the disturbing trends in the levels of military expenditure in all countries in South Asia and their implications for its citizens. Another very potent threat is the presence of nuclear weapons and their impact on regional and human security.

Conflicts between states in South Asia

The bitter colonial legacy in the region has complicated politics between countries in South Asia, especially India and Pakistan. Since the violent partition of the subcontinent, in which more than a million people died and even more were displaced, these neighbours have fought over territorial disputes, disagreements on border demarcations and water issues. Underlying these confrontations is a perceived threat to its borders and national security that each feels from the others' existence. The level of mistrust between all countries in the region has resulted very directly in the escalation of military spending to the point where they outrank other countries in the world in arms imports (India is the second largest importer of conventional arms after China), defence expenditure per capita and the size of their standing armies.

An attempt is made below to summarise the major issues behind the interstate conflicts that the region has seen and their consequences for territorial security and people's security.

The level of mistrust between all countries in the region has resulted very directly in the escalation of military spending to the point where they outrank other countries

Pakistan and India[7]

- Kashmir: The first war was fought in 1948. The core issue was a territorial dispute over accession of the princely state. The number of casualties is estimated to be between 2000 and 10,000. The war was stopped with the intervention of the UN Security Council. The matter remained unresolved and tensions catapulted the countries into another war over territorial control of the region in 1965, which resulted in 7800 casualties.[8] The war ended with the Tashkent Agreement.[9]
- Sir Creek: A territorial dispute over a 60-mile estuary forming the southern border between Gujarat and Sindh led to a war in the region in 1965. At the heart of the issue is a dispute over the line of demarcation that passes through the waters of the creek with India insisting the line pass through the middle, while Pakistan contending that earlier agreements demarcate the eastern shore of the creek. The countries had been arguing the matter at an

arbitration tribunal first in 1968, then in 1992, up until as recently as 2004, with no result.

- Bangladesh War of Independence: In 1971 Pakistan went to war with its eastern province. Underlying the civil war were issues of exploitative political and economic policies of West Pakistan with regards to the then East Pakistan that had resulted in economic deprivation and marginalisation of the East Pakistanis (see the section on internal conflicts). Indian intervention in the matter led to a war between India and Pakistan. It is estimated that between 300,000 to 3,000,000 people were killed in this war.[10] The parties involved signed a peace accord known as the Simla Agreement in 1972.
- Siachin: A territorial dispute over a glacier 150 miles northwest of Srinagar resulted in an outbreak of conflict that intensified in 1984. The territory is not specifically mentioned in the Simla Agreement. India justifies its claim on the territory arguing that Siachin is a gateway to Ladakh and so part of Indian administered Kashmir. Pakistan disputes this. 1987 saw one of the worst cases of fighting on the glacier. The two countries blame one another for the high altitude deployment (at increasingly exorbitant costs) and have been engaging in cross border fire at the highest battleground in the world.
- Wullar Barrage Project: A dispute over the water resources dates back to 1985 when India was accused by Pakistan of violating the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 by building a dam on river Jehlum at the mouth of Wullar Lake, the first and one of many water resource disputes between Pakistan and India.[11] The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 was drafted and signed by both to address issues of water resources. Other water disputes with alleged violations of the treaty are: The Kishanganga hydro-electric Project on river Neelum (Kishanganga); Dul-Hasti hydroelectric project and Sialkot Dam on river Chenab. These water disputes have led to heightened mistrust and instability in bilateral relations and delay in possible solutions to other core problems between the two countries.
- Kargil: Due to continued tensions over the disputed territory of Kashmir and accusations of alleged cross border infiltration in and around the line of control in Kashmir, in 1999 a war was started in the Kargil region. This war caused an elected government to collapse in Pakistan, a resurgence of extremist right-wing politics in India, and the escalation of a mutually destructive arms race.
- Baglihar Hydroelectric Project: The dispute arose in 2001 when India began to work on a power project on the Chenab River in Indian administered Kashmir. Pakistan sees this as a violation of the Indus Water Treaty and argues that if built this project would deprive Pakistan of precious water supply.[12] On the other hand, India contends that under the Treaty it is allowed unrestricted use of three Western rivers that are allocated to Pakistan. The matter is now pending with the World Bank for a decision. (see box 5.2)

Bangladesh and India

- Delta Island dispute in the Bay of Bengal: The issue relating to demarcating territorial waters has gone on since the 1970s. A new-born island on the river Haribhanga on the border of the two countries, known as South Talpatty to Bangladesh and New Moore/ Purbasha to India. The underlying issue is non-ratification of border demarcation and control treaties by the parties involved. In 2001 the dispute escalated to border skirmishes. The skirmishes killed soldiers on both sides and displaced around 10,000 people on the Bengali side and 1000 on the Indian.[13]
- Farakka Dam dispute: The dispute relates to issues of water sharing from the Ganges. India's construction of the Farakka barrage threatens agriculture,

fishery and forestry in Bangladesh (see chapter five).
- The unequal trading partnership between India and Bangladesh results in huge trade deficits for Bangladesh and sours relations, compromising all other avenues of economic cooperation.
- Bangladesh has refugee problems with India, Burma and Pakistan. Burmese Muslims have come to Bangladesh. On the other hand, Bangladeshi's are leaving for India mostly for economic reasons. There are also 260,000 stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh.[14]

Sri Lanka and India

- Sri Lanka is concerned about India's intervention in the civil war that has been going on in the island.[15] The tense relations are attributable to the fallout between the two countries in the early 1980s when India sent peacekeeping troops to monitor the ceasefire but were countered with allegations of assistance to the Tamil groups. The unresolved issue of Tamil separatism continues to mar relations between the two countries. Since 1998 the two countries have made progress on a free trade treaty according to which both countries will lower tariff barriers on a range of selected products within eight years.

Nepal and India

- India provides assistance to the Royal Nepal Army to counter the Maoist threat under a treaty made in 1950. But Nepal's link with the Maoist uprising in northeast India and its acquisition of Chinese weaponry in 1988 are seen as a violation of the 1950 Treaty.
- Political relations between the two countries reached a low point when Nepal criticised the annexation of the state of Sikkim.
- The preferential economic treatment given to Nepal in the Trade and Transit Treaties is affected by the rocky political relations, which led to a virtual economic blockade of Nepal in the 1980s.

Militarisation: protection or threat to human security?

It is no coincidence that South Asia while being one of the most militarised regions of the world is also one of the poorest

It is no coincidence that South Asia while being one of the most militarised regions of the world is also one of the poorest. Every rupee spent on weapons is a rupee taken away from a child's education or healthcare. Militarisation is not only a threat to human security in terms of diverting resources from human development, but it also leads to regional instability. More importantly, as Mahbub ul Haq has repeatedly pointed out that there is a '*delicate balance between the demands of human security and of national security throughout South Asia. The former requires investment in people, the latter investment in arms. How to balance these two is a major dilemma faced by policymakers. It will be difficult to accelerate human development levels in South Asia unless this dilemma is resolved.*'[16]

The impact of increased military spending does not end with enlarged military arsenals, it has emerged as a much more direct threat to individual security and human rights. When large armies outlive their usefulness for fighting wars against other nations, the countries have to bear the indirect (yet equally damaging) costs of keeping large armies. For Pakistan,

'South Asia is one of the most militarised regions in the world; it is also one of the poorest. Yet South Asian governments continue to re direct scarce resources towards building new weapons of mass destruction. Such non-productive investments in the name of national security, are taking a toll on human security while people's lives, the means as well as the ends of all development concerns, are left unheeded'

—Mahbub ul Haq

'It is evident that the level of military spending in India and Pakistan is largely independent of their low income levels. When most basic social services are missing in both India and Pakistan, the rising defense burdens in these countries continue to impose prohibitive social and economic costs on their people.'

—Mahbub-ul-Haq

the strengthening of the military institution at the behest of its political and military leaders alike, with the acquiescence of its citizens, has taken its toll on the political, democratic and judicial institutions of the country. In Nepal, increased militarisation has meant a highly weaponised society where acquiring arms is increasingly easy. In Sri Lanka, rehabilitating ex-army personnel has become a huge problem when there are not enough employment opportunities.[17]

The South Asian armies have become a force of aggression against the very people they have been sworn to protect. Not only did the Pakistan army unleash havoc on its own population in the 1971 war, it has been used twice to brutally suppress the uprising in Balochistan. The Indian army has been pitted in battles against its own people in Gujarat, the northeast and other states. The Golden Temple incident in Punjab with the Sikhs is cited as another example. The Sri Lankan army has been fighting the citizens of its country for over twenty years.

These acts of aggression are justified in the name of national interest. But the fact remains that such aggressive use of force against one's own people is tantamount to state violence and a clear violation of the rights of the people. Governments tend to deploy the military to deal with symptoms of internal unrest without addressing the real causes. This is one reason why all internal conflicts have dragged on for decades.

Trends in militarisation in South Asia

MILITARY EXPENDITURE: The hostility between India and Pakistan is responsible for a large chunk of the military expenditure in South Asia. Together these countries have two of the largest standing armies in the world.[18] Having fought three wars in 58 years since their independence, the two rivals talk of peace but refuse to lower their defence budgets. While inter-state relations are responsible for the ever-escalating military expenditures for India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka's rising defence budget points to the increasing costs of the civil war that has raged in the country for almost two decades.

Despite their grinding poverty, the countries of this region invest heavily in their armies. More than two-thirds of the populations of the South Asian countries are living below the poverty line of earning two dollars, or less, a day. More than 50 per cent of adult population in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal are illiterate.[19] More than 20 per cent of the total population in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are undernourished. One child out of every ten born to the poorest 20 per cent in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal dies at birth, due to lack of proper health care facilities.[20] And yet regional military expenditure estimates show a 50 per cent increase in South Asia's military expenditure between 1995 and 2004. Within a decade military spending in the region has gone up from US $13.4 billion to US $20 billion.[21] India and Pakistan feature amongst the 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2004, India ranking 11th with US $15.1 billion[22] worth of military expenditure while Pakistan ranking 15th.

As shown in figure 2.1, military expenditures are rising in all countries in South Asia. The whole region is caught in an ever-escalating arms race. The countries spend more on their defence because their neighbours do so.[23] The upward spiral is evident in Pakistan and India's defence spending. Both countries have increased their defence expenditures by 9.9 per cent

Figure 2.1 Trends in military expenditure as a percentage of total central government s expenditure in South Asia, 1988-2001



Sources: MHHDC Staff computations and World Bank 2005a.

and 3 per cent respectively since 1999.[24] Furthermore, major conventional weapons holdings in these countries have gone up as shown in table 2.1 for imports of conventional weapons by Pakistan and India

The increase in India's defence expenditure is attributable to a major procurement program to re-equip its forces with better weapons.[25] Other countries in the region are also exhibiting upward trends in this sector. Sri Lanka's escalating military spending is due to the continuing ethnic conflict. Its defence expenditure, although it has not fought any inter-state wars, has doubled as a proportion of its GDP during the 1990s. Although the Sri Lankan government has prioritised the social sector, the meagre resources of the country are spread very thin due to the internal conflict.

SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR: While military expenditure is a good measure of the annual financial input, it does not reflect the size and composition of the military sectors. A more comprehensive measure of militarisation is the BIC3D index developed by Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC). The BIC3D index combines four data series: military expenditures, armed forces personnel, major conventional weapons holdings and employment in arms production and provides a measure of the relative size of military sector. This index shows the levels of militarisation in South Asia at a time when the military expenditure in the world as a whole has been going down.

Table 2.3 shows that while the general trend in the world and in developing countries in general has been towards a shrinking military sector, figures for South Asia contradict that trend. Military sectors in all countries in the region have grown. Trends in South Asia also contradict the trends towards demobilisation around the world. The total number of armed forces in the world has come down from US $26 billion in 1991 to US $20 billion in 2002. Excluding India, all countries in South Asia increased the size of their armies. The largest increases are registered for Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. While none of these countries are engaged in violent international conflicts, two of the three have active civil wars that have continued for a number of years and that are the main reason for the burgeoning arsenals and expanding military sectors.

The standing armies in South Asia employ more than two million soldiers at present, about 83 per cent of these are in India and Pakistan. Employment in the armed forces has become a major source

Table 2.1 Trends in imported weapons in India and Pakistan, 1994-2004
(US $ millions)

Year	India	Pakistan
1994	566	756
1995	944	310
1996	874	509
1997	1478	699
1998	556	652
1999	1028	844
2000	598	144
2001	900	354
2002	1670	559
2003	2981	616
2004	2375	343

Note: Figures are trend-indicator values at constant 1990 prices.
Source: SIPRI 2005a.

Table 2.2 Trends in conversion, disarmament, demilitarisation and demobilisation (BIC3D) Index,[26] 1995-2002

BIC3D Index	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
World	21.4	25.6	27.6	29.3	30.3	30.7	30.6	31.4
Developing Countries	8.2	9.7	9.5	8.9	10.8	9.8	9.1	10.8
Asia	6	7	7	7	8	8	8	9
South Asia	-6	-7	-8	-9	-10	-10	-12	-12
India	-1	-2	-6	-7	-9	-7	-10	-12
Pakistan	-12	-12	-12	-11	-11	-11	-15	-13
Bangladesh	-24	-24	-26	-28	-35	-36	-36	-37
Nepal	-24	-28	-32	-32	-34	-36	-40	-47
Sri Lanka	-51	-46	-45	-46	-44	-52	-53	-55

Note: Percentage changes. A positive figure indicates a reduction in militarisation while a negative figure indicates an increase.
Source: BICC 2004.

Box 2.1 Mahbub ul Haq in his own words

Isn't it time that we ask the leaders of the Third World: Why they insist on spending two to three times as much on arms as on the education and health of their people?

Why they have eight times more soldiers than doctors today?

How they can find the resources for air-conditioned jeeps for their military generals when they lack even windowless schoolrooms for their children?

And why they pride themselves on gleaming F-16s parked on their airports when starving people are sleeping on their pavements?

Source: Haq 1993.

of employment. The present system, as opposed to a system of universal military training and draft in times of emergencies, is a huge drain on the budgetary resources in the two countries and makes it difficult to reduce military spending. A huge portion of the defence budget goes in payment of salaries, pension and health benefits of the soldiers and their families.

MILITARY VERSUS SOCIAL SECTOR EXPENDITURE: In the ranking of the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), both India and Pakistan have graduated from low-income countries to middle-income countries, currently ranking 127 and 135 out of a total of 177 countries. While the improved human development status of both countries is to be recognised, it is very disturbing to note they are also amongst the top ten on the list of arms importers. India is the second largest importer of major conventional weapons (after China) and Pakistan is the tenth.[27] It would not be unfair to attribute Pakistan and India's dismal performance, at least partly, on the consistent ignorance of their social sectors. One can rightly question why these poor countries are devoting so much of their resources on the military.

The social and human cost of this spending is enormous. Mahbub ul Haq made an attempt to calculate the human costs of arms spending in *Human Development in South Asia 1997:*

- A battle-tank normally costs US $4 million. Immunising a child against deadly diseases costs only one dollar. For the purchase of each battle tank, 4 million children can be immunised.
- A Mirage 2000-5 costs US $90 million while it costs an average of US $80 a year to maintain a child in primary school. If one Mirage were not purchased, it would be possible to extend primary school education to 1.1 million children.
- A modern submarine along with several support systems costs around US $300 million. It costs roughly US $5 to supply safe drinking water to one person over a course of a year. Each submarine purchased means denying the provision of safe drinking water to 60 million people.[28]

Table 2.3 Trends in armed forces personnel, 1991-2002

(Nos. in 1000s)

	1991	2002	% change
India	1267.67	1205	-5.14
Pakistan	564.2	587	3.91
Bangladesh	106.86	137	22.6
Nepal	34.96	51	31.4
Sri Lanka	99.6	158	36.9
South Asia	2107	2200	4.2
Developing Countries	15763.5	13840	-13
Industrial Countries	10791.4	6710	-60
World	26598.4	20550	-29.4

Source: BICC 2004 and MHHDC staff calculations.

Table 2.4 Trends in military expenditure in South Asia, 1994-2003

	As a % of central government expenditure			As a % of GDP		
	1994	1999	2003	1994	1999	2003
India	15	15	14.2	2	2	2.3
Pakistan	27	23	23.9	5	5	4.1
Bangladesh	17.6	11	n/a	1	1	1.2
Sri Lanka	12	15	13.6	3	4	2.5
Nepal	7	6	n/a	1	1	1.5
South Asia	16.32	15.24	13.557	2.21	2.22	2.359

Sources: MHHDC staff calculations and World Bank 2005a.

Neither the policy makers nor the civil societies in these countries fully comprehend the human costs of arms purchases. Although India's defence spending is much higher in absolute terms than Pakistan's, Pakistan bears a much heavier burden for its military spending. Currently Pakistan spends 4.1 per cent of its GDP on defence, while India's defence expenditure is about 2.3 per cent of its GDP (see table 2.4).

The trade off between people's security versus state security is evident in the numbers for the doctor-to-soldier ratio for the region.[29] The fact that there are more soldiers than doctors in every country makes clear the priority given to the military sector.

All countries in South Asia have shown scant regard for human security by spending huge sums on defence that do not make sense for countries that are struggling with poverty, illiteracy and ill health that plague the majority of their populations. A comparison of per capita expenditure on education and health to per capita defence expenditure in five South Asian countries, as shown in figure 2.2 below, is a stark reminder of the priority that the people in South Asia receive from their governments in their allocation of resources.

The numbers, though startling, may not give the true magnitude of defence spending. The defence budgets in South Asia are notoriously non-transparent. Many items of defence spending are camouflaged under various budgetary heads. Many details regarding purchases of equipment are missing. In Sri Lanka, the defence procurements do not follow the usual tender procedures laid out for the public sector.[30] Similarly, the 7.4 per cent decline in the Pakistani defence budget for the year 2000-01 was due to readjustment of military pensions, which account for a substantial portion of military spending, to the civil category.[31]

Figure 2.2 Per capita expenditure on defence, health and education in South Asia, 2002



Sources: MHHDC 2004 and MHHDC staff calculations.

Furthermore, the data on defence expenditure is fraught with methodological problems. For example, the defence budget for Sri Lanka does not include disability benefits and pensions of soldiers, which results in serious underestimation.

Nuclearisation in South Asia: a deterrent or a threat to human security?

The concept of deterrence is linked to the newfound role of nuclear weapons as political tools. Invented as weapons of war and used as such in the Second World War, since Hiroshima nuclear weapons have been used to achieve political ends

Pakistan and India share a long history of mutual mistrust following the violent events at the time of independence, and since then the numerous conflicts the countries have been involved in. This mistrust drives their respective foreign policies. Over the last fifty-five years, these two countries have fought over Kashmir, Bangladesh, Siachin, Indus river water sharing etc. They have also been engaged in an ongoing and ever escalating arms race that reached a new level when both countries decided to go nuclear.

Nuclearisation in South Asia has a distinctly political underpinning and is directly related to the threat perceptions of both countries. The rationale behind nuclear empowerment is that it deters two nuclear powers from engaging in a full-scale war. The concept of deterrence is linked to the newfound role of nuclear weapons as political tools. Invented as weapons of war and used as such in the Second World War, since Hiroshima nuclear weapons have been used to achieve political ends. The concept of a limited war is what links political ends to military means, and it is this kind of argument that is used for India and Pakistan now that they are both states with nuclear capability. The 1999 Kargil conflict is an example of a limited war, so are the 2001-2002 border confrontations between India and Pakistan. Yet, as Mahbub ul Haq firmly believed that nuclearisation should not be accepted as any tool, political or otherwise, on any ground. The social and economic costs are enormous particularly for poor countries but, most important of all, the constant nuclear blackmailing by state or non-state actors is not acceptable to any sane world order. A complete nuclear disarmament should be the objective of a secure world. (see box 2.2)

The people of the two countries are told by their respective governments that the weapons are kept in order to avoid a war. History tells us different. Nuclear weapons states have elected to fight wars on many occasions and have lost many of them. Britain fought and lost at Suez, even though it had already had nuclear weapons. The United States suffered significant defeats during the Korean War and the war ended in stalemate. The French lost Algeria and China's nuclear weapons did not help against Vietnam. The most famous examples being those of defeat of the US in Vietnam and that of Soviet

Box 2.2 Imagine a world without nuclear weapons

On 10 December 2005, the head of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei who received the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, emphasised in his acceptance speech, 'If we hope to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience, and no role in our security.' He further said, 'We must ensure, absolutely, that no more countries acquire nuclear weapons. That nuclear weapons states take concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament, and we must put in place a security system that does not rely on nuclear deterrence.'

Mohamed Elbaradei added that 'today, eight or nine countries possess nuclear weapons. Today we still have 27,000 weapons in existence.' Then he asked his audience to 'imagine what would happen if the nations of the world would spent as much on development as on the machines of war. Imagine that the only nuclear weapons remaining are relics in our museums. Imagine the legacy we could leave to our children. Imagine that such a world is actually within our grasp.' Is it possible for the South Asians to imagine such a world?

Union in Afghanistan despite their enormous nuclear arsenal.[32] In the case of India and Pakistan, the situation is potentially more dangerous since both states possess the weapons and the threat of use is doubled, making the region very unstable.

The benefits usually associated with going nuclear are deterrence, savings on conventional weapons and additional national/regional security. In the case of India and Pakistan, these benefits are hardly visible. Yet the costs associated with nuclear weapons are tremendous. As reported in our 1999 Report on *Human Development in South Asia*, the nuclear weaponry possessed by India and Pakistan creates a potential for mass annihilation of innocent civilians and has major environmental and security consequences for all South Asian countries. Neither country has the experience or resources for adequate command and control systems, safeguard mechanisms, credible second strike retaliatory capability or a coherent nuclear doctrine. Given large imbalances in conventional forces and unresolved regional disputes in Kashmir and Siachen, the risk of drifting into a nuclear confrontation will dramatically increase if the unstable relations between the two adversaries deteriorate further.

Despite being aware of the awesome destructive power of these weapons, the countries continue to develop, modernise and enlarge their nuclear arsenals. States defend the acquisition and development of nuclear arsenals in the name of national security. The military, and indeed many political governments, whip up public support by making nationalist arguments and employing jingoistic jargon to rally support from their people.

Impact on regional stability

Although nuclear weapons are used, in addition to being deterrents, as levellers of playing fields and a bargaining tool for foreign policy issues, they fail to ensure a political solution. Despite the fact that it has been eight years since the two countries went nuclear, the major contentious issues are far from being resolved. In fact, since the tests in May 1998, Pakistan and India have come dangerously close to a war in 1999 at Kargil. For the international community, the Jammu and Kashmir conflict is a possible nuclear flashpoint. For the 1.4 billion people of the subcontinent, the Kargil incident exposed how real the threat of a nuclear war could be.

The link between regional instability and nuclear weapons becomes evident when considering that the false sense of security afforded by their nuclear capability allowed the two countries to escalate the conflict to the point where it could have erupted in a full scale war. Kargil is a prime example of how nuclearisation instead of bringing more maturity to the relationship between India and Pakistan, bred mutual distrust, fear and suspicion.

Mahbub ul Haq believed that there must be a balance in South Asia between spending on arms and spending on people. The economic and social costs of failure to reach political solutions for the territorial problems and issues of water resources are mounting. These costs are further complicated by the presence of nuclear weapons.

The economic and social costs of failure to reach political solutions for the territorial problems and issues of water resources are mounting

Armed conflicts, arms transfers and human security

Armed conflicts within states have been on the rise since the end of the Cold war and the trend is no different for South Asia where the deadliest of armed conflicts are being fought not on state borders, but within nations, inside cities with the citizens of the states. The impact of this changed nature of war and conflict has been disproportionately high for civilians, a fact borne out by data on deaths caused directly or indirectly by conflicts. While battlefield deaths are at an all time low at the beginning of the twenty-first century, civilian deaths account for more than 50 per cent (sometimes up to 97 per cent in the worst cases in Africa) of total deaths

caused directly or indirectly by armed conflicts in poor countries.

While major arms are the most significant tools in interstate wars, the presence of small arms is a very significant determinant of the outbreak, continuation and intensification of most recent violent internal conflicts. *Small arms*[33] and *light weapons*[34] have become the main tools of violence in the ethnic and other internal conflicts by both state and non-state actors. Referred to as 'weapons of mass destruction'[35] these are responsible for the majority—between 60 and 90 per cent, depending on the conflict—of direct conflict deaths.[36] Secondary impact of small arms, when the fighting is over is long lasting and extends far beyond physical injuries. These arms are used to settle ethnic and political rivalries, in criminal activity and to interfere with development efforts to deliver food, medicine and supplies to people in dire need of relief. Threat of arms results in forced migration and failure of entitlements. Refugees are often afraid to return to their homes because of the large number of weapons that remain in the hands of ex-combatants who have not been demobilised or have become affiliated with local gangs, warlords, or militias.[37]

The most adverse impact of small arms is felt in countries where state apparatus is weak, and institutions, such as police and health services are failing. Arms often find their way into the hands of the non-state actors (militant rebel groups, guerrillas or just civilians) through the black market. Despite the destructive role small arms play in violent conflicts their transfers have not been monitored. The abuse of arms in underdeveloped conflict ridden countries is a major source of human rights violations.

The availability of arms tends to increase the incidence of armed violence, prolong wars once they break out, and enable grave and widespread abuses of human rights. The failure of the police and the military to maintain law and order has led to the formation of vigilante mob violence. These mobs, with easy access to arms, are terrorising the local communities. New recruits for such groups are being trained in military barracks. At the beginning of the conflict, the Royal Nepal Army was equipped predominantly with 45,000 Self Loading Rifles and Light Machine Guns. By 2004 this number had almost doubled to 80,000.[38]

Small arms and light weapons are attractive because they are easily available, low in cost, highly portable and easy to hide. More importantly, since they possess legitimate civilian, military and police uses, they are present in all societies. Because of their lightweight, they are the weapons of choice for child soldiers. Furthermore, the profitability of arms gives rise to profit seeking groups for whom the continuance of conflict and arms trade is beneficial. The authorised trade in arms is worth around US $ four billion.[39] Illicit transfers account for about 10 to 20 per cent of total arms transfers but are more dangerous since they find their way to the guerrillas, militia and criminal groups through the black market. The easy availability of these weapons has led to a militarisation of society and privatisation of violence. In some societies, these surplus weapons may create a 'culture of violence' that traps whole populations in an endless cycle of war.

The industrialised nations play a very significant role as far as arms availability in conflicts in poor countries is concerned. The top ten suppliers/exporters of arms are developed industrialised countries while the top ten recipients are developing countries. The United States, Russia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the five largest suppliers of major conventional weapons in the five-year period 1999–2003, accounted for 81 per cent of all transfers (see table 2.5).

The Nepalese government has received military aid (assault rifles and light machine guns etc) from Ukraine, Australia, Israel and Belgium which the rebels have managed to acquire from attacks on government installations and are being used against the civilians and the army.[40] The army in Sri Lanka receives aid from

Table 2.5 Transfers of major conventional weapons from eight largest suppliers to the largest recipients, 1999-2003

(US $ millions)

Supplier	Recipient		
	Bangladesh	Pakistan	India
USA	48	10	10
Russia	331	99	6223
France	–	813	192
UK	–	–	88
Ukraine	–	420	37
Italy	14	145	135
China	41	917	24
Netherlands	16	-	102
Others	164	121	1035
Total	611	2525	7843

Note: Figures are trend-indicator values expressed in US $ millions at constant 1990 prices.
Source: SIPRI 2005c.

India, Pakistan, Israel, the Czech Republic, Singapore, Ukraine and Russia. Although there is no reliable data available on the procurement patterns of the rebel groups in Sri Lanka, they are armed with small arms, boats and surface to air missiles through contacts with underground groups in various countries.[41]

The inflow of these arms has a direct impact on individual security in developing nations. The incidence of internal armed conflicts and widespread social violence in developing countries intensifies threats to physical security, property and a normal way of life in addition to increasing risks of permanent disruption of livelihoods. In many developing countries, political armed violence is not clearly distinguished from the criminal variety, particularly after war. This is the case in South Asia. There is a direct link between increased levels of human rights abuses and arms transfers in Nepal.[42] The failure of the police and the military to maintain law and order has led to the formation of vigilante mobs. These mobs, with easy access to arms, are terrorising the local communities. New recruits for such groups are being trained in military barracks.

Internal conflicts in South Asia

A general pattern has emerged in the past few decades that highlights the poor states as being more vulnerable to sliding into a situation of violent internal conflict—civil wars, insurgencies, separatist movements, religious and sectarian violence. Among the ten countries listed with the lowest Human Development Indices, six have suffered serious civil wars in recent years—Mozambique, Ethopia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Mali and Guinea.[43] In fact, nearly half of the fifty countries classified by the UN as 'least developed' have experienced major armed conflicts in the last twenty years.[44] This new brand of conflicts has deeper links with poverty, deprivation, inequality and identity than with international politics. In addition to being poor, these states share the malaise of weak institutions, intolerant societies and vested political interests that stand to benefit from a fragmented society. Various reasons have been identified for internal conflicts, which on the surface are linked to resources and representations.[45] But scratching the surface reveals communities, groups and regions that have been excluded from the process of development, of economic participation, of political representation, cultural and religious freedoms. This exclusion has manifested itself as horizontal inequalities (inequalities between groups/identities/peoples), which have emerged as the main underlying source of tensions in societies.

South Asia has a history of 15 ethnic conflicts in five decades. India has witnessed eight, followed by three in Pakistan and one each in Sri Lanka,

The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them—with their origins buried deep in growing socio-economic deprivations and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms.'

—Mahbub ul Haq

Geography, history, politics and resurgence of ethnicity and religion have all contributed to an increasingly complicated South Asia

Bangladesh and Bhutan. Geography, history, politics and resurgence of ethnicity and religion have all contributed to an increasingly complicated South Asia. Almost all internal conflicts are driven by tensions between groups. These tensions are apparent in the various separatist movements for greater autonomy, which is in itself an outcome of a fear of assimilation, marginalisation and a sense of relative deprivation and powerlessness. The Bangladesh independence movement was the most disastrous civil war in the history of the region, with the death toll crossing three million.[46] The civil war that has torn the island of Sri Lanka apart for over two decades has ethnic tensions at its roots driven by perceptions of political and economic marginalisation. The civil war in Nepal also has a political dimension where years of political repression of certain groups in the guise of a parliamentary democracy finally exploded in violent political upheaval. Ethnically discriminatory policies in Bhutan led to anti-government riots and a huge refugee problem. Political repression and human rights abuses have resulted in the outbreak of violence in Maldives.

Persistent horizontal inequalities result in social upheavals and are the underlying cause for civil wars (see table 2.6). The link between such failure of entitlements, conflict and human security is two fold—asymmetric distribution of entitlements leads to insecurity and results in conflict, and conflicts destroy entitlements and result in insecurity.

Horizontal inequalities—a threat to human security

Ensuring human security is important because it has a direct link to human development, as shown in chapter 1. The concept of empowerment is wedded to the process of human development; the understanding being that empowering people economically, politically and socially allows them to develop to their full potential and realise their capabilities. Insecurity results from a lack of empowerment. Empowerment comes through entitlements, which 'consist in the various forms of control over resources that permits people access to essential goods and services such as food, water, health services or education.'[47] These entitlements are protected in national and international laws by rights defined in the International Convention of Human Rights.[48] Issues of political, social and economic empowerment (or lack thereof) lie at the root of most of the internal conflicts raging around the world, and South Asia in particular. These issues have taken over internal politics in developing countries. There is a clear connection between material deprivation (poverty), issues of empowerment and identity formation. The concept of horizontal inequality connecting these three helps establish a link between perceptions of deprivation in societies and states and violent conflicts.

Horizontal inequalities, according to Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald, have three distinct dimensions—social, economic and political. The inequalities may surface as asymmetries in political representation, inequality of economic opportunity and disproportionate social deprivations between groups.[49] More than 800 million people are a part of around 200 culturally identified groups and 130 million of these people face political disadvantage or discrimination based on ethnic, religious or linguistic identities, often through public policy.[50] Disparities in levels of human development (measured in terms of income, health and education) characterise states in South Asia and more often than not the religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities get left behind. Lack of political voice and economic deprivation resulted in the Maoists insurgency in Nepal and the civil war in Sri Lanka, have as their roots perceptions of deprivation along ethnic lines. Stemming from this is a growing awareness that security of people should have precedence over security of borders, if the stability and integrity of the state is to be maintained.

'Few people have the opportunity to participate fully in the economic and political lives of their nations. And the dangerous potential for human strife that often emerges from the irresistible urge fro people's participation clashing with inflexible systems must be recognized.'

—Mahbub ul Haq

There is substantial evidence available to support the hypothesis that socio-economic inequalities between groups are the root cause of internal conflicts.[51] Inequalities in land distribution, income, wealth etc. have been linked with periods of social instability in many countries. Furthermore, given that group identities and individual well-being are connected, horizontal inequalities matter for social and political stability. In a region like South Asia, where nations are a composite of multiple ethnicities, where a significant percentage of population in these nations are living below the poverty line and where all states have suffered through various forms of internal conflict, these connections assume even more importance (see table 2.6).

Ethnicity, inequality and conflicts: links and evidence

Diverse ethnicities, religions, languages and values of the people that make up modern states, especially in South Asia, are an inescapable feature of the politics of the twenty-first century. It is an unfortunate fact that politics in this region, has evolved in a way that puts state security first and chooses to ignore or suppress diverse identities (ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural) through religious persecution and through economic, social and political exclusion.

All states in South Asia, except Maldives, have experienced negative ramifications of ethnicity. The ethnic, religious and lingual multiplicity in South Asia is linked with conflicts in the region, both at societal and state levels. Ethnic groups transcend six of the seven borders in South Asia.[52] The inter-state wars between Pakistan and India have a close link with internal conflicts: Kashmir (1948 and 1965) and East Pakistan (1971). Apart from the ethnic roots of the conflict in Sri Lanka, episodes of civil unrest are common in the ethnically diverse Indian regions (both rural and urban). The large degree of ethnic polarisation in Pakistan has resulted in sectarian violence in provinces and clashes between provinces and the central government.[53] The Bhutanese government has been accused of systematic discrimination against the Nepalese minority in the country.

Ethnicity finds expression in political domination, economic exploitation or psychological oppression. Under conditions of intense socio-economic competition in a society, ethnicity is associated with conflict and violence and produces adverse effects on peace, harmony and national integration. It manifests itself in the form of political instability, which may result in the dissolution of a nation, for example Yugoslavia or closer to home, East and West Pakistan. The links between ethnic identities and conflicts are many in this multi-ethnic and multi-religious region.

- *Sri Lanka:* The civil war in Sri Lanka, since the early 1980s, is an outcome of inequalities of access and opportunity along ethnic lines. The identities of Tamil minority and Sinhalese majority were used first by the British to favour one group over another creating horizontal inequalities of a political and economic nature.[54] The growth of Sinhalese nationalism after independence fanned the flames of ethnic division until civil war broke out in the 1980s with the Tamils pressing for self-rule.[55] Unchecked ethnocentric politics resulted in exclusionary policies that sidelined the Tamils. The Sinhalese Language Act of 1958[56] made the

There is substantial evidence available to support the hypothesis that socio-economic inequalities between groups are the root cause of internal conflicts

Table 2.6 Internal armed conflicts in South Asia

Country	Region	Date	Nature/causes of conflicts	Nature of horizontal inequality	Casualties/ deaths	Internally displaced people/ refugees
India	Naga Mizo Bodo Meitei Assamese	1956-1975 1966-1986 1967-1993 1978-2000 1983-2000	Sessionist: Allegations of economic and political marginalisation. Widespread poverty.	Economic, Political	23,590 since 1979	170,000
India	Punjab—Khalistan	1981-1992 1986	Sessionist: The Sikhs, fearful of forced religious and cultural assimilation, demanded the formation of a separate Sikh state. Widespread rioting esp in Dehli.	Social/Cultural, Political	10,000—18,000	
India	Gujarat	2002	Religious: Hindu-Muslim rioting.	Political	>1000	150,000
Pakistan	Balochistan	1970s; Inactive 2000; Active	Political/Ethnic: Lack of development and access to economic resources Perceptions of deprivation along ethnic lines resulted in a political confrontation,	Economic, Political		
Pakistan	Karachi, Hyderabad	1980s; Active 1980s	Sectarian: Religious animosity. Ethnic; lack of economic opportunities.	Political, Social, Economic	<1,760 since 1985	
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts	1970s	Political/Ethnic: Struggle for Independence by the tribal on grounds of economic and political discrimination.	Political, Economic		
Nepal	75 districts in western Nepal	1996; Active	Political: Urban-Rural disparities in economic development, political participation.	Economic, Political	11,900 since 1996	400,000
Sri Lanka	Southern region	1970s	Political: The Sinhalese youth started protest and agitations against government policies they perceived to be responsible for high unemployment rates.	Economic		
Sri Lanka	Provinces in the north	1983; Fragile ceasefire since February 2002.	Sessionist Ethnic Civil War: Ethno-centralist. Politics by the Sinhalese majority. Political exclusion and threat of economic disenfranchisement of the Tamil minority.	Economic, Political, Social	74,200 since 1983; Political assassinations continue.	362,000
Bhutan	Southern Bhutan	1990	Ethnic: Violent ethnic unrest and anti-government protests in southern Bhutan pressing for greater democracy and respect for Nepali rights.	Cultural, Political		> 100,000

Sources: MHHDC staff calculations; IISS 2005 and Stewart and Hayat 2002.

'It is a world where ethnic minorities still live in a separate nation within their countries, creating tremendous potential for ethnic explosions.'

—Mahbub ul Haq

language of the majority group the official language of the country, which restricted access to educational opportunities and civil service recruitment and compromised upward socio-economic mobility in a time of economic depression.[57] Religious exclusion came in the form of Buddhism being promoted as the favoured religion. Sri Lanka's political history became an example of a parliamentary system unable to protect the rights of its minorities.

- *Nepal:* Nepal has experienced inequalities along ethnic and caste lines as well. In the year 2000, life expectancy at birth for the Dalit population in Nepal was 20 years lower, the adult literacy rate was 40 per cent lower and per capita income was about US $200 lesser than the national average.[58] The indigenous Kham Magars, the original recruits of the Maoist militia, are now recognised as a group that was neglected and suppressed despite their sporadic revolts during the four decades prior to the start of the insurgency. This continuous disenfranchisement was enough to inspire the extreme from of socio-political mobilisation by the Maoists.[59]
- *Pakistan:* While there were many social and political reasons for the ethnic violence that the Pakistani city of Karachi witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s, these were mainly fuelled by the resentment of the educated urban Sindhies, predominantly Mohajirs, whose share in unemployment numbers was disproportionately high, despite their higher educational status. The lack of economic opportunities for the Mohajirs was a direct result of government quota system that aimed at improving access to educational opportunity and civil service recruitment for rural Sindhis and Punjabis.[60] This is a case where policies generated perceptions of exclusion and deprivation, which coincided with ethnic identities and resulted in an outbreak of conflict.

Regional disparities

Asymmetric development in regions within a nation results in perceptions of deprivation by a certain group and is often a cause for political violence

Asymmetric development in regions within a nation results in perceptions of deprivation by a certain group and is often a cause for political violence. Inter-regional comparisons within countries reveal regional disparities in development. Some regions have been able to develop faster and progress further than others, at times at the expense of others. In India, five states—Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Assam and Maharashtra—account for 56 per cent of rural poverty while containing only one-third of the total rural population. These states also share the dubious honour of having witnessed some of the worst forms of political or civil violence. In Bangladesh in 1991, the divisions of Rajshahi, Barisal and Dhaka had the highest incidence of rural poverty at around 60 per cent, whereas urban poverty in Cittagong and Dhaka was less than 15 per cent. Besides regional differences, poverty also varies on the basis of gender, ethnicity and religion.[61] Access to economic opportunity and resources determines economic security and well-being, while an environment of poverty and deprivation breed discontent. The regions excluded from the process of development become rebellious, especially when ethnic identities mix with geographical locations.

BANGLADESH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: The war of independence of Bangladesh is a striking example of economic disparities underpinning internal conflict. The discrimination against the then East Pakistan was symbolised clearly by the way in which money was allocated

'Ours is a deeply polarised society. One of the worst forms of this national polarisation is manifested in rampant provincialism…. We chose the wrong development formula. Provincial allocations [are] based on provincial populations, not their development needs.'

—Mahbub ul Haq

The restoration of democracy in 1990 was unable to bring the entire population into the mainstream of political change

by the centre for development projects. Between 1948 and 1951 a total sum of US $237 million was sanctioned for development of which only 22.1 per cent went to East Pakistan, whereas between 1948 and 1969, the value of resources transferred out of the Eastern Wing amounted to US $2.6 billion.[62] There were striking disparities in employment, human development investments, domestic resources, foreign exchange and asset ownership between East and West Pakistan in the twenty years after Pakistan's creation.

THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL: One of the reasons for the civil war in Nepal is the economic dimension of horizontal inequality, where regional disparity in development levels coupled with increasing awareness of political repression amongst various underprivileged castes resulted in violent social upheaval. The restoration of democracy in 1990 was unable to bring the entire population into the mainstream of political change. Many ethnic and deprived communities, dwelling predominantly in the rural areas of the mid-western regions, were alienated in the process. A large percentage of the population lives in poverty; there is inefficient delivery of social services (such as education and health) as well as inequality, exclusion and discrimination all of which may have further compounded the conflict.[63]

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN: Horizontal inequalities, manifested across a regional divide with ethnic tensions, are responsible for political conflicts in Baluchistan. At some level the conflicts are also about the failure of governance. 'The people of Baluchistan have a good reason to resent their government. Eight out of ten lack safe drinking water and nine out of ten have no gas. This last rankles specially, given that Baluchistan produces most of Pakistan's gas—roughly 45 per cent of total production from a single gas field at Sui.'[64]

In the context of Baluchistan, the inequalities are of a political, social and economic nature. The province is the poorest in the country and is one of the most underdeveloped areas in the region and the Baluch are the smallest ethnic minority in Pakistan. Its population is, as is clearly indicative from the social indicators, one of the most deprived with little or no opportunity to improve their socio-economic condition. While there is an undeniable aspect of political manipulation and power struggles to this conflict, there are real insecurities (those of identity, culture, economic social and finally political also) that fuel the resentment against the central government.[65]

Today while Pakistan's literacy rate is low at 39.69 per cent, it is even lower for Baluchistan at 29.81 per cent.[66] The lack of skilled educated labour has meant that while the economic growth in the rest of the country has been fuelled by a growth in the manufacturing sector, the province has not reaped the benefits of growth.[67] Furthermore, the state of health in the region is another cause for insecurity. Baluchistan has the lowest level of access to health facilities, made difficult due to the terrain and distance. The general perception in the region is that due to the dominance of the non-Baluch elite, the funds for all development purposes were skewed. While the government had shown interest in constructing roads and infrastructure in strategically important areas, the overall development of Southern Baluchistan has always been ignored.[68] The areas within Baluchistan did not receive gas long after it was tapped. The formula for revenue sharing of the four provinces, as determined in the NFC

Award, is also considered discriminatory against Baluchistan.[69]

NORTHEAST INDIA: Northeast of India remains one of the most conflict prone zones of South Asia comprising seven states—Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalya and Arunachal Pradesh. The neglect of development in the region by the central government has exacerbated ethnic tensions resulting in social upheavals and political violence. The resurgence of Maosit elements has complicated the politics in the region. The historical and ethnic links that the people of northeastern states share with other countries[70] have alienated them from the government and people in other parts of India. A feeling of neglect by the central government has aggravated this sense of alienation, leading to perceptions of economic and social exclusion. Although the people of this region have been politically active for a long time, they lag far behind in economic development.[71]

The Nagaland insurgency is the longest lasting in the history of India, and has posed a challenge to India's nation building process. At the heart of the rebellion are grievances of an excluded people. The predominantly Christian (About 95 per cent of the Nagas are Christian[72]) population of the region resents the perceived dominance of the Hindus and feels that the homogenising and centralising tendencies of the Indian state are a threat to their separate identity.[73] The lack of development and basic security issues play a role in fuelling the feelings of alienation and thus aggravating the conflict. The northeastern region registers the poorest indicators of health, sanitation and education. Rampant poverty and economic stagnation make conditions worse for the people of that region. Such conditions also provide plenty of recruits for the insurgency. The lack of economic development has heightened the discontent of the people towards the government of India. The nationalist movement took on a socialist-Maoist flavour as the insurgent groups got military and financial support from neighbouring countries. The spatial remoteness of the region has lent itself to situations where the government cannot exercise a lot of control.

In Mizoram, militant groups have been killing civilians and government security forces since the late 1960s. The central government's perceived neglect of Manipur has aggravated the different ethnic groups. Although Meitei, Kuki and Naga groups have a history of peaceful coexistence, they began to turn against each other as endemic poverty and unemployment gave rise to inter-communal resentment.[74] In Assam the resentment of the indigenous Assamese only increased when the central government failed to implement any consistent programme for the economic development of the region. This triggered the establishment of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which have been fighting for an independent Assam since 1979.[75] In Tripura, resentment over the lack of development has heightened inter-tribal tension. The demands of the main rebel bodies, the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tribal (later Tiger) Force (ATTF), include sovereignty for Tripura and the mass deportation of Bengali speaking people. Recently the central government has been attempting to redress its long neglect of the northeastern states.[76]

The neglect of development in the region by the central government has exacerbated ethnic tensions resulting in social upheavals and political violence

Religious discrimination

Political discrimination in India is defined along religious lines rather than racial or lingual.[77] The religious animosity runs very deep between the communities and is possibly the major cause of violence. Communalisation (a term used to refer to the inter-religious conflicts, especially Muslim-Hindu strife) of the Indian polity not only threatens the rights of whole communities and millions of people but the very make-up of society. The communal riots in India, largely between the Hindus and Muslims, have become increasingly violent.[78] Religion marks a clear line of demarcation, separating one group from

This violence has gone on for decades and the increasing trend of religious extremism threatens the development of the society and the opportunities for people to live together in peace

another with perceptions of deprivation revolving around this identity. In a highly heterogeneous society like India, poverty and economic imbalances weigh more heavily on some communities than on others. Muslims' access to political and economic resources in India is significantly lower, on average, than that of Hindus as are the social indicators for the Muslim population.[79]

Pakistan, despite being a religiously homogenous country, has a history of sectarian violence. The divide between the Sunni and Shi'ite communities in Pakistan has become highly politicised as each has sought to institutionalise its particular brand of Islam. Originally the Sunni and the Shi'ite communities in Pakistan had joined forces against the Ahmadiyya movement in the 1970s. This period saw institutionalised discrimination against a religious minority when a law was promulgated that accorded the Ahmedis a non-Muslim status. This was followed by widespread violence and persecution of the Ahmedis. After the 1980s, religious extremism took a new turn where the Shi'ite Muslims and Sunnis turned against one another. This violence has gone on for decades and the increasing trend of religious extremism threatens the development of the society and the opportunities for people to live together in peace.

Costs of conflict

Conflicts have emerged as a major obstacle to development and a potential threat to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the United Nations. More specifically, internal conflicts—wars, insurgencies and separatist movements for regional independence—pose a threat for individual well-being and stability of states. Internal conflicts record far more civilian deaths than interstate wars and tend to go on for a longer period. While external wars have at times been known to stimulate growth by increasing capacity utilisation and activity rates (as was the case in post Second World War Britain), the impact of internal conflicts is more decidedly disruptive for the economic and social systems. Not only does the fighting happen within the country, strategic tactics employed involve destruction of capital infrastructure and disruption of supply lines for electricity, food, water and other services to weaken the control of the state over the region. The resultant collapse of state apparatus leads to loss of control and access to essential services and assets. The insecurity, migration and deaths that are direct outcomes of fighting have damaging effects on human well-being. Although classified as indirect effects, the loss of entitlements from forced migration and destruction of property and livelihoods become a major cause for prolonged human suffering.

Most analysis and policy makers treat armed conflicts as temporary shocks to the growth path the country is on, and in doing so ignore the true nature of such conflicts and the devastating long-term impact they have on societies and economies of these countries. Societies in war-affected areas are characterised by 'depressed livelihoods' which is at the very least a long term, if not a permanent condition. People, regardless of their ethnicity and religion, are displaced from their homes and businesses, experience loss of property, injury and death and break up of communities.[80]

Human costs of conflict

The impact of conflicts on civilian life and property is directly linked to the onset of political violence in insurgencies and civil wars—suicide bombings, militia raids, rocket attacks and shoot-outs etc. Civilian casualties also result from undisciplined troops, deliberate terror and widespread use of landmines. While battlefield deaths are at an all time low at the beginning of the twenty-first century, civilian deaths account for more than 50 per cent (sometimes up to 97 per cent in the worst cases in Africa) of total deaths caused directly or indirectly by armed conflict in the poor countries.

More than 1.2 million people have been killed in internal armed conflicts in South Asia and more than 700,000 people have been internally displaced or live as refugees in neighbouring countries.[81] Half of the world's out of school children live in conflict or post-conflict societies (see section on Child Soldiers in Chapter 7).

While violence accounts for a lot of the human suffering, it is hunger, forced migration, onset of disease in the wake of violence, collapse of public services arising from the wider effects of protracted conflicts on the economic and administrative structure of the country as a whole, which lead to greater misery and death. Heavy human costs occur also through deteriorating nutrition, health and educational standards, and worsening infant mortality. All these adverse outcomes are a direct result of the disruption of access, claim and/or control on various services (public, private and market based), and social as well as communal structures that form the fabric of a well functioning society. In other words, they are a direct result of loss of entitlements, which represent people's command over resources.[82]

The onset of conflicts reduces food production, the result of which on lives of people is indicated by a fall in consumption levels and worsening availability of calories per head. The most damaging consequence for human survival is the combination of food price inflation and falling incomes that occurs simultaneously during conflicts. In the worst cases this leads to famine, with a death toll that exceeds the numbers directly killed by fighting. While establishing a clear causation between war and famine is a complicated exercise, onset and intensification of famine has been associated with political violence and war in a number of conflicts; Cambodia (1978-1988), Eriteria (1974–1992) and the war of independence in Bangladesh (1971).[83]

Disruptions to health services, especially infant vaccinations, compound the effects of food shortages as malnourished children succumb to disease. The exodus of the displaced and refugees during times of conflicts leads to the spread of infections and high death rates among the weakened population specially among the children and the elderly.[84]

In Nepal, nearly 400,000 rural families have been internally displaced. In Sri Lanka, the number of people displaced due to the war was estimated to be around 650,000, comprising roughly one-third of the population living in areas affected by conflict.[85] 80 per cent of the population of Vanni, which is a conflict-affected area, has been displaced.

One of the most obvious indicators of human suffering caused by armed conflict is the rampant and devastating poverty in war-torn societies. 8 per cent of the total population of Northeast Sri Lanka were in welfare centres as of 2001.[86] The poor bear a disproportionately large burden of the economic and social impacts of conflict on a micro level. Extreme poverty and persistent lack of development have been cited as one of the reasons for the onset of the revolutionary movement in Nepal. Estimates for Sri Lanka show that while one in every twelve households got killed due to the war in the general population in the northeast, among the poor the number rose to one in every seven households.[87]

The burden of loss of livelihoods through disrupted markets, as people move or are killed, is the heaviest for the poor. The most affected by the reduction in government's provision of basic services are the poorer sections of society. Furthermore, the agricultural sector is usually the worst hit and this is the sector where most of the poorer sections of society are employed. In Sri Lanka, the war served to intensify and expand greatly the threshold of vulnerabilities routinely associated with agricultural, fishing and other livelihoods. Apart from the daily insecurity of falling victim to violence, the people in the north east provinces feel insecure because they do not have freedom of movement, secure land rights and are subjected to illegal taxation. Freedom of movement is critical for the ability of the

The exodus of the displaced and refugees during times of conflicts leads to the spread of infections and high death rates among the weakened population specially among the children and the elderly

people to live and work. The civil war and the resulting violence have denied them access to markets, farm lands in other areas and fishing reserves.[88] Land right is a major cause of instability in the north east province, where people do not have secure access to their farmland.

Civil wars reduce the control of the state over the national territory and lead to social disintegration. The public entitlement failure is linked directly to government's inability to provide public services to its people. Some governments intentionally reduce relief services and transfers in enemy territory. The failure of public entitlement is also linked to overall fall in social sector expenditure. However, in Sri Lanka the government continued to provide services to Tamil controlled territory.

Violence against women during conflict is not accidental or a matter of course. It is a weapon of war, strategic, systematic and gender specific

Despite the Sri Lankan government's initiative to continue provision of basic services, there has been a significant public entitlement failure due to conflicts. The value of education services in the region declined substantially between 1990-91 in LTTE controlled regions of Sri Lanka. Rail and water transport services also fell sharply. Water transports suffered the worst with passenger ferry services and boat transport being virtually halted from 1991 onwards. Rail transport was attacked and disrupted by the LTTE to keep soldiers from reaching the northern areas.[89]

Women in situations of conflict

Conflict impacts the lives of women in a most fundamental way. Women are the most vulnerable group in the population. Conflict takes away the bare minimum of rights available to them. It threatens their lives, survival and the survival of their children. It takes away their homes, families and livelihoods.

The direct threat to women's lives and well-being comes from physical violence during the fighting. Violence against women during conflict is not accidental or a matter of course. It is a weapon of war, strategic, systematic and gender specific. The objectives vary from ethnic cleansing, spreading political terror, breaking the resistance of a community, to rewarding soldiers. Ironically it is the 'exalted' status of women as symbols of national honour and bearers of the national culture, values and traditions that makes them targets of the violence.

The collapse of heath facilities in conflict zones impact most on women. The collapse of state control makes enforcement impossible in a conflict-ridden situation. The most vulnerable of groups at the best of times, women's legal status and rights are non-existent at times of war.

Estimates of mortality rate show that women fare worse than men in times of conflict[90], a disturbing revelation given that the men are at the frontlines doing the actual fighting. During wartime when food supplies are low, women's share gets compromised in favour of feeding men. War and forced displacement takes a heavy toll on the reproductive health of women. Women fleeing their homes give birth without the barest necessities and the minimum adequate healthcare facilities. Women have very little or no access to pre-natal and post-natal care as hospitals and health care units are the first to be destroyed. Women doctors are killed, forced to leave or forbidden to attend to patients by the government's security forces and militia's alike. Difficult access to health facilities disrupts family planning services and exposes women to unattended pregnancies, unsafe abortions and sexually transmitted infections, including HIV.

The impact of conflict on women is not only gender specific it also varies with religion, caste, ethnicity, location and political affiliation. The mere suspicion of association with a particular group during conflict is a death sentence for women. Systematic rape during conflict has evolved to become a war tactic. Other forms of gender specific violence include sexual slavery, forced pregnancies and enforced sterilisation. In Bangladesh, estimates of the number of women raped during the country's nine-month war for

Box 2.3 Women's role in peace in South Asia

The human rights discourse on the impact of conflicts predominantly focuses on women as victims. While it is true that women have had to bear a disproportionate amount of misery and suffering, they are far from being merely victims. Women have taken on the role of able citizens, combatants, heads of households, war resisters and political leaders at the local and national level. Women's role in the peace building process is recognised internationally. Resolution 1325 of the Security Council explicitly mentions the need to give greater role to women in peace building measures.

There is a long history of women activism in South Asia and the initiative women have taken in this context is to be appreciated. Women make interventions for peace. They reach out across the ethnic divide and try and reunite societies. Women's engagement in everyday conflict leads them to consider issues of security, peace and conflict. Women mobilise themselves as members of a specific ethnic or religious community. The Naga Mothers take the lead in the process of peace building. The Naga Mothers in Association with the Mothers of Manipur appeal to the politicians to stop the violence. The women are united across the ethnic divides and political differences. In the Naga Hills of Manipur the ethnic violence between two tribes brought 5000 women out across the conflict divide onto the streets in 1995 to appeal for peace. They forced the village elders to broker a peace agreement. Women in Assam, Orissa and Bihar in India have undertaken similar initiatives. Women's groups have also opposed trends in militarisation.

One important outcome in the post-conflict stages has been the change in traditional roles of women in South Asia. They have gone from being victims to survivors. Whether it is voluntary or circumstantial, women no longer allow themselves to be confined to the four walls of their homes. Women have had to empower themselves and their roles have changed dramatically in both the political and economic sphere. Given that the men go off to fight leaving the women to care and provide for the families, the women have no choice but to take up earning a living. Traditionally, in Nepalese women are not allowed to plough the land but in the Maoist affected areas and guerrilla zones women have taken this opportunity to assert their capabilities.

Placing women in a position of power and decision making, whether it is on the international, national or community level, has proven very effective in getting justice for victims, making peace processes gender sensitive and helping communities recover from conflict. At the international level, appointment of women judges has led to significant advances in punishing sex crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal.

Source: Manchanda 2001.

independence in 1971 range from 250,000 to 400,000, and these rapes led to an estimated 25,000 pregnancies.[91]

In Kashmir, both the security forces and the militants have systematically used rape as a weapon to punish, intimidate, coerce, humiliate or degrade. According to human rights investigations, mass rape began to be routinely used in search and cordon operations.[92] Forced prostitution of migrants and displaced women and survival prostitution are said to be widespread in conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka. Women in Sri Lanka have suffered rape, detainment, and harassment at checkpoints in the two decades of civil war.

Economic costs of conflict

The nature of conflict, its duration and geography as well as the pre-conflict conditions in the economy (income levels, structures, external dependency, flexibility) are important determinants of the severity of impact. The actual fighting in the civil war in Sri Lanka for example, was geographically limited to the north of the country. The damage to infrastructure and capital was thus contained, as was the

adverse impact on the economy. The indirect effects of conflict filter through the economic channels and are, more often than not specially in the case of internal conflicts, more disruptive and destructive than the direct impact.[93] The economic costs arise from a worsening macro-economic situation, as resources are diverted to military expenditure, rising transaction costs of business, and falling investment due to uncertainty. While military activity accelerates, the agricultural sector and trade are disrupted. Destroyed infrastructure during ongoing internal conflicts reduces production capacity and disrupts markets.

While military activity accelerates, the agricultural sector and trade are disrupted. Destroyed infrastructure during ongoing internal conflicts reduces production capacity and disrupts markets

The destruction of physical and human capital comes as a direct result of the violence during the conflicts. Organisational capital can be severely weakened as a result of diminished state authority. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has caused a significant decline in educational services provided in the northern province because a majority of schools and colleges have been destroyed. Similarly, the rebels have destroyed government hospitals and health centres. Teachers and doctors are often targetted to further deteriorate the conditions in these regions and to spread terror.[94] In Nepal, the war has taken a significant toll on the economic, social and physical infrastructure of the country, and its consequences are felt in every sphere of the social and economic life in Nepal. Not only have the human rights violations reached crisis proportions, political, legal and social rights are being eroded everyday. Schools are frequently closed due to rising threats and strikes. There is a lot of looting and forced collection of taxes by insurgents, and supplies of essential goods are frequently interrupted in remote areas.

Destruction of government infrastructure increases reliance on immediate ethnic ties further polarising society. War related population movements have led to increased ethnic segregation in Sri Lanka, making much of the northern province ethnically homogenous with only the Tamil population remaining. The negative impact of such destruction is magnified as development expenditure[95] to build or reconstruct damaged infrastructure declines during times of conflict.

The impact of conflicts on macro-economic indicators has a direct link to concepts of economic security. Various studies have shown the impact of conflicts on GDP. Of the 25 countries that had experienced major internal conflict during the years 1960-1995, GDP per capita fell in all nations except one where the fighting was contained in one specific region.[96] It is important to note that deaths due to conflicts are lower in countries with higher levels of income. The states with improved social indicators are able to sustain economic growth despite ongoing conflict as in Sri Lanka.

During times of conflict, the economy moves from tradable to non-tradable products. The consequent fall in exports leads to reduced foreign exchange earnings. Although the overall level of output in the economy falls due to a decline in agricultural as well as industrial output, the former is affected far worse. Given that all countries in South Asia are highly dependent on their substantial agricultural sectors, the negative impact on agriculture and food production is particularly damaging.

- *Nepal:* The escalation of the Maoist insurgency in 2001 drastically affected the economic performance of the country, with the economic growth slowing down to an average of 1.9 per cent (FY2002-04) from a high of 4.9 per cent in the decade before. Private investments, as a percentage of GDP, have fallen from 15.4 per cent to 12.6 per cent between 1996 and 2004.
- *Bangladesh:* During the civil war in the then East Pakistan, all economic activity including agriculture was disrupted and most government services ceased to operate. The region's GDP fell by more than 20 per cent and food production per head fell by 12.5 per cent between 1969 and 1972.[97]

- *Sri Lanka:* Unlike the case in Nepal and Bangladesh, the Sri Lankan economy has managed to escape the negative impact of the prolonged civil war. This is partly attributable to the fact that the violence is contained in a restricted geographical area and partly to effective economic policies by the government that have increased trade flows. While Sri Lanka's 5 per cent economic growth rate despite ongoing conflict is commended, and rightly so, it is important to note that these calculations ignore the negative growth in the northern province. The economic impact of the armed conflict is apparent from the virtual destruction of the two main economic activities of the northeast region, farming and fishing, and the consequent depression of the livelihoods of the people of that region. The economic embargoes, transport difficulties, security restrictions, breakdown of marketing systems and rent seeking by armed forces among other factors have caused the rural economy to collapse.[98]

Refugees: a consequence of violent conflicts

Threats to life and physical security, fear of and active persecution, destruction of homes and means of livelihoods, and collapse of state provision and control, all become a reason for people to flee from their homes. These threats are a direct consequence of conflicts making refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs)[99] a tragic feature and consequence of conflicts within and between states.[100]

Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, South Asia has experienced mass population movements that arose as a result of grave human security concerns such as war, violent conflict, human rights violations or discrimination. Records show that more than 14 million people have left their homes during the partition. Another 10 million people were also displaced during 1971 when Bangladesh became independent. The third wave of refugees, and by far the largest in the history of the region, came during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1970s, when millions of people fled to Iran and Pakistan. While these events top the list with regards to the severity of the situation, other states in the region have also experienced mass displacement and exodus as a consequence of civil wars and insurgencies. In Nepal, nearly 400,000 rural families have been internally displaced from the mid-western regions due to the Maoist insurgency. In Sri Lanka, the civil war has displaced an estimated 650,000 people, comprising roughly one-third of the population living in affected areas.[101]

South Asia is home to 13.7 per cent of the total 9.236 million refugees in the world. Three-quarters of these refugees live in Pakistan. These figures include only the refugees that are registered with UNHCR and, therefore they understate the exact numbers. For example, a recent population census of Afghan refugees in Pakistan gives the total number of Afghan

Table 2.7 Number of refugees in South Asia, 2004

Country of Asylum	Number of refugees*	The origin of the refugees
India	162,687	Afganistan (6%), China (58%), Sri Lanka (35%)
Pakistan	3,047,225	Afganistan (99.9%)
Bangladesh	20,449; 300,000	Myanmar (99.7%); Biharies
Nepal	124,928	Bhutan (84%), Tibetans (16%)
Sri Lanka	63	
Azad Kashmir (Pak)	50,000	Disputed Kashmir
South Asia	1,268,744	
World	9,236,521	

Note: * The figure includes the refugees registered to UNHCR and do not include the asylum seekers during that year.
Source: UNHCR 2005a.

refugees living in Pakistan as 3.05 million, triple that of the registered number. Two-thirds of them live in North-West Frontier province, a quarter in Balochistan, 7 per cent in Punjab and 4 per cent in Sindh. If the 2.5 million Afghans who were repatriated since 2002 are taken into consideration, Pakistan becomes one of the largest host countries of refugees by being home to 10 per cent of the total refugee population of the world. According to UNHCR statistics, 960,617 people are still living with refugee status in Pakistan. The census conducted by the government indicates the number as more than three million.

While at some level the needs of refugees and displaced people are gender neutral, given the fact that approximately 75 per cent of the displaced are women and children their needs require greater attention

Most of the refugees do not want to return home but are forced to go back, sometimes by the host states[102] and at other times in the hope of rebuilding their lives. UNHCR has registered more than 2.5 million voluntary repatriations from Pakistan. The lack of law and order, employment opportunities and even adequate shelter or enough money to resettle then forces the refugees to return to their host countries. This phenomenon of 'reverse flows' is an additional cause of concern for humanitarian agencies.

While, at some level, the needs of refugees and displaced people are gender neutral, given the fact that approximately 75 per cent of the displaced are women and children their needs require greater attention. Women are more concerned with physical protection, food security, primary health care and education for themselves and their children. A significant proportion of the refugees and internally displaced people in the South Asia countries are comprised of children under eighteen; Pakistan (59 per cent), Sri Lanka (34 per cent), India (35 per cent), Bangladesh (58 per cent) and Nepal (39 per cent).[103]

Education is a big challenge in refugee camps: Entirely dependent on foreign funding, education budgets for UNHCR all over the world were cut because of a shortage of funds in 2001, compromising the provision of this fundamental human right for the refugees.[104] Additional challenges include lack of availability of textbooks and reluctance of trained teachers to teach in camps. At times, cultural taboos keep girls out of schools. The enrollment and retention rates in Balochishtan show only boys enrolled in camp schools. One-third of refugee children and adolescents in populations categorised as 'UNHCR assisted' are in UNHCR-supported schooling and perhaps 40 per cent are in school altogether. Girls represent about 40 per cent of UNHCR-funded students.

Policy implications

The threat to human security in South Asia, as discussed in this chapter, originating from conflicts within a country or between them, is now increasingly being realised by the people and the governments as the main stumbling block for the region to become an economic giant with over 1.4 billion peaceful and harmonious people. As Mahbub ul Haq passionately believed, there is nothing standing in the way of South Asia becoming like the European Union of one economy and seven polities. May be that is for the future South Asian people and their leaders to decide, but for now we need to think concretely about how to resolve some of the conflicts so that the region is ready for a peaceful future.

The solutions that readily come to mind are the ones we have suggested in our previous reports, such as reducing arms imports and military expenditure, and using the money thus saved for social development. This was the idea behind Mahbub ul Haq's famous 'peace dividend'. But under the current geo-political situation in the region, we do believe that these suggestions many not be accepted by any policy maker.

Recently, through some confidence building measures, the relations between India and Pakistan have improved. In the wake of the earthquake that hit parts of Kashmir earlier this year, Pakistan and India have shown surprising maturity in their relationship reflected in the voluntary

decision by both parties to open up the line of control for travel of the Kashmiri people from both sides of the border. In recent years, there also have been several signs of a serious political commitment to improve relations between the two countries; the Lahore summit, declaration of a cease-fire on Kashmir by both countries, agreement to resume direct air links, the first bus service in sixty years between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar etc. These measures need to be supported by increased trade and economic ties, such as the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline agreement with the potential to help meet the energy needs of all countries involved.

There is also a very pressing need to address the underlying causes of internal conflicts. Equitable economic and development policies that cut across ethnic, religious, linguistic divides and ensure opportunities for all—access to education, health, and due process of law—are important ingredients for achieving such ends.

While policies that directly address the causes will help reduce the probability of violent social upheavals, there is a dire need for the design and implementation of policies that help reduce the suffering of people in the conflict zones today. As the Sri Lankan example shows, by continuing the provision of basic social services, the suffering of the afflicted during the fighting can be minimised. Another important lesson to be learnt from Sri Lanka's experience is that any form of governance, even a parallel rebel government as the one by the LTTE in the northeast, helps in maintaining some security for the people. Sustaining public entitlements—preventive health measures, notably immunisation, and access to adequate food[105]—can be ensured with adequate levels of total expenditure even with increases in military expenditure. Flexible approaches like mobile clinics and classrooms, the training and use of basic health workers and primary school teachers and campaigns for immunisation and sanitation improve social outcomes

Box 2.4 Mahbub ul Haq on settlement of Kashmir dispute

'A few months ago, I suggested a new approach to the Kashmir dispute which drew a good deal of excited comment from within the country and prompted many undeserved personal attacks. However, I still believe that these proposals are worth serious consideration. Let me recapitulate the six main components in my plan:

- Both India and Pakistan should withdraw their forces from Kashmir towards a defined border belt, as an initial step towards the complete dimilitarisation of the region.
- The present border between the two parts of Kashmir, demarcated by the Line of Control, should be completely opened to enable Kashmiris to live together in peace.
- The political and economic administration should be transferred to the full control of the Kashmiri people through a programme of self-governance in a step-by-step process.
- Over the next ten years, Kashmir should be placed under the administration of 'trusteeship' of the United Nations to ensure that current passions cool down, the present violations of human rights cease and the Kashmiri people are given a chance to determine their own fate at the end of this process.
- Kashmiri leaders should be allowed to meet freely and discuss among themselves the form and shape of the future of Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan should tacitly agree not to 'bilaterise' the Kashmir issue, but to leave it increasingly open for discussion among Kashmiri leaders.
- After a temporary period of UN trusteeship, a plebiscite should be held under the supervision of the United Nations to determine the free will of the Kashmiri people—whether they desire accession with Pakistan or with India, or prefer independence.'

tremendously. Health campaigns in Nepal, undertaken by the UNHCR, have proven to be a huge success despite the ongoing violence in the rural regions of the country. Measles immunisation and the vitamin-A supplementation program undertaken in May 2005 are estimated to be averting the deaths of 12000 Nepali children each year.[106]

Furthermore, there is a need to make the peace dialogue more gender sensitive and to give women a more central role in the peace process. Political dialogue with all parties represented has proven to be more productive. The peace accord signed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts that brought an end to the hostilities is a case in point. Also in conflicts in Nepal and Sri Lanka, sustained if fragile ceasefires were negotiated not through military might but by a recognition of the grievances involved. Finally, there is a need to develop institutions that lessen the degree of fragmentation in South Asian societies (see chapter 8).

We would like to end this chapter with excerpts from a proposal of Mahbub ul Haq to resolve the Kashmir dispute. As is evident today, many elements of Haq's proposal are now being considered seriously by both Pakistan and India, although in 1996 he was severely criticised for having thought of such unpatriotic ideas. Mahbub ul Haq was ahead of his time in everyway (see box 2.4).

Chapter 3

Economic Security

'The basic concept of security is undergoing a profound change all over the world. The security of people is moving to centre stage, with more emphasis on income and job security, environmental security, security against crime, security of both individuals and communities.'

—Mahbub ul Haq

Increasing economic insecurity has emerged as a defining feature of the material life in South Asia in recent times. This insecurity is reflected in various dimensions, and is related to causes both external and internal to the economies of the region. At one level, what is true of South Asia is also true across the globe, especially for the developing world. But there are particular processes which have largely resulted from policies employed by governments within South Asia. These processes have interacted with political economy configurations to create regional specificities. The chapter discusses the major forms of economic insecurity in the region. These forms include poverty and widening gaps in income, food insecurity and the changing nature of employment and unemployment in the backdrop of greater global economic integration. The analysis in this chapter draws upon the evidence presented in the previous reports on human development in South Asia. These include Reports on; Globalisation and Human Development (2001), Agriculture and Rural Development (2002) and The Employment Challenge (2003).

Poverty and income inequality

Figure 3.1 provides the estimates of poverty for South Asia in terms of the standard poverty line of US $1 a day. The incidence of poverty varies significantly across the region, ranging from a high of 39 per cent in Nepal to a low of around 8 per cent in Sri Lanka. When we take into account those who are surviving at US $2 a day or less, the picture for South Asia gets grimmer. Two-thirds or more of the total population in every major country, except Sri Lanka, earns less than US $2 per day. This suggests that a very high proportion of the South Asian population stays barely above the poverty line and even a slight upward movement of the poverty line is sufficient to push this section of the population into abject poverty. Majority of the population in the region may, therefore, be termed as highly insecure from the economic viewpoint.

Most countries have experienced either stagnation or increase in poverty levels as defined by the headcount ratio (table 3.1). Rural poverty has been consistently on the increase in Sri Lanka. On the contrary,

Figure 3.1 Population below international poverty line in South Asia, 2000



Note: The latest survey years for Pakistan and Nepal are 1998-99 and 1995-96 respectively.
Source: World Bank 2005a.

Table 3.1 Trends in population below national poverty line in South Asia, 1993-2000

(%)

Countries	Survey year	Rural	Urban	National
India	1993-94	37.3	32.4	36.0
	1999-2000	30.2	24.7	28.6
Pakistan	1993	33.4	17.2	28.6
	1998-99	35.9	24.2	32.6
Bangladesh	1995-96	55.2	29.4	51.0
	2000	53.0	36.6	49.8
Nepal	1995-96	44.2	23.0	42.0
Sri Lanka	1990-91	22.0	15.0	20.0
	1999-2000	27.0	15.0	25.0

Source: World Bank 2005a.

in both the urban and rural sectors. Specifically, the national poverty level in India was brought down to around 29 per cent in the year 2000 from 36 per cent in 1993-94.

The rising inequality is clearly the major reason why South Asia has failed to make progress in reducing poverty. The evidence on income inequalities across the region is broadly in conformity with the earlier evidence on increasing poverty levels. Inequality measures show that

Table 3.2 Income/consumption shares and inequality measures in South Asia, 2000

		Share of income/consumption (%)				Inequality measures	
Countries	Survey year	Poorest 10%	Poorest 20%	Richest 10%	Richest 20%	Richest 10% to poorest 10%	Richest 20% to poorest 20%
India	1999	3.9	8.9	29	43	7.3	4.9
Pakistan	1998	3.7	8.8	28	42	7.6	4.8
Bangladesh	2000	3.9	9.0	27	41	6.8	4.6
Nepal	1995	3.2	7.6	30	45	9.3	5.9
Sri Lanka	1999	3.4	8.3	28	42	8.1	5.1

Source: UNDP 2005.

Pakistan and Bangladesh both experienced a dramatic rise in urban poverty during the late 1990s. This is not to overlook the fact that poverty is overwhelmingly rural in South Asia. India is the only country for which plausible estimates do suggest that poverty has been on a consistent decline

Nepal and Sri Lanka have the highest income gaps in South Asia (table 3.2). However, all the economies in the region are characterised by high inequalities of income. The characteristic feature of most countries is that the income/consumption share of the poorest 10 per cent is less than 4 per cent of the aggregate income/consumption. Conversely, above one-fourth of the income/consumption is snatched away by the richest 10 per cent.

To gauge the inequality trends in South Asia, it is useful to look at the inequality in the income distribution for specific countries, measured in terms of the Gini index:

Figure 3.2 Trends in the Gini coefficient for Pakistan, 1988-2002



Source: SPDC 2004.

- Figure 3.2 reveals that the income distribution in Pakistan worsened from 1988 onwards with the Gini coefficient jumping from 0.35 to 0.41. Beyond 1999, the situation somewhat stabilised in the rural areas but the same was not true for the urban income inequality.
- In Bangladesh, the Gini coefficient spiraled in both urban and rural areas

during the 1990s (figure 3.3). The increase in rural inequality over this period was driven by the growth and distribution of income from a handful of sources—non-farm enterprise, salary from non-farm employment, remittances (especially from abroad) and property income. These sources became highly concentrated and unequalising in Bangladesh over the nineties.

A significant feature of the prevailing income inequality in both Bangladesh and Pakistan is that the income distribution has been worse in the urban sector as compared to the rural areas. Moreover, in both countries, there has been a substantial and consistent increase in the urban inequalities.

The growing inequalities of income are also evident in South Asia in terms of the differences between sub-regions within countries:

- There has been a sharp increase in regional inequality in India during the 1990s. By 2002-2003, the net per capita state domestic product (NSDP) of Punjab (the richest state) rose to about 4.7 times that of Bihar (the poorest state). This ratio had been a much lower 4.2 in 1993-1994.
- In Nepal, the difference between Kathmandu and the rest of Nepal, including other urban areas, is very marked. Infact, the poverty ratio in the urban Kathmandu Valley has been estimated at a negligible 4 per cent.
- The industrialised Western Province of Sri Lanka fares the best on most human development indicators, whereas the war-torn north and east of the country are the poorest and the most deprived.

The widening of income gaps has, in some cases, been associated with increased social and political tensions in South Asia. This friction has been expressed not so much as direct demand for redressal of income imbalances, but rather in terms of other ethnic, social, cultural or regional demands. Of course such influences have served to render South Asia a much less secure region in economic terms.

Figure 3.3 Trends in the Gini coefficient for Bangladesh, 1991-2000



Source: Ghosh 2005.

Food security

South Asia is an agricultural region endowed with an abundance of natural resources. Around 70 per cent of the population is dependent, directly or indirectly, on agriculture. Agriculture accounts for a little over 28 per cent of the sectoral share of GDP in the region. The food grain production has more than doubled in the region since the 1960s. The average per capita availability of food, as represented by per capita dietary energy supply, rose in all countries in South Asia between 1990 and 2002 (table 3.3). Yet there is a wide prevalence of hunger and malnutrition which is seriously jeopardis-

Table 3.3 Trends in dietary energy consumption in South Asia, 1990-2002

(kcal/person/day)

Countries	1990-92	2000-02
India	2370	2420
Pakistan	2310	2430
Bangladesh	2070	2190
Nepal	2350	2440
Sri Lanka	2230	2390

Source: FAO 2005a.

Figure 3.4 Trends in proportion of the undernourished in South Asia, 1990-2002



Source: FAO 2005c.

ing the economic security of the people in South Asia.

State of malnutrition in South Asia

The proportion of the undernourished has been brought down steadily in South Asia since 1990 (figure 3.4). The ratio, however, continues to be high, ranging from 17 per cent in Nepal to 30 per cent in Bangladesh. At present, over 300 million South Asians are chronically malnourished (table 3.4). This constitutes about 40 per cent of all food insecure people in the developing world (815 million). This is not all, however. There are tens of thousands in the low-income group who constantly live under the threat of food insecurity. Any sudden fluctuation in income, production shortfall or loss of employment inevitably pushes these individuals to the very brink of food insecurity. If the vulnerable groups are taken into account, the extent of malnutrition in South Asia appears to be truly mind-boggling:

- Admittedly, Pakistan has made encouraging progress in the per capita availability of food over the last decade. However, the situation with regard to malnutrition has only improved marginally, from 26 per cent of the population to 24 per cent, in the past 20 years. Infants, pre-school children and pregnant and lactating mothers remain particularly vulnerable. During 1999-2000, there were eight million malnourished children in Pakistan with iron and anemia deficiency being quite common.[1]
- Malnutrition presents an overwhelming national challenge for Bangladesh. With 9 out of 10 children malnourished, at least 600 children die daily from causes related to malnutrition.

The state of malnutrition is well-reflected in the high prevalence of underweight children in the region (figure 3.5). Not surprisingly, Bangladesh has the highest proportion of underweight children

Table 3.4 Trends in the number of undernourished people in South Asia, 1990-2002

(millions)

Countries	1990-1992	2000-2002
India	215.8	221.1
Pakistan	27.7	29.3
Bangladesh	39.2	42.5
Nepal	3.9	4.0
Sri Lanka	4.8	4.1
South Asia	291.3	301.1

Source: FAO 2005c.

with India not too far behind. Though the situation is somewhat better in Pakistan (38 per cent underweight children), the proportion of underweight children has stagnated over the years. In Nepal, a survey conducted by the Ministry of Health found that nearly half the children are underweight with as many as 13 per cent falling in the category of being severely underweight.[2]

Figure 3.5 Trends in the percentage of underweight children (under-five) in South Asia, 1990-2004



Source: FAO 2005c.

Elements of food security

There are three key elements to assure food security in South Asia—availability, access and distribution. The linkage is that the physical availability of food does not guarantee everyone's access to the same. Equitable access is, in turn, dependent upon equitable food distribution.

Availability

During the 1970s and 1980s, most countries in South Asia were food self-sufficient. The growing population, however, exerted decisive pressures on the domestic food supplies rendering a number of countries as the net importers of food. Pakistan, for instance, had achieved near self-sufficiency in wheat and was considered a leading rice exporter during the early 1980s. However, by the later half of the 1990s, Pakistan was annually importing 2.5 million tons of wheat. Similarly, Nepal, previously a food surplus country, imported 46,000 metric tons of cereals during 1999. Today, 45 out of 75 states in Nepal are classified as food deficit.[3]

Access

The crisis of food insecurity in the region is mostly related to low access rather than the low availability of food. Well above half the consumption expenditure in South Asia is reserved for food items. The poor, however, lack the purchasing power to access food. The high incidence of food/income poverty in South Asia has already been highlighted in the previous section. Despite increased food availability, severe inequality in land and income distribution prevents the poor from meeting their minimum daily nutritional requirements. The highly skewed asset-distribution in most South Asian countries is by far the critical factor negatively affecting food security. Small farmers have limited access to water, credit, fertiliser and other resources as compared to large farmers and landowners. Lower access to these resources generates inadequate incomes that jeopardise food security. In South Asia as a whole, 80 per cent of the farms have an average size of a meagre 0.6 hectares.[4] This is the case throughout South Asia:

- Of the total farm area in Pakistan, 40 per cent is owned by 7 per cent large farmers with an average landholding of 10 hectares or more. Infact, four out of five farmers have small landholdings of 5 hectares or less.
- In Bangladesh, 96 per cent of the farms have an average size of just 0.3 hectares.
- More than two-thirds of the landholders in Sri Lanka have less than a single hectare of owned/leased cultivable land.
- Holdings as small as one hectare (or less) account for 30 per cent of the total farm area in Nepal.[5]

Distribution

The public food distribution system in South Asia is believed to be highly inefficient and corrupt. National examples make the point clear:

- The Food Corporation in India is responsible for the procurement, stocking and supplying for the Public Distribution systems (PDS). The inefficiency of the corporation is cited as one of the major factors behind malnutrition and the hindrances in access to adequate food in India.
- Pakistan has tried to experiment with a new system of food marketing since 1987. Under this system, the government annually issues wheat in bulk to the authorised flourmills in the country at a fixed price. Unfortunately, this mechanism has failed to provide food at cheaper rates to very low income families. Various food stamp/food distribution schemes introduced for the purpose have not been very successful
- In Nepal, The Nepal Food Corporation (NFC) is responsible for the supply of food grains to the food deficit districts. The corporation is reputed to procure food grains from traders, rather than farmers, at high prices.

The reality is that the food distribution programmes in South Asia comprising food aid, food subsidies, low cost rations etc. have mostly been expensive and poorly targeted. If anything, the price support and regulation harmed producers' incentives, thus depressing the domestic production of food.

Intra-household food security

In South Asia, the distribution of food within households is often dictated by tradition. The women usually eat last and utilise the minimum amount of food. This gender bias is largely due to the perceived differences in social and economic benefits that a family can procure from children of different gender. The food insecurity of women has impacts on their ability to engage in farm and non-farm activity apart from affecting the health of the future generation. The gender disparity in intra-household access to food is evident from the fact that almost half the world's anemic women live in South Asia.[6] A very high percentage of the pregnant women are anemic. This largely accounts for the high infant and maternal mortality rates, as well as the prevalence of low birth weight newborns in the region.

The future scenario

Does the future promise something markedly better for the undernourished in South Asia? The food requirement in South Asia is likely to double over the next 25 years. This is in the face of a shrinking natural resource base due to the burgeoning population. Increasing urbanisation and industrialisation will create additional pressure on the limited natural resources. The increased food demand has to be met form higher agricultural yields. Unfortunately, however, the scope of bringing new lands under cultivation in the South Asian region is rather limited. South Asia will, therefore, continue to be home to a massive proportion of malnourished children. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) projections indicate that by the year 2020, over 63 million pre-school children in South Asia will be malnourished. They will account for nearly half the developing world's under-five children suffering from malnutrition. In 2020, India alone will be home to 44 million malnourished preschoolers.[7] Already, South Asia has been consistently reporting the highest increase in the number of undernourished people after Central Africa. Given these present trends and future projections, attainment of economic security presents a huge challenge for South Asia.

Employment security

Employment generation is indeed the essential link between growth and poverty reduction. Apart from their direct effect on economic security, the patterns of employment growth in South Asia are critical to the determination of the changes in income distribution and the incidence of poverty. The rates of growth of employment in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan have failed to keep pace with the growth rates of labour force and the gross domestic product (GDP). Sri Lanka's employment growth has also failed to match its GDP growth. Nepal, however, appears to have exhibited impressive performance in the employment sector (table 3.5). The economic growth in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh has failed to absorb the incremental labor force due to a couple of major reasons:

- Economic growth itself started faltering in these countries in the second half of the 1990s.
- The pattern of the growth process—capital–intensive and urban-oriented—did not help generate better employment outcomes, even in case of the economies that experienced impressive growth. In most countries, during the second half of the 1990s, there was a sharp decline in the employment elasticity of output growth. In India, for instance, employment elasticities fell in agriculture, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, transport, storage and communication, finance and insurance and services sectors.

Table 3.5 Average annual growth rates of employment, labour force and the gross domestic product (GDP) in South Asia, 1995-2002

(%)

Countries	Employment 1995-2002	Labour force 1995-2002	GDP 1995-2000
India	1.0	2.0	6.6
Pakistan	3.2	3.4	3.8
Bangladesh	1.6	2.6	5.1
Nepal	5.9	2.6	4.5
Sri Lanka	2.4	1.8	5.0
Bhutan	…	2.6	6.9
Maldives	4.2	3.4	6.7

Note: Estimates for employment are up to the latest year available.
Source: ILO 2003.

Unemployment and underemployment

South Asian labour market is characterised by pervasive unemployment and underemployment. Unemployment rates in South Asia vary from one country to another and are generally not very high if judged by global standards. The region, as a whole, registered a low unemployment rate of 3.4 per cent in the year 2002.[8] However, some countries registered much higher levels of unemployment within the region. For instance, Sri Lanka and Pakistan registered unemployment rates of 8.2 per cent and 7.8 per cent respectively over the period 1999-2001 (figure 3.6).

Open unemployment in the region is generally recorded to be low due to multiple causes:

- There is an absence of social protection plans for the unemployed.
- The employment agencies that could be used for identifying the unemployed are virtually non-existent.

Figure 3.6 Unemployment rate in South Asia, 1999-2001



Sources: ADB 2003 and ILO 2002c.

- The pervasive nature of the household enterprise system in South Asia acts as a labor market sponge.

In addition to the above, the financial tribulations encountered by the unemployed force them to engage in activities that, under no circumstances, can be regarded as 'fully employing'. It is in this context that underemployment and the non-productive use of labor force emerge as the core employment issues in South Asia. Statistics utilising the 'time criteria' paint a distressing picture:

- In Pakistan, 15-20 per cent of the total employed work for less than 35 hours per week and are, therefore, recorded as 'underemployed'.
- Those working less than 40 hours a week account for 34 per cent of the employed in India.
- Using a criterion similar to the one employed for India, underemployment rate was a whopping 47 per cent in Nepal in 1996.
- The incidence of underemployment appears to be much higher among the women and youth of South Asia.

The persistence of large-scale underemployment implies the continued proliferation of low productivity jobs, most typically now in the services sector.

The sectoral distribution of employment

The sectoral distribution of employment reflects the overwhelming importance of the agriculture sector in South Asia, which accounts for well over half the total employment. The proportion of people engaged in agriculture-related occupations is, however, diminishing steadily in all countries with the passage of time. There has been a reallocation of labour from agriculture to services rather than industry. Presently, the employment share of agriculture varies across the region, ranging from a low 22 per cent in Maldives to around 79 per cent in Nepal (table 3.6). In some instances, such trends are a major source of increased economic insecurity. According to the National Sample Survey (NSS) data for India, there has been a very large increase in landless households as a percentage of total rural households, from around 35 per cent in 1987-88 to as much as 41 per cent in 1999-2000. The peasants were effectively dispossessed of their land and forced to find wage incomes in and out of agriculture, contributing heavily to the fall in the employment share of the sector.

Workers' rights

In South Asia, the desired ratification of the International Labour Organization (ILO) core labour standards has left a lot to be desired:

Table 3.6 Sectoral distribution of employment in South Asia, 1980-1995

(%)

Countries	1980			1990			1995		
	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services
India	69.5	13.1	17.4	69.1	13.6	17.3	66.7	12.9	20.3
Pakistan	52.7	20.3	26.8	51.1	19.8	28.9	47.3	17.1	35.6
Bangladesh	72.6	8.7	18.7	66.4	13.0	16.2	63.2	9.6	25.0
Nepal	93.8	0.5	5.7	83.3	2.3	13.7	78.5	5.5	16.0
Sri Lanka	45.9	18.6	29.3	47.8	20.6	30.0	41.6	22.5	33.4
Bhutan	94.4	1.4	4.2	94.2	0.9	5.0	…	…	…
Maldives	49.3	29.3	21.3	25.2	22.4	48.5	22.2	23.9	50.4

Source: ILO 2001.

- Sri Lanka is the only country that has ratified the eight core ILO conventions.
- Pakistan and Bangladesh have ratified seven of the conventions, Nepal has ratified six, while India lags far behind, having ratified a paltry four conventions.
- Bhutan and Maldives are not even the members of ILO.

In most cases, the implementation of the labour standards, the actual extension of the rights, has been poor, to say the least. There have been huge gaps between the rights promised to the workers and what has ultimately been promulgated. The effective implementation of labour standards in the region has been rendered difficult on the following grounds:

- Prevalence of a huge informal sector
- Minimum-size restrictions for organisations to benefit from these laws
- The usual exclusion of the agriculture sector from the jurisdiction of the laws

The rights of the South Asian workers, though enshrined in each country's constitution and supported by specific labour legislation, are not protected across the board today. This is especially accurate in case of women and children employed in the informal and exploitative sectors. In India, for instance, the proportion of workforce formally covered by legal protection (minimum labour standards) is not more than 10 per cent. Informal sector activities account for the rest of employment. Of course, the lack of political will to enforce the fundamental labour standards has profound negative implications for economic security in South Asia.

Impact of privatisation on economic security

Privatisation has taken two important forms in South Asia. The first is the direct sale of public assets to private agents who are then charged with providing the good or delivering the service. Such a sale is usually subject to some regulatory authority. The second form is the running down or closure of state units that were delivering goods or services, such that private providers necessarily become more important. The first type has been more significant for goods-producing public enterprises as well as utilities such as power generation and distribution. The second is more evident in a range of public services like health and education.

Downsizing of employment and closure of loss-making public sector enterprises have typically been features of the attempts at fiscal consolidation across South Asia. It is often the case that some of these actually provided important services to farmers, small enterprises and people in general, so their closure also had unfortunate productive and distributive implications. Privatisation of basic services like electricity and transport has also raised the prices of these services in many places. This has definitely contributed to the increased inequality and economic insecurity observed during the 1990s. The worst hit have been the relatively backward regions where private participation in industry is low.

The increasing incidence of poverty and inequality in Pakistan, for instance, may largely be attributed to the 'Structural Adjustment Programme' adopted in the late 1980s. A significant feature of the structural reforms was privatisation and the consequent loss of employment for redundant workers. The adverse impact of the programme on the poor was exacerbated by the prevailing weak institutional context. Given other similar examples, all the governments in the region now recognise that employment generation has been a major failure of the privatisation process in the region. Infact, it is now widely acknowledged that the privatisation process has been associated with the deceleration of employment in South Asia. Strangely, however, the latest policy statements for employment generation

There have been huge gaps between the rights promised to the workers and what has ultimately been promulgated

refer to further privatisation and deregulation of domestic economic activity. If greater economic security were to be the focus of the new policy thrust in the region, then it would entail a rethinking of the policy framework rather than further doses of the same ineffectual reforms.

Globalisation and economic security in South Asia

All the economies in the South Asian region underwent substantial trade liberalisation from the early 1990s onwards

The late 1980s and the 1990s were years of increased global economic integration for the South Asian countries. This period of increased openness coincided with the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Initially, there was an air of optimism regarding the growth of the key sectors of the South Asian economy—agriculture, textile and services:

- The Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) in 1995 brought agriculture under the effective purview of a multilateral trading system to remove trade distortions resulting from unrestricted use of production and export subsidies and import barriers. The South Asian countries stood to benefit by the creation of massive employment opportunities because of the expected reduction in subsidisation of the agriculture sector by the developed countries. Rural labour demand and wages were projected to rise in South Asia. Also, it was expected that rural infrastructure development, a labour-intensive process, would follow export-led growth in the agriculture sector.
- The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was seen as a great fillip for the textiles and clothing sector in South Asia. ATC aimed at phasing out the highly protectionist Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which allowed the developed countries to selectively impose quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing from developing countries. Most countries in South Asia possess comparative advantage internationally in this sector and stand to gain considerably in a truly liberalised trading scenario. As the sector is labour-intensive, it was expected that ATC would help create much needed productive employment opportunities in South Asia.
- The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) covers a broad range of services like tourism, education, consultancy services and manpower exports. The services sector currently accounts for about half the GDP of South Asia. Hence, the liberalisation of the services sector was expected to be extremely beneficial for the region which could take advantage of cheap labour to increase exports.

Behind the rosy scenario, WTO laid a crucial demand on developing countries including those in South Asia. These countries had to remove all non-tariff barriers and reduce tariff barriers on industrial goods. Accordingly, all the economies in the South Asian region underwent substantial trade liberalisation from the early 1990s onwards. The effective rates of protection across the region were sharply reduced.

Unfortunately, thus far, the globalisation experience seems to have belied the optimistic expectations. It is true that in the major national economies in South Asia, there has indeed been a spurt in employment in a particular export sector—readymade garments in Bangladesh, cotton cultivation in Pakistan, clothing, software and information technology (IT)-enabled services in India and some miscellaneous manufactured exports in Sri Lanka. However, this has been more than counterbalanced by the decline in employment in traditional sectors and in industry catering to the domestic market that have faced import competition consequent upon trade liberalisation. This is why across the region, aggregate rates of employment show deceleration in growth and in manufacturing, even declines. Infact, for South Asia as a whole, the unemployment level increased from

2.9 per cent in 1995 to 3.4 per cent during the first six years of trade liberalisation.[9]

In the era of globalisation and market liberalisation, South Asia has seen a trend to move away from large enterprises and stable workforce/wage system towards more flexible production processes propelled by rather unstable systems of employment and wage. Hence, a critical facet of the new labour market is the extent of informalisation and casualisation of employment. As discussed earlier, the employment share of the services sector is steadily rising throughout South Asia. Such phenomenon in itself also indicates a rise in self-employment and casual employment in the informal economy of the region. Statistics present the remaining story:

- Currently, less than one-third of the total workers in South Asia fall in the category of wage workers, salaried workers and employers. This ratio is as low as 12 per cent for Bangladesh.
- There has been a steady increase in the casualisation of the labour force in India with the share of casual employment reaching a high 70 per cent in 1993-94. Particularly, for male workers in urban areas, the shares of casual workers and self-employed workers have steadily increased, while there has been a marginal decline in the share of regular employment.
- Similarly, in Bangladesh, there has been a dramatic increase in the ratio of self-employed to total workers (figure 3.7).
- Own-account enterprises have emerged as an extremely significant source of employment during the globalisation phase. This, of course, is an indicator of the growing informalisation of economic activities and the growing casualisation of the labour force.

In general, the shift to self-employment in non-agriculture tends to be less rewarding in income terms for the poor, than the shift to regular work, and definitely implies more insecurity because of the uncertainty of self-employed incomes of small producers and service providers.

Globalisation has pushed downwards the real wage rates both in the formal and informal sectors in South Asia. Sri Lanka has been an exception where the growth rate of real wages in the unorganised sector actually increased between 1980 and 1993. In all other South Asian countries, the dismantling of labour institutions and increasing labour flexibility increased employment insecurities, reduced real wage rates and widened gaps between the formal and informal sector. For instance, in Bangladesh, real wages declined in the formal sector at an annual rate of 3.9 per cent and in the informal sector by 0.3 per cent between 1986 and 1990.[10] Such trends are especially worrisome because Bangladesh, India and Pakistan were experiencing rising real wage growth rates of both formal and informal sector workers in the pre-globalisation period.

The worst affected by import penetration have been the small producers, who are by far the most labour-intensive employers in South Asia. They have often been displaced by imports produced through more capital-intensive techniques. Hence, globalisation has affected patterns of

Figure 3.7 Trends in self-employed workers as percentage of all workers in Bangladesh, 1996-2003



Source: Ghosh 2005.

technological choice of domestic producers, independent of whether they are producing for the home market or for the export market. Local producers are compelled to adopt relatively labour-saving techniques to successfully compete with large multinational producers in both domestic and international markets with strict standards of cost and quality. Even small-scale producers are not immune to this trend in South Asia as the products of the multinational companies become more widely available in the relatively remote or rural markets in the region.

Why, after all, has globalisation failed to ensure greater economic security for the inhabitants of South Asia? Admittedly, there have been certain failures on the domestic/regional front:

- With globalisation and greater competition, the demand for skilled and semi-skilled workers in South Asia has gone up. It is the educational attainment of the labour force that governs the extent of adaptability of the labour force to changed market demand. But, due to the prevalence of high illiteracy rates and low levels of educational attainments, the quality of labour force has continued to be relatively poor. Infact, less than one-tenth of those employed in South Asia are graduates.[11] In India and Pakistan, nearly half the employed are totally illiterate. While the literacy levels are higher in Sri Lanka, there still appear to be few job-seekers beyond the middle school level. The illiteracy rates are much worse for the female employed. In India and Pakistan, three out of four women participating in the job market are not literate. Obviously, most South Asian countries have miserably failed to improve the capability of the poor through better access to education which could have expanded the access of the poor to employment and better wages.
- Agriculture in South Asia did not show the kind of growth that was expected. One may identify certain structural explanations for the failure. These, for instance, comprise the dependence of farmers on middlemen which sharply escalates the costs while reducing competitiveness.

The crux of the matter, however, is that there are serious problems with the manner in which WTO is being implemented. Infact, WTO has failed to provide a level playing field for the developing countries:

- According to the AOA stipulation, agricultural subsidies in developed countries were to be reduced by 36 per cent during the stipulation period. The developed countries have not yet responded to the demands made on them by AOA and continue to subsidise their farm produce. Infact, the Total support Estimate (TSE) given by the OECD countries to their agriculture sector increased from US $305,000 million in 1986-88 to US $346,000 million from 2002-04.[12] Unless the developed countries fulfill their obligation under the AOA, South Asian agriculture sector will not be able to reap any tangible benefits under the new trade regime.
- Most of the products on which quotas have been abolished under the ATC are commercially insignificant for the South Asian countries. At any rate, the implementation of the ATC has not been extensive enough to result in any solid gains for South Asia.
- There has not been any meaningful liberalisation in the services sector that would have helped in the export of low-skilled labour from South Asia to the developed world. Services have only been liberalised in sectors of primary interest to the developed countries, for example, in telecommunication and financial services.

As things stand, for the poor of south Asia, globalisation has been associated with greater economic insecurity. The gains of globalisation have so far accrued

to those who already possess education and skill, easier market access and adequate collateral to access credit. Generally, the quality of employment appears to have deteriorated with an increase in casual work, greater fragility of contracts and indications that day labourers find fewer days of work. Real wage rates have typically stagnated and wage shares of income have declined. This is largely because the ongoing globalisation process has failed to ensure that trade is rooted in the principles of equity and fair play among nations. In this regard, it is commendable that recently the developed countries have finally agreed to eliminate farm export subsidies by 2013 and subsidies on cotton by 2006. The agreement was reached after protracted negotiations at the WTO ministerial conference in Hong Kong in December 2005. In addition, the wealthy nations also committed to give duty-free and quota-free privileges to at least 97 per cent of products exported by the least developed countries by 2008.[13]

Policy implications

There are far too many economically insecure individuals in South Asia today (box 3.1). Hence, at the national/regional level, South Asian countries need to make sustained efforts in certain policy areas to enhance the economic security of the people. Globalisation must also be guided by ethical considerations to make the process sustainable for South Asia in socio-economic terms. The gap between the beneficiaries of trade globalisation and those who have not managed to benefit from it will increase unless alternative policies are introduced in the immediate future. We present here a policy framework that incorporates recommendations from our previous Reports, but which is just as relevant today:

Achieving food security

- Food security for all, which is the *sine qua non* of economic security, cannot be achieved in South Asia unless conventional policies are modified and a concerted effort is made to abolish hunger and malnutrition from the region. The first step in this direction should be to address the structural issues associated with the problem of food security i.e. chronic poverty and low purchasing power of the people. Infact, combating hunger and food insecurity is directly related to the objective of reducing poverty.
- Since poverty in South Asia is mostly a rural phenomenon, food security can only be ensured by boosting agricultural production and productivity. The rise in agricultural production would improve the overall access to food by bringing down the prices to an affordable level. Besides, it will afford better incomes to those most vulnerable to fluctuations in availability/prices of food items.
- South Asian governments must work towards developing a suitable rural structure to provide rural employment and to make rural produce more competitive internationally. To benefit from globalisation, structural defects in the agricultural system of South Asia ought to be removed. Foremost among these issues is the prevalence of subsistence farming with little or no potential for cash-crop production.
- Another panacea for rural economic insecurity in South Asia is to invest in and promote the rural non-farm economy. The rural non-farm economy in South Asia accounts for 20-40 per cent of total rural employment and 25-50 per cent of total rural income.[14]
- To eliminate hunger and poverty, the governments in South Asia must reallocate expenditures in favour of the less-developed regions. Over two-thirds of the South Asians today dwell in backward areas that are primarily dependent on rain-fed agriculture.[15] Instead of the blind reliance on 'trickle down effects', direct investments are needed in basic infrastructure,

Box 3.1 People's perception of economic insecurity in South Asia

A recently conducted survey depicts the intense feeling of economic insecurity among the South Asians in no uncertain terms:

- Nearly one-third of those surveyed admitted that they are 'extremely fearful' whether their means of livelihood will last long enough. This proportion balloons to 43 per cent for the unskilled workers.
- The picture is grimmer as regards the 'fear for property'. In this case, half of those employed, but unskilled, are reported to be very fearful of losing their economic assets.
- Worse still, more than one-third of the respondents expressed a fear that they might be unable to sustain even a subsistence standard of living.
- As a rule, the 'fear factor' was found to be considerably higher among the rural inhabitants.
- Critically, 9 out of 10 individuals in South Asia do not feel that government agencies have the capability to help them out of any financial crisis in future. Among the illiterates and/or those earning below US $30 a month, only 6 per cent consider government agencies an avenue of support. Such perceptions about the national governments might be a major source of the fears reflected above.
- Fifty five per cent people stressed that employment generation ought to be one of the top three priorities for the government budget. Such a response clearly underlines the lack of adequate economic opportunities in the region in both the urban and rural sectors.
- A high 56 per cent of the respondents lamented that they also lack opportunities to acquire skills necessary to raise their earnings. Nearly two-thirds of those with primary education or less and/or monthly income of below US $60 rued this lack of opportunity. In the final analysis, the creation of more such opportunities in South Asia might be the focal agenda to alter the prevailing environment of pessimism and economic insecurity.

The above results are based on a public opinion survey conducted in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka by GALLUP for the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre. The methodology of the survey and the sample sizes are explained in the Appendix.

technology and the social capital of such areas.
- The welfare programmes to address food insecurity are useful if properly targeted. Better design and orientation of social safety nets and other welfare programmes in South Asia is indeed critical to provide food security to the most vulnerable.
- Population control is another prerequisite for providing economic security. A substantial reduction in population growth can improve the per capita availability of food in the region.

Generating employment

- For economic security, emphasis needs to shift to public expenditure which has tangible effects, direct or indirect, on productive employment generation. An obvious example of such expenditure is that on rural employment schemes that are designed to build rural infrastructure. Similarly, more public expenditure ought to be made on urban employment schemes for better provision of public services.
- It is imperative for South Asia to counter some of the adverse effects of trade liberalisation on employment. For the purpose, the region may have to rely on special measures like marketing assistance and/or some protection for small-scale producers competing with large multinationals. A system of variable tariffs can be evolved to preserve a degree of stability in domestic output prices and to protect industries that are vital from the employment perspective.
- Public policy measures are also required to counteract the gradual dominance of capital-intensive production techniques and to render more appropriate technologies widely acceptable. These measures could, for instance, comprise fiscal/credit incentives to producers who choose to employ more labour.
- It is important to revive the possibility of directed credit, which has been reduced or removed across the region under policies of 'financial liberalisation'. This will provide the means to ensure the economic viability of the largest employers—agriculture and small-scale producers in manufacturing and services.

- The endemic problem of under-employment can only be addressed by an increase in labour demand that employs all labour productively. The policy focus, therefore, must be on employment diversification. This will entail identifying sectors with a potentially large use of labour and then systematically promoting them through a variety of measures
- The South Asian governments must play a much more effective role in ratifying the core ILO conventions and ensuring their implementation. The reach of these laws needs to be extended to the informal sector and to the workers in export-processing zones. A fundamental principle that should guide the policy makers is the strict respect for the maintenance of basic levels of social welfare and labour standards. This principle should not be viewed as a hindrance to economic efficiency but rather as an essential pillar of economic security for the people of South Asia.
- South Asia needs to pursue the two-pronged strategy of diversifying into high technology goods and services while continuing with more traditional labor-intensive low-technology exports. The Indian success in establishing a niche for itself in the fast-growing global software and information technology market clearly demonstrates that such diversification can be achieved.

Imparting education/skills

- Provision of good quality public education is imperative for economic security in South Asia. In Pakistan, for instance, the incidence of food insecurity is almost three times higher in illiterate households as compared to those with education up to secondary level or higher.[16] Besides, better education will adequately prepare the labour force to face global competition. Central to this is the strategy to provide quality primary education and appropriate skill-training as well as higher levels of education in new technological fields. While the governments should allocate sufficient resources for primary and secondary education, the private sector should be mobilised to set up technical institutions for imparting training at higher levels.

Managing disasters

- South Asia is highly vulnerable to extreme natural shocks like droughts, floods and earthquakes, which create extreme economic insecurity among those affected. There is, infact, a strong inverse relationship between the occurrence of such disasters and progress in reducing the number of undernourished.[17] Any plan targeting economic security must, therefore, incorporate a comprehensive strategy to deal with food emergencies and economic losses due to natural disasters.

At the global level, the time is indeed ripe to revisit some of the excellent ideas for reforming the institutions of global governance. The privatisation/globalisation policies must be imparted a human face. All such strategies must be strictly judged by the yardstick of their impact on poverty reduction, employment generation and the vulnerable sections of the population. Institutions at national and regional levels should be put into place to monitor the impact—both short term and long term—of these policies.

Chapter 4

Health and Human Security

The right to live life free from disease, violence and misery is fundamental to securing human lives

The Report on *Human Development in South Asia 2004* highlighted the specific health issues that are of relevance to a vast majority of people living in South Asia. It argued that the right to life is the most basic and, in fact a fundamental human right. To be able to live a healthy life, free from disease is an essential freedom that people, everywhere must have. For most people a feeling of insecurity arises from daily worries of illness and hunger in life rather than fear of a global cataclysmic event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Would they be safe from disease? The uncertainty that we may or may not be able to enjoy a healthy life brings in the question of security. What if we are ill? What would happen? Would we be able to receive treatment on time? Would we be able to afford the medicines? All these risks to our health and life damage our human security. As the Report of the Commission on Human Security puts it, '*good health is instrumental to human dignity and human security*'.[1]

The right to life is the most basic human right. And the right to live this life free from disease, violence and misery is fundamental to securing human lives. However, physical health alone is not sufficient for securing complete human well-being and security. What is needed, as the World Health Organization Constitution states is, '*a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity*.' In this sense, good health is both physical well-being and a state of mental and social peace.

But '*security continues to be understood in the narrow sense as encompassing state security, which requires the protection of the state from external threats, and not human security that focuses on the well-being of individuals that inevitably leads to security for the state.*'[2]

The intensity of a particular threat can also differ from one area to another while some threats remain common to all people. While basic issues of health and healthcare may not be a major threat in the developed world, in South Asia, where many lives are lost because of untimely or an absolute lack of cure, the risks are high. The threats from disease and death also vary across different sections of society; it is usually the poorest especially women, children and people living in rural areas that are at greatest risk everywhere.

Health security in South Asia

The health problems and outcomes in South Asia are as diverse as the culture, religion, and language of its people. In all South Asian countries there are widespread contrasts among different regions, states, rural and urban areas, and also across gender, socio-economic and ethnic groups. In particular, India is such a large country that it is difficult and misleading to analyse the condition of people through national averages as these tend to hide the huge differences that exist among various states, groups and localities. While some countries and regions in South Asia like Sri Lanka and Kerala in India have made significant progress in health, with indicators comparable to those in developed countries, others like Pakistan and Nepal manifest dismal failures with some of the poorest health outcomes in the region and the world. There has been unprecedented progress in health for the rich and the privileged while the burden of disease among the poor and the less privileged is unfathomable. While the poor are at a greater risk of dying than

other groups, the situation for women and children is particularly difficult across all groups.

The most basic of freedoms according to Amartya Sen is the '*freedom to survive*'.[3] Many people across the globe particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are denied this fundamental freedom. Millions of people in these parts of the world suffer from disease, malnutrition, poor water and sanitation, and violence and conflict. In addition, they also lack access to basic healthcare resulting in premature mortality. *If the basis of human security is the protection of human lives then securing these lives from morbidity and mortality is fundamental*. As the *Human Security Now* Report states '*Health security is at the vital core of human security—and illness, disability, and avoidable death are critical pervasive threats to human security*'.[4]

In South Asia, overall life expectancy has increased by 43 per cent during the period 1960-2002. This means on average an individual in South Asia can now expect to live 19 years longer than he/she could in 1960. These gains in life expectancy have occurred across South Asia with life expectancy in 2003 ranging from 74 years in Sri Lanka to 62 years in Nepal (see table 4.1). However, the region still has one of the lowest life expectancies in the world, second only to Sub-Saharan Africa—a region where HIV/AIDS has taken its toll. Also, as is evident from table 4.1, life expectancy has gone up by a mere

Figure 4.1 Trends in major indicators of survival in South Asia, 1993/94-2003



Sources: MHHDC 1997 and Human Development Indicators, table 1, 4 and 5.

two years in the last decade and many of these years are spent in illness and disease. On average in 2002 an individual born in South Asia could only expect to live 53.4 years of his/her life in full health.[5] Women bear a greater burden of disease and mortality and it is estimated that while men may lose up to 11.5 per cent of their total life expectancy, women are at a greater risk of losing up to 14 per cent of their lives due to ill health in South Asia.[6]

The decline in the crude death rate in South Asia during 1970-2002 is even more dramatic. There has been a 48 per cent decrease in the number of deaths that has consequently resulted in a lowering of the crude birth rate that declined from a high rate of 41 per 1000 live births in 1970

Table 4.1 Life expectancy and health in South Asia

	Life expectancy (years)		Crude birth rate		Crude death rate		Fertility Rate		Annual population growth rate (%)	
	1993	2003	1994	2003	1994	2003	1994	2003	1980-90	2000-05
India	61	63	29	24	10	8	3.8	3.0	2.1	1.6
Pakistan	62	63	41	36	9	10	6.1	5.0	3.6	2.0
Bangladesh	56	63	36	29	12	8	4.7	3.4	2.1	1.9
Nepal	54	62	39	33	13	10	5.4	4.2	2.6	2.1
Sri Lanka	72	74	21	16	6	7	2.5	2.0	1.6	0.9
Bhutan	51	63	40	35	15	9	5.8	5.0	2.2	2.2
Maldives	62	67	42	36	9	6	6.8	5.3	3.2	2.5
South Asia (weighted average)	61	63	32	26	10	8	4.2	3.3	2.3	1.6

Sources: MHHDC 1997 and Human Development Indicators, table 1 and 10.

Children and women are particularly vulnerable and at risk of poor health

to 26 in 2002. However, while these improvements in health are commendable they have failed to reach the poorest and most vulnerable in the region. These health gains are inequitably distributed with crude death rate varying from 10 per 1000 live births in Pakistan and Nepal to 7 in Sri Lanka. Similarly, crude birth rate varies across the region with Pakistan and Maldives having the highest rate of 36 and Sri Lanka the lowest at 16. The achievements in reducing both the death and birth rates have created conditions for further improvements: the fertility rate has declined from over six in the 1960s to about three at present. The fertility rate also varies sharply across the region with very high rates of 5.3 in Maldives, 5.0 in Pakistan and Bhutan, and 4.2 in Nepal to relatively lower rates of 3.4 in Bangladesh, 3.0 in India and 2 in Sri Lanka.

Nearly 450 million people in South Asia live below US $1 a day and numerous more are 'capability poor' or are 'health deprived' with their lives remaining short and scarred by disease. As Mahbub ul Haq said in the first *Human Development in South Asia Report 1997,* looking at the deprivation of the people gives an insight into lack of human capabilities and opportunities. In order to measure such deprivation of not only poverty but also of health and education, he developed a Human Deprivation Measure (HDM). Table 4.2 shows the extent of health deprivation in South Asia. As is evident from the table, there are 482 million people who are 'health deprived' in South Asia, while 450 million are income poor. Thus, human poverty far exceeds income poverty. Health deprivation is measured by using the lack of access to safe water and malnourishment as indicators of poor health. Lack of access to safe drinking water is a very powerful indicator, particularly in the context of South Asia, since 80 per cent of the diseases in this region are waterborne. Malnourishment handicaps the growth of human capabilities. In the 1997 report due to unavailability of data at the time for the malnourished population as a whole, the indicator used was that of malnourished children as it reflects deprivation of capabilities for the new generation. Since data for undernourished population is now available, we have calculated health deprivation using this indicator along with lack of access to safe water. To look at health deprivation, and not income deprivation alone, is important as a large number of people, who do not classify as income poor, fail to realise their full potential because the healthcare system offers inadequate and often poor quality services.

Table 4.2 Health deprivation measure for South Asia, 2002

	Population		Health deprivation measure (%)	
	%	Total (millions)	%	Total (millions)
India	75	1050	36	376.4
Pakistan	11	150	27.4	41.1
Bangladesh	10	144	33.4	48.2
Nepal	2	25	26.4	6.6
Sri Lanka	1	19	46.8	8.9
Bhutana[a]	0.16	2.2	0.41	0.9
Maldivesa[a]	0.02	0.3	5	0.015
South Asia (average %, total)	100	1391	35	482

Note: Health deprivation measure has been computed by adding measures of lack of access to safe water and undernourished population. a: For Bhutan and Maldives due to non-availability of data on under nourishment of the entire population malnourished children below age five have been used instead.

Sources: MHHDC 2005 and MHHDC staff calculations.

Children and women are particularly vulnerable and at risk of poor health. They bear the brunt of health deprivation and avoidable deaths in South Asia. The vulnerability of women and children to ill health and premature death can be gauged from the following statistics:

- Around one-third of children under the age of five are underweight and malnourished in South Asia.[7] It is further estimated that by 2020 two out of every five children in South Asia would be malnourished.[8]
- In 2001, 2.4 million infant deaths occurred in South Asia. In 1999, of the ten million child deaths in the world 2.1 million were in India alone.[9]

- An estimated 185,000 women die annually due to pregnancy and birth-related complications.[10]
- As many as 51 per cent of pregnant women aged 15-49 suffer from anemia in South Asia. In Nepal nearly two-thirds of pregnant women in the same age group are anaemic. It is estimated that the number of maternal deaths attributed to severe anemia among women is 25,600 in South Asia—38 per cent of the world's total.[11]

South Asia is one of the few regions in the world where men outnumber women. This unfavourable ratio is primarily a consequence of the high levels of mortality among young girls and women in their childbearing years. For South Asian women, discrimination begins at birth and since the introduction of prenatal screening methods, sometimes, even before birth. In South Asia, excluding Maldives and Sri Lanka, there is evidence of inequitable feeding practices for girls from infancy. The gender biases in feeding practices continue into adulthood and result in chronic under-nutrition and micro nutrient deficiencies among girls and women. Failure to nourish girl children limits their capacity for healthy adulthood and a lack of adequate healthcare compounds the problem. As a result of this discrimination the ratio of female to male population in South Asia is 94 women to 100 men. This defies the biological norm where men outnumber women. In all societies the biological norm is that women live longer than men and that is why there is an overall ratio of 106 women to 100 men in the world. It seems that 50 million women are simply 'missing' in South Asia.[12] This fact was first highlighted by Amartya Sen and later used by Mahbub ul Haq in the 1997 *Human Development in South Asia* Report. The distressing fact is that this ratio remains unchanged

The greatest risk that women in South Asia face is that of death during pregnancy. More than one-third of all maternal deaths in the world occur in South Asia (see figure 4.2). Maternal mortality is an important indicator in terms of the status of women in a society. It reflects the differences in social and economic status of women in the developed and developing world. In developed countries maternal mortality is rare but in the developing world this is a major cause of death among women. Disparity between developed and developing countries is huge in maternal mortality as almost all maternal deaths—99.6 per cent—occur in the developing world.[13]

Pregnancy and childbirth become a nightmare for a majority of poor South Asian women. It is estimated that each day 507 women die due to complications during pregnancy and childbirth. The estimated annual deaths due to pregnancy related complications add up to a staggering 185,000. This makes South Asia the region with the second highest number of maternal deaths in the world after Sub-Saharan Africa. The region contains three countries that rank among the 13 countries with the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world: with an estimated 136,000 maternal deaths per year, India has the highest number of maternal deaths in the world; Pakistan with 26,000 ranks third among the 13 countries followed by Bangladesh which ranks eighth with 16,000 maternal deaths.

The maternal mortality ratio in South Asia is 516 per 100,000. The maternal mortality ratio is as high as 740 per 100,000 live births in Nepal where only 11 per cent of births are attended by trained health personnel.[14] The lifetime risk of dying due to complications during pregnancy and childbirth is also very high in most South Asian countries: Nepal 1 in 24; Pakistan 1 in 31; Bhutan 1 in 37; India 1 in 48; Bangladesh 1 in 59; Maldives 1 in 140 and Sri Lanka 1 in 430 (see table 4.3). The maternal mortality ratios vary between regions within a country. In areas where health facilities are not easily available and/or cultural traditions limit women's mobility and freedom to access health services, rates are much higher. For instance, the maternal mortality ratio in

Figure 4.2 South Asia s share in global maternal deaths, 2000



Source: WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA 2002.

Table 4.3 Maternal mortality in South Asia, 2000			
Countries	Maternal deaths (total)	Life time risk of maternal death 1 in:	Maternal mortality ratio
India	136,000	48	540
Pakistan	26,000	31	500
Bangladesh	16,000	59	380
Nepal	6,000	24	740
Sri Lanka	300	430	92
Bhutan	310	37	420
Maldives	10	140	110
South Asia	184,620	52	516

Source: WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA 2002.

Karachi's urban settlements is 281 per 100,000, however, it is as high as 673 per 100,000 in rural Balochistan.

Such high maternal mortality ratios are the result of the overall ill health and nutritional deficiencies among women in South Asia such as those of iron, iodine and Vitamin A. Anemia or iron deficiency is one of the leading causes of maternal mortality as the shortage of iron in the blood increases the risks of haemorrhage during and after childbirth. It has been estimated that more than half the women in South Asia are anemic. The prevalence of anemia among pregnant women is as high as 65 per cent in Nepal, 53 per cent in Bangladesh and 52 per cent in India. Iodine deficiency among pregnant women is associated with low birth weight for babies and increased risks of infant and child mortality. It is also said to be a cause of mental disability. It is estimated that each year 9.65 million children are born mentally impaired in South Asia. The percentage of underweight women is four times higher in South Asia as compared to Sub-Saharan Africa.[15] A large number of infant and maternal deaths can be prevented by providing better nutrition and care to women before, during and after pregnancy. It is estimated that the number of maternal deaths as a result of anemia in South Asia is 25,600—38 per cent of the world's total. The global share of South Asia in children born mentally impaired due to iodine deficiency is 55 per cent.[16]

The survival of children is an important indicator of the welfare of children and reflects the level of healthcare facilities and their delivery in any country. In South Asia, children are at great risk of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality. Children are often born without their mothers being attended by trained health staff. An estimated 62 per cent of mothers struggle alone without the care of trained health personnel. During 1998-2001, of all the deliveries that took place 78 per cent of those in rural areas and 41 per cent of those in urban areas were done at home. It is, therefore, not too surprising that this 'miracle of birth turns into a nightmare of death'[17] with too many children losing their mothers at the time of their arrival in this world. With a very high maternal mortality ratio of 516 per 100,000 live births in South Asia, the children face great difficulties in their survival and development.

South Asia is the most malnourished region in the world where nearly half the children under the age of five are malnourished (see table 4.4). South Asia despite lower levels of poverty and higher average incomes has a 20 per cent higher rate of malnutrition than Sub-Saharan Africa.[18] The situation in India is particularly severe where there has been little improvement in the malnutrition situation that affects nearly half the

Table 4.4 Malnutrition among children under age 5 in South Asia			
	1980-1994	1990-1997	1995-2003
India	69	53	47
Pakistan	40	38	38
Bangladesh	67	56	48
Nepal	70	47	48
Sri Lanka	38	38	29
Bhutan	38	38	19
Maldives	…	39	30
South Asia	64	51	46

Note: Children who are moderately and severely underweight for age are taken to represent malnutrition among children under 5.

Sources: UNICEF 1995, 1996 and 2004.

children.[19] Of the 150 million malnourished children in the developing world, 78 million alone are in South Asia. Many of the deaths among children under-five are also associated with malnutrition.

The infant mortality and under-five mortality rates in South Asia have more than halved since the 1960s. There has been substantial progress in reducing the infant mortality and under-five mortality rates during 1990-2003 (table 4.5). The improvements in reducing infant and child mortality rates has been particularly rapid in Bangladesh where it is estimated that both rates have been falling by more than 5 per cent a year.[20]

However, despite the progress in reducing infant and child mortality rates, the numbers are still among some of the highest in the world. Of the 10.8 million global under-five deaths in the year 2000, one-third were in South Asia (see figure 4.3). What is worrying is the fact that although there has been a continued decline in child mortality, the rate of decline in all developing countries seems to be slowing down. During 1990-2003, child death rates in developing countries fell at a slower pace than during the 1980s.[21] It is estimated that two-thirds of all child deaths occur in 13 countries, three of which are in South Asia, namely, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Of these, only Bangladesh is on track to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) target.[22]

The risks of infant and child mortality vary across countries in South Asia: Pakistan, for example, has the greatest risk of infant and child mortality where the infant mortality rate is 81 per 1,000 live births and child mortality is 103 per 1,000 live births. The risk of child mortality in India is 87, Bhutan 85, Nepal 82, Maldives 72, Bangladesh 69 and Sri Lanka having the lowest risk of child death of 15 per 1,000 live births. However, due to its large share in the global population India alone accounts for 2.5 million child deaths annually, one in five of the global child deaths.[23]

The risks of death during infancy and early childhood also vary within countries, across gender, location and income group. In India, it is estimated that girls aged 1-5 are 50 per cent more likely to die than boys. This trend of higher female mortality continues through age 30 and is responsible for the 130,000 missing girls in India.[24] In Pakistan's Sindh and Punjab provinces the infant mortality rate was estimated as 95 per 1,000 live births much higher than the levels in Balochistan (86) and North West Frontier Province (62).[25] One of the reasons attributed to the higher levels in Punjab and Sindh is the fact that a larger proportion of their populations live in urban areas and thus a higher incidence of reporting. In India too, there are large variations in infant and child mortality rates among different states. While some states have shown significant improvements

Table 4.5 Trends in infant mortality and child mortality in South Asia, 1990-2003

	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)		Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	
	1990	2003	1990	2003
India	80	63	123	87
Pakistan	96	81	128	103
Bangladesh	96	46	144	69
Nepal	100	61	145	82
Sri Lanka	19	13	23	15
Bhutan	75[a]	70	166	85
Maldives	80	55	115	72
South Asia	84	63	126	86

Note: a: data refers to 1992.
Sources: UNDP 2003 and 2005.

Figure 4.3 Regional share of under-5 deaths, 2000 *(millions)*



Source: UNDP 2003.

Figure 4.4 Child mortality rate by country and region in South Asia, 2003



Sources: UNDP 2005 and Human Development Indicators, table 5.

in lowering the risks of premature death most states still lag far behind in securing the lives of millions of children. There are states with much lower infant mortality rates like Kerala (10), Goa (17), Manipur (14), and Chandigarh (21) where the infant mortality rate is much lower than the national average. On the other hand, states like Assam (70), Madhya Pradesh (85), Orissa (87) and Uttar Pradesh (80) lag behind other states and have infant mortality rates that are much higher than the national average. The rural area infant mortality rates are even higher than the aggregate IMR (infant mortality rate).[26]

The situation for child mortality rates is also similar. While in Kerala the under-five mortality rate in 2002 was 19 per 1,000 live births, in Bihar, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh it is still very high at 105, 115 and 123, respectively (see figure 4.4).[27] The vulnerability of children to death varies across location, with children living in rural areas at a greater risk of death than those in urban areas. In rural areas of India, for example, the child mortality rate was 104 while in urban areas the rate was much lower at 63.[28]

Spread of infectious diseases

The poor environmental conditions that result from widespread poverty in South Asia are responsible for a large burden of preventable diseases. It is estimated that in India 42 per cent of the total deaths are due to communicable diseases.[29] Among women in the reproductive age, communicable diseases account for the largest proportion of total deaths. These avoidable diseases are also responsible for 2.5 million deaths among children under the age of five.[30] The World Health Organization (WHO) has identified six diseases that it calls 'diseases of poverty' because they primarily affect the poor, and worsen poverty. These six diseases—tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS, measles, pneumonia and diarrheal disease combined with the complications of childbirth, each year kill 14 million people worldwide. All six diseases can be prevented or treated with very little money. The Global Fund was created to finance a dramatic turn-around in the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. These diseases kill over 6 million people each year, and the numbers are growing.

Resurgence of malaria

Malaria is among the top 10 killer diseases in the world. It kills at least one million people each year and infects an estimated 350-500 million others.[31] Most of these cases are in Africa (almost 90 per cent), where malaria is responsible for about one in five of all childhood deaths.[32] Among the remaining 10 per cent cases around two-third are in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The disease particularly affects the health of women and children causing a large number of deaths among children under age five. Malaria is also one of the leading causes of anemia among children and pregnant women. The children born to mothers infected with malaria during pregnancy are more vulnerable to infections and have an increased risk of infant mortality. To

Table 4.6 Reported malaria cases and rate in South Asia, 1990-2003						
	1990		2000		2003	
	Total cases	Rate (per 1,000)	Total cases	Rate (per 1,000)	Total cases	Rate (per 1,000)
India	2,018,783	2.4	2,031,790	2.0	1,781,336	1.7
Pakistan	79,689	0.7	82,526	0.6	125,152	0.8
Bangladesh	53,875	0.5	55,599	0.4	56,879	0.4
Nepal	22,856	1.2	7,616	0.3	9,394	0.4
Sri Lanka	287,384	17.1	210,039	11.3	10,510	0.6
Bhutan	9,497	5.6	5,935	2.9	3,806	1.7

Source: WHO and UNICEF 2005.

combat the global threat of malaria to health security, the World Health Organization (WHO), along with the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, found the global partnership to Roll Back Malaria (RBM) in 1998.

Yet at the end of 2004, 107 countries and territories were at risk of malaria transmission and some 3.2 billion people lived in areas at risk of malaria.[33] Patterns of malaria transmission and disease vary markedly between regions and even within individual countries. This diversity results from variations between malaria parasites and mosquito vectors, ecological conditions that affect malaria transmission and socio-economic factors, such as poverty and access to effective healthcare and prevention services. Currently, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, have endemic falciparum malaria.[34]

In South Asia, most malaria cases result from the *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* parasites. The severity of malaria varies within different regions in South Asia, with some areas having most of the burden of malaria-related morbidity and mortality. In 2003, there were around two million reported cases of malaria in South Asia, mostly in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (see table 4.6). While the reported malaria cases and deaths have declined more than ten-fold in Sri Lanka, the situation in Bangladesh and Pakistan has been worsening over the years. During the last decade the number of reported cases of malaria in India has remained at very high levels, though there has been a gradual decline in the reported incidence of laboratory confirmed cases. Bhutan too has a high prevalence rate of malaria at 1.7 per 1,000. Maldives is the only country in the region to have been given malaria-free status since 1998 as no indigenous cases were reported from the country since 1984.

Malaria re-emerged in South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, when it became resistant to most of the commonly used conventional drugs[35]. Most of the burden of malaria in South Asia is concentrated among the poorest 20 per cent of the population and affects more men than women (see table 4.7).[36]

INDIA: In India, urban malaria has emerged as a serious health problem in several states accounting for around 15 per cent of the total malaria cases.[37] Rapid urban growth and labour migration led to some of the epidemics that have occurred

Table 4.7 Malaria cases by gender, 2002			
	Total reported cases	Male	Female
India	1,842,019	1,081,849	760,170
Pakistan*	101,761	NA	NA
Bangladesh	55,646	34,987	28,627
Nepal	12,786	6,712	5,546
Sri Lanka	41,411	22,400	19,011
Bhutan	6,511	3,985	2,557

Note: * Gender wise data on malaria cases not available for Pakistan.
Source: WHO and UNICEF 2005.

with increasing frequency since 1995. During the 1980s, the country experienced malaria epidemics that were controlled by insecticide spray but since the 1990s there have been frequent outbreaks of malaria (see box 4.1). Most of the malaria cases in India are concentrated in the northeast region and in the tribal forested and hilly areas of several states like Maharashtra. Orissa alone accounts for around one-fourth of all malaria cases, followed by Chattisgarh (11 per cent), West Bengal (10 per cent), Rajasthan (8 per cent), and Gujarat (7 per cent), other states like Madhya Paradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Karanataka each accounts for around 6 per cent of the total malaria cases. Around half the malaria cases are caused by *P. falciparum*. There is an increasing resistance to chloroquine, an important anti-malarial drug, in some areas. Some insecticide-resistant malaria vectors are also present in some regions. Each year there are an estimated 1,000 malaria related deaths that are reported, but these numbers do not include cases treated in private and not-for-profit health facilities.

Malaria control activities in the country are integrated into the general health services. The National Health Policy 2002 reinforced the commitment to malaria made by the National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP), and set the goal of

Box 4.1 Malaria outbreaks in South Asia in recent years

India

1996	Malaria epidemic in Rajasthan and Haryana. A large number of deaths from malaria reported in Rajasthan.
1997	In the states of Gujarat, Goa and West Bengal 4 districts were predominantly affected by a malaria outbreak.
1998	Goa and Maharashtra where 2 districts were severely affected.
1999	Malaria outbreak in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar and West Bengal where 23 districts were affected.
2000	Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka where 5 districts were affected be a malaria epidemic.
2003	In Rajasthan where a large epidemic affected several districts.

Bangladesh

1993	Bangladesh experienced a severe epidemic in 1993. Since then many concentrated epidemics occur each year, many of which go unreported. Some of the recent concentrated outbreaks of malaria occurred in:
2002	In Banderban, Rangmati and Khagrachari where there were around 16,000 clinical cases of malaria and 177 reported deaths.
2004	An outbreak of malaria reported from Chittagong, Netrakona and Cox's Bazaar that affected an estimated population of 4.1, 2.2 and 1.9 million respectively. Confirmed cases of malaria were 2813, 182 and 5531 respectively and reported malaria deaths were 25, 10 and 168 respectively.

Nepal

1996	Malaria epidemics reported in two villages in Parasan that affected an estimated 727 cases of which 88 per cent were due to *P. falciparum*. There were 15 reported deaths.
1997	In Pratappur (Nawal Parasi) where around 19 thousand of the population was affected. There were nearly 1,000 reported cases of which 64 per cent were due to *P falciparum*. There were two reported deaths.
1998	A malaria epidemic in Bardia where there were 1,307 cases.
1999	In Dhanusha where there were an estimated 1,162 cases. Also a reported malaria epidemic in Karve where there were 2,556 cases. There was also a malaria epidemic in Mahadevsthan for which no details are available.

Sri Lanka

1998	Since 1998 there has been a malaria threat in Kilinochchi and Malativu in the north-east that have experienced a substantial increase in malaria as a result of conflict and a large number of displaced persons.
1999-2000	A malaria outbreak in Moneragala.
2000	There were 76 deaths in Arunadhapura due to malaria.

Bhutan

Malaria cases surged during 1995 and 1999, however, there are no reported epidemics. This may be attributable to the increase in susceptible population and a decline in control activities.

Sources: WHO 2005d and e.

reducing by half the malaria mortality in the country by 2010. The expansion of agriculture and deforestation has increased the risk of Anopheles mosquito[38] breeding sites that could lead to an increase in the burden of malaria.

PAKISTAN: Malaria continues to be a major health problem in Pakistan. Between 1990-2003 the number of reported malaria cases has increased by around 60 per cent. It is estimated that the actual number of cases maybe much higher as according to official estimates less than 20 per cent of the cases are actually recorded.[39] A large agricultural sector that relies heavily on extensive networks of irrigation and monsoon rains together contribute to the threat of malaria in the country. Both *P. falciparum* and *P. vivax* are widely prevalent. In most parts of the country malaria outbreaks are reported after the monsoon season, between July and November. Most of the malaria cases are reported from Sindh (30 per cent) and Baluchistan (29 per cent). The remaining burden of malaria is distributed among other areas: Punjab (11 per cent), North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (21 per cent) and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) (11 per cent). This variation in the burden of malaria cases across the country is due largely to the quality of malaria control activities in each of the provinces. The efforts to control malaria in Balochistan and Sindh are particularly weak. There is also a growing resistance of *P.falciparum* to chloroquine and of malaria vectors to insecticide. High population movements complicate control of malaria in border areas, between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The three countries have now started to coordinate their malaria control activities.

Pakistan adopted the RBM control strategy in 1999 and has since increased federal spending and developed a five-year strategic plan for the malaria control programme (2000-2006). However, the administration and implementation of the programme remain weak at both the federal and provincial levels.

BANGLADESH: The malaria situation in the country has been worsening, particularly in the hilly and forest areas and also along the border areas. It is estimated that around 88 per cent of the population is at risk of malaria. Nearly all the malaria cases in the country are concentrated in Chittagong (97 per cent). In 2003, there were an estimated 574 reported malaria deaths. There is also a growing drug resistance in the 13 endemic districts in the country. These 13 districts have a population of around 24 million of which 10 million are considered to be at a very high risk of acquiring malaria.[40] Surveillance and reporting is weak in these areas as a result of the difficult terrain and inaccessibility. The malaria control activities have been integrated with the general health services and the overall responsibility rests with the deputy director of Malaria and Parasitic Disease Control who works under the director of primary healthcare.

NEPAL: In 2003, out of 22.8 million population of the country, 16.2 million people lived in areas where they were at risk of malaria. However, malaria incidence in the last five years has remained around 8,000 to 9,000 cases annually. The monthly distribution of malaria cases indicates that the disease is prevalent throughout the year with the major concentration in the monsoon season. The first national public health programme in the country was the malaria eradication programme launched in 1958. This programme failed to achieve its objective and the country reverted to malaria control in 1978.

BHUTAN: Malaria continues to be a serious threat to health in Bhutan. The malaria situation was under control until 1971 when a programme for eradication of malaria was in place. The situation worsened in subsequent years, particularly from 1983-1990 when annual cases of 11,000 to 19,000 were being reported. It peaked in 1994 when there were an estimated 38,901 cases of malaria. Since then the situation has improved as a result of increased efforts in identifying focal

A large agricultural sector that relies heavily on extensive networks of irrigation and monsoon rains together contribute to the threat of malaria

areas. No malaria outbreaks have been reported in the past five years. In 2003 the number of malaria cases was 3,806. A high percentage of malaria cases are reported from the forest areas.

SRI LANKA: During the 1970s and 1980s, malaria caused very high morbidity levels and regularly broke out into epidemics in Sri Lanka. In 1992 the National Malaria Control Programme was revised in line with the WHO malaria strategy. As in the eradication phase of the 1960s and 1970s indoor residual spraying was a major focus of the new control strategy.[41] Since 1999, reported malaria cases and deaths have fallen by more than ten-fold. In 2003, the recorded malaria incidence fell to the lowest levels observed since 1967. However, as the majority of patients seek treatment through the private sector health facilities, and as a number of patients in public sector facilities are treated for malaria without laboratory diagnosis, the actual number of cases is likely to be much higher than reported. Monitoring and evaluation has been hampered in recent years because of the civil war. Epidemics have coincided with the civil war and population movements in Sri Lanka in 1990-92. Malaria control efforts are decentralised and not intensively monitored. The tsunami in December 2004 has also raised concern about an increased risk of malaria epidemics in the coastal areas of the country.

Increased threat from tuberculosis

Tuberculosis (TB),[42] drug-resistant TB and TB/HIV co-infection are serious health threats for South Asia and the rest of the developing world. In view of the gravity of the problem, the WHO in 1993 declared it a global emergency. TB is the second major killer in South Asia after diarrhoea. Of the nearly two billion people estimated to be infected with the TB bacillus, around three-fourths live in developing countries. There are an estimated 16 to 20 million cases of active TB worldwide, that is those who are sick with TB, 80 per cent of these are concentrated in 22 countries of the world of which three are in South Asia. And each year more than eight million people become sick with infectious TB. Of these nearly one million people are co-infected with TB and HIV/AIDS and another 300,000 cases are resistant to major TB drugs. Two million of these people die *every* year. These constitute 26 per cent of avoidable adult deaths worldwide.[43] Moreover, tuberculosis is a leading cause of death among women in the reproductive age in South Asia.

Though Sub-Saharan Africa has a higher incidence of per capita TB cases, it is South Asia that is home to the highest absolute number of TB cases. Among the 10 countries with the largest number of TB patients the three South Asian countries are India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. In

Table 4.8 Estimated burden of TB in South Asia, 1990-2003

	1990		2003	
	Prevalence rate, all cases including HIV+	Death rate, all cases including HIV+	Prevalence rate, all cases including HIV+	Death rate all cases including HIV+
India	504	45	290	33
Pakistan	377	41	359	43
Bangladesh	741	65	490	57
Nepal	636	56	318	29
Sri Lanka	182	16	89	9
Bhutan	626	55	194	21
Maldives	542	48	39	2

Note: A tuberculosis case is defined as a patient in whom tuberculosis bacteria has been confirmed or diagnosed by a clinician.
Source: WHO 2005b.

order to understand the severity of the threat from TB it is important to understand both the extent of the infection and the burden of disease. For example,

- Each year there are around 2-2.5 million new cases of TB in South Asia.
- In 2003, there were around 4.5 million people who were infected and sick with tuberculosis in South Asia. Of these more than half were infected with TB in 2003 alone.
- The incidence of TB has increased since 1990 that means more people are acquiring the infection each year. In 1990 around 2 million people were infected that year, while in 2003 around 2.5 million became infected. The absolute number of TB has, however, declined: in 1990 there were more than 5.6 million people infected with TB. The prevalence of TB in 2003 was around 4.5 million.
- In 2003, more than half a million people died from TB in South Asia.
- India carries the world's greatest burden of tuberculosis cases, with more than three million people sick with TB in 2003.

Tuberculosis control in South Asia is threatened by many factors. Among the most challenging is the increasing spread of HIV/AIDS in the region particularly in India, and the increasing strains of drug-resistant TB. These coupled with the widespread poverty in the region contribute to the spread of TB.

TB/HIV: The increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS has lead to an increase in the spread of TB as latent TB infection rapidly progresses to the active stage with HIV. This is the most powerful risk factor for the acceleration of the TB infection. As HIV/AIDS weakens the immune system the TB infection that has been dormant is activated and the person becomes infected with both HIV/AIDS and TB. Globally it is estimated that up to half the people with HIV or AIDS develop TB. There are an estimated 21 million people worldwide who are co-infected with TB and HIV/AIDS. In South Asia the proportions of adults who have TB and are HIV positive are: India (5.2 per cent), Pakistan (0.6 per cent), Bangladesh (0.1 per cent), Nepal (2.9 per cent), Maldives (0.3 per cent), Bhutan (0.1 per cent), and Sri Lanka (0.2 per cent).

DRUG-RESISTANT TB: There is growing evidence of drug-resistant TB in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan (see table 4.10). Drug resistance is caused by inconsistent, impartial or inappropriate treatment. Some strains of TB are resistant to all drugs. Multi-drug resistant TB, that is, the resistance to two of the most commonly used drugs, is the most dangerous. People affected with drug-resistant TB pass on similar infections to others. Multi-drug resistant TB is more difficult and expensive to treat and it was estimated that it was up to 100 times more expensive to treat than conventional TB. (see table 4.10)

Table 4.9 New cases of tuberculosis in South Asia, 2003

	Estimated annual TB incidence (total)	Annual TB incidence (all cases per 100,000)	Global rank (by estimated number of cases)
India	1,788,043	168	1
Pakistan	278,392	181	6
Bangladesh	360,767	246	5
Nepal	53,139	211	27
Sri Lanka	11,530	60	73
Bhutan	2,492	110	113
Maldives	142	45	167

Source: WHO 2005a.

Figure 4.5 South Asia s share in the global burden of TB, 2003



Source: WHO 2005b.

Table 4.10 Tuberculosis related mortality and resistance to treatment, 2003

	TB-related mortality (all cases)	New cases multi-drug resistant (%)
India	1,788,043	3.4
Pakistan	278,392	9.6
Bangladesh	360,767	1.4
Nepal	53,139	1.0
Sri Lanka	11,530	1.0
Bhutan	2,492	—
Maldives	142	—

Source: WHO 2005a.

Lack of healthcare, poor nutrition and poor living conditions are major factors that increase the risk of acquiring TB. On the other hand, poverty deepens with TB-related illness and death. Studies in India have shown that the prevalence of TB is between two to four times higher among the lower income groups with no schooling. TB also impacts children both as a direct threat to their health and also indirectly as when parents are infected they suffer. In India, for example, 300,000 children leave school because their parents are sick with TB.[44]

Treatment of TB

The Direct Observed Treatment (DOTS) is the internationally approved TB control strategy that consists of five elements including sustained political commitment, access to quality TB sputum microscopy, short-course chemotherapy to all cases of TB, uninterrupted supply of quality drugs and a recording and reporting system that would enable better assessment. In the last few years, the cost of drugs to treat TB has come down to US $10 per patient that has made access and treatment easier. DOTS treatment is being carried out in all South Asian countries but the coverage and success of the programme varies across all countries (see table 4.11). Pakistan has the lowest coverage of DOTS treatment (63 per cent) and also has the least treatment success rate (77 per cent) in the region. Bangladesh, Maldives and Bhutan have DOTS coverage for almost all their populations and treatment success rates are also better than other countries in the region.

Table 4.11 DOTS coverage and success in South Asia, 2003

	DOTS population coverage (%)	DOTS detection of new ss+ cases (%)	DOTS treatment success (new ss+,%)*
India	67	47	87
Pakistan	63	17	77
Bangladesh	99	33	84
Nepal	94	60	86
Sri Lanka	74	70	81
Bhutan	100	32	86
Maldives	100	106	95

Note: * data refers to 2002; ss+ is smear positive cases.
Source: WHO 2005b.

New threat from HIV/AIDS

The HIV/AIDS epidemic has become the most severe global concern of the twenty-first century. It is not simply a health issue. It has devastating consequences that impact all levels of society making it a human security issue. The impact of the epidemic aggravates the vulnerabilities of the weakest groups in society including women, children and the poor. It increases their risks by making them weaker, poorer and further excludes them from society. The scale of the epidemic led the United Nations Security Council to make a historical move by adopting a resolution that addresses a health issue for the first time and links the spread of HIV/AIDS to the maintenance of global peace and security.[45] A special session of the UN General Assembly was devoted to the need for global action on HIV/AIDS in 2001, and a Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was launched in 2002.

HIV/AIDS threatens human security in two ways. First, by worsening the human development situation. As documented in *Human Development in South Asia 2004*, experiences from around the world have shown that the epidemic worsens economic growth, human capital formation, functioning of education, health and agricultural sectors, deteriorates poverty and income inequality, and hence human development. According to estimates, a nation can expect a decline of 1 per cent of its GDP each year when more than 20 per cent of the adult population is infected with HIV.[46] Second, HIV/AIDS has a direct and negative impact on human survival, the very core of human security.

In some African countries HIV/AIDS is threatening human survival. In countries like Botswana and Swaziland more than one-third of the adult population is infected with HIV/AIDS. These shocking numbers of infections and eventual deaths

have made HIV/AIDS a national catastrophe for many countries, and a growing threat to global peace and security.

For South Asia, the spread of HIV/AIDS with the still uncontrolled communicable diseases pose a double threat. Since the detection of the first HIV/AIDS case in South Asia in the mid 1980s, the virus has infected more than five million people today: India (5.1 million), Pakistan (74,000), and Nepal (61,000) (see table 4.12). South Asia today is home to the second highest number of people living with HIV/AIDS, around 13 per cent of the world total. The HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of 0.7 per cent in South Asia may seem like a small percentage but in absolute numbers it translates into more than five million people. India alone with a population of more than one billion, half of whom are adults in the sexually active age group, has an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 0.9 per cent.[47] Considering the large population size of the country, a small increase of 0.1 per cent in the prevalence rate would result in an increase of half a million more adults infected with HIV/AIDS.

The epidemic poses the greatest threat to India that is home to 97 per cent of South Asia's HIV/AIDS infected population (see figure 4.6). Latest official estimates show that about 5.134 million people are living with HIV/AIDS in the country, while the U.N estimates there may be up to 8.5 million HIV/AIDS cases. The Naz Foundation, a New Delhi-based AIDS charity, says the real figure may be closer to 15 million.[48] Also, among the 5.134 million patients of HIV/AIDS in India, 37 per cent are women (see figure 4.8).

In India, the HIV/AIDS crisis is fast emerging as a potential threat to human survival and security. With a population of over one billion, the HIV epidemic in India will have a major impact on the overall spread of HIV in Asia and in the world. A 2002 report by the CIA's National Intelligence Council predicted 20 to 25 million HIV/AIDS cases in India by 2010, more than any other country in the world. According to the head of the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) '*the world's battle against HIV and AIDS is going to be won or lost in India*'.[49]

The HIV/AIDS virus in South Asia has affected more men than women. According to 2003 data, around 60 per cent of HIV

Table 4.12 People living with HIV/AIDS in South Asia, 2003

	First detected (year)	People living with HIV/AIDS (total)	Adult prevalence rate (%)
India	1986	5,100,000	0.90
Pakistan	1987	74,000	0.10
Bangladesh	1989	13,000	<0.10
Nepal	1988	61,000	0.50
Sri Lanka	1986	3,500	< 0.10
Bhutan	1993	<100	…
Maldives	1991	<100	…
South Asia		5,250,000	0.70

Source: MHHDC 2005.

Figure 4.6 Share of South Asia in estimated number of people living with HIV/AIDS, 2004



Source: UNAIDS and WHO 2004a.

Figure 4.7 HIV/AIDS cases in India, 2002-2004



Source: Avert 2005.

Figure 4.8 Estimated number of adults and children living with HIV/AIDS in India, 2003



Source: UNAIDS and WHO 2004a.

infected people were men while 37 per cent were women and 2 per cent children in India (see figure 4.8). This is similar to the situation at the initial stages of the epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa where more men were affected at the start but gradually the pattern was reversed and today more women than men are living with HIV/AIDS in that region.

The spread of HIV/AIDS in India is as diverse as the patterns of social behaviour between different regions. The transmission mode of the epidemic varies from mainly heterosexual sex in some states to injecting drug use in others. However, among the registered cases, heterosexual sex is the predominant mode of transmission (86 per cent).

Six states, namely, Maharashtra, Manipur, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Nagaland, in which around a quarter of the total population is settled, are home to 80 per cent of the people living with HIV.[50] By May 2005, 92 per cent of the nationally reported AIDS cases have been found in 10 of the 38 states and union territories. The highest numbers were in Maharashtra and Gujarat in the west; Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh in the south; and Manipur in the northeast.

In Tamil Nadu, HIV prevalence of 50 per cent has been found among sex workers. While in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and more recently Goa, the HIV prevalence rate among pregnant women is more than 1 per cent (see figure 4.9). These prevalence rates were taken from data collected during screening of women attending antenatal clinics. If the prevalence rate of HIV is found to be greater than 1 per cent among pregnant women this indicates the spread of the virus among the general population. Although HIV/AIDS is still largely concentrated among the high-risk groups like commercial sex workers, injecting drug users and truck drivers, the data show that in some regions the epidemic is moving beyond these groups to the general population. It is also moving from urban to rural areas. The epidemic is also moving towards women and young people. Around 38 per cent of those infected are women. In 2004, it was estimated that 22 per cent of the HIV cases in India were among married women with a single partner.[51] Of the total reported AIDS cases (87,596) by November 2004, nearly 30 per cent were women. Also, of these reported cases 37 per cent were under the age of 30.

In Pakistan, the first case was found in Lahore in 1987. The numbers have since been steadily increasing and the official estimates put the figure at around 74,000 in 2003. Pakistan is a low prevalence but a high-risk country. Initially, most cases of HIV/AIDS that were reported were among the deported migrant workers from the Gulf states and among people receiving blood transfusions. However, recent outbreaks among certain high-risk groups, particularly injected drug users (IDUs) are cause for concern. In Larkana, Sindh just under 10 per cent of IDUs were reportedly tested HIV positive. This shows that the epidemic is now moving on to the second

Figure 4.9 Indian states with generalised epidemic, more than 1 per cent of pregnant women with HIV/AIDS, 2002



Source: Avert 2005.

stage and is becoming concentrated among high-risk groups, in this case IDUs.

The reported cases remain low due to the social stigma attached to HIV/AIDS and also due to lack of adequate testing facilities. Official estimates in 2004 put the total number of HIV infections at 2,748 of which 250 were reportedly full blown AIDS cases. However, UNAIDS puts the number of people infected with HIV/AIDS in Pakistan at 74,000. The prevalence rate among the adult population is estimated to be around 0.1 per cent.

At present as in other South Asian countries, there are more men than women living with HIV/AIDS. Recent estimates suggest that the ratio of men to women living with HIV/AIDS is six to one. Most cases have been reported in urban areas, however the risks of the virus spreading to other parts of the country cannot be ruled out, as there is large rural-urban migration. Particularly risky behaviour is found among truck drivers.

The main modes of transmission of the HIV/AIDS virus, as reported in Pakistan, were unsafe sex (63 per cent), HIV contaminated blood transfusion (7 per cent), and men having sex with men (6 per cent).[52]

In Bangladesh, the first HIV/AIDS case was reported in 1989. Since then the number has risen to 13,000.[53] The country is a low prevalence country with an estimated adult prevalence rate of 0.1 per cent. The reported cases, however, are much lower at 363. The most risky group is IDUs, with an HIV infection rate of 4 per cent. The prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS is still low in Bangladesh even among the high-risk groups and the country still has the opportunity to prevent the virus from spreading particularly among the high-risk groups.

In Nepal, according to UNAIDS estimates, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS is 61,000, and around 3,100 people had died from the disease by 2003. The adult prevalence rate is still low at 0.5 per cent. However, the epidemic is concentrated among IDUs and sex workers. Unsafe drug use is a major cause of the virus in Nepal and it is estimated that 22-68 per cent of male IDUs across the country were infected by 2002, many of them younger than 25.[54] Among sex workers the prevalence rate is 17 per cent. There is a strong link between HIV and mobility in Nepal. Also among sex workers in Central Nepal who had worked in Mumbai (India), half of them were HIV-infected compared to 1-2 per cent of those who had never left Nepal.

The risks of the virus spreading is high and it is estimated that the prevalence rate may go up to one or 2 per cent among the adult population.[55]

Sri Lanka has a low prevalence rate of 0.1. According to 2003 UNAIDS estimates there are around 3,500 adults and children living with HIV/AIDS. The major mode of transmission is heterosexual sex (64 per cent). There are few cases of mother to child transmission, and transfer through blood transfusion. Also there are no reported cases of HIV/AIDS transmission among IDUs. Among the risks of the virus spreading in the country the most damaging maybe the ongoing civil war that has increased the presence of army personnel and has caused the growth of brothels and sex workers near army camps.

Bhutan has 100 people who are HIV/AIDS positive according to UNAIDS estimates and the adult prevalence rate is less than 0.1 per cent. The only mode of transmission is heterosexual sex. Maldives too has a low prevalence and it is estimated that there are 142 cases of HIV/AIDS. However, both countries, despite low levels, are at risk as there is cross border mobility: in Bhutan from India and Nepal, and from Sri Lanka and India into Maldives. In addition, the migration to Bhutan from India is largely from the Indian states of Mizoram, Nagaland and Manipur where the epidemic is now generalised.

Causes of health insecurity

The primary cause of the large burden of disease and mortality in South Asia is the lack of government commitment to provide adequate and quality healthcare for the poor. Government expenditure on public health remains low and inadequate. Also, the focus of government expenditure on health is on urban and tertiary level care, and not on rural and primary healthcare. Moreover, whatever little is spent is often wasted through a lack of adequate monitoring and delivery system.

Poverty and poor living conditions also exacerbate the problem of poor health outcomes for a majority of South Asians. A large proportion of South Asians live in absolute poverty. The poor also have little or no access to safe drinking water and a decent means of sanitation. These increase the burden of disease and mortality among the poor, especially women and children. The poor also lack access to timely healthcare as public facilities are often not present or are of poor quality. Poor health pushes people further into poverty.

Environmental hazards also pose a grave threat to health security globally and in the South Asian region. Poor quality of and poor access to water, air pollution, vector-borne diseases and inadequate urban housing are some of the major causes of disease, death and disability in South Asia. It is estimated that in South Asia 25-30 per cent of the total burden of disease is a result of poor environment.[56]

Poverty of income and health

Poverty of income and opportunities is a major threat to health and human security. South Asia, being home to more than 450 million poor people, faces a huge challenge of providing health for all. Poverty results in poor living conditions; lack of safe drinking water, poor sanitation facilities, and unhygienic environment. It also means lack of immunisation of children and malnourishment. The poor human conditions result in a large burden of preventable diseases. It is estimated that in India 42 per cent of the total deaths are a result of communicable diseases.[57] Among women in the reproductive age, communicable diseases account for the largest proportion of total deaths. These avoidable diseases are also responsible for 2.5 million deaths among children under the age of five.[58]

The increased burden of disease on the poor is a result of the lack of access to immunisation, clean water and sanitation, information about preventive methods, and poor nutrition. The poor are also less likely to seek care when it is urgently needed due to a lack of accessible health facilities, both in terms of the distance needed to travel to such a facility and in terms of the money required for treatment. Sickness pushes the poor into further poverty, as large amounts of expenditure are required to meet the costs of treatment. Sometimes, it is not only the expenditure on treatment that is difficult but also the additional burden of loss of income, if the sick person is the main breadwinner. In one study from northwest Bangladesh, for example, eight out of 21 TB patients had been forced to sell land or livestock to meet the costs of their treatment and to compensate for loss of income.[59] In South Asia, where the man is usually the breadwinner, the women and children are forced to earn for the family. This exposes women and children to the risk of exploitation and pushes the family into further poverty and poor health. Thus, poverty of income and health combine to entrap individuals in a 'poverty trap'.

South Asia remains one of the world's most malnourished regions. Poor nutrition weakens the body and its ability to fight against infections. The high prevalence of malnourishment in South Asia, particularly India, can be attributed to some extent to widespread poverty among a large proportion of the population (see chapter 3). The poor are at a greater risk of malnourishment and this in turn results in poor health.

Poverty and income inequality lead to increasing health insecurity of the poor.

Inequalities in income result in a large burden of morbidity and mortality among the poorest. The greatest risk of premature death, across all countries and within countries in South Asia, is to children and women, particularly pregnant women. As reflected in various surveys carried out in these countries, the access to health facilities and mortality rates of children vary substantially with income. The poorest quintile has the least access to healthcare and the highest mortality rates whereas the richest quintile has a much greater access to health services and lower mortality rates. Differences in access to healthcare and IMR are found across all South Asian countries. In Pakistan the poorest had an IMR of around 89 compared to 62.5 for the richest; Bangladesh 92.9 IMR for the poorest against 57.9 for the richest; and in Nepal the poorest had an IMR of 85.5 compared to 53.2 for the richest. Similar results are also found in under-five mortality rates. Poverty results not only in a lack of access to basic health facilities, but the children in poorer households are malnourished, and not immunised against fatal childhood diseases.

The inequalities in mortality rates among the children of the rich and the poor are the result of the prevailing inequalities in access to health facilities. In India, for example, while for the poorest only 16 per cent of births are attended by skilled health personnel, around 85 per cent of births for the richest are attended by a skilled health professional. In Pakistan, trained health personnel attend more than half the births among the richest while only around 5 per cent of the births among the poorest are attended by such staff. The same is true for Bangladesh and Nepal.

A large proportion of children in poor rural households are not immunised against preventable diseases. In Nepal, for example, while more than three-fourths of children from rich households had been immunised, only half the children from poor households had received all vaccinations. The disparity in immunisation rates along income lines is true for all of South Asia (see table 4.13).

Poverty is also one of the major risks for the spread of HIV/AIDS. Poor people lack access to education and health services that makes them more susceptible to disease. They also have little information and means to protect against acquiring the virus. Poverty also pushes people into working as commercial sex workers. Poor women, particularly from rural areas are forced into commercial sex work as a result of unemployment and poverty. Many women working as sex workers reported not using condoms. In India, a quarter of street based sex workers said that if a client refused to use a condom they simply went ahead and charged a higher fee.[60] Such risky sexual behaviour, particularly among high-risk groups, increases the danger of HIV/AIDS. A majority of drug users in South Asia also belong to the poorest sections of society. The existence of a large drug industry contributes to a redistribution of income from the poor to a few rich individuals who control the drug trade, worsening income inequality. Drug use among the

Table 4.13 Inequality in maternal and child health, 1990-2001

	Survey year	Births attended by skilled health personnel (%)		One-year olds fully immunised (%)		Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)		Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	
		Poorest 20%	Richest 20%	Poorest 20%	Richest 20%	Poorest 20%	Richest 20%	Poorest 20%	Richest 20%
India	1998	16.4	84.4	21.3	63.8	96.5	38.1	141.3	45.5
Pakistan	1990	4.6	55.2	22.5	54.7	88.7	62.5	124.5	73.8
Bangladesh	1999	3.5	42.1	50.3	74.9	92.9	57.9	139.7	72.4
Nepal	2001	3.6	45.1	54.2	81.6	85.5	53.2	129.9	67.7

Source: UNDP 2005.

poor leads to the sharing and reusing of needles that is a major cause of the concentration of the HIV/AIDS epidemic among IDUs in Pakistan, India and Nepal.

Lack of an effective and widespread healthcare delivery system

The healthcare system in South Asia is inadequate, inefficient, and expensive. In most countries in the region, the healthcare system consists of an under-funded and inefficient public sector along with a mixed, expensive and unregulated private sector. The accessibility and availability of health services in South Asia is low due to the limited health infrastructure in areas where a majority of the people live—the rural and less developed areas. Where the services are available, they are often too expensive and of a poor quality. The present health system cannot support the health needs of the 1.4 billion people of the region.

The primary cause for the poor quality and coverage of health services in South Asia is the low level of health expenditure. Even compared to other developing countries, South Asia's health expenditures are extremely low. It has been estimated that lower-income countries would need US $30-45 per capita as the minimum amount needed to finance essential health services.[61] Per capita health expenditures in all South Asian countries are lower. In 2002, per capita health expenditures in India was US $30, Pakistan US $13, Bangladesh US $11, Nepal US $12 and Sri Lanka US $32. The per capita public expenditures on health are even lower and range between US $3 in Nepal and Bangladesh to US $16 in Sri Lanka.[62]

The total health expenditure is not only low but mostly private expenditure. In India, for example, of the total health expenditure, less than one-fourth was spent by the government while three-fourths was by the private sector. Of this private expenditure, nearly all was out-of-pocket expenses(see table 4.14). Similarly, in Pakistan, most of the health expenditure was private, and nearly all of the private expenditure was out-of-pocket.

Public expenditure on health averages a mere 1 per cent of GDP. Most of the public expenditure in South Asia is concentrated on tertiary level facilities based mostly in urban area. Rural areas and primary level services are largely ignored in government health expenditures, resulting in a large burden of diseases and mortality that are preventable with small interventions. While the *quantity* of health expenditure is important it does not ensure *quality*. The quality of health service delivery is also poor in South Asia and the people are forced to go to private facilities. Most people are forced to incur out-of-pocket expenditures on health in a region where around 40 per cent of the population lives in absolute poverty. When people are forced to spend themselves, without public support, they are pushed further into poverty.

Table 4.14 Expenditures on health in South Asia, 2002

	Total expenditure on health as % of GDP	Public expenditure on health as % of total health expenditure	Private expenditure on health as % of total health expenditure	Out-of-pocket expenses as % of private expenditures on health
India	6.1	21.3	78.7	98.5
Pakistan	3.2	34.9	65.1	98.3
Bangladesh	3.1	25.2	74.8	85.9
Nepal	5.2	27.2	72.8	92.2
Sri Lanka	3.7	48.7	51.3	95.1
Bhutan	4.5	92.2	7.8	100
Maldives	5.8	87.7	12.3	100

Source: WHO 2005a.

Poor immunisation coverage of children

A major cause of the high childhood mortality in South Asia is the lack of immunisation coverage. There are 27 million children (under age one) who were not protected against common childhood diseases in the world in 2003.[63] Of these South Asia has the largest number of unprotected children. There were around 11 million children in South Asia who had not been immunised against measles (see figure 4.10).[64] India has the largest share of children who are not immunised, due to both low levels of coverage and a large and growing population. However, it is Pakistan that has the lowest immunisation coverage rate in the region. In 2003, only 61 per cent of children were immunised for measles in Pakistan while Sri Lanka and Maldives have almost achieved universal immunisation coverage with 99 and 96 per cent of children aged one being immunised for measles in 2003 (see table 4.15). Coverage in Bhutan has slipped just below 90 per cent in 2003. All countries in South Asia have to improve substantially if they are to provide universal immunisation, especially Pakistan requires to make the biggest effort.

Since becoming part of the Expanded Programme of Immunisation (EPI), South Asia has made progress in immunisation coverage. However, this progress is far from universal and many countries in the region still lag behind. Pakistan's example stands out as the country that has managed to achieve an average growth rate in GDP of around 5 per cent since 1990 but still has the lowest immunisation coverage for its children. Only 5 per cent of the country's districts have more than 90 per cent measles immunisation coverage (see table 4.16). Pakistan's progress in measles immunisation between 1990-2003 has been around 0.8 per cent a year, while in order to achieve the target of universal immunisation coverage the country will need to increase annual immunisation coverage between 2004-2010 at around 4.1 per cent. Similarly, India's progress in measles immunisation has also been lagging at around 0.8 per cent a year during 1990-2003. In order to achieve immunisation for all, India too will need to progress at a much faster rate and achieve a growth rate in immunisation of around 3.3 per cent. Despite its ongoing civil conflict, Nepal has achieved a relatively high average annual rate of increase in measles immunisation coverage of 1.4 per cent between 1990 and 2003, however, it is still far from the goal of universal coverage and will need to progress at an even faster rate in the future (see table 4.16).

Immunisation rates vary with levels of income, education and location but, above all, with the ability of healthcare services to reach the people. In South Asia, the healthcare system is concentrated in the urban areas with little focus on rural and poor areas. Routine immunisation coverage remains low in some areas of the region partly because the districts lack planning capacities and funds to conduct supervision and monitoring systems to track progress, but also because of the weaknesses in the wider health systems in the region, with poor basic facilities and

Figure 4.10 Children not immunised in South Asia, 2003 *(millions)*



Note: Afghanistan contributes 0.5 million to the total un-immunised children in the world but is not included in the South Asia aggregate above.
Source: UNICEF 2005e.

Table 4.15 Trends in measles immunisation in South Asia, 1990-2003 *(%)*

	1990	2000	2003
India	56	56	67
Pakistan	50	56	61
Bangladesh	65	76	77
Nepal	57	71	75
Sri Lanka	80	99	99
Bhutan	93	76	88
Maldives	96	99	96

Source: UNICEF 2005d.

Table 4.16 Coverage and reach of immunisation in South Asia

	Average annual rate of increase (%) of coverage against measles		Reported % of districts with > 90% coverage against measles	% of routine EPI vaccines financed by government 2003
	Observed 1990-2003	Required 2004-2010		
India	0.8	3.3	–	100
Pakistan	0.8	4.1	5	100
Bangladesh	0.9	1.9	80	100
Nepal	1.4	2.1	13	65
Sri Lanka	1.5	Sustain	100	100
Bhutan	-0.4	0.3	–	0
Maldives	0.0	Sustain	100	98

Source: UNICEF 2005e.

low salaries for health staff that give them little incentive to work in the more remote areas.

Poor reproductive healthcare facilities

More than one-third of maternal deaths in the world occur in South Asia. It is estimated that every day 507 women in South Asia die from complications during pregnancy and childbirth. This results from the lack of adequate and timely healthcare facilities. Most women in South Asia are not attended by a skilled personnel during delivery, receive no antenatal care, and are often not vaccinated during pregnancy against tetanus.

An essential component of reproductive health is antenatal care that includes routine checkup during pregnancy. This care is important in order to reduce the possible risks of mortality for both mother and child. Antenatal care forms a bridge between women and the health system in order to provide eesential health services to pregnant women. In South Asia, it is estimated that more than half the women receive no such care. This level of antenatal care is lower than any other region in the world (see table 4.17). Within the region, Nepal presents the worst case scenario, with only 28 per cent of pregnant women receiving antenatal care during the reporting period 1995-2002. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, with 98 per cent coverage, has reached almost universal coverage of antenatal care.

Table 4.17 Antenatal care by region, 1995-2002

Regions	Women aged 15-49 reporting 1+ antenatal visits with a skilled attendant (doctor/nurse/ midwife) (%)
Sub-Saharan Africa	68
Middle East and North Africa	65
East Asia and Pacific	82
Latin America and Caribbean	86
CEE/CIS and Baltic States	84
South Asia*	55
World	72

Note: Data is calculated as a weighted average.
Source: MHHDC 2005.

In addition to the *access* to antenatal care, *quality* of care is also an important issue in the context of South Asia. For example, in Nepal, among the women receiving antenatal care only half were informed about the dangers that may occur during pregnancy, only one-third received iron/folic acid tablets, and less than 30 per cent had their blood and urine samples taken.[65] In Bangladesh, among the women who received antenatal care, only 35.6 per cent had an examination of their abdomen, one-third had their weight or height measured, and only 35 per cent had their blood pressure checked.

Maternal tetanus is responsible for around 5 per cent of maternal deaths in the world. There are an estimated 257,000 neonatal tetanus deaths annually, and 30,000 women die each year from tetanus infection after they have given birth.[66] Most South Asian countries still have low levels of tetanus protection for women (see table 4.18). Pakistan's immunisation record for women remains the worst in South Asia.

Most women in South Asia receive no skilled care at delivery. It is estimated that only around one-tenth to one-fifth of the births are attended by a trained health personnel in South Asia (see table 4.19). There is also a huge disparity in the provision of skilled care at delivery between urban and rural areas. It is estimated that women living in urban areas of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are two to three times more likely to receive skilled care than women living in rural areas.[67] In Sri Lanka, the urban-rural

Table 4.18 Pregnant women receiving tetanus vaccination in South Asia, 2003

	(%)
India	78
Pakistan	57
Bangladesh	89
Nepal	69
Sri Lanka	97

Note: Data is for 1996-2000.
Sources: MHHDC 2005 and UNICEF 2005e.

Table 4.19 Births attended by skilled health personnel in South Asia, 1995-2003	(%)
India	43
Pakistan	23
Bangladesh	14
Nepal	11
Sri Lanka	97
Bhutan	24
Maldives	70

Source: UNDP 2005.

gap in access to skilled care has almost been overcome.

Policies for strengthening healthcare in South Asia

The healthcare system in South Asia suffers from several shortcomings, some of which have been discussed above. However, most of these deficiencies in the existing healthcare systems in South Asia can be corrected with focussed policy interventions to make the healthcare system more responsive to the needs of a majority of South Asians. Since the first report in 1997, South Asia Human Development Reports have been articulating the need and provided policy suggestions for improving the capabilities of people in the region. The Report on *Human Development in South Asia 2004* provided a complete framework for revitalising healthcare in South Asia. This section will briefly revisit some of those policy ideas.

Improving the access, equity and quality of health services

In order to improve the coverage and quality of healthcare, the following key interventions are vital:

i) *INCREASE PUBLIC SPENDING ON HEALTH:* Health expenditures must increase substantially if any improvement is to be made in access to and equity in healthcare. Most South Asian governments spend less than 1 per cent of their GDP on health. The government must give greater priority to health at the primary level, and to preventive care in particular, as the private sector is less likely to deliver in this area of healthcare.

ii) *FOCUS ON POOR:* Free and quality healthcare must be provided to the poor in order to increase their capabilities and to improve equity. Similarly, the focus of healthcare should be on providing opportunities in rural and less developed areas in order to create a more equal environment in access to health.

iii) *PREVENTIVE HEALTH VERSUS CURATIVE CARE:* It is important that public spending in South Asia should focus not only on providing curative care but more on the prevention of diseases in the first place. Providing extensive primary level facilities would ensure that diseases are controlled at the initial level and at a lesser cost than would be required if the disease was ignored and dealt with at the tertiary level.

iv) *IMPROVE PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT:* There is an urgent need to improve the management of the public healthcare sector. It is important that modern management techniques are introduced in order to minimise delays and reduce costs. Monitoring and control needs to be strengthened to improve efficiency.

v) *PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS:* There is a need to create more public-private partnerships to provide specific services. The governments in South Asia can create alliances with several NGOs and private healthcare providers to control certain diseases.

Improving the health of women and children

Women and children are more vulnerable to disease and mortality in South Asia and, therefore, there is a need to formulate policies specifically aimed at improving their condition. Policies that are important

to improve the health of women and children are:

i) *EDUCATION FOR HEALTH:* Education contributes positively to the health of women and children. South Asian governments must provide equal opportunities for education to girls. Education of women leads to lower fertility, greater contraception use, better health of children, and greater immunisation rates of children, among many other benefits to the family and community. It is also important to educate both men and women about nutrition, hygiene and prevention of certain diseases. This can be done with the help of both the electronic and print media.

ii) *IMPROVE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTHCARE:* There is a need to improve the quality and access to reproductive healthcare through the provision of better family planning services, improving antenatal care facilities and ensuring skilled care at delivery. There is also a need to ensure that all women are vaccinated for tetanus in order to reduce the chances of both maternal and infant mortality.

iii) *EMPOWERING WOMEN:* It is important to provide equal employment opportunities to women as income means empowerment for women and better health for the family. It is also important to give women a greater role and voice in policies that affect them. Women's greater and meaningful political participation in all branches of government is essential.

Regulation of private sector

The private sector in South Asia is largely unregulated. The care provided by them is not necessarily of a better quality. It is important that they are monitored. The private sector also includes various traditional practitioners and it is important to control and monitor their activities to ensure that people are not exploited.

Healthcare safety nets for the poor

There is a need to ensure health security for the poor through a provision of healthcare services by government's community-based facilities. A large proportion of the South Asian population works in the informal sector and is not covered by any form of health safety nets. Even those employed in the formal sector often lack access to healthcare. What is now provided by the government is too little and too inefficient. A public-private partnership in this area is something to think about for the policy makers.

Chapter 5

Environmental Security

'To ensure security from hunger, ignorance, poverty, health hazards, and ecological degradation, minimum goals should be established for human development and ecological security. The development indicators should define the objectives for sustainable relationship between population and environment.'

—Mahbub ul Haq

The natural disasters of 2005—the Asian tsunami, hurricanes in USA, and the devastating earthquake in South Asia—have chillingly depicted the magnitude of human insecurity in today's world. Add to these natural disasters the man-made ones—the polluted air and water, unsanitary hygienic condition to depletion of ozone layer and increasing global warming—the environmental insecurity of all people everywhere is overwhelming in scope and impact. The link between human development and human security has already been established in previous chapters. In this chapter, we broaden that concept to emphasise the link between environmental security to both human development and human security. Environmental degradation endangers the most fundamental aspect of human security by undermining the natural support systems on which all of human activity depends. Indeed, environmental change is among the earliest and the most pervasive sources of insecurity and conflict.

South Asia is a region characterised today by extremely high environmental stress resulting from a variety of acute environmental problems. To begin with, most countries simply do not have sufficient water to meet demand. The scarcity of water is accompanied by deterioration in water quality due to heavy industrial use, pollution and environmental degradation. Urban air pollution levels in the region are amongst the highest in the world, producing serious human health impacts and affecting aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. With most rural inhabitants relying upon traditional cooking fuels, indoor air pollution has evolved into an even more severe health hazard. Cost-ineffective thermal power still dominates the installed capacities of power utilities in South Asia. Resultantly, most countries are facing serious power shortfalls in the wake of skyrocketing industrial and household demand.

South Asia is home today to over four thousand cities and towns, eighty of which house populations of more than 500,000.[1] The high urban population density is creating various physical environmental problems and health issues—a result of poor solid waste disposal. Dumping of hazardous industrial and toxic waste is magnifying the challenge. The massive population growth in the South Asian countries and the consequent increase in the demand for food, shelter, energy and fuel and fodder to meet the basic subsistence requirements have ruthlessly burdened the natural ecosystems existing in the region. Deforestation and forest degradation are the critical issues of the day. No wonder that the incidence of natural disasters in South Asia is increasing in frequency and magnitude. South Asia accounted for more than 60 per cent of disaster related deaths worldwide during the period 1990-98.[2]

In this chapter, we will address the issues of environmental insecurity in South Asia due to water scarcity and pollution, air pollution, lack of energy security, and natural and man-made disasters.

South Asia is a region characterised today by extremely high environmental stress resulting from a variety of acute environmental problems

Box 5.1 The costs of water-related diseases

- Two billion people are at risk from malaria alone, with 100 million people affected at any one time, and 1-2 million deaths annually.
- There are four billion cases of diarrhea and 2.2 million deaths annually. 90 per cent of the victims are children under five.
- Intestinal worms infect about 10 per cent of the population of the developing world.
- About six million people are blind from trachoma.
- Those affected with schistosomiasis number 200 million and 600 million are at risk.

Sources: CSD 1997; UNEP 1995; WHO 2004a and WHO and UNICEF 2000.

Water security

One of the greatest threats to human security comes from lack of safe drinking water. Water is essential for human health and welfare. The huge increase in water demand over the past century can be largely attributed to three factors; population growth, industrial development and the expansion of irrigated agriculture. The statistics of water scarcity are staggering:

- Today, the world's supply of water per capita is only one-third of what it was in 1970.[3]
- 18 per cent, or 1.1 billion people, currently lack access to safe drinking water.
- Some 80 countries were found to be suffering from serious water shortages by the mid-1990s.[4]

For many of the world's poorer populations, a grave impediment to good health remains the continued use of polluted water. Well in excess of 90 per cent of the wastewater of the developing world is discharged directly into streams, open drains, rivers, lakes and coastal waters without treatment.[5] Lack of access to safe water supply and sanitation results in hundreds of millions of cases of water-related diseases (box 5.1).

The Himalayan water system feeds the life cycles of much of South Asia (except for Sri Lanka). Extending from the highest mountain chain on earth to the diverse ecological zones of South Asia, it nurtures one of the largest supplies of fresh water in the world. The rivers constituting the system indeed provide a lifeline and serve as the perennial primary source of water for drinking, agricultural and industrial purposes for the multitude of humans dwelling in the region. Insecurity of water arises from inadequate availability of water for domestic and agricultural use, polluted water and its effect on human health, mismanagement of water resources, and cross-border arrangements/disputes regarding sharing of water.

Figure 5.1 Renewable internal freshwater resources of South Asia, 2003



Source: World Bank 2005b.

Availability and access to safe water

Bangladesh and Pakistan have renewable internal freshwater resources of less than 1000 cubic metres per capita—a level commonly taken to indicate that water scarcity is a severe constraint (figure 5.1). In India, the availability of freshwater has fallen far below the ideally desirable limit of 2000 cubic metres per capita. Water scarcity is severe in certain watersheds of west and south India, although this is not a problem at the national level.

South Asia has made substantial progress in bringing safe water to its population (table 5.1). By 2002, water coverage had been successfully extended to at least three-fourths of the total population in all countries except Bhutan. However, the variation in water access patterns among the rural and urban households is quite noticeable. Provision of safe water has lagged behind in the rural sector varying from 60 per cent in Bhutan to 87 per cent in Pakistan.

Increasing dependence on groundwater

In South Asia, surface water is the primary source of municipal/domestic water. However, most countries are drawing water from groundwater sources as well. Groundwater demand in India has been increasing as a secondary source of drinking water as well as for irrigation.

Currently, above one-half of all water requirements in India are met by groundwater with more than 80 per cent of all rural water coming from this source.[6] The water requirements of Lahore and Dhaka, two big urban centres, are almost exclusively met by groundwater. The water table has seen a consistent and dramatic decline in many parts of South Asia:

- The water table is depleting in Pakistan around the urban centers and intensively irrigated areas because of higher extraction to the aquifer than recharge. It has been estimated that the water table has been falling at an annual rate of ten feet.[7]
- In Bangladesh, Water Resource Planning Organization (WARPO) conducted an analysis using data from the groundwater monitoring wells distributed all over the country. Results showed that the groundwater table of the country has been lowered over the last decade.
- The water table in the Kathmandu valley in Nepal has fallen substantially. The groundwater depletion rate is alarmingly high with the drop in level ranging from 9 metres to as much as 69 metres.[8]

Table 5.1 Trends in access to improved water source in South Asia, 1990-2002

(%)

	Total population		Urban population		Rural population	
Countries	1990	2002	1990	2002	1990	2002
India	68	86	88	96	61	82
Pakistan	83	90	95	95	78	87
Bangladesh	71	75	83	82	68	72
Nepal	69	84	94	93	67	82
Sri Lanka	68	78	91	99	62	72
Bhutan	…	62	…	86	…	60
Maldives	99	84	100	99	99	78

Source: WRI 2005.

Water demand for irrigation

Irrigated agriculture has recorded a massive expansion in South Asia. Pakistan commands the highest ratio of irrigated cropland in the region with four-fifths of its total cropland being currently irrigated (figure 5.2). However, it is Bangladesh which has registered the highest increase in the proportion of net sown irrigated area between 1990 and 2002. The increased need for irrigation is partly the outcome of sowing more and more high-yielding varieties (HYVs). In most South Asian countries, around 95 per cent of annual

Figure 5.2 Trends in irrigated land in South Asia, 1990-2002



Source: WRI 2005.

Table 5.2 Trends in access to improved sanitation facilities in South Asia, 1990-2002

(%)

Countries	Total population		Urban population		Rural population	
	1990	2002	1990	2002	1990	2002
India	12	30	43	58	1	18
Pakistan	38	54	81	92	19	35
Bangladesh	23	48	71	75	11	39
Nepal	12	27	62	68	7	20
Sri Lanka	70	91	89	98	64	89
Bhutan	…	70	…	65	…	70
Maldives	…	58	100	100	…	42

Source: WRI 2005.

water withdrawals are used up by the agricultural sector. The ratio is slightly less for India where irrigation utilises 86 per cent of the available water supplies.[9]

Surface water pollution

Water quality remains a key health security issue in South Asia. The major causes of consistent degradation of water quality are related to land-based activities, when adequate regulatory measures are not incorporated and the stakeholders do not show proper concern. Such activities have led to the overcharging of the carrying capacity of the water bodies to assimilate and decompose wastes. Gradual contamination of lakes and rivers has, therefore, resulted. For instance,

- India's two major Himalayan rivers, the Ganga and the Yamuna, have turned into virtual sewers. Ganges is right at the top of the list for the world's most polluted rivers.[10] At New Delhi, the water of the Yamuna is so polluted that even after prolonged boiling its foul smell perforce negates its consumption.[11]
- The Kelani River, which bisects the Colombo Urban Area (CUA) in Sri Lanka, is getting increasingly contaminated.
- River systems in proximity to urban areas of Bangladesh are also exhibiting a gradual decline in water quality. Buriganga in Dhaka and Karnafuli in Chittagong are the worst affected.

Three factors are primarily responsible for water pollution in South Asia:

- The most widespread contamination of water is from disease-bearing human wastes.[12] In South Asia, the enormous problem of such contamination manifests itself in the poor and deteriorating surface water quality in all countries. In India, sewage and municipal effluents account for 75 per cent of the total pollution load in rivers.[13] The sanitation facilities thus far provided in South Asia, miserably fail to meet the requirements of its huge population (table 5.2). Even less has been done in the region to extend the treatment of human sewage. With the sewage still largely untreated, the replacement of septic tank systems with piped sewerage systems has merely facilitated the pollution of surface water at an increasing rate.
- In the process of rapid industrial development in South Asia, huge amounts of residuals have been generated with an undesirable impact on water. The industrial effluents are frequently discharged into local water bodies without treatment. Industries pertaining to leather and tanning, fertilisers, textiles, food products and paper and pulp are highly water polluting. Infact, food and beverage industry is responsible for maximum water pollution load in all South Asian countries except Bangladesh (table 5.3). In Bangladesh, the textile industry alone contributes two-thirds of the

Table 5.3 Industry shares of emissions of organic water pollutants in South Asia, 2001

(% of total)

Countries	Primary metals	Paper and pulp	Chemicals	Food and beverages	Textiles	Others
India	12.6	7.5	9.3	53.0	13.0	4.6
Pakistan	11.6	7.0	8.4	39.9	30.0	3.1
Bangladesh	1.8	6.8	2.5	23.2	64.0	1.7
Nepal	1.5	8.1	3.9	43.3	39.0	4.2
Sri Lanka	0.5	7.0	6.4	52.3	31.0	2.8

Source: World Bank 2005b.

organic water pollutants. The industrial sector in South Asia commands a significant share of emissions of total organic water pollutants. 7 per cent of the total effluents in the Nepalese rivers originate from its industries.[14]

- Agriculture has been intensified in South Asia through the increasing use of chemical fertilisers, fungicides and pesticides. The run-off from irrigation feeds into surface water and subsequently seeps into sub-soil water. All South Asian countries, except Nepal, have registered consistent upward trends in fertiliser consumption (table 5.4). Within the region, the intensity of fertiliser usage is the lowest in Nepal, in other countries the intensity rose rapidly in the 1990s (figure 5.3). Similarly, the usage of pesticides in South Asia has been improper and indiscriminate. For instance, the total quantity of pesticides consumed in Pakistan went up eight fold between 1990 and 2004.[15]

Table 5.4 Trends in fertiliser consumption in South Asia, 1981-2001

(thousand metric tons)

Countries	1981	1991	2001
India	6084.6	12728.1	17344.3
Pakistan	1079.8	1884.1	2944.5
Bangladesh	400.0	1004.4	1449.6
Nepal	23.8	81.1	72.5
Sri Lanka	147.4	177.2	244.1

Source: WRI 2005.

Groundwater pollution

As the surface water near towns and cities in South Asia becomes increasingly polluted and costly to purify, public water utilities and other urban water users have turned to groundwater as a potential source of a cheaper and safe supply. Unfortunately, many areas in South Asia are increasingly facing groundwater quality problems. Prominent among these is the presence of fluorides, nitrates and/or arsenic in groundwater aquifers.[16] The core issue for groundwater is that of over pumping and the resultant infiltration of salt water into fresh water aquifers. Excessive amounts of salt in the water, of course, render it impotable. Groundwater salinity has been reported from many places in India. In the North Western Province of Sri Lanka., nitrate concentration has been recorded at a level far above that advocated by the World Health Organization (WHO) for safe drinking water in almost 80 per cent of the wells.[17] A study in Punjab (Pakistan) discovered that nearly three-fourths of the wells and tube wells in the province were providing water that was biologically and/or

Unfortunately, many areas in South Asia are increasingly facing groundwater quality problems

Figure 5.3 Trends in intensity of fertiliser use in South Asia, 1980-2001



Source: WRI 2005.

Box 5.2 Arsenic contamination in Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, groundwater has always been considered as a relatively secure source of drinking water. Thousands of hand pumped tubewells were installed in the 1970s to curb diseases from dirty surface water. In rural areas, these shallow tube wells account for nearly the entire supply of safe drinking water. Unfortunately, the arsenic contamination issue is today threatening to reverse all the good work done for the provision of safe drinking water.

In the late 1980s, a local health researcher linked the tubewells to an outbreak of strange skin lesions. Major studies that followed detected serious arsenic contamination of groundwater resources in almost all the districts of Bangladesh. It has been estimated that more than 50 million people in the country are exposed to water with higher arsenic levels than what World Health Organization (WHO) considers safe. High levels of arsenic in groundwater can cause serious health problems if imbibed over a long period (from 5 to 15 years). Chronic arsenic poisoning can lead to skin ailments, cancers of the skin, lungs, urinary bladder and kidney, damage to internal organs and eventual death. Already thousands of cases of arsenic poisoning have been recorded among the exposed population. Some deaths have also been reported.

Some scientists believe that arsenic is entering shallow groundwater in the Bengal basin as the result of a natural process. Yet other experts are of the view that arsenic contamination originates either from the use of synthetic chemicals, such as wood preservatives, or insecticides. The evidence, however, suggests that the over-pumping of groundwater and diversion of river water are largely responsible for groundwater arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh.

Sources: Ahmad *et al*. 2002; GoB 2000; Pierce 2001 and The NEWS 2005a.

chemically contaminated.[18] In Bangladesh, arsenic contamination has emerged as a major threat to the safety and survival of future generations of the country (box 5.2). WHO has called it the 'largest mass poisoning of a population in history'. Hence, South Asia today encounters the critical challenge of recovering the groundwater quality from contaminated underlying aquifers.

Health effects

The use of polluted waters for drinking, cooking and bathing is one of the principal pathways for infection by diseases that kill and sicken hundreds of thousands in South Asia each year. Infected water has led to health problems such as diarrhea, hepatitis and occasional outbreaks of typhoid and cholera:

- In India, 19 per cent of children under the age of three suffer from diarrhea. One in every seven of the patients aggravates his/her condition into dysentery.[19] India is also afflicted by an average caseload of about two to three million malaria cases annually. Worse still, the rate of malarial mortality is depicting a rising trend.
- A survey carried out by John Hopkins University in 1990 confirmed that diarrhea is the leading cause of loss of healthy life years in Pakistan.[20] The aggregate annual health costs of using polluted water have been approximated to lie in the range of US $403-1093 million for the country.[21]
- According to WHO estimates, in 1992 there were 230,000 deaths in Bangladesh, directly related to water-borne diseases. In addition, there were more than 15 million cases of diarrhea, malaria, intestinal worm infestation and skin diseases caused by water pollution.[22]
- Nepal has the highest prevalence of diarrhea in South Asia. One in every five children less than five years of age had diarrhea in 2001. Significantly, the incidence of diarrhea is lower for children residing in households with access to piped water.[23]
- Water pollution is imposing whopping human health costs exceeding US $6 million annually in the Colombo metropolitan area (Sri Lanka) alone.[24] Intestinal infections are widespread due to usage of water from shallow and unprotected wells. The rate of such infections ranges between 600-700 per 100,000 of the inhabitants in Colombo.[25]

Mismanagement of water resources

In South Asia, current water delivery and use patterns for agriculture are quite wasteful. Farmers often tend to use wasteful flood irrigation methods instead of drip and sprinkler irrigation, which economises on the use of water. The irrigation infrastructure is growing increasingly dilapidated owing to maintenance efforts that are grossly inadequate. Inadequate funding of

Operation and Maintenance (O & M) costs is the major contributing factor. Vital improvements like the rehabilitation of canals, the lining of water channels and land leveling are undertaken very sporadically. Hence, delivery losses of the irrigation system are extremely high. In most countries, wastages due to technical management problems have been compounded by corruption and water misappropriation. It has been estimated for Pakistan that the delivery mechanism has an average delivery efficiency of a paltry 35-40 per cent from the canal head to the root zone.[26] The delivery is particularly inefficient in the watercourses. Irrigation practices add another 10-15 per cent to the losses.

The water distribution networks in the urban areas of South Asia are also suffering from unsustainable distribution losses. Distribution systems are obsolete and operational wastage is high. For instance, in Dhaka city, the unaccounted loss of water is at least 45 per cent—out of which 20 per cent is physical loss and 25 per cent is administrative one.[27]

Cross-border water sharing

The limited water resources are giving rise to explosive rivalries/disputes in the region. Although water has not been the cause of inter-state conflict in the military sense, it has been a major source of regional discord. Disputes have arisen essentially in relation to water sharing in rivers that either transcend national boundaries or flow along them. While some of these divergences have been resolved through treaties, others simply refuse to go away.

India-Pakistan

After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the water sharing issue acquired special intensity in South Asia. The division of the basin between Pakistan and India cut the upstream reaches of the tributary rivers of the Indus. Pakistan was a lower riparian nation with its choices from the eastern rivers extremely limited. After long, intensive and difficult discussions and international mediation over a 13-year period, the Indus Water Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India on September 19, 1960. The water sharing under the treaty was quite simple. The three western rivers (the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus itself) were allocated to Pakistan. On the other hand, the annual average of 29 million-acre feet (MAF) from the three eastern rivers (the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej) was allowed to be fully used by India. India was also permitted to build a number of dams, barrages and link canals to distribute water from the eastern Indus tributaries. However, Article III of the Indus Water Treaty does not allow India to interfere with the waters of the western rivers except for specified uses like domestic use, non-consumptive use, agricultural use and generation of hydro-electric power. The treaty precludes the building of any storages by India on the rivers allocated to Pakistan. The treaty also mandates certain institutional arrangements. There was to be a permanent Indus Commission consisting of one Commissioner each for India and Pakistan. Moreover, under its Article IX, the treaty provides for an elaborate dispute resolution mechanism in cases where the two governments fail to agree.

Despite extreme political differences between India and Pakistan, the operation of the Indus Water Treaty has been smooth and reasonably satisfactory. It was never abrogated—even during periods of war. The treaty is an internationally appreciated and well-quoted example of successful trans-boundary agreements on river water sharing. Unfortunately, some serious disputes have gradually gained ground under the ambit of the treaty. The Baglihar Project has been in the arena of intense public debate for the last five years (box 5.3). The issue has assumed classical proportions of an Indo-Pak dispute since the invocation of the arbitration clause of the Indus Water Treaty for the first time in its history. In addition, the proposed construction of the Kishanganga hydro-

Although water has not been the cause of inter-state conflict in the military sense, it has been a major source of regional discord

power project by India is now also emerging as a serious bone of contention. Kishanganga is a 330 megawatt (MW) project on the Ganga river in held Kashmir. Pakistan anticipates a serious water deficit in the Neelum River once the project starts operating. Attempts to solve the dispute bilaterally have failed to allay Pakistan's concerns with regard to the design of the project.

India-Bangladesh

The expression 'water security' acquires special significance in the India-Bangladesh context. As the lowest riparian in the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) system, Bangladesh has 54 rivers (including rivulets and streams) that cross the Indo-Bangladesh border.[28] The major water dispute between Bangladesh and India pertains to the sharing of water from the Ganges (a trans-boundary river) during dry periods. In 1975, the Farraka Barrage was commissioned by India on the Ganges, 18 kilometers upstream of the border between Bangladesh and India, along the Rajshahi District.

The diversion of water through the Farraka barrage altered drastically the hydrology of the entire Ganges-dependent area in Bangladesh. This was particularly true for the lean season when the average discharge of the Ganges plummeted dramatically. Some of the tributaries of the Ganges virtually died, while many others choked due to changes in sedimentation patterns. Resultantly, salinity penetrated inland through surface water systems. The intrusion of salinity has impacted on agro-ecological characteristics, rendering barren over 800,000 hectares of potential dry season paddy lands each year.[29] Open water fish production has declined in the entire southwestern region due to shrinkage in surface water systems. The worst impact, however, has been on the Sundarbans—the largest patch of productive mangrove forest in the world. The timber loss has been conservatively estimated in monetary terms at US $320 million.[30] The Sundarbans have been the means of livelihood security for about three million people, most of whom stand affected now.

Box 5.3 The Baglihar Dam controversy

The Baglihar Project is divided into two phases each designed to produce 450 megawatt (MW) power. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for construction of the first phase was signed in March 1999. The Project envisages the construction of a 308 metres high dam on River Chenab near the place known as Baglihar. The dam will have a storage capacity of 321,000 acre-feet. Of this, live storage (pondage) is 30,400 acre-feet. This pondage is meant to supplement the discharge during low flow period. This is precisely what Pakistan is opposing. Pakistan's stance is that the Baglihar Dam involves the creation of storage beyond what is legitimately allowed to India under the terms of the Indus Water Treaty. Hence, Pakistan's objections primarily relate to the design of the plant and they do not *ipso facto* question India's right under the Indus Water Treaty to construct hydroelectric dams.

Pakistan fears that the dam will cause it a loss of 6,000 to 7,000 cusecs of water every day, equivalent to 27 per cent water loss in the Jhelum River. Some experts also claim that the Baglihar Dam will have major economic and security implications for Pakistan owing to increased Indian control over its share of water supplies. India could either reduce water-flows to Pakistan or release stored water to cause floods. According to a report, the project will aid India in tapping around 7,000 cusecs of water for irrigation purposes in the short term. This is but a confirmation of Pakistan's apprehensions regarding India intentions about its storage potential. The Pakistani objections are thus partly water-related and partly security-related. However, India considers the security fears as totally misconceived and claims that the Baglihar Project is within the minimal rights granted to India on the western rivers by the Indus Treaty.

Sources: Husain 2005 and Iyer 2005.

On 12 December 1996, Bangladesh and India signed the historic 'Ganges Water Sharing Treaty'. The treaty provides Bangladesh the opportunity to invest in long-term sustainable projects to develop freshwater resources in the Ganges. Apparently, there still remains a question mark regarding the guarantee of minimum flow to Bangladesh. Hence, the treaty had a shaky start because of abnormally low flow in the Ganges during the 1997 lean period. Fortunately, the treaty worked to the satisfaction of both governments in the succeeding lean periods. Unfortunately, over the last couple of years, the proposed 'Indian River Link Project' of the government of India has created fresh resentment in Bangladesh. It is feared that if the mega project does materialise the impact on Bangladesh would be much more severe than what ensued after Farraka withdrawal. Infact, it is every inch a possibility that the 'Indian River Link Project' would induce major changes in the environmental characteristics for the entire Bangladesh. Realising all this, Bangladesh has already communicated its concerns formally to the Indian side.

India-Nepal

There are a few significant pending issues regarding water sharing between India and Nepal in relation to certain rivers. Initially, a new chapter was perceived to have been opened with the Mahakali Treaty of February 1996. The treaty aimed to set the stage for the development of the Pancheswar Multi-purpose Project. The Pancheswar Project was to be completed within eight years of the date of agreement. Specific provisions were stipulated regarding the ways in which India and Nepal would share the water of the Mahakali River and the energy that the high dam would generate. Action under the treaty has remained stalled unfortunately. Even nine years after its ratification, the very basic provisions of the treaty remain unimplemented. The clauses pertaining to water rights, the price of electricity and the status of the river at its origin at Kalpani have proven to be highly contentious. Meanwhile, criticism has been mounting regarding the social, political and economic aspects of the chosen path. Resultantly, the issue of water sharing between India and Nepal has today become intertwined with a long-drawn battle for human security.

Air pollution

Despite increasing environmental awareness, air pollution levels continue to be high in many parts of the world, and cities continue to grow without taking appropriate environmental measures. Air pollution from combustion sources is associated with a broad spectrum of acute and chronic health effects that may vary with the pollutant constituents. Infact, indoor and outdoor air pollution is estimated to be responsible for nearly 5 per cent of the global burden of disease. The studies by World Health Organization (WHO) establish that indoor smoke from solid fuels causes above one-third of lower respiratory infections. Mortality due to indoor air pollution amounts to 1.6 million people annually while another 0.8 million fall prey to outdoor exposure to air pollution every year.[31]

The air quality situation in South Asia is currently severe and further deteriorating

The air quality situation in South Asia is currently severe and further deteriorating. The urban population in South Asia is constantly growing in absolute numbers as well as a proportion of the total population (figure 5.4 and table 5.5). The rapid increase in urban population in South Asia has resulted into unplanned urban development and higher consumption causing escalation in demand for transport, energy and other infrastructure and hence more and more pollution. This has given rise to a situation where the air quality in most of the major cities is way beyond WHO standards. This is particularly true for the three major pollutants; suspended particulate matter (SPM), sulfur dioxide (SO_2) and airborne lead. For instance, SPM and SO_2 levels in Dhaka are respectively 12 and 10 times higher than the global standards.[32]

Table 5.5 Trends in urban population of South Asia, 1990-2005

(millions)

Countries	1990	2005
India	216.1	315.3
Pakistan	33.9	56.1
Bangladesh	21.6	38.1
Nepal	1.7	4.2
Sri Lanka	3.6	4.1
Bhutan	0.1	0.2
Maldives	0.1	0.1

Sources: UN 2004b and 2005c.

Figure 5.4 Trends in urban population as percentage of total population in South Asia, 1990-2005



Sources: UN 2004b and 2005c.

The South Asian region is experiencing unacceptable air quality on account of three broad sources:

- Mobile sources (vehicles)
- Stationary sources (use of fossil fuels in industries and thermal power plants)
- Indoor sources (burning of biomass)

A brief discussion of each source is in order here.

Vehicular emissions

Traffic is a leading air polluter in the big cities. There has been a dramatic expansion in the number of vehicles on the road in the urban areas of South Asia:

- In India, the motorised fleet increased to 37.2 million in 1997 from a mere 0.3 million in 1951. Out of these, almost one-third ply in the 23 metropolitan cities with populations exceeding a million.[33] In Pakistan, over the last ten years, the number of motorcycles and scooters has almost doubled, while that of rickshaws has expanded by 59 per cent.[34]
- The vehicle fleet in Nepal tripled between 1990 and 1998.[35] Over the same period, Bhutan witnessed a vehicular growth of almost 5 per cent per annum.[36]

Understandably, vehicle emissions are today the key contributory factor to the problem of growing air pollution in the urban sector characterised by low air dispersion. The total daily pollution load more than doubled in Delhi between 1991 and 1997 with two-thirds of the increase contributed by the transport sector.[37] There has been a massive rise in petrol and diesel consumption in South Asia. The consumption of gasoline and high-speed diesel (HSD) in India grew by more than 3 times during the period 1980-1997.[38] The higher consumption complemented by the use of low quality fuel has contributed enormously towards the heavy concentration of pollutants. Worse still, various studies have revealed that the automobiles in South Asia are often worn out, overloaded and poorly maintained. An average vehicle in

Pakistan reportedly emits 15 to 20 times more pollutants than the average vehicle in a developed country.[39]

Industrial pollution

South Asia is a region in the throes of industrialisation. None can argue against the perceived benefits of greater industrialisation in South Asia. However, rapid strides made by the South Asian countries in the industrial sector have brought with them an unwanted consequence—escalation in air pollution. Highly air-polluting industries include integrated iron and steel, copper/zinc/aluminum smelters, cement, oil refineries, petrochemicals, pesticides and fertiliser units. This is not all, unfortunately. Small-scale industries especially foundries, chemical manufacturing and brick making are also significant polluters. India alone has over three million small-scale units accounting for almost 40 per cent of the total industrial output.[40] Owing to the frequent absence of effective zoning restrictions in South Asian countries, industries have been constantly proliferating within urban areas and even the residential zones. No surprise, therefore, that city pollution in South Asia is far worse today than even the highly industrialised countries.

Thermal power plants

Coal-fired stations constitute a large proportion of the total thermal generating capacity in South Asia. Why is such power generation polluting? Most coal in the region has a very high sulphur content. Combustion efficiencies are often poor, and modern emission control technologies are seldom deployed. The dependence of the power sector on this inferior quality coal is, hence, causing toxic emissions of particulate matter and oxides of nitrogen, sulphur and carbon. About three-fourths of the power generation in India is thermal based, using coal predominantly.[41] Thermal power plants have been classified by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) of India as a 'highly polluting industry'.

Indoor air pollution

The rural areas in South Asia suffer from polluted indoor air caused by the combustion of biomass in poorly ventilated rooms. The major source is the domestic use of highly polluting and inefficient cooking fuels. For the poor households in rural areas, these are often the only fuels available/affordable. For instance, the households in Bhutan burn truckloads of firewood for *bukharis* during the winter months. Such traditional fuels are much more polluting than their modern alternatives like kerosene, biogas and electricity.

Impact on human health

Particulate air pollution is consistently and independently related to the most serious effects including lung cancer and other cardiopulmonary mortality.[42] Adverse pregnancy outcomes such as stillbirth and low birth weight have also been associated with air pollution.[43] If anything, poor health and nutrition levels have rendered the populations in South Asia more susceptible to the afore-mentioned negative health consequences.

- In 1993, a study by the World Bank concluded that respiratory infections contribute above one-tenth of the total disease burden in India.[44] Indoor pollution in rural areas is responsible for five hundred thousand deaths in India every year. Most casualties are of women and of children under five years of age.[45] Air pollution is imposing an economic burden worth a whopping US $500-2100 million on the major Indian cities alone.[46]
- The reported cases of acute respiratory infection (ARI) among children in Punjab (Pakistan) almost doubled to 1.5 million over the period 1998-2000.[47] More than 90 per cent of the children residing in the metropolitan area of Karachi city have been found to have considerably high blood lead levels threatening irreversible mental

Small-scale industries especially foundries, chemical manufacturing and brick making are also significant polluters

impairment and a range of behavioral effects by hindering the neurological development of children.[48] The losses attributed to localised air pollution in Pakistan, in terms of premature deaths, hospital admissions and sickness, have been assessed at US $249-385 million per year.[49]

- Rising SPM levels are reportedly responsible for six and a half million hospital admissions in Bangladesh annually due to respiratory problems. Chronic lung diseases and asthma in the country are, infact, causing 850 million fewer 'activity days' per year due to respiratory complications.[50]
- Pandey and Basnet computed a strong correlation between the prevalence of chronic bronchitis and indoor smoke pollution in Nepal.[51] They found that between 11 per cent and 31 per cent of the bronchitis cases in the various regions of the country were due to indoor smoke pollution. Acute respiratory infection (ARI) is the leading cause of death among children under five years of age in Nepal, accounting for almost one-third of the causalities in this age group.[52]
- The fast growing air pollution problem in Bhutan is reflected in the sharp increase in the incidence of acute respiratory tract diseases, bronchitis and asthma. For instance, acute respiratory tract diseases affected 14 per cent of the population in 1998, up from the figure of 10 per cent eight years back.[53]

Energy security and environmental impact

Energy is pivotal to the environment-security nexus because of its direct linkage with the magnitude of air pollution as well as its connection with important social issues that touch on sustainable development. As indicated by figure 5.5, the per capita energy consumption has increased substantially in all South Asian countries. The major drivers of this growth are the structural changes accompanying economic growth and the rise in population coupled with rapid urbanisation. However, despite the vast energy resources within the region, energy consumption is still abysmally low when compared with the developed countries. For instance, the per capita energy consumption in USA is more than 15 times of the consumption in India.

Biomass

South Asian countries rely heavily on biomass for meeting the bulk of their energy needs. As revealed by bare numbers, biomass sources of fuel wood, twigs, crop residue and animal waste play a significant role towards maintaining

Figure 5.5 Trends in energy use per capita in South Asia, 1990-2002



Source: World Bank 2005b.

energy security of a large majority of the population, especially in the rural areas:

- In Nepal, more than four-fifths of the energy demand in the domestic sector is met from fuelwood.[54]
- Around 78 per cent of the rural households in India are dependent on consumption of biomass energy for cooking and heating.[55]
- Firewood is the primary source of energy in Bhutan due to its abundant availability. Infact, it accounts for virtually all non-commercial energy consumption in the rural areas of the country.
- In Sri Lanka, wood supplies 90 per cent of cooking and heating energy for rural households.[56]

Unfortunately, with the dwindling forest cover in South Asia, biomass fuel has been rendered increasingly unreliable and expensive. Moreover, the biomass fuels are usually being consumed beyond sustainable limits, which has myriad adverse implications for the environment in South Asia.

Electricity

It is the availability of electricity, the most convenient form of energy, which goes a long way to determine living standards in the modern world. Electricity generation has substantially expanded in South Asia over the last two decades (table 5.6). In addition, per capita electricity consumption has grown considerably in all South Asian countries. In Maldives, the electricity consumption per capita stood at a paltry 25 kilowatt hours (kwh) till 1980. By the year 2002 the figure had risen to 448 kwh.[57]

Despite a substantial increase in electricity generation, there has only been a modest success in extending the coverage of electricity. In Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, the three largest countries of the region, no fewer a proportion than one-half to two-thirds of the population does not have access to electricity.[58] The situation is much bleaker if one was to focus on the rural areas alone. Moreover, serious power shortages are adversely affecting all sectors of the South Asian economies. India faced a shortfall of 11.3 per cent in meeting its peak energy requirement in 1997-98.[59] The failure in better energy utilization owes to the problems of electricity pilferage, high transmission and distribution (T&D) losses, low metering etc.

How is electricity being generated in South Asia today? The first fact worthy of note is that the gigantic potential of hydroelectricity remains severely under-employed (box 5.4). The existing power generation capacity in South Asia

Table 5.6 Trends in electricity production in South Asia, 1990-2002

(billion kwh)

Countries	1990	2002	Average annual growth (%) 1990-2002
India	289.4	596.5	8.8
Pakistan	37.7	75.7	8.4
Bangladesh	7.7	18.4	11.6
Nepal	0.9	2.1	11.1
Sri Lanka	3.2	7.0	9.9

Source: World Bank 2005b.

Box 5.4 Hydroelectric power in South Asia

The hydroelectric power potential of the sub-continent is enormous—250,000 megawatt (MW) or about 4.5 per cent of the world's total hydro-electric potential. This renewable energy, while theoretically accessible, is proving politically difficult to tap because of conflicting security perceptions in the region.

Admittedly, the entire installed capacity of electricity in Nepal is hydropower-based. The misfortune, however, is that the country has been able to harness a paltry 0.63 per cent of its techno-economically feasible hydropower potential so far. This despite the fact that given its vast water resources and steep topography, Nepal can boost of an ideal scenario for development and employment of hydropower. Similarly, in Bhutan, the potential of hydroelectricity, estimated at over 30,000 MW, remains largely unexploited.

The use of hydropower for electricity production has been on a consistent decline in India since the early 1970s. Its contribution has plummeted to about 10 per cent now from a high of 43 per cent in 1970-71. The case of Pakistan is not much different. More than two-thirds of the total electricity in the country is being produced through thermal generation. Hence, the hydro potential, embedded mainly in the NWFP and the Northern Areas, has never been utilised sufficiently.

Sources: GON 2003; UNEP 2001a and World Bank 2005b.

Figure 5.6 Composition of forest area in South Asia, 2000



Source: WRI 2005.

comprises a mix of hydro, coal-based thermal, oil-fired thermal, gas and nuclear sources. Heavy dependence on one/two sources for generating electricity is, however, a major feature of the national electricity sectors.

Table 5.7 Average annual deforestation in South Asia, 1990-2000

Countries	thousand hectares	%
India	-38	-0.1
Pakistan	39	1.5
Bangladesh	-17	-1.3
Nepal	78	1.8
Sri Lanka	35	1.6

Source: FAO 2005b.

Deforestation

The earth had some 5 billion hectares of forested area on the eve of the 20th century, which has now shrunk to below 3.9 billion hectares. At the global level, the net loss in forest area during the 1990s was an estimated 94 million hectares. With a forest cover worth 77 million hectares, approximately one-sixth of the land area of South Asia is under forests. Majority of the forest area is constituted by natural forests (figure 5.6). Particularly, in case of Nepal and Bhutan, nearly all the forests are composed primarily of indigenous tree species. However, plantations account for a much greater proportion of the forests in larger countries. Notably, plantations constitute more than half the total forest area of India.

Assessments have shown for many years that in a number of South Asian countries the area of forests is shrinking. Figure 5.7 brings home striking conclusions. Between 1990 and 2000, the only country in the region to have visibly enhanced its forest cover is Bangladesh. The forests in Bangladesh witnessed an average annual growth of 1.3 per cent for the period analysed (table 5.7).

Meanwhile, the forest area has declined considerably in Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The rate of deforestation is the highest in Nepal at 1.8 per cent per year. The forest coverage in Nepal was an impressive 45 per cent in 1966, nearly 40 per cent of which stands lost now. However, the situation is by far the most drastic for Pakistan. Pakistan is one of the few developing countries with no remaining biologically undisturbed forests.[60] With a paltry 3.1 per cent of the area under forests, the continuing forest depletion is likely to play havoc in the near future. Infact, according to an estimate, Pakistan's total wood biomass could be totally consumed within the next 10 to 15 years.[61]

The forests in South Asia are also suffering from dwindling tree density. In many forested regions, the stock of trees is now growing at a fast diminishing rate. For instance, in Nepal, the total growing stock was 522 million cubic metres of bark (up to 10 centimetres top diameter) in 1985. Over the next fifteen years, the stock was reduced to 388 million cubic metres.[62] In Pakistan, good quality tall tree forests (with more than 50 per cent cover) occupy less than 400,000 hectares.[63] To all intents and purposes, the ingredients of a serious environmental conflict are fast

Figure 5.7 Trends in percentage of forested land area in South Asia, 1990-2000



Source: UNDP 2003.

Figure 5.8 Trends in availability of arable land in South Asia, 1981-2002



Source: FAO 2005a.

maturing in South Asia owing to consistent forest loss and degradation.

Causes of deforestation

- Poorly designed forest policy is in itself the leading factor that has contributed to reduction of forests in South Asia. For the most part, the British colonists treated the regional forests as 'timber mines'. The concept of sustainable forest management has, therefore, failed to gain the desired momentum in South Asia. The involvement of local communities in joint forest management has not been recognised as a significant feature of national forest policies and programmes in the South Asian countries. Given the long history of top-down, command-and control management of the forestry sector in South Asia, operationalising the latest approaches in practice is but a formidable challenge.
- Most tropical deforestation is done for agricultural purposes. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood for a majority of the rural population in South Asia. Unfortunately, the per capita availability of arable land in South Asia has presently been reduced to a paltry 0.14 hectares per capita. In India and Pakistan, 0.23 or more hectares of arable land per capita were available till 1981. Over the last twenty years, the availability has met with a serious decline (figure 5.8). In Bangladesh, the reduction has been even more drastic, with latest estimates pointing to a meagre 0.06 hectares per capita of arable land. The frantic quest for food security in South Asia has, therefore, led to the inclusion of more and more areas from forests into the agriculture sector.
- South Asian countries rely heavily on wood energy. In rural areas, bulk of the energy needs are met by fuelwood and charcoal.
- Deforestation is also driven by the demand for timber. Over the period 2000-2002, the average annual production of industrial wood in South Asia stood at 24.5 million cubic metres (table 5.8). India alone is producing a whopping 19 million cubic metres of industrial wood every year. Such high production levels of timber have serious consequences for the forests in the region.
- Forest area is being used increasingly as grazing land for swelling numbers

Table 5.8 Average annual industrial roundwood production in South Asia, 2000-2002

Countries	thousand cubic metres
India	19123
Pakistan	2679
Bangladesh	595
Nepal	1260
Sri Lanka	688
Bhutan	134

Source: WRI 2005.

of livestock. The number of livestock (cattle, goats, sheep etc) in Pakistan, for instance, has currently shot up to 138 million as compared to 104 million in 1990-91.[64] Forests are also under great pressure from the ever-increasing demand for fodder of the livestock population. In Nepal, one-fifth of the livestock feed in the country is estimated to come from the forest.[65]

- The forestry sector in South Asia is afflicted by illegal forest activities including corrupt practices. Commercial logging methods are often destructive and contribute directly or indirectly to deforestation. When certain species are selected, non-target species are also damaged in utter violation of national conservation measures. The high monetary stakes that accompany commercial logging have led to the emergence of 'logging gangs'.

Impact of deforestation

The ongoing trend of deforestation in south Asia is at a considerable cost to the communities who depend on forest resources to satisfy a variety of needs. The cost of deforestation in Pakistan alone has been estimated at US $28-36 million per year.[66] Impacts of deforestation in South Asia are perceived on the following fronts:

- A conspicuous impact of deforestation is on the flora and fauna. Various plant species in the region are now considered threatened as a result of deforestation and increasing pressure on their usage. For instance, in Nepal, 60 non-endemic and 47 endemic plant species were found to be under immense threat in 1996.[67] Some species of medicinal and ornamental plants and timber trees have already disappeared in Sri Lanka.[68]
- A thin overstorey canopy of trees with virtually no regeneration, severe erosion and low organic matter content of soil characterise most degraded forest in the region. This is but a recipe for a spate of onsite and downstream ravages. Deforestation is, therefore, leading to an increase in natural disasters such as landslides, soil erosion and floods.
- In 2002, South Asian exports of forest products amounted to US $96 million.[69] Deforestation is gradually eating away at this precious source of foreign exchange earnings. Nepal presents an appropriate example. In 1980, the export value of non-wood forest products (NWFPs) from Nepal stood at a healthy US $5.6 million.[70] The exports declined sharply to US $2.7 million by 1998.[71]
- Commercial logging in South Asia has proven to be especially damaging for sensitive ecosystems such as transitional forests and mangroves. Table 5.9 shows that significant mangrove deforestation is taking place in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The rapidly expanding shrimp aquaculture industry is posing the maximum threat. In the Sundarbans in Bangladesh, the vegetative density has shrunk significantly over the years. Deterioration of the canopy cover and continued encroachment in the Sundarbans are threatening the very existence of the rich biodiversity.

Table 5.9 Trends in mangrove area in South Asia, 1980-2000

	Thousand hectares			Annual change	
Countries	1980	1990	2000	1980-1990	1990-2000
India	506.0	492.6	479.0	-0.3	-0.3
Pakistan	345.0	207.0	176.0	-4.0	-1.5
Bangladesh	596.3	609.5	622.6	0.2	0.2
Sri Lanka	9.4	8.8	7.6	-0.6	-1.4

Source: FAO 2003.

Natural and man-made disasters

People and the environment are increasingly suffering from the terrible effects of natural and man-made disasters. Over the past four decades, the number of disasters has tripled, with 70 per cent of the most costly events ever occurring during the previous decade.[72] In absolute terms, the recorded economic cost of disasters has been increasing over decades

(figure 5.9). An average of 211 million people was annually affected by disasters in the 1990s.[73] In the last two decades, more than one and a half million people have been killed by natural disasters alone.[74] In addition, a number of disasters involving chemicals and radioactive materials have drawn attention worldwide to the dangers of mismanagement, particularly in the sectors of nuclear power, transport and chemicals.

The huge increase in disaster impact over the years cannot be explained through climate changes and variability alone. Risk accumulating that ends in disaster is often intricately tied to problems of environmental sustainability. Soil degradation, biodiversity loss, over-fishing, deforestation and water scarcity undermine livelihoods and pave the way for vulnerability to environmental hazards. This is why we find that two-thirds of those killed in disasters since 1991 came from countries with low levels of human development, while just 2 per cent came from highly developed countries.[75]

Global climate changes could, however, exacerbate the deleterious effects of the afore-mentioned environmental hazards. United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the global average land and sea surface temperature has increased by 0.6° C (±0.2° C) since the mid-19th century, with most change occurring since 1976.[76] The 1990s was found to be the warmest decade on record. Patterns of precipitation have reportedly changed; arid and semiarid regions are apparently becoming drier, while other areas, especially mid-to-high latitudes, are becoming wetter. Moreover, the earth's ozone layer has thinned by record levels, especially in the Antarctic and the Arctic. In September 2000, the Antarctic ozone hole covered more than 28 million square kilometres.[77] Ozone depletion results from certain chemicals, the most notorious of which are the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). These chemicals are used in refrigerators, air conditioners, aerosol spray, insulating and furniture foams and fire fighting equipment.

The drastic climatic changes represent an extreme additional stress for ecosystems already bursting to the seams by resource demands, unsustainable management practices and pollution. This additional stress may permanently impair the capacity of some environmental systems to provide food, clean air and water, energy, safe shelter and low level of diseases on a sustained basis. Many experts, therefore, expound a direct link between global warming and extreme weather events like major heat waves, hurricanes, floods and

An average of 211 million people was annually affected by disasters in the 1990s

Figure 5.9 Trends in economic losses due to natural disasters, 1960-1999



Source: UNDP 2004c.

Table 5.10 Estimated deaths and damage cost from natural disasters in South Asia, 1980-2005

Countries	Deaths	Damages (US $ million)
India	133144	32018.1
Pakistan	83062	6839.2
Bangladesh	179603	16272.2
Nepal	9948	1304.6
Sri Lanka	36349	1670.4
Bhutan	280	3.5
Maldives	102	476.1
South Asia	442488	58584.2

Source: CRED 2005.

droughts. Indeed the frequency and magnitude of such disasters is predicted to increase further in a warmer world.

The United Nations Climate Change Conference was held at Montreal in November-December 2005 in conjunction with the meeting to review and upgrade the Kyoto Protocol. The conference struck an optimistic note by adopting the 'rule book' of the Kyoto Protocol—the 1997 landmark treaty designed to curb greenhouse gas emissions.[78] It is ironic, however, that all latest studies warn about the consistent fast melting of Himalayan glaciers due to global warming. Average temperatures in the Himalayas have risen by 1°C since the mid 1970s. The melting glaciers are creating unstable lakes of melted water that threaten to swell out of the banks. Hence, countries like Bhutan are in imminent danger of catastrophic flooding. Average glacial retreat in Bhutan is computed at 100-130 feet (30-40 metres) per year.[79]

Natural disasters are already posing a serious threat to development in South Asia. Apart from the loss of human life, the economic costs of the disasters are on an alarming rise. Over the last 25 years, disasters have killed nearly half a million in South Asia besides inflicting damages worth a whopping US $59,000 million approximately (table 5.10). Bangladesh is evidently the most vulnerable to such catastrophes, accounting for the maximum mortality. Serious hardships are inflicted on the survivors due to heavy losses to property, crops and damage to infrastructure. The number of people affected by disasters in South Asia is rising consistently with the passage of time (figure 5.10).

Figure 5.10 Trends in the number of disaster-affected people in South Asia, 1956-2005



Sources: CRED 2005 and MHHDC staff calculations.

Earthquakes

Well above half of India's total area, comprising a population of almost 400 million, is susceptible to seismic disturbances.[80] The powerful earthquake that struck the Katch area in Gujarat (western India) in early 2001 has been the most damaging earthquake in India during the last five decades. The quake, measuring 6.9 on the Richter scale, caused large-scale loss of life and property. Estimates indicate that over 20,000 people were killed, 150,000 got injured and 15.9 million were seriously affected. Official estimates placed the economic loss due to the calamity at around US $4.5 billion.

A redefinition of the seismic zones and fresh identification of relative vulnerability of different populations to earthquake risk in South Asia is going on after the absolutely catastrophic earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005 (box 5.5). Even more distressing is the fact that this disaster occurred in the wake of the debilitating tsunami, which had earlier hit South Asia ten months back (box 5.6).

Box 5.5 The 2005 South Asia earthquake

A 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck Pakistan close to Muzaffarabad, on the morning of October 8, 2005. The earthquake epicentre was located 100 kilometres north-northeast of Islamabad. Tremors were felt across a wide swath of South Asia, from central Afghanistan to western Bangladesh. In Pakistan, the earthquake left widespread destruction in its wake, killing at least 73,000 people and severely injuring or disabling another 70,000. Over 2.8 million people were left without shelter and approximately 2.3 million without adequate food.

Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), and the eastern districts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) bore the full force of the earthquake in terms of extensive damage to economic assets and infrastructure, with social service delivery, commerce, and communications either paralysed or destroyed. Nearly one-third of the total employed have lost their livelihood. A preliminary estimate is that the loss in employment and the resulting income shock has affected around 1.6 million people in the earthquake-affected districts. The largest job losses are in agriculture, small businesses/shops, and construction. The earthquake completely destroyed above 0.2 million housing units, while nearly as many were damaged to various degrees. It affected 7,669 educational institutions, at least half of which need rebuilding. There has been heavy damage to the mountainous roads largely due to landslides precipitated by the earthquake. About 574 health facilities have been partially damaged or destroyed. Water supply schemes stand disrupted and a number of hydropower stations are functioning below their full operational status.

The overall cost associated with the earthquake is estimated at approximately US $5.2 billion (see table). The cost of reconstruction of lost assets and the restoration of services is estimated to be US $3.5 billion. The rising death toll in the aftermath of the earthquake has had a serious impact on the population and social structures of the earthquake-hit areas. The main victims have been groups that were dwelling in comparatively inaccessible mountainous areas with lower levels of income and service provision as compared to the national average. Severe shocks and trauma are widespread among bereaved families, particularly among children. Widows and single-headed households present a particular vulnerability, as they have to deal with their psychosocial distress as well as caring for children on their own. Unattended children constitute a group which requires special protection immediately to prevent exploitation.

The landslides triggered by the earthquake and its associated aftershocks have adversely affected streams, rivers and other water bodies. The debris has had a significant impact on the distribution of sediments in stream flows and river channels. However, there is an imminent threat of the unsustainable exploitation of the already limited forest resources. The greatest impact is likely to result from a 200-300 per cent increase in timber demand for reconstruction. Lack of proper housing will also lead to increased fuel wood demands for heating.

Overall costs of the earthquake
(US $million)

Category	Costs
Relief	1092
Death and injury compensation	205
Early recovery	301
Restoration of livelihoods	97
Reconstruction	3503
Total	5198

Sources: ADB and World Bank 2005 and The NEWS 2005b.

Floods

Floods are a recurrent phenomenon in the sub-continent, causing extensive damage each year. The extent and duration of flooding in South Asia and the damage it causes are influenced both by natural phenomena and human activities. Floods have been critically affecting food production, soil erosion, the security of homesteads and demographic distribution. Huge numbers are exposed to catastrophic flooding in the region. Figure 5.11 graphs the population exposed to flood hazard as a proportion of national populations. The ratio is the highest for Nepal being equivalent to almost its actual population. For Bangladesh and Pakistan, the exposed numbers constitute less than half the national count. Apparently, the flood risk is far lesser for people in India and Sri Lanka. However, when translated into absolute numbers, the relevance of flood risk to India becomes evident (table 5.11):

- An average of 158 million people in India were found to be exposed to flood risk annually over the period 1980-2000. In India, flood-prone areas now exceed 40 million hectares comprising eight major river valleys.[81]
- In the years 1988 and 1998, devastating floods inundated more than two-thirds of the geographical area of Bangladesh. The flood of 1998 is considered one of

Table 5.11 Average physical exposure to disaster risk for floods in South Asia, 1980-2000
(people per year)

Countries	Physical exposure (millions)
India	157.5
Pakistan	48.8
Bangladesh	51.9
Nepal	17.2
Sri Lanka	4.1

Source: UNDP 2004c.

Box 5.6 The 2004 tsunami and South Asia

A massive undersea earthquake struck off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia on December 26, 2004. The most definitive estimate so far has put the earthquake's magnitude at 9.15. The earthquake triggered a series of tsunami waves clocking more than 500 kilometres per hour, directly impacting coastal areas of India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Thailand. The tsunami was one of the deadliest disasters in human history. The US Geological Survey records the count as 283,100 killed, 14,100 missing, and 1,126,900 people displaced. The worst-affected South Asian nations are Sri Lanka, Maldives and India.

In India, the disaster devastated communities with its high toll of human lives, injuries and adverse effect on family networks, homes and livelihood. Nearly 11,000 people died, mostly in the state of Tamil Nadu. Besides, the tsunami and its after-effects disrupted the ability to earn a living for some 645,000 families. Seawater penetrated farmlands as far as three kilometres inland. More than 150,000 houses were fully or partially damaged. Of these households, nearly 80 per cent belonged to the fishing community. Rehabilitation and reconstruction needs are estimated at US $1.2 billion.

The social fabric of the tsunami-hit areas of Sri Lanka has been impacted by extensive physical damage, loss of more than 31,000 lives, injuries to more than 15,000, and the displacement of approximately 443,000 people. The number of women and children among the dead has been disproportionately high. The tsunami surge completely destroyed 99,480 homes and partially damaged about half as many. Overall damage for Sri Lanka is estimated to be a whopping US $1 billion. Job losses are placed at around 200,000, with the fishing industry accounting for about half of them.

Total damages in Maldives have been estimated at US $470 million—almost two-thirds of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Substantial damage was caused to agricultural crops, houses, tourist resorts, boats and other fishing equipment, schools, health facilities, transport and communication equipment, water and sanitation, and electricity infrastructure. An unquantified yet critical cost is that of environmental damage and substantial soil erosion in many affected islands.

Sources: ADB, Japan Bank for International Cooperation and World Bank 2005; ADB, UN and World Bank 2005; WIKIPEDIA 2005 and World Bank, ADB and UN 2005.

the century's longest and worst natural disasters. This flood had far-reaching impacts on the national economy culminating into serious hardships for the people and disrupted livelihood systems in urban and rural areas.

- In Pakistan, monsoon floods cause considerable damage to agriculture

Figure 5.11 Average physical exposure per year to flood risk as percentage of population in South Asia, 1980-2000



Source: UNDP 2004c.

over vast areas. The floods of 1973 and 1976 destroyed 70 per cent of the standing agricultural crops, triggering critical food shortages.
- Flash floods occur regularly in Nepal, causing shifts in river channels and creating new flood zones, which displace people.
- In Bhutan, riverbank erosion and inundation of agriculturally important valleys are a constant threat during the monsoon season.
- Coastal flooding has been experienced regularly in the past in Maldives. The intrinsic risk factor stems from the extremely low elevation of all Maldivian islands—the average elevation is 1.5 metres above sea level.

Droughts

- A population no fewer than 86 million is vulnerable to droughts in India. This population, spread over 14 states, inhabits nearly one-sixth of the country.[82]
- Drought conditions, due to deficiency in rainfall, afflict northwestern Bangladesh mostly during the pre-monsoon and post-monsoon periods. The drought of 1979 was particularly severe and affected nearly 42 per cent of the total area.[83]
- In Pakistan, approximately 10 million people were found to be exposed on average every year to drought risk during the period 1980-2000.[84] In the year 2000, Pakistan experienced one of the worst droughts in its history which affected the southern, southeastern and western regions. The province of Balochistan with vast stretches of arid/semi desert land took the brunt of the crisis.

Cyclones

Heavy rains accompanying cyclones and the tidal waves due to wind effects cause much damage in South Asia.[85]

- The Indian Ocean is one of the six major cyclone-prone regions of the world. An average of six cyclones occur annually along the 5,700 kilometers long coastline of southern, peninsular India. Two or three of these are usually quite severe.
- A very large proportion of the Bangladesh's population is exposed to tropical cyclones. This is particularly true for the heavily populated rural communities along the fertile delta at the confined head of the Bay of Bengal.
- In Pakistan, the effects of tropical cyclones/depressions are more frequently felt in the form of heavy rainfall. In 1993, a tropical depression in Pakistan resulted in 600 deaths and the loss of hundreds of fishing boats.

The Indian Ocean is one of the six major cyclone-prone regions of the world

Environmental sustainability for human security—The Millennium Development Goals

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), emanating from the United Nations Millennium Declaration, manifest the international community's unprecedented agreement on the goals for eradicating poverty, improving health and promoting peace, human rights and environmental sustainability.[86] The MDGs are constituted by eight goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators. A healthy environment is an integral part of meeting these goals. The environmental goal (goal seven) aims at a reversal in the global loss of environmental resources. For the purpose, it sets a target of halving by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. Further, the goal calls for achieving a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. There are extremely significant interactions between the environmental goal and all other MDGs at myriad levels. Every single step towards greater environmental sustainability contributes

Table 5.12 Why reaching the environmental goal is vital for other goals

Goals	Links to the environment
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	The livelihood and food security of the poor depends on ecosystem goods and services. Poor people have insecure rights to environmental resources and energy services, which seriously limits the productive opportunities.
2. Achieve universal primary education	The time available for schooling is reduced due to the regular activity of collecting water and fuel wood. In addition, the lack of energy, water and sanitation services in rural areas serves as serious discouragement for qualified teachers.
3. Promote gender equality and empower women	Women and girls take the brunt of water and fuel collection. Women also suffer from unequal access to natural resources, limiting their opportunities/ ability to access other productive assets.
4. Reduce child mortality	Diseases (such as diarrhea) tied to unclean water and inadequate sanitation and pollution-related respiratory infections are among the leading killers of children under five.
5. Improve maternal health	Adequate provision of energy and sanitation services is a prerequisite for maternal health care. Indoor air pollution and the necessity of carrying heavy loads of water and fuelwood exacerbates the risks of complications during pregnancy.
6. Combat major diseases	Up to 20 per cent of the disease burden in developing countries may be due to environmental risk factors, the foremost ones being the use of untreated water and indoor and outdoor air pollution. It is far more cost-effective to take preventive measures to reduce such hazards.
8. Develop a global partnership for development	An effective partnership between rich and poor countries is the only pathway to finding a solution for global environmental problems like climate change, ozone depletion and loss of species diversity.

Source: UNDP 2003.

heavily to the other goals in numerous ways. Indeed, ensuring environmental security is necessary for achieving the MDGs (table 5.12). The interconnection underlines the fact that human well-being is impossible to secure in the absence of adequate environmental security which alone can thwart the looming threats to human security.

Environmental security in South Asia — some initiatives

Notwithstanding the array of predicaments that the South Asian region faces today in pursuing sustainable development, there are quite a few success stories 'on the ground'. Here we showcase a selection of some significant achievements and potentially far-reaching initiatives towards greater environmental security in South Asia.

Iran-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline Project

The proposed 'Iran-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline Project' represents a marked initiative to promote renewable resource development/deployment and, hence, to improve energy efficiency in the region. In 1995, Pakistan and Iran signed a preliminary agreement for construction of an onshore gas export pipeline linking South Pars (Iran) with Karachi (Pakistan). In April 2000, it was formally agreed to modify the pipeline project and to extend it to India. Under the current arrangement, the pipeline would travel from Iran and the southwestern portion of Pakistan towards Multan, an urban city located in the heart of the Punjab province. The pipeline would be approximately 2,670 km long and is likely to cost about US $7.2 billion. The gas supplies would be a huge boost for energy-starved India and Pakistan. The quantity of gas to be

provided annually to Pakistan is estimated at 2.2 billion cubic feet per day.[87] The land between the southwestern Pakistani-Iranian border and Multan is predominantly a desert and dry area populated by tribal communities living in villages. The very fact that the pipeline travels through remote rural areas, where renewable energy is in demand, boosts the prospects for extending the pipeline into a domestic network providing natural gas to village populations. The Project ensures that lower costs will be incurred by both Pakistan and India in accessing the much-needed energy and that too in a scenario that is environment-friendly. The pipeline, hence, carries profound ramifications for provision of greater energy security in South Asia through meaningful regional cooperation.

Taragram, Tikamgarh, India

Taragram is an 'Appropriate Technology Centre' located in the Tikamgarh district of Madhya Pradesh, equally accessible to the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. The Centre is a product of the Development Alternatives (DA) Group established by Ashok Khosla in 1983. The DA Group realised that in order to improve local economic conditions to meet basic needs, solutions based on local resource regeneration and use were the need of the hour. Sustainable livelihood systems were, therefore, conceived as the major area of focus. The most important mandate of Taragram is to work at different levels and scales to encourage self-sustaining concepts like micro-enterprises and other such business models. The Centre has, accordingly, taken up projects dealing with watershed conservation and development, wasteland development and drinking water supply and sanitation. One hundred check-dams have been constructed to augment agricultural productivity through the regeneration of water resources. The handmade paper unit at Taragram has created technology-based livelihoods. An energy programme has been initiated to promote large-scale dissemination of renewable energy technologies. In the area of shelter, walling and flooring materials have been developed. The Centre has also endeavored to empower women through a number of capacity-building exercises. Taragram today serves as a model to bring together social, environmental and technological knowledge to generate sustainable livelihood.

The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), Karachi, Pakistan

The Orangi Pilot Project has emerged as one of the best-known civil society initiatives in the provision of sanitation in Pakistan and across the world. The OPP was launched by Akhtar Hamid Khan in April 1980 in Orangi (Karachi). The Project has directly and indirectly assisted over one million inhabitants of the low-income Orangi settlement to construct and maintain modern sanitation. The OPP has, infact, been simultaneously operating a number of programmes. These programmes have been developed in the sectors of housing, basic health and family planning, supervised credit for small family enterprise units, school education, skill-building of women, social forestry and rural development. The primary strategy of the OPP is to promote community organisation and self-management. By providing technical guidance, it facilitates the mobilisation of local, financial and managerial resources through cooperation. By generating self-help and developing the appropriate, affordable technologies, OPP never allowed financial dependence to grow within the community. Self-financed infrastructure is one of the defining marks of the OPP's strategy. For the past eight years, the staff from the Project has also been assisting government and non-government agencies to initiate projects in cities across the country, drawing on the lessons of the OPP.

Sustainable Environment Management Programme (SEMP), Bangladesh

In the early 1990s, the National Environment Management Action Plan (NEMAP) was launched by the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) in association with a number of key NGOs. The main motivation behind the NEMAP process was to solicit the various environmental and developmental concerns emanating from the grassroots and other stakeholders and professionals belonging to the major agro-ecological zones of the country. Through grassroots workshops, expert group consultations and an elaborate survey, a number of prioritised projects/ activities were identified for future action. The recommendations were formulated as a workable action plan. In 1997, as a follow-up to NEMAP, the Government approved a US $26 million, UNDP-funded Sustainable Environment Management Programme (SEMP). The programme united the government and other development agencies in Bangladesh, including NGOs and the private sector dealing with major environmental issues, under an umbrella national project to address national environment objectives. Activities under SEMP are being undertaken in areas related to policy and institutions, participatory eco-system management at grassroots level, community-based environmental sanitation, awareness and advocacy and training and education. Given its solid track record, the Plan has been widely recognised as a commendable exercise in environmental planning which incorporates full participation of the people.

The Community Forestry Programme, Nepal

The Community Forestry Programme was started in Nepal in 1978. It emphasises sustainable management and development of forests by involving communities as forest user groups (FUGs). According to an estimate, the government has handed over a total of 850,000 hectares of state-owned forests to 12,000 community forestry user groups for conservation, management and sustainable use.[88] In addition, these groups share all benefits among users and possess exclusive rights to forest income. Benefits have mainly resulted in terms of capital formation and its flow, governance reforms and community empowerment. Foremost, community forestry has become a means to increase natural, social, human, financial, and to some extent the physical capital of community forest users. Second, the re-orientation of the Forest Department to move away from its traditional role of policing to the role of a facilitator and advisor has been made possible by the Community Forestry Programme. Finally, community forestry has emerged as the vehicle to bring about a change in social processes to empower the poor and the disadvantaged members of the community. All stakeholders involved with the programme have begun to realise the need for the active participation of the marginalised groups in all stages of project planning, implementation and monitoring. It has been estimated that 1.2 million individuals have so far directly benefited by being members of the FUGs.[89]

Policy implications

Policy interventions for greater environmental security in South Asia must focus on improvements in environmental management to effectively tackle the many and varying causes of environmental degradation. The agenda for reform is a large one. Accepting the challenge of making South Asia environmentally secure will involve a substantial shift in policies and priorities. We discuss here a set of recommendations that ought to guide environmental policies and their concrete implementation in South Asia:

- It is imperative to reform, streamline and strengthen the existing environmental institutions in South Asia. Many environmental problems are grounded

in institutional failures and poor governance. To enhance institutional capacity for environmental management, there is a need for better technical skills, adequate finance and a clarification of environmental regulations. New institutional arrangements are also needed in the region to coordinate national policies in response to regional and global environmental challenges. In particular, better institutions are necessary for the conservation and management of the water resources in South Asia. These institutions must possess the capacity to resolve water conflicts at the local, national and regional levels.

- Many well-intentioned environmental policies in South Asia have been thwarted by other policies that pull in the opposite direction. Policy development processes for the environment need tightening to become more rigorous, systematic and integrated, turning out policies tailored for specific localities and situations. This implies a clearer understanding of the environmental implications of decision-making processes, better information on the quality of environmental management, the prioritisation of issues, the setting of goals, targets and time frames, and the development of tools for monitoring progress and evaluating results. Participation of all stakeholders in policy formulation and implementation must be ensured. Environmental considerations need to be intrinsic to policy making. Environmental sustainability has to be made a part of all sectoral policies. Policies with significant effects on the environment should be subject to rigorous environmental impact assessments.
- High quality, comprehensive and timely information on the environment continues to be a scarce resource in South Asia. Successful environmental planning and decision-making is impossible in the absence of sound data and information. There is urgent need for a knowledge base accessible to environmental policy makers. South Asian countries can reap large returns from investments in basic environmental data on exposure to emissions and unsanitary conditions, soil and water depletion, land capability and loss of forests and natural habitat.
- In South Asia, the national governments must refine and improve the methods of calculating the economic value of environmental goods and services. This will enable them to evaluate environmental costs and benefits in all sectors of the economy and provide more comprehensive estimates of the environmental impacts of economic activity. An important step in this direction could be the preparation of environmentally sensitive national income accounts to reflect the impact of environmental damage on national output each year.[90]
- At many places in South Asia, natural resources are being plundered by corruption, benefiting powerful elites at the expense of the poor and the weak, who are less potent politically. Countering corruption requires strengthening governance, with better enforcement, stiffer penalties and increased community involvement. Moreover, South Asian countries have often been guilty of setting unrealistically tight environmental standards (often borrowed from the OECD countries) and then enforcing them selectively. This has wasted resources, facilitated corruption and undermined the credibility of all environmental policies. It would be better to have fewer and more realistic standards that are truly implemented.
- The public policies in the South Asian countries must combine market instruments with traditional command-and-control measures, such as internalising environmental costs, introducing environmental taxes and removing perverse subsidies. At the national level, energy pricing must be reexamined to induce greater efficiency in energy use. Regulation or corrective taxation may be required to align

private and public incentives with the need for environmental protection. Polluters must be made to pay for the environmental damage they cause. This can only be accomplished by clarifying overall property and user rights to common resources.

- South Asia today requires a comprehensive framework to encourage investment in alternative, relevant and more environmentally sound technologies, combining traditional and indigenous wisdom with cutting edge science. Ways must be found to capitalise on these innovations and to transfer the technologies to the needy at affordable cost. An international policy for technology transfers should ensure that environmentally sound technologies are not closely guarded, as all other technologies are, but are made more freely available in the interest of common survival. Cleaner production processes, technologies and self-regulatory mechanisms like the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) 14000 series on Environmental Management Systems must be adopted by the industrial sector in the region. As compared to large and medium industries, the small-scale sector is poorly equipped, both financially and technically, to adopt pollution control measures. It is imperative to support the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with more efficient technologies, financial incentives and capacity building for upgradation.
- While the urban centres in South Asia do possess agencies to manage routine municipal administration, adequate support mechanisms to systematically plan and facilitate the development process are missing frequently in case of small and medium towns. Resultantly, a number of rapidly expanding urban areas are quite likely to be transformed into environmental and social disasters in the near future. There is urgent need to explore various technological and social management options for better solid waste disposal, transportation systems and energy utilisation in the urban centres.
- There is acute requirement for a 'South Asian Disaster Preparedness and Management System'. This system will promote regional cooperation to ensure security from natural disasters. The very first step towards more concerted and coordinated regional action on disaster risk reduction ought to be a clear understanding of the depth and extent of hazard, vulnerability and disaster loss. The focus will also be on appropriate governance for integrated disaster risk management so that existing risks are successfully mitigated. The system will strive for key improvements in disaster preparedness and response with regard to the three Rs: Rescue, Relief and Rehabilitation.
- Forest protected areas are one of the keys to the conservation of biological diversity in South Asia. Many forest areas in South Asia are being managed in protected areas such as national parks, wildlife sanctuaries and game reserves. By 2003, approximately 227,000 square kilometres were under the protected area status in South Asia (figure 5.12). The effectiveness of on-the-ground management is, however, what really matters. Unfortunately, these areas have rarely been adequately protected because of paucity of management funds. The crux is that people whose livelihoods depend on protected areas must benefit from them and have a stake in their continued success. The need of the hour in the region is for integrated management with the involvement of the private and public sectors as well as greater emphasis on participatory and community-based-decision-making with multiple stakeholders.
- National governments in South Asia cannot by themselves address every issue and deliver every service in pursuit of environmental security. The civil society and the private sector must play a supportive and compassionate

Figure 5.12 Nationally protected areas in South Asia, 2003



Sources: UNDP 2003 and World Bank 2005b.

role in improving the lot of the environmentally insecure in South Asia. Efforts are needed to promote synergies between public institutions, think tanks and the private sector to facilitate the exchange of ideas, capacity and skills. More attention should also be paid to harnessing the potential of formal voluntary initiatives in business such as environmental recycling.

- Several international environmental agreements have already drawn attention to the need to manage the global environment. However, these agreements were frequently not based on concrete, enforceable objectives. International agreements should share burdens equitably and ensure that the benefits of better environmental management accrue to the local people who bear the direct costs and lost opportunities of environmental resource protection. There is imminent need to strengthen the capacity of developing countries, including those of South Asia, to negotiate, access technology and to ensure implementation of global conventions. Pilot programmes and innovative approaches to find lasting solutions in these countries to international environmental challenges, like ozone depletion and greenhouse warming, need to be financed by the industrial countries. A coordinated international effort is also desirable to minimise the duplication of effort and ensure that initiatives are consistent with overall development policies.
- Finally, it is apparent that despite their diversity of context and experience, South Asian economies share a number of issues with respect to environmental security. Regional cooperation could, therefore, go far towards meeting South Asian energy needs, and enhancing environmental issues. With the exception of Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the other South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) member countries are located on a single landmass making it economically feasible to plan an integrated power infrastructure, including power grids and gas pipelines. The necessity of developing and utilising the non-conventional energy sources (solar, wind, biogas etc.) cannot be emphasised enough to address pollution concerns and to meet growing energy shortages. South Asia is well endowed with such energy resources which offer massive potential for power generation. What is needed is a mechanism to recognise and tap the expertise within each country. Regional cooperation again provides an ideal framework for such exchanges.

Chapter 6

Human Security of South Asian Women

'No society can ever prosper half-liberated and half-chained. Women's empowerment is a pre-condition for human security.'
—Mahbub ul Haq

To achieve true human security for all people in the world, it is imperative to focus on the security of women

As has been repeatedly underlined in this report, human security is concerned with people and their dignity and welfare. To achieve true human security for all people in the world, it is imperative to focus on the security of women who form the majority of the world's population. Yet, around 700 million[1] women of South Asia have their human security threatened everyday in all walks of life. As Mahbub ul Haq pointed out in 1997, 'South Asia is the least gender sensitive region in the world'[2], and thus is also the most insecure region for women.

All our previous reports have documented the magnitude of insecurities faced by South Asian women from cradle to grave. Women do not have equal access to education and healthcare, and they do not have equal opportunity to participate fully in the economic and political life in their society. As a result of these, as well as the prevailing gender-based discriminatory tradition and culture, women's status in the society is low which exacerbates the threat to their personal security. The insecurity of South Asian women is reflected in gender disparity in all indicators of health, education, and in economic and political participation. For example,

- In South Asia, women's right to live or spend a healthy life is hampered by the gender-based discrimination. As a result of discrimination against girls in feeding, immunisation and healthcare practices as well as female feoticide and infanticide, there are fewer women than men in South Asia, which is against the biological norm. The outcome of gender discrimination in health is more visible when gender differences in under-five mortality rate, proportion of underweight and immunised children are taken into consideration.[3]
- In addition to gender discrimination in healthcare practices, South Asian women are also less likely to get education than men. Education is the main foundation for human security and human development. But the majority of girls in South Asia are deprived of this opportunity. In South Asia only 45 per cent of adult women are literate. There are about 250 million illiterate women in South Asia, constituting 47 per cent of the illiterates of the developing world.[4]
- Women's work in South Asia is also characterised by job and income insecurity, as they work mainly in the informal sector characterised by low wages and unsafe and hazardous working conditions. Employers usually prefer women workers as they are easier to hire and fire and less demanding in terms of wages or job security. In 2003, less than half the women of the age group 15-64 were economically active in the region.[5]
- Women are also unable to break through the glass ceiling. At the professional level, the majority of women work at the lowest ranks of their occupations.
- In South Asia, women are usually engaged in the agricultural sector as contributing family member, indicating that their economic contribution is not properly recognised, thus undermining their status in the household.
- All the countries of South Asia have quotas and reservations for women in

parliament either at the national or local levels or both.[6] However, the female participation in parliament still remains quite low. As of March 2005, women held only 9.7 per cent of the seats in South Asia. The representation of women in parliament varies from 2 per cent in Bangladesh to 20.6 per cent in Pakistan.[7]

Thus, human security of women in South Asia is threatened as a result of their lack of capability to exercise their rights and lack of opportunity to participate in economic and political life. Combined with the prevailing patriarchal social structure, these deprivations end up in not adequately providing protection against violation of their rights. In effect, these deprivations provide a fertile ground for human security violations against women in South Asia.

Against this background of pervasive discrimination against women in all fields, the issue of violence against women in South Asia is discussed in this chapter. Violence against women is a threat to women's personal security. This is also a factor limiting the opportunities of women to enhance their capabilities through education, and participate in social, economic and political life. Lack of these capacities and to opportunities leads to further subordination of women.

Violence against women in South Asia

Violence against women (VAW) is a direct violation of the right to live in a world free from violence and the right to live in dignity, which are the fundamental aspects of human security. VAW is defined by United Nations as '*any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life*.'[8] VAW occurs in every country of the world in many forms, ranging from verbal abuse or neglect, to murder.

Women from every income group, education level, religion, caste or age might face physical, sexual or psychological violence throughout their lives. However, some specific groups of women are more vulnerable than others. According to United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, these groups include women from minority groups, refugee women, indigenous women, migrant women, women in detention, women with disabilities and elderly women, women in situations of armed conflict and female children.[9]

VAW has devastating impact on the lives of women. It negatively affects women's health, hinders their participation in social and economic life, besides making them insecure wherever they live. VAW also hinders the well-being of other family members, particularly children who witness acts of violence against their mothers or sisters. Above all, VAW is a violation of basic human rights covered by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights that requires states to protect their citizens against violence. In addition to this, not to prevent violence against women and/or to redress women who are the victims of the violence is itself an insecurity reflecting the ineffectiveness on the part of governments to ensure human rights.

Human security of women in South Asia is threatened as a result of their lack of capability to exercise their rights

Violence in South Asia: responsible factors

'Violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women….'

—UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, General Assembly Resolution, December 1993.

Violence against women in South Asia is the result of the historically unequal relation between men and women that also manifests itself in the extreme form of

Box 6.1 Life cycle of violence against women in South Asia

Before birth
Female foeticide
Indirect impact on the well being of infant due to violence during pregnancy

Infancy and childhood
Female infanticide
Neglect in health care and nutrition
Denial from education
Child sexual abuse
Incest
Child labour particularly in domestic work
Child trafficking
Psychological abuse as a result of being unwanted

Adolescence
Early marriage/forced marriage
Domestic violence
Trafficking and forced prostitution
Rape and sexual abuse
Homicide
Incest

Reproductive ages
Domestic violence (battering, marital rape etc.)
Unwanted pregnancies and/or forced abortion
Sexual abuse and harassment
Trafficking and forced prostitution
Homicide
Cultural forms of violence including stove burnings, acid attacts, dowry deaths, sati, honour killings etc.

Elderly
Elderly abuse (physical, sexual and psychological)
Deprivation of support and care/Neglect
Homicide

Sources: UNICEF 2000a and UNIFEM 2005.

patriarchal structures and male chauvinism that we still observe in South Asia. The low status of women due to patriarchy, lower education levels of women than men and almost miniscule economic, social and political participation of women have also been the factors that made women vulnerable to violence.

There is no single factor that leads to VAW. There are various culturally and traditionally entrenched and highly interactive factors that increase the risk of violence against women.[10] These can be grouped as the historical factors; traditional, cultural, religious factors that promote subordinate gender roles; privacy of violence; lower status of women; and the seeming inability of states to prevent violence against women.

In South Asia, the historical factors have been the agriculture-based economies and the prevalence of feudalism that have perpetuated violence. Also lack of effective institutions, particularly the judiciary, has been responsible for strengthening the existing parallel systems such as *jirga* and *pancahayat*, which based their decisions on traditions, cultures, religions and customs that attach a subordinate value to the status of women, and promote rigid patriarchal values. Hierarchical gender relations in the marriage or family are also the main causes leading to marital conflicts.

VAW manifest itself in many different forms throughout the lives of women. The lives and well-being of millions of girls and women in South Asia are in danger even before they are born and throughout their life cycle (box 6.1).

Incidence and prevalence of VAW in South Asia

Documenting the prevalence of violence against women is a challenging and sensitive task since VAW is usually veiled under the cultural norms and religious and traditional tenets and, therefore, the exact number of women and girls facing violence has always been underreported and underestimated. For instance, officially reported cases are likely to be the tip of the iceberg in showing the real incidence of VAW due to the tendency of women not reporting the cases because of shame, fear and/or cultural acceptance of violence in South Asia. On the other hand, most of the surveys conducted to determine the prevalence of violence against women are usually small scale, except for a few surveys in India. Thus these numbers do not represent the national levels of violence. Also definitions of violence differ in different samples. Furthermore, none of the countries of South Asia has a system to collect data and monitor progress in this area. However, available data is sufficient to give us some idea of the disturbing extent of violence perpetrated against women in South Asia.

The criminal reports, which can be used as an indication of incidence, demonstrates that in India during 2003 at least 140,603 crimes committed against women's dignity and personal security. More than one third of these cases were cruelty perpetrated by husbands of women or relatives (36 per cent), followed by molestation of women or girls by the others (23 per cent) (table 6.1). More than a quarter of the total cases against women occurred in two states; Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.[11]

The data on the incidence of violence cases shows that the cases reported increased by 32 per cent since 1995. However, we cannot be sure about whether the increase is due to increase in the

incidence of the cases or reporting of the cases, as the data is based on the reported cases.

According to Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid, a Karachi based organisation, during the first eight months of 2004, around 10 women were physically abused in Pakistan every day. During those months, 940 women were murdered and 1,427 women were tortured and beaten mostly by people related to them.[12]

There were 5,207 reported cases of violence in Bangladesh in 2003. As table 6.2 shows, 30 per cent of these crimes were related to rape, followed by murder (14.2 per cent). According to Bangladesh National Women Lawyers' Association, the incidence of VAW is increasing in Bangladesh, which may also be a result of increasing awareness and reporting.

In Sri Lanka, during 1998 there were 1,106 incidences of VAW reported in the newspapers. Around one quarter of these were cases of domestic violence.[13] In Nepal although the incidence of violence against women is not known, various types of violence, particularly rape and trafficking of girls and women, are reported quite often in the print media.[14]

The reported incidences show only a miniscule proportion of the cases of violation against women. The extent of problem can be better gauged by surveys conducted on the prevalence of different types of VAW. Data from various surveys conducted on the prevalence of different types of VAW show that VAW is a serious problem in South Asia. At least half the women face violence within their own homes.[15]

Domestic violence: The hidden truth

Domestic violence[16] is the most common and the most hidden and neglected form of violence. Globally, at least one-fifth of the women face domestic violence and the share of women facing violence is much higher in those countries where domestic violence is culturally accepted and not recognised as a criminal issue by the legislation, law enforcement agencies and by the judicial system. The perpetrators of domestic violence is usually the husband followed by other male members of the family and sometimes by another woman, such as the mother-in-law. Forty-eight population-based surveys from 35 countries of the world have shown that 10-67 per cent of women have experienced physical violence from their partners at least once in their lives.[17]

In South Asia, domestic violence is the predominant mode of violence against women. The prevalence of wife battering in South Asia has been found one of the highest in the world when it is compared with 14 other societies.[18] Apart from wife battering, various other physical, sexual and psychological forms of domestic

Table 6.1 Crimes against women in India, 1995-2003

	1995	1999	2003
Rape	13,754	15,468	15,847
Kidnapping and abduction	14,063	15,962	13,296
Dowry death	5,092	6,699	6,208
Cruelty by husband and relatives	31,127	43,823	50,703
Molestation	28,475	32,311	32,939
Sexual harassment	4,756	8,858	12,325
Importation of girls	191	1	46
Crimes against			
Sati Prevention Act	27	0	0
Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act	8,447	9,363	5,510
Indecent Representation of Women Prohibition Act	539	222	1,043
Dowry Prohibition Act	…	3,064	2,684
Total	106,471	135,771	140,601

Source: GOI 2004.

Table 6.2 Crimes against women in Bangladesh, 2003

Incidence of rape	1,550
Dowry related violence	427
Physical torture	204
Fatwa related violence	27
Murder	740
Suicide	562
Acid burn	254
Trafficking	329
Abduction	537
Unnatural death	577
Total	5,207

Note: Data is based on nine leading newspapers of Bangladesh.
Source: BNWLA 2004.

Figure 6.1 Physical and psychological domestic violence against women in India, 1997-1999



Source: ICRW and INCLEN 2000.

Figure 6.2 Extent of domestic violence in Pakistan



Source: Human Rights Watch 1999.

violence occur in South Asia. Sex selective abortions, homicide and various cultural and traditional forms such as forced and early marriages, stove burnings, honour killings and forced temple prostitution are the main types of domestic violence that directly lead to physical and mental sufferings of women.

The extent of domestic violence, particularly that perpetrated by husbands, is very high although it is likely to be underestimated due to its private nature and cultural acceptance in South Asia, as well as lack of research on domestic violence, except in India and Bangladesh. Indeed, in South Asia being married seems like the biggest risk factor that increases the likelihood of women being subject to violence. According to data of various surveys, domestic violence in the region is around 50 per cent and even goes up to 70-90 per cent in Pakistan.[19]

In India the available data on domestic violence varies from 21 per cent to 50 per cent. While second National Family and Health Survey of India[20] indicates that 21 per cent of women were, at least, once physically mistreated or beaten since the age of 15, various surveys[21] conducted in seven cities of India during 1997-99 showed that 40 per cent and 44 per cent of women experienced physical and psychological domestic violence in their married lives (figure 6.1), and 15 per cent of women were forced for sex by their husbands.[22] Furthermore, half of the women who experienced intimate partner violence in the last 12 months have experienced violence more than three times during the same period.[23]

Among the countries of South Asia, the extent of domestic violence is the worst in Pakistan. The estimates show that, domestic violence by husbands occur at least once in the life of 70-90 per cent of women.[24]

In Bangladesh, the data on domestic violence against women by their husbands vary from 30 per cent to 67 per cent.[25] A small-scale survey in rural Bangladesh showed that two-thirds of the women were verbally abused (66.8 per cent) by their husbands, and half of the women (50.5 per cent) were battered by their husbands.[26] While another study conducted in 2002, showed that 67 per cent of the women experienced physical domestic violence at least once in their lifetime.[27]

In a study conducted in Dhaka city and rural Matlab, Bangladesh, 60 per cent of women in Dhaka and 61 per cent of women in Matlab reported experiencing physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime.[28] Among those women who experienced physical violence, only 7 per cent in Dhaka and 9 per cent in Matlab reported the perpetrator as being non-relative, indicating that nine of the ten acts of violence against women are at their homes and by their families.[29]

Despite the fact that Sri Lankan women enjoy higher status in terms of education and health compared to their other South Asian counterparts the estimates of domestic violence show that women of Sri Lanka is as vulnerable as women in India and Bangladesh. According to estimates, the prevalence of domestic violence varies from 32 per cent to 60 per cent in Sri Lanka.[30] A study conducted among 515 women to determine the extent of domestic violence in Sri Lanka indicated that around one-third (32 per cent) of women experienced physical domestic violence.[31]

Domestic violence is perpetrated when the legislation, law enforcement agencies and judicial systems do not recognise it as a criminal issue. In South Asia, despite proposals and gradual inclusion of domestic violence in legislation, domestic violence is still not recognised properly as a crime. More importantly, most of the efforts of the countries have been on preserving the existence of family rather than preventing women from violence. Actually, the private nature of the problem keeps the act of VAW away from obtaining justice most of the time as women prefer remaining silent rather than seeking help, particularly when they are economically and socially dependent on men. In Bangladesh 68 per cent of women who experienced physical violence did not

report the act to anyone, and 30 per cent sought the help of their families.[32] The cases are reported only when they are serious and include murder. Similarly, judiciary and law enforcing agencies lack the understanding to better handle the cases of domestic violence. For example in India, three-quarters of judges think that preservation of family should be the main aim of women even if she faces violence and nine out of ten judges say they would not opt for legal redress in cases of domestic violence including their daughters or female relatives.[33]

A survey conducted by Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre in 2005, shows that more than 60 per cent on the South Asians believe that domestic violence is a 'private matter' that has to be solved by the family. Therefore, most of the time the cases of domestic violence are not reported (figure 6.4).

Sex-selective abortions and infanticide

Son preference in a patriarchal society is one of the main factors that perpetuate VAW in South Asia. Indeed, perceiving boys as economic security for family (the old age security of parents and a source of income to the household) has been one of the main causes of threat to survival of girls. In fact, South Asia remains as the only region in the world where the number of females is fewer than male.

Son preference is common in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Female foetuses are aborted or female children killed at the time of their birth. As a result of female foeticide, infanticide and neglect in healthcare and nutrition, it is estimated that in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh one in six deaths of a female infant is due to neglect and discrimination.[34]

In India, sex selective abortions are reported in 27 of India's 32 States. It is estimated that in Punjab, India one in five girls is missing due to sex selective abortions.[35] In another study conducted in Maharashtra of 8,000 abortions, all the fetuses except one were found to be female.[36]

Besides sex selective abortions female infanticide is also common, particularly in India. According to a study,[37] 41 per cent of the early neonatal deaths in India are due to infanticide. 8 to 10 per cent of the infant deaths were accounted for female infanticide in 1995.[38]

Acid attacks

Acid attack is a type of violence that is generally used by husbands in family conflicts particularly in cases of divorce, or proposal of marriage rejected by girls, in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Acid attacks besides disfiguring women leaves the victim disabled or blind. In some cases women are unable to continue vital functions such as breathing or eating. Acid attacks require a painful and long treatment.

- In Bangladesh around 10 women suffer from an acid attack every week.[39]
- According to Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, around 400 women suffer from acid attack every year in Pakistan.[40] In 2004, there were 42 cases of acid attacks occurring against men and women. Three quarters of these were against women. Only one quarter of the cases are reported and among these only 40 per cent of the accused were arrested.

Figure 6.3 Physical domestic violence in Bangladesh, 2002



Source: Bates *et al*., 2004.

Figure 6.4 Percentage of people perceiving domestic violence as a private matter, 2005



Source: Perception Survey of MHHDC 2005 (see Appendix).

Box 6.2 Dowry deaths

A 26 year old woman who was living in Debhata upazila in Bangladesh, was beaten to death by her husband on November 9th 2003. Husband later tried to show the murder as suicide by pouring insecticide into her mouth. Although a case was registered against him by the father of the victim, the husband managed to escape. On the same day, in the same upazila, another young woman also shared the same fate and beaten to death by her husband.

Source: Ameen 2005.

Dowry-related violence

Dowry is a common custom in South Asia, although it is legally forbidden to ask for a dowry in all countries. However, dowry requirement at the marriages perpetrate violence against women in two ways in South Asia. Firstly, the absence of dowry or even the perception that the dowry given to the bridegroom's family is inadequate can lead to physical and psychological violence against women. This might include every kind of torture and can even end up in homicide. According to a survey conducted in Bangladesh, dowry-related problems double the likelihood of the brides being subjected to physical violence.[41] Secondly, dowry is one of the root causes of son preference since the families perceive girls as financial burden and this perception sometimes leads to female foeticide and infanticide.

It is difficult to capture the exact extent of dowry related murders in the South Asian countries as it may take many forms and might not be reported as a 'dispute on dowry'. Data of the National Crime Records Bureau in India indicates that around 17 women die in India everyday as a consequence of dowry related demands of their husbands. The most of these cases were reported from Uttar Pradesh (21.4 per cent) and Bihar (14.6 per cent).[42] Hundreds of women in Pakistan are killed by their husbands and/or other family members as a result of disputes on dowry. In Bangladesh, 427 women faced dowry related violence in 2003.[43] However, these statistics are far from reflecting the reality, as according to a study the extent of incidence of dowry cases in India is around 300 times higher than the reported cases.[44]

Dowry is usually associated with another traditional form of violence, stove burning, which is a practice that is used for injuring or killing women through burning while they are cooking on kerosene stoves. The murderers are usually the husband or the family of the husband. Although it is a case of planned murder, it is usually shown as accident and the murderers remain unpunished. This form of violence is prevalent in many parts of South Asia.

In Pakistan, during the nine months of 2004, 91 cases of burnings were reported by Human Rights Commission Pakistan. Around half the cases were due to stove burnings and in most of the cases the accused were husbands, followed by mother-in-laws. The majority of cases were not reported to law enforcing agencies (76 per cent).[45]

How security of women is violated in the name of tradition and culture?

South Asia is possibly the region with the highest incidence of violent traditional and customary practices against women.[46] These practices include honour killings, sati (widow burning), witch killing, fatwa related violence, forced marriage, and forced temple prostitution (box 6.3). All of these lead to physical, sexual and mental violence of girls and women but remain hidden and unrecognised under the veil of culture and traditions.

Violence perpetrated by community

Community violence is the form of violence in which the perpetrator(s) does not have any blood relationship to the victim. The perpetrator might be an individual or a group, and the reason for the VAW might be individual reasons or revenge between two opposing groups belonging to two different groups based on ethnicity, religion or caste. Community VAW also arises from private interests of

Box 6.3 Insecurity based on tradition, culture or religion

Karo-Kari (honour killings). Rooted in patriarchal and cultural perceptions of women as male property, *karo-kari* ostensibly takes place to avenge family 'honour' when a woman violates tribal or cultural norms. *Karo-kari* is carried out when a woman and man have an illicit relationship, or are even suspected of having one, since public perception of the woman's guilt is considered sufficient to taint family 'honour'. Inevitably, the practice targets women, who are never given the opportunity to defend themselves against the allegations. Thus, all reports indicate that far more women than men are victims of *karo-kari* killings. This practice is called *karo-kari* in Sindh, *kala-kari* in Punjab, and *siyah-kari* in Baluchistan. During 2001-2004, it took 4,101 lives in Pakistan. Although honour killings are forbidden under the law, according to HRCP, during the first nine months of 2004 at least 464 women were the victims of honour killing.[47]

Devadasi and deuki are the terms used for forced temple prostitution in India (Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh) and Nepal. It is an old tradition that requires sacrificing daughters to God. The act is accepted as parents' payoff for their petitions to God but causes exploitation of young girls and children. Children as young as five years old are sacrificed to the temples and forced to work as servants and prostitutes. These children are usually from lower caste families indicating caste-based violence in addition to gender-based one. It has negative impact on health of women particularly considering the spread of HIV/AIDS in the region. An estimated 5,000-15,000 girls are forced into prostitution every year in India and through the *devadasi* system.

Watta Satta/addo baddo refers to the barter marriage in which a woman is bartered to a man, in exchange of a woman from another family to be married to a man from the bride's family. Watta Satta is a practice mostly seen in Pakistan. However, this is a form of marriage that violates women's rights to marry with her consent. Furthermore, the marriages that occur in the form of Watta Satta are more fragile since marital conflict in one family affects the relations in the other and women married through Watta Satta are more likely to face violence at home.

Swara is the term used for blood money in Pakistan where women can easily be used as a compensation for the settlement of a murder between two families. In this settlement the offended family might ask for a woman from the offending family to be married to somebody from offended family as blood money/punishment. The *Qisas* (retribution) and *Diyat* (blood money) Act of Pakistan has been one of the loopholes that stipulates *Swara* as a punishment.

Fatwa is a religious decree which among various religious issues also deals with punishments for perceived moral misdemeanor. Although it does not cause violence against women directly, the misuse of fatwa leads to sufferings of women in Bangladesh. Since 2001 it is forbidden under the law in Bangladesh, yet in 2003 there were 27 reported cases of fatwa related violence. Because of fatwas, many rural women in Bangladesh are also divorced because of their using family control methods.

Sources: HRCP 2005; Islam 1997 and Naveed 2003.

influential people such as landlords or slumlords in South Asia.

Sexual violence of women is the most common form of community violence observed in South Asia. Trafficking of young girls and women has become a serious phenomenon that has reached alarming level across South Asia. Witch killing in Bihar, India and Nepal is also another form of violence perpetrated by community.

Witch killing is usually practiced in Bihar, India and some rural parts of Nepal. The women are usually blamed for being witch and killed by the community. The reasons for blaming women for being witch are usually economic and arise from disputes on land or other property. Men also use witch hunting to get rid of the women they do not want. In Singbhum district of Bihar, every year around 200 women are killed on the allegation of being witches.[48] The victims are usually old or single women with some land holdings.

Trafficking of girls and women has become the fastest growing international business and the third largest source of income of the organised crime in the world. South Asia, together with South East Asia, South Eastern Europe and Latin America, has become the centre for trafficking of girls and women. There are various reasons for trafficking of girls and women in the region. Poverty and the perception of girls and women as being 'commodity' have been the main reasons for the high level of trafficking. The families are often responsible for selling their daughters or wives for prostitution

The stigma attached to the victims of rape makes the victims or their families not take legal action against the perpetrator

across national borders, and sometimes with the aim of receiving some extra income without knowing the kind of work they do. It is estimated that every year, 5,000-7,000 women and girls are trafficked for sex work from Nepal to the brothels in India.[49] Most of the trafficked women are young rural girls.

Rape and sexual harassment have received attention by the public, media, NGOs and governments over the last years. Despite the recognition and attention given to this most humiliating form of violence, it continues to exist and the cases of rape are increasing in most countries of South Asia. However, the reported cases are only a small fraction of the total cases. The victims in general remain silent because of lack of protection by the law enforcing agencies or inefficiencies and corruption of the government machineries. Also the stigma attached to the victims of rape makes the victims or their families not take legal action against the perpetrator. Yet some statistics are available.

- In India, during 2003, 15,847 cases of rape were reported.[50]
- According to Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, rape cases are on the rise in Pakistan. During the first nine months of 2004, 320 cases of rape and 350 cases of gang rape were reported. Around a quarter of the victims were minors.[51]
- In Bangladesh there were 1,550 incidence of rape in 2003.This was almost the double of the cases reported during 2002, most probably due to increase in reporting of the incidences by victims.[52]

Sexual harassment at work place is also another area receiving increasing attention in South Asia. A study conducted in Pakistan to determine the prevalence of sexual harassment among nurses, domestic workers, office workers, and women in the fields and brick kilns revealed that overall 78.4 per cent of women working in these occupations experienced sexual harassment at their workplaces in 2001-02. Among these groups 58 per cent of the nurses had faced sexual harassment by co-workers, doctors, patients and their attendants; 91 per cent of domestic workers had faced sexual harassment mostly by their male employers; 93 per cent of women office workers from public and private sectors faced sexual harassment by their co-workers and bosses. Women in fields, particularly women brick kiln workers, were most vulnerable to sexual harassment.[53]

Violence perpetrated by the state

In some instances, VAW is perpetrated or condoned by the state. Women are likely to experience physical and psychological violence perpetrated by the state under custodial detention, during war and armed conflicts and when they are displaced due to conflicts.

CUSTODIAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: Violence against women by the people who are supposed to protect them is well acknowledged in the region (box 6.4). The verbal and physical torture under the police custody and even the rape of the accused by the policemen is also reported very commonly by the South Asian media.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT: During the periods of war and communal conflicts women are more vulnerable than men to violence due to the collapse of law and order. Furthermore, women's bodies become a tool for taking revenge against the opposing forces. Indeed, throughout history sexual violence against women has been one of the methods used to punish the men of the rival group, community or country. During conflicts, women and girls are subject to rape, gang-rape, sexual mutilation, torture etc. Women and girls are also the ones to leave their homes and seek shelter in other places, thus becoming refugee or internally displaced people (IDP). According to UNHCR estimates, the majority of refugees and IDP are women and children (80 per cent).[54] As of 2002, there were at least 25 million people

IDP in the world. They live in refugee camps, shelters, and welfare centres etc. where women and girls are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and trafficking. Losing their husbands, sons or other male members of the family during armed conflicts also has a devastating impact on the women who now have to bear the burden of earning a living and taking care of the children. Conflicts also affect economic and social development of women and girls by limiting their access to education and employment opportunities.

Socio-economic impact of violence against women

Violence against women has far reaching impact on their lives in terms of denying them their legitimate human rights and socio-economic development Leaving aside human rights violation, VAW has specifically negative impact on women in following areas:

Health

Violence against women has short, as well as long-term, physical and psychological consequences that may also result in death.[55] Indeed, VAW besides causing physical sufferings also damages human spirit, the main ingredient of human wellbeing. According to a World Bank study, domestic violence and rape accounts for about 5 per cent of the total disease burden of women of reproductive ages (15-44) in developing countries.[56] World Health Organization (WHO) also recognises violence against women as a serious public health issue.

The number of studies that show the impact of violence on women's health in South Asia is limited. The cases of death due to some specific forms of violence against women are provided by the criminal records or health statistics, but they do not represent the exact number of cases occurring in South Asia.

Sexual and physical violence against women also has devastating impacts on the reproductive health of women. Besides causing sufferings from non-fatal reproductive diseases, unwanted pregnancies and mental destruction, sexual and physical violence against women may also lead to death of women as a result of pregnancy complications or sexually transmitted diseases like HIV/AIDS.[57] A study conducted in 400 villages in Maharashtra, India concluded that 15.7 per cent of the maternal deaths were due to domestic violence experienced by women during their pregnancy.[58] A similar result has also been found in Bangladesh, where the data shows that 13.8 per cent of all maternal deaths are due to violence and injury.[59] Besides the death of pregnant, women, women might also lose their newborns as a result of violence they experience. The health of the newborn is in danger usually as the result of the direct trauma, or lack of proper attention to mother's physical needs caused by the violence.[60] For example, a quarter of women experiencing physical violence during pregnancy in Bangladesh reported losing their children after birth. The health of the children is also affected compared to the children of mothers who are not facing violence at home. In Nepal, for example, children of

Box 6.4 Custodial rape

A 17 year old college student was kidnapped on 3rd January 2005 in Islamabad. She was kept in a house and gang-raped for 37 days. When she was rescued by the police and taken to the police station on 12th March 2005, she thought that the nightmare was over. Unfortunately, it was starting again. The rescuers, the so-called protectors, became the perpetrators and gang-raped her again. The girl also came to know that these policemen knew the place where she was confined 15 days before the rescue operation. The girl had not stayed quiet and had registered a case against the perpetrators. The gang rape of her at the police station was confirmed after the medical and legal examination, but the station officer forced her father to withdraw the case. The case, with the support from media and activists, came to the attention of the President. The victim is now waiting for the justice promised to her by the President of Pakistan.

On 17th May 2005, another 15 year old girl was travelling with her family when they were stopped at a police check post. She was taken to a police station and gang-raped by four policemen. The policemen also extracted money from the parents in the name of 'honour money'. The four policemen were arrested.

Source: Naqvi 2005.

mothers who reported violence are found to be 1.5 times more likely to be stunted and 1.75 times more likely to be wasted than the children of women who did not report violence.[61]

The psychological impact of violence against women affects women in various ways. The behavioural changes, changes in eating and sleeping habits are the most commonly experienced symptoms of depression and anxiety, which might be a result of violence. In India, women experiencing abuse are five and three times more likely to have depression and anxiety symptoms than the women who are not facing abuse. The psychological damage can also lead to suicide. A study in Bangladesh showed that women experiencing violence are four times more likely to have suicidal thoughts and 2.5 times more likely to attempt suicide.[62]

Rape and domestic violence are also found to be contributing factors to the spread of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS

Rape and domestic violence are also found to be contributing factors to the spread of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS. Women are particularly vulnerable to acquiring HIV when they are exposed to violence in the form of forced and unprotected sex, trafficking etc.

Development of women

Violence and the fear for violence limits the choices of women in all spheres of their lives. Fear of violence limit the mobility of women and girls which in turn limits their ability to attain better education levels and to develop skills in order to earn a livelihood, to work in the jobs that they want, to develop personal relationships, as well as enjoying basic freedoms and rights that are provided in the Constitutions of South Asian countries. Around one-quarter of women (23 per cent) reported never going out alone.[63] Overall, VAW perpetuates poverty by confining half of the population's capabilities and undermines the progress towards human development.

Impact on children

VAW also has detrimental effects on the physical and psychological wellbeing of the children who witness acts of violence against women. Children of the families, in which domestic violence occurs, show behavioural problems such as difficulties in socialising, starting friendships, and problem in schools, besides having sleeping and eating disorders. The children of these families are also more likely to have substance abuse and suicidal behaviour. In addition, witnessing or experiencing violence also leads to intergenerational transmission of violence, as various studies have shown that children who witness violence are the potential perpetrators of violence against women. For example, a Bangladeshi husband is 2.29 times more likely to abuse his wife if he experienced or witnessed violence in his childhood than the husbands who have not.[64] A study in Pakistan also showed that 75 per cent of the perpetrators of violence were the victims or witnesses of violence in their childhood.[65]

Economic impact

VAW is a burden on the economies, directly and indirectly, although it is not possible to exactly calculate such costs. The direct costs relate to the costs on healthcare system, judicial system, and the specific programmes aiming to redress the victims of violation. Then there are the production losses due to decreased productivity of women workers due to absenteeism. There are very few studies that have estimated the economic costs of violence in South Asia. In India, a study showed that the mean number of days lost by women in paid and household work due to violence were 6.88 days and 6.87 days, respectively per incidence of violence.[66] Another study in Bangladesh shows that 32 per cent of women in Dhaka and 23 per cent of women in Matlab district reported work disruption as a result of physical violence by their

husbands; more than half of them reported suffering from ill-health.[67]

How does the legal system protect women from insecurity?

As a sound legal framework can be the backbone of a state of optimum security for women, so can a discriminatory and prejudiced legal system severely augment women's insecurity. There lies the supreme importance of law and the legal system in ensuring women's security in a society. The laws not only dictate women's position in society but also are reflective of the society's attitude towards women.

In South Asian countries, despite Constitutional guarantees of equal rights and protection, the simultaneous presence of religious laws in fact negates or jeopardises those very guarantees. The requirement of four witnesses for rape cases in Pakistan is an example that diminishes a woman's rights to proper justice and is a gross violation of her basic rights. In other cases, the Constitution itself remains ambivalent regarding the status of women, further contributing to their insecurity. The separation of personal laws that are not dictated by the equal rights clauses from the public ones (for example, in Bangladesh) is a testament to that Constitutional dichotomy. Nonetheless, Constitutional remedies, as well as other substantive laws enacted by legislative or administrative authorities can be a powerful legal intervention to address violence (and other factors contributing to their insecurity) against women in South Asia.

However, 'an equitable legal framework can never guarantee the equitable treatment of women is society.'[68] But although legal measures by themselves are not enough to produce qualitative change in the status of women or even prevent violence and discrimination against women, they nonetheless provide the bulwark against existing inequities against women. Hence it is the law (and a legal system) that has the capability to generate a new value-system by overturning or reforming an older and discriminatory value-system.

South Asian countries are signatories to various international documents that directly or indirectly aim at eliminating violence against women.[69] The principle of gender equality is also well established in the Constitutions of South Asian countries. In India, equality before the law and equal protection under the law are recognized, and discrimination based on sex, religion, race, caste or any other basis are prohibited in Constitution. Similarly, Pakistan besides providing equality before the law, and equal protection to all of its citizens, prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender.[70] The Bangladeshi Constitution enshrines the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens of the country irrespective of race, religion, caste, gender, and place of birth, in addition to providing equal status and equality of opportunity for all citizens of the State.[71] However, equal rights to women provided by the Constitution cover only the public sphere and exclude the private one. This leads to complicating women's status through simultaneous existence of personal and family laws that are based upon religious doctrines of respective communities and then are applicable to members of that community regarding their personal and family matters.[72] Nepal and Sri Lanka also provides for gender equality before the law and prohibits discrimination.

The Constitutions of South Asian countries also have various special provisions that reflect women as 'someone to be protected', and group women with the other specific categories of children, disabled and backward etc.[73] These provision, in fact, diminishes the status of women by presenting 'a traditional, conservative, and rigid interpretation, leading to actions which tend to curtail women's rights, rather than ensuring them.'[74]

Various legal measures have been undertaken by South Asian countries, from passing laws to signing declarations and conventions, to making plans of

Despite Constitutional guarantees of equal rights and protection, the simultaneous presence of religious laws in fact negates or jeopardises those very guarantees

But the issues that create and perpetuate violence against women are extremely complex as they are intertwined with the issue of women's status in South Asian society

action, to address the issue of violence against women. However, some laws still have discriminatory clauses that undermine women's protection, or criminalise them even when they are the victims. These legal measures are also far from complying with the internationally required norms.

The response of South Asian countries to enhance women's security in terms of policy and legal measures, and the remaining challenges are provided for South Asia and each country separately in box 6.5. The response of the United Nation system to address the challenge of violence against women is presented in box 6.6.

Policy recommendations

The previous pages show that the legal and political systems in all the countries of South Asia have been devising and implementing a number of policies and actions to promote women's security. But the issues that create and perpetuate violence against women are extremely complex as they are intertwined with the issue of women's status in South Asian society. The issues of discrimination against women, as reflected in the indicators of gender disparity, have been repeatedly addressed in all the previous reports of this Centre. The policies to address the issues have also been provided in each report. Specifically, *Human Development in South Asia 2000* discussed at length the issues of ineffectiveness of the legal system to protect women from violence and the policies required to address the situation. Here we would like to revisit some of those policy conclusions, and suggest a few that specifically address issues related to VAW.

Ensure equality for men and women under the law as required under constitutions in each country

South Asian countries have taken several steps to repeal or amend discriminatory personal laws to guarantee constitutional provisions on gender equality, and to strengthen the existing criminal laws to address violence against women. In this regard, during the last five years, citizenship laws in Pakistan and Sri Lanka have been amended to remove the discriminatory clauses. But still the laws governing citizenship in Nepal and Bangladesh do not allow transfer of citizenship to children born to women married to foreigners. Although the discriminatory inheritance and property laws have been amended in India (Hindu women recently received equal inheritance rights with men in agricultural land with Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005) and Nepal, women in all other countries in the region, particularly Muslim women, do not have the same inheritance rights as men. Polygamy is allowed in almost all the countries. Furthermore, women do not have the same right as men do on issues related to divorce. As shown in Box 6.5, implementation of laws to protect women is very slow. So the priority should be to ensure women's equality under the law and protection from violence by:

- Harmonising existing lawswith constitutional guarantees on gender equality. The personal and family laws are still not equal for women and men. The criminal laws also have loopholes that lead to their misuse against women;
- Improving legal knowledge of the law-enforcing agencies and the general public.

Address the root causes of insecurity

The gender disparity in education and health, as well as in economic and political participation, are the main reasons for women's subordinate position in society that make them vulnerable to violence and less secure. Over the last decades, extensive efforts have been made by governments and civil society to improve the education of women. The rates of literacy and school enrolment of girls have been growing faster than those for boys.

Box 6.5 South Asian legal measures to advance women's security

South Asia

Responses	Remaining challenges
• Governments of South Asian countries are paying increasing attention to domestic violence. All the countries, except Pakistan and Bangladesh, have introduced specific domestic violence laws. • SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children, 2002 was adopted by members countries. • In 2003 Dhaka Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in South Asia was adopted by South Asian parliamentarians. • In 2005 Islamabad Declaration was adopted during the Fifth South Asia Ministerial Conference that promised to prioritize the efforts and actions of the countries in combating violence against women. • India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have initiated OXFAM's *We Can* campaign in South Asia for raising awareness.	• Availability of data and regional cooperation in data collection and dissemination is weak • Personal laws on family related matters, particularly marriage and divorce, guardianship and adoption, and also in inheritance and property rights are highly influenced by religion, culture, and customs, and also have various clauses conflicting with the equality clauses of Constitutions and other general legislation. These laws are not in uniformity, mostly due to *respect for pluralism* of different religious groups living within the boundaries of a country, however they create ambiguity and leave an open window for misuse and discrimination, and also have negative repercussions on security of women. • The implementation of existing criminal laws is weak due to legal loopholes and systematic problems and corruption, particularly of judiciary and police. • Legal and healthcare support systems to the victims of violence are insufficient both in numbers and services provided. • There is almost no legal awareness; about the laws, legal procedures and legal aid provided. Outreach of these services by the rural communities, women and disadvantaged groups are low. • Lack of strong social sanctions due to patriarchal values, norms and institutions is a barrier in providing redress to women experiencing violence. • Misinterpretation of religion and increasing religious fundamentalism is a threat for women's security.

India

Policy and legal measures	Implementation challenges
• Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Indian Penal Code 1860 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872 prohibits dowry and criminalizes dowry related violence. • Custodial rape was recognized in 1983. • Devadasi and Sati practices are prohibited in India. A special act, The Commission of Sati Prevention Act, 1987 defines sati and establishes punishments for violation. • Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and prevention if Misuse) Act, 1994 amended in 2002. The Act, besides prohibiting prenatal diagnosis techniques and advertisement of them, also prohibits pre-conception techniques. • Constitution and penal code of India explicitly prohibits human trafficking. A National Plan of Action to combat trafficking and commercial sex exploitation of women and children and to integrate the victims of trafficking was passed in 1998, and also the penalties for human traffickers increased. The appointment of special police officers and establishment of protective homes and care centres for the children of sex workers are required by Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.	• Laws, criminal justice and support systems are still inadequate to address violence against women. • Justice is denied due to inefficiency and corruption in law enforcement that leads to cases not being investigated or prosecuted properly. • Criminal justice system is unfair as it is biased against some groups that are economically, politically and socially disadvantaged. • Judiciary is highly gender insensitive particularly in the cases of domestic violence. The influence of patriarchal values and stereotyping of women who are the victims of rape is very strong affecting the punishment to the perpetrator.

India

Policy and legal measures	Implementation challenges
• Despite the fact that there is no specific legislation on sexual harassment at workplace, in 1997 the Supreme Court by a decision recognised and asked for redress in case of sexual harassment. Indian parliament also has proposed a Sexual Harassment Bill in 2005. • Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2002 defines domestic violence and requires appointment of protection officers in each district. Recently, India also introduced Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Bill, 2005, defining domestic violence as actual abuse or threat of abuse, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic violence. The Bill also covers dowry related harassment. • In 2001, National Policy for the Empowerment for Women was prepared, which aims at eliminating all forms of discrimination against women as well as halting VAW. • National Policy and Charter for Children has been drafted to eliminate child marriages and trafficking girls into commercial sex work. • To speed up the process of cases of violence against women, a less formal justice delivery system introduced by Lok Adalats (people courts) and Parivarik Mahila Lok Adalats (family women's courts). • A scheme called *Swadhar* has been launched to benefit destitute women, also including the victims of violence.	

Pakistan

Policy and legal measures	Implementation challenges
• Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act and Rules of 1976 restrict the amount of dowry and bridal gifts. • Family Courts Act amended in 1996 and 1997 to speed up the progress in cases and for the recovery of dowry. • Government established a fund under the Women in Distress and Detention Fund Act of 1996 to provide legal and monetary assistance for the women in jails. • Death penalty has become the mandatory punishment in cases of gang-rape by an amendment in Offence of *Zina* (Enforcement of Hudood Amendment 1997). • Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance was promulgated in 2002. • The Section 167 of Criminal Procedure Code has been amended to ensure the safety of women in police custody. The Code requires a female police officer to be present at the detention of a female accused and provides that a magistrate cannot authorise the detention of a female accused in police custody unless commits dacoity or murder. • Honour killings are recognised as intended murder in the Penal Code, Section 302. • Crisis centres for women in distress providing legal and medical help. Women police stations, jails and refugee counselling centres have been established.	• Unavailability of data is a major obstacle for identifying the extent and proper steps to take to eliminate VAW. There is almost no data on prevalence of VAW, causes and consequences of VAW, and about the available services to prevent or redress VAW. • The Constitutional provisions on equality of women and men are not recognised in practice. Furthermore, the discriminatory laws still exist and are not being repealed. For example, Qanun-e Shahadad, 1984 (Law of Evidence) recognises the value of a woman testimony as half of that of a man; Hudood Ordinance, 1979 requires four witnesses in case of rape, otherwise a raped woman is charged with adultery. • The legislation that has been introduced to prevent honour killings has a loophole that prevents the perpetrator from punishment. The perpetrator who is usually the father, brother or husband of the victim can use the Qisas and Diyat Law of Pakistan Penal Code, 1986 to be forgiven by a close relative of the victim. • The awareness about the rights of women is weak. Most of the awareness raising campaigns are conducted by NGO sector and are not enough to cover the whole country.

Pakistan

Policy and legal measures	Implementation challenges
• National Policy for Development and Empowerment of Women of 2002 recognises the need for police reform (gender sensitisation and inclusion of more women in the police force), the need for a law on domestic violence, family protection programme (for providing legal and psychological help), and requires zero tolerance policy towards VAW, declares honour killings as murder. • National Strategic Framework for Family Protection has been prepared, recommending a multi-disciplinary approach based on awareness raising, access to justice, access to support services and a system for referral for the elimination of VAW.	• Law enforcement agencies are corrupt and sometimes they themselves become the perpetrators of VAW. Similarly, the judicial system is not free from corruption besides being male dominated and gender insensitive. The laws introduced are usually unable to tackle the issue of VAW properly. • The services provided to support the victims of violence are limited. There are few legal and medical services for the victims of violence. • There exist parallel systems of judiciary (customary-*jirga, panchayat,* Council of Islamic Ideology and Federal Shahriat Court), which lead to discrimination and violence against women.

Bangladesh

Policy and legal measures	Implementation challenges
• Dowry is prohibited since 1980 under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980 and Dowry Prohibition (Amendment Ordinance). • Cruelty to Women (Deterrent/punishment) Ordinance of 1983 provides punishment for the acts of VAW including kidnapping or abduction, trafficking, dowry related violence and rape. • Special Tribunal Act, 1995 provides for penalties in cases of rape and death by rape. • In 2000, a Supreme Court decision against *Fatwa* was a landmark for women's rights movement in Bangladesh. • Free Legal Aid Act enacted in 2000 to provide free legal services for the poor. • Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act prohibits detention of girls under 18 in the places where prostitution is carried on. A National Plan of Action against Sexual Exploitation and Exploitation of Children, including trafficking prepared and adopted in 2002. Guideline titled 'Counter Trafficking Framework Report: Bangladesh Perspective' prepared in 2004 and National Road March Programme launched by the Prime Minister in 2005 to raise awareness about VAW and human trafficking. • Speedy Trial Tribunal Act, 2002, which aims at speeding up the cases of VAW, is passed. • Suppression of Violence against Women and Children Act passed in 2000 and amended in 2003. The Act has provisions on some forms of violence including rape, trafficking, abduction, death caused by rape, gang-rape and custodial rape by policemen.	• Lack of data on the prevalence of violence is the main barrier in addressing violence against women. • Equal rights to women are provided by the Constitution covers only the public sphere and exclude the private one. This leads to complicating women's status through simultaneous existence of personal and family laws that are based upon religious doctrines. • Gaps remain in the legislation and implementation of the legislation due to inefficiencies of law enforcing agencies and judiciary. • General law and order situation is deteriorating and corruption in law enforcing agencies is quite high. • Legal system is inadequate; delays in court verdicts, cumbersome and lengthy procedures are barriers to women seeking help in the cases of violence. • Efforts to raise awareness and support systems to the victims of violence are inadequate.

Bangladesh

Policy and legal measures	Implementation challenges
• Acid Crime Control Act and Acid Control Act were passed in 2002 to control the act of acid throwing, speed up the punishment and regulate the sale of acid. Suppression of violence against Women and Children Act also prescribes punishment for the perpetrators. Foundation for Acid Survivors was established in 2000 for providing treatment, rehabilitation and other support to the victims of acid attack and training to the doctors and nurses for improving the care. • A National Advisory Council for the Prevention of Violence against Women (aiming at prevention of oppression against women), and Prevention of Violence against Women Cell to monitor and deal with the cases of VAW have been established. • Investigation Cells and safe custody homes have been established to receive complaints on VAW, carrying out investigations as well as protecting women and children from sexual abuse and harassment when they are under custody. • National Policy for Women's Advancement and its action plan aims at improving the status of women through eliminating gender discrimination and violence against women • A Multi-sectoral Programme on Violence against Women was developed in 2001. It is in a pilot phase establishing various mechanism such as One Stop Crisis Centres that have been established for providing immediate legal, medical and other services and to provide treatment and rehabilitation services for victims of violence.	

Nepal

Policy and legal measures	Implementation challenges
• *Deuki* system is discouraged by Children Act of 1992, which provides five-year imprisonment for the perpetrators. • Constitution of Nepal and the Muluki Ain (Country Code) prohibits human trafficking. Nepal also has a special Human Trafficking Control Act, 1986 which defines trafficking and establishes punishment up to 20 years in jail. An amendment to this Act is proposed to extend the definition of trafficking and increase penal sanctions on human trafficking. Human Trafficking Control Bill passed in March 2002. A National Plan of Action Against Trafficking in Children and Their Commercial Exploitation was also prepared in 1997. • Eleventh amendment of Muluki Ain 2002 besides providing inheritance rights to women also aims at eliminating child marriages and increases the punishment for rape crimes. • Domestic Violence Bill was prepared in 2002 but lapsed after dissolution of the Parliament.	• The data on the VAW is scarce, almost unavailable. For example, Nepal being one of the conflict hit countries of the region has no data on the impact of conflict on the VAW and/or the prevalence of VAW during conflict. • The governments were weak about complying with the declarations and commitments they have made. There still exist laws that are discriminatory and the implementation of legislation is very weak. • The attention given to the provision of support services for the victims of violence is weak. Most of the support services are provided by the NGOs. However, they are inadequate to address the growing need. • Effective law enforcement is lacking in a sense that awareness about how to handle the cases of VAW are weak among enforcement personnel. • Judiciary is ineffective in providing timely verdicts. • Cultural and traditional forms of violence are not properly addressed in the country's criminal system.

Nepal

Policy and legal measures	Implementation challenges
• Supreme Court passed a judgment recognising marital rape in 2002. • A National Commission on Women was established in 2002. • National Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment formulated in 1998, among various statements on gender equality it also includes identifying different forms of VAW, establishing a system for collecting data regularly and a mechanism to rehabilitate the victims of violence and to formulate laws that can protect against violence VAW.	

Sri Lanka

Policy and legal measures	Implementation challenges
• There have been various amendments to Penal Code such as sexual harassment introduced by an amendment (section 345), definition of rape extended (section 363) and human trafficking became a punishable crime (with 2-20 years imprisonment and a fine) in 1995. • Law on domestic violence drafted in March 2001. • National Child Protection Authority was established in 1999. • Centre for Gender Complaints established in 1999 by the National Committee on Women. • Police Desks for women and children have been set up in order to be more responsive to trafficking of women and children. • National Plan of Action for Women (2002-07) recognises VAW as one of the areas related to women's empowerment and status. • National Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking of Children adopted in 2002.	• Legal system is inaccessible and costly. • Legal procedures, particularly in the cases of rape are insensitive and burdensome for women. For example, corroboration is required in the cases of rape, which means woman has to prove that there was lack of consent. • Delay in justice is a problem leading to reluctance of victims to come forward and give evidence after years. • The legal procedures of complaint are long and complicated, while police officers also fail to exercise their duties in compliance with the criminal system requirements. • The services such as providing shelter, legal advice and rehabilitation are limited in scope and distribution.

Sources: Gomez and Gomez 2004; Goonesekere 2003 and 2004; Jilani and Ahmed 2004; MHHDC 2000; Mollah 2005; Oxfam 2004; Singh 2004; The Centre for Reproductive Rights 2004; UNFPA 2003 and UNIFEM 2003b, c and 2005.

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives have been successful in closing the gender gaps in school achievements. However, the gaps still exist in other countries of the region, particularly in Pakistan. And the gender gaps are still significantly high at the higher levels of education. Similarly, the health indicators are still dismal for girls and women. More than half a million mothers lose their lives during pregnancy and childbirth. To improve education and health of all children, including girls, we need to reiterate our policy conclusions of our previous reports. These are:

i) Budgetary allocations on education and health should be increased. This has happened in almost all countries, but is still not adequate for providing quality services to all.
ii) Compulsory education laws should be implemented. Not all countries in South Asia have done this.
iii) Access to education and health services in rural areas should be improved both in quantity and quality. This is still a major health issue.
iv) More importance should be given to make education relevant and beneficial for girls.

Box 6.6 United Nations response to address violence against women

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which was adopted in 1979 and came into force in 1981, has been the first binding international document defining violence against women as a form of gender discrimination. CEDAW Recommendation Number 19, passed in 1992, underlined that VAW is a barrier to enjoyment of rights and freedom of women.

Soon after the CEDAW recommendation, in 1993, violence against women was recognised as a human rights violation by the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, and by the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, which was adopted in the same year by the United Nations General Assembly. The Declaration is the first international document dealing exclusively with the issue of violence against women, and a stepping-stone in raising the responses to VAW thereafter.

In 1994, the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) reaffirmed the commitment to the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. The first UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women was also appointed with the duty of analysing and documenting the VAW.

The Platform of Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 included violence against women as one of the twelve areas in its strategic objectives and required international community to take steps to prevent VAW.

In 1996, VAW was declared as public health priority by World Health Organization. In 2000, the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in the Millennium Summit, Millennium Declaration, stated that being free from violence is one of the fundamental human rights, and requires states to combat violence against women.

During the first years of the millennium some specific forms of violence, which usually have an impact beyond the national borders, gained importance in the form of the Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000. The UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS in 2001 and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, were adopted in 2003.

Sources: Naveed 2003 and UN 1998.

v) Gender biases in the curricula should be removed.

Labour market discrimination against women should be removed by law and in practice. Providing equal opportunities for women and men in economic life should be an important step to enhance women's security.

Prevent violence against women

The specific actions to address this issue include:

i) Improve data and research on VAW to gauge the extent of violence and its specific causes.

ii) A whole range of services are needed to provide legal advice, shelter, physical and psychological treatment, as well as skill building and income generating projects for the victims of violence in the region. Many NGOs are providing these services, but it is the governments who have the resources to broaden the coverage.

iii) Particular attention should be paid to gender-sensitive training of the police and other law enforcing authorities.

Chapter 7

Insecurity of South Asian Children

'To be a child in South Asia is to suffer a life of constant denial.'

—Mahbub ul Haq

A quarter of the world's children live in South Asia where they are constantly insecure due to multifaceted threats to their health, education and basic rights.[1] These threats arise from highly interlinked causes including high poverty levels, weak and failed education and health systems and lack of implementation of existing international and national laws in the region.

Children constitute 41 per cent of the total population in South Asia, yet they are the ones who are the most deprived of their rights and the most insecure in terms of receiving proper healthcare. As was documented in *Human Development in South Asia 2004*, the health condition of South Asian children is quite catastrophic. Indeed, South Asian countries have failed in protecting the human security of their children in terms of ensuring their right to live and providing good quality healthcare for all children. As a result of this failure, in South Asia, one in every ten children dies before seeing his/her fifth birthday, half the children are malnourished, half the children below the age six and one-third of the children below the age five have micro-nutrient deficiencies of Vitamin A and iron, respectively. Children of South Asia are also unprotected against the risk of acquiring childhood diseases. Around 30 per cent of children are not immunised against measles, DPT and polio.[2] These statistics makes South Asia the second most insecure region of the world in terms of children's health, following Sub-Saharan Africa.

Children in South Asia are also insecure in terms of achieving quality education, another fundamental right of children. The region has also the highest number of out-of school children in the world. As has been propounded by Mahbub ul Haq, human security is closely linked to enrichment of human lives, and thus with education. Education is the true essence of human development and a key that opens many economic, social, and political doors for people. Education is one of the most important tools for attaining human security. Basic education is the foundation to attain higher levels of education and training and also to achieve better health. Particularly, girls' education has benefits leading to intergenerational gains for individuals, families and society at large. Education is also an empowering tool for people to demand their rights necessary for achieving meaningful democracy.

In South Asia one in every ten children dies before seeing his/her fifth birthday

Right to education has been one of the biggest human rights achievements of the twentieth Century. In 1948, education was declared as a fundamental human right by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since then the attention given to primary education has grown rapidly. By 2000, with the Millennium Declaration, universal primary education was identified as one of the priorities for global community. All countries were required to spend maximum efforts in order to attain this goal.

The primary enrolment rates in South Asia are increasing, but still not all children go to school or complete primary education in South Asia. Around 16 per cent of primary age children do not go to school and half of them drop out before completing grade 5, even if they enrol in primary school. Net primary enrolment is the lowest in Pakistan (table 7.1).

As a result of low demand for and improper supply of education, there are more than 32 million out-of-school children in South Asia, constituting

Table 7.1 Some selected indicators of primary education in South Asia, 2002-2003

	Compulsory education (age group)	Net enrolment ratio, primary (%)	Survival rate to grade 5	% of trained teachers	Pupil/ teacher ratio	Out of school children (in millions)
India	6-14	87.0	47.0[a]	…	42.0	20.55
Pakistan	5-9	60.0[a]	50.0[b]	…	40.0	8.15
Bangladesh	6-10	84.0	54.0	67.0	56.0	2.43
Nepal	6-10	70.5[a]	65.0	16.0	36.0	0.92
Sri Lanka	5-14	99.9[a]	98.0	…	23.0	0.002
Bhutan	6-16	…	91.0	92.0	38.0	…
Maldives	6-12	92.0	98.0[b]	64.0	20.0	0.002
South Asia	…	83.6	49.2	…	42.8	32.04

Note: a: Data refer to period 2001/02; b: Data refer to administrative records of period 1998-2001.
Sources: UNESCO 2003 and 2005 and UNICEF 2004.

Figure 7.1 Share of South Asia in world s total out-of-school children, 2000-2001



Source: UNESCO 2003.

around one-third of the world's out-of-school children (figure 7.1). These children are vulnerable to one of the biggest threats to their childhood—child labour.

Multiple threats to children's security

The well-being of the South Asian children is threatened as a result of various practices in the region, many of which stem from the cruel fact of pervasive poverty and lack of affordable good quality education and training for all children of South Asia. The region boasts of many excellent quality education and high-level technical and professional facilities for the children of the rich and middle class. That is where the focus has been since the colonial days. No government truly wanted to educate the masses who were supporting their agriculture, infrastructure and other labour requirements of the informal sector. It was not in the interest of the rulers to open the minds of this class of people.

This is the background to the practice of child labour in all its terrible forms of exploitation. Some other practices emanate from the traditional values such as child marriage. In addition, the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the region is posing additional threat to children's life.

Child labour in South Asia

Child labour is a threat to children's security for a number of reasons. First of all, child labour is a direct violation of child rights that are defined in various international instruments such as Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (CRC) and International Labour Organisations (ILO) Conventions 138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (C138) and Convention 182, Worst Forms of Child Labour,1999 (C182). In addition, by hindering education and health of children it is also an indirect violation of children's rights to education, and physical and mental well-being and development as repeatedly covered in international arena since 1948 by the Declaration of Human Rights. Child labour causes health insecurity by placing children in an environment where they can be forced to work or be abused. It also hinders the

Box 7.1 How insecure are South Asian children?

Out of every 100 South Asian children

63 are unregistered and invisible
9 die before seeing their 5th birthday
50 are malnourished
30 are not immunised against the common childhood diseases
16 are not enrolled in primary schools

Also
More than 23 million children are engaged in child labour
32 million children are out-of primary school
Thousands of children are trafficked every year
Many are also used in conflicts

Children who are deprived of their basic rights of education and healthcare are more likely to be from poor households, from rural areas, girls and from disadvantaged castes and ethnic groups.

future livelihoods of children. Child labourers are less likely to get education and training to get secure jobs. In this sense, child labour is a major factor in perpetuating poverty and inequality, although it is a direct result of poverty itself. In addition, the children are also employed in jobs that are dangerous even for the adults.

The exact number of child labourers is hard to obtain as the illegal nature of child labour affects its availability. According to the latest ILO estimates on child labour, in 2000 there were around 211 million children of ages 5-14 and 141 million children of ages 15-17 who were economically active in the world.[3] Around half of these children were employed in hazardous works, and 8.4 million (2.3 per cent) were employed in jobs that are defined as unconditional worst forms[4] by ILO C182.[5]

Despite various international commitments, national legislative measures, policies and programmes which aimed at eliminating child labour, more than 23 million children in South Asia are engaged in child labour (table 7.2). Some of these children are employed in hazardous sectors of economy or in unacceptable forms of child labour, risking their lives in addition to their physical and mental development.

INDIA: According to 2001 Population Census of India, 5 per cent of children aged 5-14 are child labourers in India. There were 12.6 million children labourers (ages 5-14) in 2001.[6] Around half of these children were employed mainly in four states namely Uttar Pradesh (15 per cent), Andhra Pradesh (11 per cent), Rajasthan (10 per cent) and Bihar (8 per cent).[7] These are the states where human development is quite low. More than 90 per cent of child workers are found in informal sectors of rural areas engaged in agriculture or agriculture-related occupations.

Child labour in India, as well as in all other countries in South Asia, is highly correlated with poverty levels. Various surveys indicate that as the level of monthly income increases, the economic activity rate of children decreases.[8] Low access to education facilities, low quality of education and perceived worthlessness of education are the other main causes that lead to family's willingness to send their children to work.[9]

Rural to urban migration, mainly due to mechanisation of agriculture, also contributes to child labour in India as the children of migrants are more likely to be involved in domestic work or rag-picking.[10]

PAKISTAN: The one and only national child labour survey of Pakistan was conducted about a decade ago. According to this survey, 3.3 million of 40 million children aged 5-14 were child labourers. Three-fifths of these children were in the Punjab province. Two-thirds of the children were reported to be experiencing injuries and illnesses frequently (6.6 per cent), occasionally (27.6 per cent) and rarely (33.3 per cent).[11]

The main reasons for children joining the labour force in Pakistan are poverty, the need for additional labour in family enterprises and in agriculture. Inadequate education facilities, low quality of education, and lack of enforcement of existing legislations are additional reasons for the children to enter the labour force.[12]

BANGLADESH: According to the second National Child Labour Survey of Bangladesh, conducted in 2002-03, there were 4.99 million child labourers constituting 14.2 per cent of the total children aged 5-14 in Bangladesh. In addition, 2.9 million children from the age

More than 23 million children in South Asia are engaged in child labour

Table 7.2 Economically active children in South Asia, 1996-2003

	Economically active children ages 5-14 (in millions)	Economically active children ages 5-14 (as a % of total children in the age group)
India 2001	12.6	5.0
Pakistan 1996	3.3	8.3
Bangladesh 2002-2003	5.0	14.4
Nepal 1996	1.67	26.7
Sri Lanka 1999*	0.235	6.0

Note: * Includes children from the age group 5-17.
Sources: Gilligan 2003; GOB 2003c; GOI 2005a; GOP, ILO and IPEC 1996 and GOS 1999.

group of 15-17 were also economically active. Four out of every five children were engaged in rural areas. More than half the children of the age group 5-17 were employed in the agriculture sector (56.4 per cent), a quarter was in the services sector (25.9 per cent), and the remaining in the industrial sector. Nine out of ten of these children were employed in the informal sector and a majority of them were unpaid family workers (57 per cent).[13]

Poverty is the most important determinant of child labour in South Asia

The underlying causes of child labour in Bangladesh are also listed as poverty and deprivation, adult unemployment, and high school drop-out rates. Other reasons are high fertility in rural areas, lack of legal provisions and enforcement, and social acceptance of child labour.[14]

NEPAL: Nepal has the highest proportion of working children among the countries of the region. According to the National Child Labour Survey conducted in 1996-97, 2.6 million of 6.2 million children aged 5-14 were engaged in some work, and 1.67 million children were child labourers, indicating one out of every four children were child labourers in Nepal. The majority of children were engaged in activities in rural settlements. The work participation rate of rural children was double the rate of their urban counterparts.[15]

The factors contributing to child labour in Nepal include: financial difficulties, socio-economic deprivations of the family, low value attributed to education, low access to education, and civil war that compells families to send their children to safer areas. The existing social indifference towards child labour and the lack of enforcement of laws and legislation also contribute to child labour.

SRI LANKA: National Child Activity Survey of Sri Lanka, which was conducted in 1999, provides the number of economically active children at around one million, which is one-fifth of the children aged 5-17 in Sri Lanka. This number includes children who were also attending schools. The number of children who did not attend any kind of educational institutions and were economically active was 234,618, constituting around 6 per cent of the total child population in the age group of 5-17.[16] The majority of economically active children were male and resided in rural areas (nine out of ten of economically active children resided in rural areas).

Main reason for families to let their children work was financial as 47.5 per cent of the families of the children who were economically active but not attending any kind of educational institution had shown financial difficulties as the main cause for letting children work. In addition, 46 per cent of families of the children (work only) stated that their household living standards would have declined, and 3.6 per cent of the households could not survive without the contribution of the child.[17]

MALDIVES: MICS-2 of Maldives gives the proportion of child labourers as 26.2 per cent of the total child population aged 5-14. The economic activity rate of girls was higher than boys. One-third of girls in Maldives were economically active while the ratio was one to five for boys.[18]

Main causes of child labour in South Asia

Poverty is the most important determinant of child labour in South Asia. The increasing economic insecurity in the region as well as the prevalence of high adult unemployment and underemployment are the contributing factors to increasing numbers of economically active children. Additionally, low wages of the adult members of the family force the families to send children to work, as their income means survival of the family.[19] Lack of access to education and skill training, and low quality of education are also important factors for pushing children into the labour market rather than in schools. South Asia has a culture that accepts the phenomenon of child labour. A recent study has shown that the wide societal acceptance of child labour by all

concerned parties, families, employers and society, is one of the reasons for child labour in Nepal.[20]

On the other side, lack of political will to tackle the issue, the loopholes in legislations, and lack of implementation of the existing legislations contribute to the continuing demand for child labour in the region. Lack of proper birth registration system is an important hurdle in the implementation of programmes against child labour (see box 7.3).

Worst forms of child labour in South Asia

The fundamental rights of children and their physical and mental development are violated when they are employed in occupations that are hazardous even for the adults, and in those occupations that are morally reprehensible and illegal. These occupations are defined as the worst forms of child labour by ILO C182. The countries ratifying this convention are required to determine the magnitude of worst forms of child labour in their countries and to take action to eliminate this practice as soon as possible.

Yet according to ILO estimates, worldwide 8.4 million children were employed in the worst forms of child labour in 2002. Although the exact number of children engaged in the worst forms of child labour is unknown, many children are engaged in activities in South Asia that fall within the definition of worst forms of child labour. All the countries, except India, ratified C182 that prohibited the worst forms of child labour. However, in South Asia, the worst forms of child labour are prevalent in the form of bonded labour, children in hazardous industries, child trafficking, sexual exploitation of children, and child soldiers.

Child bonded labour

Child bonded labour is a modern form of forced and slave labour that are strictly prohibited in C182. This form of child labour is not only common in South Asia but also seen across the world particularly in Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia.[21] Worldwide 12.3 million people are in forced labour, 40-50 per cent of them are children.[22]

In South Asia, bonded labour is common in India, Pakistan and Nepal, particularly among the lower castes, minorities and the poor. Millions of children in these countries were also born into bondage or get into the bonded labour system to repay the loans of their parents. Children are denied their basic rights and freedom, particularly education and healthcare. Furthermore, many bonded children work under conditions that are harmful to their health.

Although the exact number of bonded child labourer is unknown, millions of children are reported to be working as bonded labourers in:

- agriculture, brick kilns, carpet industry, plantation, domestic work in Nepal;
- agriculture, gem industry, carpet industry, match and firework industry, silk weaving, flower growing, silver work, bidi rolling, brassware, footwear, bangles, in brick kilns, domestic work, stone quarries in India; and
- agriculture, domestic work, football industry, carpet industry, brick kilns; shoe making, stone/brick crushing; power looms in Pakistan.[23]

According to Human Rights Watch, around 38 per cent of 40 million bonded labourers were children in 2000. The bonded labourers in India are mostly from the Dalit families and the bonded system is passed from one generation to next.[24] At least 300,000 children were bonded labourers in the carpet industry in India.[25] In Tamil Nadu, 10 per cent of one million bonded labourers are children.[26] Similarly, almost all of the 350,000 children working in the silk thread making and weaving industries of Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh on hired basis were estimated to be bonded labourers. Around half of the 450,000 girls working in the hybrid

The fundamental rights of children and their physical and mental development are violated when they are employed in occupations that are hazardous even for the adults

cottonseed farms in Andhra Pradesh are also estimated to be bonded.[27]

In Nepal, at least 17,000 child laborers were working as bonded laborers in the remnants of the prohibited Kamaiya system,[28] while the estimates of the total number of bonded child labourers are around 33,000.[29]

In Pakistan, various rapid assessment surveys conducted to analyse bonded labour in agriculture, brick kilns, carpet and mining industries, and domestic work and begging indicated involvement of children as bonded labourers.[30]

Children in hazardous industries

Millions of children are engaged in hazardous occupations in various industries in South Asia. These occupations risk the health and safety of children. Around two million children are employed in hazardous industries such as brick manufacturing, stone quarrying, fireworks manufacturing, and glassware production in India.[31] In Bangladesh, 40 occupations that children are mainly involved in are found to be hazardous. The results of various baseline surveys conducted in order to gauge the involvement of children in some of the occupations are provided below:

- A total of 15,923 children of ages 5-17 were engaged in automobile establishments, constituting 41.8 per cent of the total workers of the automobile establishments. Around one-third of these children have various health problems and 28.4 per cent experienced verbal or physical abuse during the reference period of the survey.[32]
- There were 85,619 children employed in the road transport activity mainly in urban areas. 45.5 per cent of these children had experienced various health problems and 41.6 per cent were abused by their employers.[33]
- A national total of 39,031 children (aged 5-17 years) were working in welding establishments. Around 45 per cent of children surveyed in this industry were not using any protection against risks of accident.[34]
- A quarter of people employed in battery recharging/recycling sector were children from the ages 5-17 years. Only 13.2 per cent of them used protective gear for avoiding risk.[35]

In Pakistan, Rapid Assessment, and Occupational and Safety Health surveys conducted under the Time-Bound Programme in various districts that are home to hazardous industries showed that:[36]

- There were 5,800 children employed in Surgical Instruments Manufacturing in Sialkot. Among 101 children surveyed for the health risks in this industry many suffered from musculo-skeletal and ENT disorders, respiratory diseases, anemia and conjunctivitis. Half of the children also experienced injuries due to work.
- There were around 10,000 child labourers in the glass bangle industry in Hyderabad. These children faced respiratory and skin problems.
- The deep-sea fishing industry in Gadani Area of Balochistan employed 2,478 children. These children were likely to suffer from skin diseases, musculo-skeletal disorders and abdominal pains.
- There were around 89,500-106,500 rag-pickers in Lahore, Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar and Islamabad. One-third of them reported being subject to sexual abuse.
- The tanneries in Kasur district of Pakistan employed 700-750 children. Half of these children reported injuries due to work.
- 357 children in Chakwal and 95 children in Nowshera districts were found working in the coal mining sector.

In Nepal, the baseline and rapid assessment surveys conducted under the Time-bound programme indicate that:

Box 7.2 Child camel jockey

Thousands of young children are being trafficked from South Asia, particularly from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to be used as jockeys for camel races in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, Mascut, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. There are reports of children as young as two years old are being trafficked to be used as jockeys.

These children who are separated from their families are subject to life-threatening situations simply for the amusement of the elites in these countries where camel racing is almost becoming a national sport. Child camel jockeys are often abused both physically and mentally, deprived of food to prevent weight gain, or might get injured or stampeded to death by camels. Poverty and financial insecurities of the families are the common cause of children being trafficked to camel jockeying in South Asia. For example in Pakistan, parents of the child jockeys receive around US $140 per month, which is a considerable amount for the poor of Pakistan

Considering the extent of poverty and deprivation in Pakistan, finding a way to address this problem was impossible without a strong political will. In 2002, Pakistan promulgated the Prevention and Control of the Human Trafficking Ordinance which besides other forms of trafficking, declares trafficking of children for camel jockeying as a criminal offence and suggests a 10 year sentence for the child traffickers. The government of Pakistan, with UNICEF, banned the use of children in camel races and to return child camel jockeys to their homes.

On 31 May 2005, the government of UAE also imposed a ban on child camel jockey, requiring camel jockeys to be at least 18 years of age. With the help of UNICEF, Pakistan is now repatriating child camel jockeys from UAE. During June-July 2005, 108 children returned home and were placed in a child protection centre in Punjab, where they are provided basic needs till they are reunited with their families. UAE also agreed to send 3,000 child camel jockeys back to the country and stated that they are planning to use robots as jockeys instead of children.

Sources: Anwar 2004; Asghar *et al*. 2004 and BBC 2005.

- There were 5,682 short distance and 106,700 long-distance child porters in the country.[37]
- There were 3,695 rag pickers in the country. A majority of them (55 per cent) reported being sick or injured during work.[38]

The health hazards of child labourer in Sri Lanka seem to be minimal. About 90 per cent of the children surveyed in 1999 national child labour survey mentioned that they did not have any injury or illness due to work.

Child trafficking

It is estimated that at least 600,000-800,000 people are trafficked every year across national borders in the world. A majority of the people trafficked are women and girls (around 80 per cent). Children—both boys and girls—constitute half of the people trafficked. As the number above does not include internal trafficking, the number of trafficked persons is expected to increase substantially.[39]

As discussed in *Human Development in South Asia 2003*, trafficking of children is a regional problem in South Asia that received some attention from the policy makers. The countries of South Asia are source, transit or destination countries[40] for thousands of children who are trafficked both internally and across the national borders. The trafficking of children usually occur either forcefully or with the help of the family members who sell their children for a meagre amount of money in order to ease their financial difficulties. The trafficked children are used for commercial sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, bonded labour, camel jockeying and begging.[41]

The exact number of children trafficked is unknown due to the illegality of the act. However it is estimated that at least 12,000 women and children are trafficked from Nepal to the brothels of India every year, one-fifth of them are younger than 16. More than one million children were known to be trafficked from rural to urban areas for domestic servitude and commercial sex work, to the Middle East to work as bonded labourers and for domestic chores, to United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar as camel jockeys. Thousands of children are also trafficked

from Bangladesh and Nepal to Pakistan and India.[42]

There are a number of causes that perpetuate child trafficking in South Asia. They are mostly interlinked and reinforce each other but economic insecurity, weak law enforcement, along with corruption, are reported as the most common factors that increase the vulnerability of children, as well as women, to trafficking in South Asia.

While international law makes recruitment of any child below the age of 18 illegal, it is common knowledge that most of the child soldiers are younger than 15

Sexual exploitation of children

In South Asia the use of children for commercial sexual exploitation is widespread. For example,

- Around 15 per cent of the 2.3 million people working in commercial sex industry in India are children.[43]
- In Bangladesh, there are 15,000-20,000 girls engaged in street prostitution, and thousands are trafficked for sexual exploitation.[44]
- A recent survey conducted in various cities in Pakistan indicates that child sexual abuse is common, particularly in Red Light District of Lahore, in shrines, in transport and deep-sea fishing industries etc.[45]
- According to government estimates, the number of child prostitutes is about 2,000 in Sri Lanka. However the private estimates goes up to 20,000.[46]

Child soldiers: lost innocence

UNICEF estimates put the number of children—boys and girls under the age of 18 at 300,000—actively fighting in 30 armed conflicts in 41 countries worldwide.[47] Unofficial sources raise the estimate to 500,000.[48] While international law makes recruitment of any child below the age of 18 illegal, it is common knowledge that most of the child soldiers are younger than 15, some as young as seven years old. They are employed because they make cheap, compliant and effective soldiers. Some are fighting on the sides of the government forces and others with armed opposition groups. While some are abducted or forcibly recruited others are forced by poverty, abuse and discrimination. Some join 'voluntarily', unaware of the dangers and abuses, because their fathers and brothers did so. Others join to avenge the atrocities committed against their families.

While this crisis is of horrific magnitudes in Africa, a significant proportion of child soldiers are involved with various conflicts in Asia. In South Asia, child soldiers are fighting in Nepal, India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. There are more than a 1,000 registered cases of forced recruitment by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),[49] and the unofficial figure is estimated to be ten times that. In India children as young as thirteen or fifteen year old are recruited by armed political groups. In the northeastern state of Assam children between the ages of 15 and 18 join the Maoist People's War Group (PWG) to escape the poor living conditions. Similarly, children between 14 and 18 have been recruited in Jammu and Kashmir. Four hundred children were abducted in the area in 2003 alone. In Nepal more than 15,000 children have been abducted since 1996 and evidence suggests forced recruitment has been stepped up since the collapse of the ceasefire in 2003.[50] The situation of the child soldiers in Maoist controlled areas in Nepal is unknown but, according to the Asian Human Rights Commission, child soldiers comprise 30 per cent of the Maoist forces. In addition to the forcible and 'voluntary' recruitment by the militias, the constitutions of a number of countries allow recruitment of children under eighteen as soldiers in the army. In Bangladesh in 1999 more than three thousand children under eighteen were serving for the national army.

The most vulnerable to being recruited are those with displaced families, living in combat zones and with limited access to education and or other training that would enable them to earn a living to

support themselves and their families. They carry small arms that are light and easy to handle like the AK-47s and M-16s. They are used in direct combat activities, as spies, messengers and porters, for suicide missions and, because they are so small, for laying and cleaning minefields. The girls, in addition to military duties, are frequently exploited sexually and forced to serve as commanders' wives. The result is a high rate of unwanted pregnancies, abortions and HIV/AIDS epidemics. Seen as dispensable commodities and hardly given any training before being sent into combat, the child soldiers are the first to get killed. As part of the process of desensitisation these children are often threatened, tortured, drugged or raped. There are reports of children being killed by the governments under allegations of being spies in Nepal.

The recruitment and use of children for combat is outlawed by various measures of international human rights law, humanitarian law, labour law and criminal law, but a chasm exists between these standards and their application. In addition to the 1949 Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child outlaws involvement of children under 18 in armed conflict. Since the ceasefire in 2002, UNICEF is working with the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to develop an action plan for returning the child soldiers to school, accessing vocational training and developing monitoring systems to prevent child recruitment in the future. In India and Nepal, there are no government initiatives to assist the reintegration of child soldiers or children affected due to conflict. Demobilising and prioritising social reintegration of child soldiers is an arduous task for which the international community needs to play a much more active role than at present since the legacy of child soldiers exacerbates cultures of violence and endangers the entire process of peace building in a post-war society.[51]

Child marriage: lost childhood

Child marriage is a threat to development of children besides being a violation of human rights,[52] as child brides and bridegrooms are usually deprived of their education, health and other basic freedoms.

The practice of child marriage affects both boys and girls but the burden of marriage usually falls on girls. Girls are expected to perform house work, bear children and are deprived of their education and other opportunities of life. In a study conducted among 50 countries of the world, including India, Bangladesh and Nepal, it has been observed that child brides, i.e. girls marrying before the age of 18, are less likely to be educated, more likely to experience domestic violence, and are less likely to have knowledge about modern contraceptive methods, HIV/AIDS and use contraception than girls marrying after 18.[53] Child marriage is one of the contributing factors to high fertility and high maternal mortality rates in the region.

The practice of child marriage affects both boys and girls but the burden of marriage usually falls on girls

The practice of child marriage is mostly prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, and moderately prevalent in the Middle East and North Africa. Among the countries of South Asia, child marriage is widespread in all countries except Sri Lanka. The number of child brides is highest in Bangladesh where more than half the women aged 20-49 surveyed in 2004 reported being married when they were 15, and eight out of ten at the age of 18. In India and Nepal, more than 60 per cent of women reported being married at the age of 18 (figure 7.2).

The most comprehensive document on child rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, although not addressing child marriages explicitly, defines children as someone below the age 18 and requires state parties to abolish all 'traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children'.[54] As signatories to CRC and CEDAW, South Asian countries have enacted various laws that determine the age at marriage and prohibit child

Table 7.3 Minimum age at marriage in South Asia

	Female	Male
India[a]	18	21
Pakistan	16	18
Bangladesh	18	21
Nepal[b]	20	20
Sri Lanka	18[c]	18
Bhutan	18	21

Note: a: Muslim Personal Laws defines the minimum age at 15 or puberty; b: With parents consent to marriage minimum age for marriage is 18 for both female and male; c: No minimum age for valid marriage is specified but muslim girls below the age 12 can marry with the permission of *Quazi* who is similar to a judicial officer.
Sources: MHHDC 2000 and United States Department of State 2004a.

marriages. Only Pakistani laws allow the marriage of girls under 18. Despite the prohibition of child marriage, the personal laws, particularly those of Muslims, do not comply with the ages determined by these general laws. For example, within the region for Muslim girls the age of puberty is the minimum accepted age for marriage.

The root causes that can be associated with the prevalence of child marriage are financial difficulties of parents, the perception of girls as economic burden and honour of the family, and lack of enforcement of existing legislations prohibiting child marriage.

HIV/AIDS and children: lost lives

The increasing number of people living with HIV/AIDS has become one of the biggest threats to children's well-being, security and development. In 2005, an estimated 40.3 million people were living with HIV/AIDS in the world of whom 5.7 per cent are children below the age 15.[55]

HIV/AIDS wreaks havoc in the lives of children by threatening their lives, education, healthcare and protection, and also by discrimination and stigmatisation. HIV/AIDS is a major contributing factor to high infant and child mortality in HIV/AIDS-affected countries as well. In 2004, 570,000 children died due to AIDS related illnesses. Children constitute 14 per cent of new global infections of HIV/AIDS that occurred in 2005, indicating that every day about 1,600 children acquire HIV in the world.[56]

HIV/AIDS also threatens protective environments for children since death of a parent means losing a protector. Children of HIV/AIDS-affected families are also denied their fundamental rights to education and healthcare due to weakening education and healthcare systems, in addition to weakening the financial ability of families to send their children to school or provide healthcare services. Children are also likely to face stigma associated

Figure 7.2 Percentage of women aged 20-49 who were first married by exact age of 15 and 18



Note: Data is originated from the Demographic and Health Surveys of the countries.
Source: ORC Macro 2005.

with the HIV positive status of their parents and/or themselves. Around 15 million children in the world have been orphaned due to this killer disease, and have become totally unprotected against exploitation and violence.

HIV/AIDS has not affected children of South Asia as much as it has devastated the lives of children in Eastern and Southern Africa. However, with additional half a million HIV positive cases every year, India is likely to become one of the epicenters of HIV/AIDS orphan crisis in the near future, if the spread of the virus is not slowed down. India is home to more than 5 million HIV positive people, of whom 130,000 are children.[57]

Action against child labour in South Asia

The main international instrument covering rights of the child comprehensively came in 1989 with United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Countries that ratify this Convention promise to provide free primary education and health to all children and protect children from the exploitative and forceful employment.[58] UNCRC has been ratified by all the countries of South Asia. Majority of South Asian countries have also ratified or signed one or more child labour specific conventions of ILO or Optional Protocols of UNCRC, showing their commitment to eliminate child labour (table 7.4).

In addition to international commitments, various subregional commitments of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) also aim at addressing child labour, particularly trafficking of children and women for sexual exploitation, and ensuring the welfare of children. Two regional Conventions were signed in 2002, SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating the Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution; and SAARC Convention on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia.

Each country in South Asia has also passed legislation setting minimum age for work and/or prohibiting employment of children in specific occupations or production processes. However implementation is weak due to lack of political will, high levels of corruption and the weaknesses arising due to lack of birth registration systems (box 7.3).

A brief summary of the legislative measures taken by the South Asian governments is provided below:

India

India is neither a signatory to the ILO C138 nor to C182, however the principle of elimination of child labour is recognised in the Constitution. The Constitution of India prohibits employment of children below the age of 14 in factories, mines or any other hazardous works (Article 24), and trafficking of persons and forced

Table 7.4 Status of main international instruments related to child labour, as of September 2005

	UNCRC 1989	UNCRC optional protocol on involvement of children in armed conflict	UNCRC optional protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography	ILO Child Labour		ILO Forced Labour	
				C138	C182	C29	C105
India	X					X	X
Pakistan	X	S	S		X	X	X
Bangladesh	X	X	X		X	X	X
Nepal	X	S	S	X	X	X	
Sri Lanka	X	X	S	X	X	X	X
Bhutan	X			NA	NA	NA	NA
Maldives	X		S	NA	NA	NA	NA

Notes: X ratified, S signed, NA not applicable since not a member of the organisation.
Sources: ILO 2005b and OHCHR 2005.

Box 7.3 Unregistered children

Without birth registration, a child has no identity or nationality. Besides this legal aspect, it is also important for statistical reasons. A good birth registration system provides readily available data regarding the basic characteristics of a population. Birth registration is important for providing other fundamental rights to children, such as protecting them from early marriage, trafficking, recruitment for the army, and other forms of child labour. It is also important for school enrolment. In times of natural disaster, it is a tool that can be used to reunite families.

Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) requires children to be registered soon after birth. The states need to take necessary actions to ensure that every child has this right by national legislations. All South Asian countries have legislations in place making birth registration compulsory. However, due to lack of real enforcement mechanism, the percentage of registration of births in South Asia is the lowest in the world.

There are 48.3 million under-five children in the world who are not registered at birth. The share of South Asia in the total unregistered children is 47.6 per cent. Around 63 per cent of children under the age of five, constituting more than 23 million children in South Asia, are denied their right to identity and are vulnerable to exploitation in the form of child labour. Since this figure indicates only children under the age of five, the exact number of unregistered children is expected to be much higher.

In India, registration of births is compulsory under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969. However, around two-thirds of the births are unregistered in the country. Since 1961 the birth registration has been compulsory in Pakistan, yet only one-fifth of the births are registered in the country. Bangladesh has the lowest percentage of registered births in South Asia. Only 7 per cent of the births are registered in the country. Only one-third of the births in Nepal are registered. In Sri Lanka, registration of births has been compulsory for more than a century. Sri Lanka is the only country in the region that has a strong birth registration system. Almost all of the births are registered in Sri Lanka. In Maldives, registration of births is mandatory within a week after the birth of the child. However, according to MICS-2 conducted in 2001, 27 per cent of the births during the last five years were not registered.

South Asia's share in total number of unregistered births, 2000



Sources: GOM 2001; Nigamuni 2003; The Daily Times 2005 and UNICEF 2005g.

labour (Article 23). In India, education also guaranteed in the Constitution, is free and compulsory till the age of 14 (Article 45).[59]

Various other legislative instruments have been introduced to regulate the minimum age for employment of children in different industries, and to extend the legal protection of children in terms of working conditions. In total, there are more than 10 Acts covering child labour issues,[60] but the two major national legislations are:

- The Factories Act, 1948 that prohibits employment of children below the age of 14 and requires provision of fitness certificates for the employment of children aged 15-18. The Act also regulates the working hours of children aged 14-18 by limiting the working hours by 4.5 hours per day and banning work at night;
- Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 that prohibits employment below the age of 14 in 13 occupations and 57 processes those are hazardous to children and listed in the Schedule to the Act.

In addition to these legislations, a Supreme Court Judgment of 1996, requiring state and union governments to identify child labour in hazardous works, withdrawal of them from work and provide quality education, is also an important step for elimination of child labour.[61]

However, there are loopholes in legislations. For example, Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 does not cover agriculture or informal sectors of the economy where most of the children work. Similarly, Factories Act, 1948 do not cover factories with less than 20 employees (or 10 workers if power is used).[62]

Government of India adopted National Child Labour Policy in 1987 with the aim of ensuring legal action against child labour under the provisions of Child Labour Act of 1986, and to focus on child health, education, welfare etc., and in those areas that are known to have high concentration of child labourers.[63] In 1988, National Child Labour Programmes was initiated for the rehabilitation of child labourers in the industries where child labourers were concentrated. These programmes aimed at a) rehabilitation of child labourers, b) establishment of special schools for the provision of non-formal education and training, c) employment generation opportunities, d) increasing public awareness about the child labour phenomenon, e) conducting surveys and evaluation, and f) promoting additional income to the parents of the children. These programmes now cover children working in hazardous industries in 100 child labour endemic districts of India. Additional 150 districts are planned to be covered during the tenth Five-year plan period.[64]

Pakistan

The Constitution of Pakistan prohibits employment of children below the age of 14 in any factory, mine or any other labour that is hazardous to their health (Article 11(3)). Forced labour and trafficking is also prohibited by Constitution (Article 11(1) and 11(2)).[65]

Employment of Children Act, 1991 is the main legislation exclusively dealing with the child labour in Pakistan. The Act defines children as any person below the age of 14 and prohibits employment of children in specific sectors and for hazardous labour. The laws like Factories Act, Mines Act also prohibit employment of children in specific hazardous occupations.

Pakistan has also formulated laws that are addressing the worst forms of labour, including bonded labour and trafficking of children. The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1992 abolished the system of bonded labour in Pakistan. The Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance, which was promulgated in 2002 prohibits the trafficking of person below the age of 18. Government also has promised to increase the minimum age limit to 18 years for the worst forms of child labour,[66] and is preparing to ratify ILO C138.

Government of Pakistan aims at eliminating child labour gradually, and worst forms of child labour immediately, through implementation of legislation, provision of education and training opportunities to all children to prevent their entry into labour market, rehabilitation of former child workers, and raising awareness about the child labour issues. For this purpose, the government, with relevant stakeholders, formulated a National Policy and Plan of Action in 2000. However, there has been no effective and comprehensive implementation, except for the launching of the National Plan of Action for Education for All and the National Project on Rehabilitation of Child Labour. A National Plan of Action against Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation has also been drafted in 2000-01. Various other industry-specific child labour projects are also being implemented with the assistance of ILO-IPEC. A Time-bound Programme for elimination of worst forms of child labour has been launched in 2002 (box 7.4).

Bangladesh

The Minimum age for employment is defined as 12 to 18 years by the various statutes, depending on the industry employed.[67] The minimum age for employment of children in hazardous occupations is defined as 18 under the Factories Act, 1965 (section 87).

There is no Child Labour Policy in Bangladesh, however, the government ratified ILO C182 in 2001 and since then has been working on the preparation of the National Child Labour Policy. For this, Government is also working closely with IPEC, under the Time-bound Programme. The preparatory phase of time-bound

Box 7.4 Time-bound Programmes for the elimination of worst forms of child labour

Four of the countries of the region, namely Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, have ratified ILO C182, promising to take immediate and time-bound actions to prohibit and eliminate the worst forms of child labour.

IPEC in order to assist the countries to eliminate worst forms of child labour within a specific time frame has developed Time-bound Programme (TBP) Approach. The TBPs basically have three aims: a) prevention of children from entering worst forms of child labour through enhancing educational opportunities, raising household income and increasing awareness about the consequences of this type of labour; b) rehabilitation of children through health and counseling; and c) protection of children form exploitation and hazardous work through strengthening legislation.

Currently 20 countries of the world have started TBP processes with the assistance of ILO-IPEC. Nepal is one of the first three countries of the world to implement TBPs. The TBP in Nepal has been started in 2001. Pakistan and Bangladesh have also initiated TBP in their respective countries since 2002-03.

Various actions have been taken under the TBP in Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan including completion of rapid assessment surveys, publication of awareness raising material, workshops for mobilisation and information sharing, partner capacity and training needs assessments etc.

In Nepal, child bonded labour, child trafficking and child domestic work have been identified as priority areas that TBP will focus initially. Then the child porters and children working in hazardous occupations will be covered. Preparatory stage of TBP in Bangladesh was launched in 2004. In Pakistan, during the preparatory phase of the programme, 29 industries were listed as hazardous for children's employment. In 2003, ILO-IPEC launched its Project of Support to the National Time-bound Programme, targeting the elimination of children in various industries including glass bangles, surgical instruments, manufacturing, tanneries, coal mines, rag-picking and deep-sea fishing.

TBP approach is more comprehensive than the earlier approaches that aimed at eliminating worst forms of child labour as TBPs a) are initiated and led by the countries; b) are integrated in the development programmes; c) have multi-sectoral participation; d) consider the specific circumstances in each country; e) strengthen data availability and understanding of the issue by extensive data collection and analysis; and f) include effective evaluation and monitoring.

Source: ILO 2004h.

Programme was started in March 2004. A draft Labour Code has also been prepared, setting a uniform minimum age for employment at 14 in accordance with the minimum age defined in ILO C138.

The Ministry of Labour and Employment is also implementing a project aiming at eradication of child labour in hazardous works. The programme, which uses non-formal education and skill training for working children, and micro-credit for the families of working children, covers Dhaka and Chittagong.

Bangladesh is also following a policy of eliminating child labour through provision of free, good quality education that addresses the needs of children in order to keep them away from the labour market. Bangladesh made primary education compulsory for the children aged 6-10 with the Primary Education Act in 1993. During the same year, the Food and Education Programme was started with the aim of attracting students, particularly from the poor families, towards primary education. In order to tackle the problem of low attendance in the formal education and provide alternatives to children, the government established the Primary and Mass Education division and the Directorate of Non-formal Education in 1992 and 1996, respectively.[68]

Nepal

The Constitution of Nepal, 1990 requires the state to prevent children from exploitation and gradually to ensure free education (Article 26(8)).[69] Article 20 of the Constitution prohibits human trafficking and forced labour in any form and the Civil Code of the country defines forced labour as illegal and punishable. The county also has child labour specific legislation defining the minimum age for employment of children and regulating children's work.

Nepal ratified both the ILO C138 in 1997 and C182 in 2002. The main legislation related to child labour is The Children's Act, 1992, which states that

children under the age of 14 cannot be employed in any work. Similarly, The Labour Act, 1992 prohibits the employment of children under the age 14, in addition to prohibiting the employment of children of 14-18 in hazardous work. The amendment to this Act, The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1999 lists the activities that children cannot work and prohibits the employment of children younger than 16 in these occupations.[70] Bonded Labour Prohibition Act also prohibits bonded labour for all, and makes it a punishable act.

Nepal has prepared a Ten Year National Plan of Action for Children that include the issue of child labour. A master plan for the elimination of child labour is also at its final stage. Nepal has committed to eliminate the worst forms of child labour by 2010 and to eliminate child labour by 2014. Nepal has been the first country in the region to start the Time-Bound Programme for the elimination of worst forms of child labour.

However, the laws governing child labour do not comply with each other in respect of defining the child as well as the minimum age for hazardous work.[71] Similarly, the Labour Act does not cover the informal sector of the economy where most of the children are employed. Besides, the loopholes in legislations, the conflict situation in the country, and lack of birth registration hamper the implementation of legislation and policies. The lack of birth registration also obstructs the school participation of children, even though primary education is compulsory.

Sri Lanka

With the Article 27(13) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, the state pledged to promote and protect the well being of children. The draft Constitution proposed in 2000 included various articles related to the rights of the child and forced labour. The draft Constitution, among other provisions, requires the state to provide free education to children age 7-14, and outlaws the employment of children in hazardous occupations (Article 22).[72] Article 23 also states that nobody should be employed forcibly.

Sri Lanka is the only country in South Asia that is signatory to all relevant international conventions and protocols. The minimum age for employment is 14 as set by an amendment in 1999 to the Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act of 1956. Penal Code (Amendment) Bill has been prepared including the definition of trafficking in compliance with the UN Transnational Organised Crime Convention and ILO C182. The Bill also criminalised the worst forms of child labour in response to ILO C182.[73]

A National Plan of Action to combat trafficking of children for sexual and labour exploitation, and a National Policy to eliminate the worst forms of child labour, have been formulated and adopted after signing ILO C182. TBP is also in the process of preparation.[74]

Policy implications

The above section shows the extent of awareness of the South Asian governments about the problem of children's security, and how the governments have already responded in terms of legislations and plans in order to address this issue. Yet in practice nothing much seems to have happened. The children in South Asia are still not as secure and safe as we would like them to be. There seems to exist a huge gap between what the governments and people would want to do and what is actually happening. Therefore, the need for the governments is not to enact more laws or for us to give more recommendations. It is time to show results.

To create an environment that enables children to develop to their best and that protects them from threats to their security requires a number of actions by all the stakeholders, including governments, international institutions, and families. As the chapter shows, in South Asia there are numerous threats to children's security. Yet the governments have mostly failed

Box 7.5 The 2005 South Asia earthquake: a threat to children

Natural disasters, particularly in those countries that lack proper disaster preparedness, hamper everyone's security by destructing living environments. Children are more likely to be affected from these than any other group in the community. Such was the case in 8th October 2005 earthquake in South Asia.

In the earthquake of Pakistan, children were the worst hit. Before the earthquake, around half the population (42 per cent) living in the earthquake-hit areas of AJK and NWFP were children below the age 15. Although the death toll of children is unknown, as the earthquake occurred during the school hours the extent of physical damage to schools were enough to estimate the massive loss of children's lives. Due to earthquake, thousands of children have also become disabled. In addition, thousands of children are left without their parents, becoming highly vulnerable to abduction or trafficking. The trauma and psychological impacts of earthquake on children are also as devastating as the physical ones. These children need long-term help and support.

Freezing weather is also triggering illnesses such as pneumonia. Despite heavy immunisation campaigns that had started after the earthquake, the outbreak of measles in the camps are also impacting the lives of children. Severe damages to already weak healthcare infrastructure—75 per cent of the primary levels facilities are damaged—and the losses of healthcare stuff further threatens health status of children and their families.

More than 150,000 households have partially damaged or destroyed water supplies. Lack of clean water is a threat to children's health as it might lead to outbreak of water borne diseases in the quake-hit areas.

Education of children is also under threat. Around 8,000 schools are destroyed totally or partially, decreasing the likelihood of children continuing their education. Children of displaced families are likely to drop out from school.

Source: ADB and World Bank 2005.

to implement or enforce the laws that were so necessary to protect the children against the harmful practices. We believe now that the countries need to focus on a few areas that would ensure implementation and enforcement of existing national and international laws, conventions and plans of action. To be specific, to protect children from exploitation and to ensure their fundamental rights the minimum actions needed can simply be put in four sentences:

1. Implement and enforce all the national laws, regulations and plans related to child protection, registration, and development.
2. Make national laws compatible to all the international laws, conventions and standards that have been ratified and agreed to by the countries. International pledge to protect the children must be honoured.
3. Education, training and healthcare must be extended to all groups irrespective of gender, locality, religion or ethnicity.
4. Civil societies should be empowered to monitor the progress of governments and private individuals in enforcing child protection laws.

Chapter 8

Democratic Governance for Human Security

Governance, broadly conceived as institutions, rules and political processes, plays a central role in fostering human security. In the words of the UN Secretary General, it is perhaps the single most important factor in advancing the cause of peace.

Previous chapters of this Report have focused on the core challenges to human security that emanate from internecine conflicts, adverse socio-economic conditions and environmental stress. These various facets of insecurity are fundamentally rooted in problems of governance, and could be viewed largely as manifestations of institutional failures.

In this sense, the various expressions of human insecurity—be it destructive conflicts, economic mismanagement, abysmal social indicators or environmental degradation—are merely symptoms of a deeper institutional malaise. Weak governance is the pre-eminent explanation for the lack of human security. The absence of equitable, fair and inclusive institutions deepens ethnic cleavages, exacerbates the damaging consequences of civil strife, generates harmful economic distortions, reduces the effectiveness of social service delivery, and worsens human poverty.

This chapter delineates the key links between governance and human security, documents the state of governance in South Asia—and its damaging consequences for human security.

But before proceeding further, it is important to ask: what does good governance mean? A variety of definitions are on offer, ranging from the narrow conceptualisation of governance as management of economic and social resources to the broader approaches focusing on the entire gamut of human freedoms.

From a human development perspective, democratic governance is governance that ensures: respect for essential human rights, people's participation in decision-making, accountability of rulers, fair and inclusive rules, and protection from discrimination.

For ordinary people, the meaning of governance is both clear and present. It constitutes for them a daily struggle for survival and dignity. Ordinary people are too often humiliated at the hands of public institutions. For them, lack of good governance means police brutality, corruption in accessing basic public services, ghost schools, teacher absenteeism, missing medicines, high cost of and low access to justice, criminalisation of politics, and lack of social justice. These are just a few manifestations of the crisis of governance.

These definitional differences aside, there is a growing consensus on the essential elements of good governance. There is an emerging consensus that the architecture of democratic governance should rest on rule of law delivered through an independent and accessible judiciary, inclusive and fair rules, transparent and accountable public institutions, freedom of the press, and a participatory political process, to mention a few.

Various facets of insecurity are fundamentally rooted in problems of governance, and could be viewed largely as manifestations of institutional failures

The nexus between human security and governance

Democratic governance is an important means to achieve the twin objectives of human security: 'protection' and 'empowerment'. In fact, democratic governance lies at the core of securing the life, liberty and property of common people.

There are distinct linkages between governance and human security—both *direct* and *indirect*. Democratic governance can *directly* advance human security by ensuring access to public goods, efficient

delivery of justice, and by nurturing resilience against disruptive economic and political conflicts. Democratic governance can also *indirectly* affect human security by providing an enabling environment for pro-poor growth, and perhaps more importantly, by empowering people through rights and freedoms to claim a better life. This section spells out these links in some detail.

Governance as protection

Good governance protects human security by maintaining law and order, delivering justice and building institutions of conflict management. A primary task of the state is to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens. However, governments in developing countries are often negligent of even their basic duties of administering justice and maintaining internal order.

Governments need to protect people not just from external aggression, but also from oppression of their own institutions. Ordinary people are routinely subjected to oppression by state institutions. Domestic governments have done more harm to human security than wars. During the 20th century, the number of deaths directly caused by governments was five times more than those caused by wars.[1]

Consider police aggression that directly risks the lives of ordinary people. Rather than protecting personal security, the police are often a cause for insecurity—through torture, harassment and intimidation of vulnerable people. Lack of physical security is one of the central concerns of the poor, who are clearly more vulnerable to police brutality. As global perception surveys show, the police is viewed as a major threat to public security. Democratic governance can guarantee personal security by holding security services accountable to the state and civil society.

Another channel through which good governance can promote human security is by protecting the property rights of ordinary people. For instance, insecure property rights can imperil economic security, since they translate into fewer incentives for investment, reduced output, lower returns, and limited access to credit markets. Thus, lack of secure title over land hinders the economic security.

An efficient judicial system can protect people from injustice. In fact, human security cannot be visualised without an efficient administration of justice. Democratic governance can deliver a judicial system that is low-cost, accessible, and enjoys the trust of common man.

A key protective role of institutions comes into play in times of crises. Well-functioning institutions protect people in times of crises, allow a quicker recovery, and prevent temporary shocks from having lasting consequences. Strong institutions thus provide an insurance against political and economic risk. In this view, democratic governance fosters human security by making countries more resilient to sudden shocks.

Empirical evidence suggests that countries with well-developed institutions are better able to mitigate the risk of economic instability. Evidence suggests that an increase in the democracy score of 0.5 points (roughly the difference between Malaysia and the United States) is associated with a reduction in growth volatility of 1.7 percentage points. The message is clear: strong institutions are the fundamental cause of economic stability.

The burden of economic recessions falls most heavily on societies that are institutionally weak. This is why, 'the worst economic crises in democracies have been much less severe than the worst under dictatorships.'[2]

Democracies are also better able to manage political turmoil. As UNDP (2002) notes: 'Between 1950 and 1990 democracies experienced twice as many riots and demonstrations and three times as many labour strikes. But such events—as well as changes in government—did not slow economic growth in democracies'.

Democracies are also likely to avoid the worst kinds of civil wars. Cross-

country evidence suggests that the probability of experiencing a civil war is significantly lower in stable democracies. Dictatorships had been experiencing a war every 12 years, compared with every 21 years in democracies.[3] With a free and independent media, democratic governance can also facilitate a superior management of natural disasters.

Why are democracies better at managing conflicts of various sorts—economic, social and political? There are several reasons why democracies provide for superior shock absorption. For a start, democratic governance can 'offer non-violent ways of resolving political conflict'. Strong political institutions 'impose mechanisms of participation, consultation, and bargaining, enabling the policymakers to fashion the consensus required to undertake necessary policy adjustments decisively.' In democracies, the political incentives for compromise are stronger. Thus, participatory political regimes have better capacity for collective decision-making and for translating the preferences of diverse interest groups into socially responsible choices.

Democracy also offers a mechanism of conflict resolution: it lowers the intensity of ethnic conflicts by mediating costly disputes between diverse ethnic groups. In fact, democracy effectively offsets the negative effect of ethnic diversity on growth. 'A maximally fractionalised society that lacks democratic institutions grows three percentage points less a year than an undemocratic homogenous society.' In dictatorships, ethnic diversity is particularly detrimental: a highly diverse society loses 3 per cent of GDP growth per annum.[4]

Clearly, the premium on having democratic institutions and processes is greater in ethnically fragmented societies. It was mainly through democratic institutions that a multi-ethnic country like India has been able to integrate its diverse communities in the national mainstream. And it is the lack of participatory institutions in Pakistan, which is held responsible for the country's break-up in 1971, and the soaring ethnic and provincial troubles that continue to this day.

The desire for democratic governance has assumed added significance in a globalised world marked by a rising integration of trade and finance. Even as the world becomes more globalised, there are parallel strains of fragmentation—induced by transnational conflict, recurring economic and financial crises, and the vagaries of weather.

Perhaps the only permanence in global order is change—and often, violent change. Consider economic crises alone, which have become more frequent, more lethal and more transnational. Since the early 1990s there has been an economic or financial crisis in some part of the world every year. Developing countries are particularly susceptible to such crises: volatility of real GDP per capita growth is more than three times higher than that in industrially advanced economies.

These economic crises are much more than a simple arithmetic of fluctuating national incomes. They disrupt human livelihoods, pushing the poor and vulnerable communities to the margin. Economic crises entail output collapse, job losses, loss of human capital, social dislocation and a worsening of poverty. Even temporary crises can leave a permanent impact on human livelihoods, since ordinary people rarely have access to formal credit markets or social insurance.

Finally, good governance can also promote economic security by providing an enabling environment for growth and investment. There is no automatic link between democracy and economic growth. The available evidence is ambiguous about the precise direction of this relationship. But democracy and development need not be incompatible.

Markets are increasingly seen as solution to the various economic ills that developing countries face today. But markets can be imperfect, uncertain, unpredictable and unequal. For markets to deliver pro-poor growth and human security, they must be judiciously

The desire for democratic governance has assumed added significance in a globalised world marked by a rising integration of trade and finance

Participatory governance is an important means of empowering people and promoting collective agency

combined with non-market institutions, that is, institutions of democratic governance.

Governance as empowerment

Democratic governance needs to be nurtured not just because it engenders growth and promotes economic stability, but because it is intrinsically important as a universally valued principle. It is a desirable feature in its own right, even if it comes at some cost to growth. In Mahbub ul Haq's own words: 'While the paradigm of economic growth can be indifferent to political freedom, the paradigm of human development cannot. People are not at the centre of development if they are in a political prison.'

People are not merely beneficiaries of democratic governance—they are also agents of promoting good governance. They must shape their own environment for human security, actively participating in the formulation and implementation of strategies for human security.

Participatory governance is an important means of empowering people and promoting collective agency. It enables people to claim their social and economic rights and allows them to take charge of their own security, by influencing decisions that affect their security directly or indirectly. Protecting the basic rights and freedoms of people is thus an important means of fostering human security.

The state of governance in South Asia

'South Asia presents a fascinating combination of many contradictions. It has governments that are high on governing but low on serving; it has parliaments that are elected by the poor but aid the rich; and society that asserts the rights of some but perpetuates exclusion for others. Despite a marked improvement in the lives of a few, there are many in South Asia who have been forgotten by formal institutions of governance. These are the poor, the downtrodden, and the most vulnerable of society, suffering from acute deprivations on account of their income, caste, creed, gender, or religion. Their fortunes have not moved with those of the privileged few and this in itself is a deprivation of a depressing nature'

—The 1999 Report on *Human Development in South Asia*

Weak institutions of governance lie at the core of analysing human security issues in South Asia. This section provides a quick survey of issues surrounding the institutional crisis in South Asia, focusing on the political, economic and social aspects of weak governance.

Political governance

Consensual democracy based on the principle of 'one person, one vote' is an important ingredient of advancing human security. It empowers people and allows them to take charge of their own security. Participatory democracy—in the basic procedural sense of having regular, free, and fair multiparty elections—is a universally recognised ideal. It has yet to become a universal practice in South Asia. In several South Asian states, people lack the right to elect and change governments:

- In the Maldives, political parties have been banned for a long time; it was only recently in June 2005 that the parliament has backed steps to introduce multiparty politics.
- In Nepal, frequent changes in government have hindered the proper establishment of democracy since it was introduced in 1991. The Nepalese King has twice assumed executive powers over the past few years, even though he has repeatedly affirmed his commitment to democracy and multiparty politics.
- Bhutan still functions under a monarchy.
- Pakistan witnessed a return to dictatorial rule through a bloodless coup in 1999. Even though a semblance of civilian

rule has been established through parliamentary elections in 2002, military still remains a dominant player in the political process.

With few exceptions, electoral democracy has not yet firmly taken root in South Asia. Figure 8.1 documents the extent of political volatility in the region during the period 1975-99. The figure considers the difference between democracy and autocracy indicators and traces the democratic trends over time. The data comes from one of the most credible political science database, the *POLITY IV*. As is clear from the figure, South Asia witnessed a period of political liberalisation in 1988. However, this democratic surge was short-lived. Perhaps more striking is the democratic reversal in 1999 that seems to have taken place in the region, with India (and Bhutan) as notable exception to this democratic regress. Democratisation in the region has thus faced a clear setback in late 1990s.

Globally, there is a marked shift from authoritarianism to democracy, with 68 per cent of the world's people living under some notion of formal democracy in 2001, up from the 46 per cent in 1980.[5] South Asia, however, is riding against this global tide of democratisation. What is going wrong in South Asia? Why is the democratic space shrinking so fast in the region? This sub-section will provide selected evidence on democratic deficit in South Asia.

Even though South Asia can boast of established democracies like India and Sri Lanka, a stable democratic order still remains an elusive dream in most countries. Sri Lanka, for instance, has been plagued by violence and political instability. Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, Bangladesh has successfully managed political transitions. However, the country still suffers from substantial political volatility. Only in India, which has witnessed virtually uninterrupted democracy, have institutions been resilient and alternative centres of power accommodated within the state structure.

Even where the procedural elements of democracy are in place, democracy is far from being substantive. The democratic process is often incapacitated by corruption, poverty, fickle coalitions, regionalism, military interventions and the inordinate influence of money and crime. South Asia fares poorly on many dimensions of governance. Figure 8.2 presents the

Even though South Asia can boast of established democracies like India and Sri Lanka, a stable democratic order still remains an elusive dream in most countries

Figure 8.1 The democratic trends in South Asia, 1975-1999



Source: Polity IV Project 2005.

comparative performance of individual countries on four key indicators since 1996: *Government Effectiveness*, *Voice and Accountability*, *Political Stability*, and *Rule of Law* (see description in figure 8.2). The indicators are subjective, based on the perceptions of analysts and investors and compiled by the World Bank Institute. The numbers displayed in the figure are percentile ranks, which position South Asian countries relative to the rest of the world. The findings are instructive: Pakistan and Nepal have witnessed a dramatic fall in the quality of governance on all four indicators; in the case of Bangladesh, the quality fell on three dimensions. There have been some improvements in comparative performance. Bhutan, for instance, has moved up on the percentile rank for *Rule of Law.*

Many of these problems of governance are rooted in institutional failures, and especially in the absence of checks and balances on the discretion of policy makers. Figure 8.3 ranks countries on a measure of degree of constraints on the executive, based on data available for 2001. This measure, the *Political Constraints Index*, is based on the number of independent veto points in the political system (executive, legislative, judicial and sub-federal branches of government) and the distribution of political preferences both across and within these branches. The figure presents a bleak picture, as institutional checks and balances are visibly missing in at least three countries: Pakistan, Bhutan and Maldives. India and Sri Lanka fare much better on this score; both have values on the index that compare favourably to mature democracies.

While indicative of the 'broader' performance, these indicators do not capture the complex issues underlying South Asia's crisis of governance. The litmus test of any political process is whether it is accessible and accountable to non-elites, especially the poor people. This is a recurring concern of the analysis that follows.

A simple—and admittedly imperfect—measure of electoral participation is the voter turnout. Participation in elections remains decent across South Asia, as evidenced by the voter turnouts (see table 8.1). Average voter turnout during the last fifty years had been well in excess of

Figure 8.2 South Asian performance on key governance indicators, 1996-2004

Government effectiveness measures the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery. *Voice and accountability* measures political, civil and human rights. *Political stability* measures the likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in, government, including terrorism. *Rule of law* measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.



Source: Kaufmann *et al*. 2005.

50 per cent. An exception was Pakistan, where voter turnout has stagnated at around 42 per cent. In some countries, such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, voter turnouts are close to those maintained in established democracies (77 per cent). However, even where turnouts are high, they could mask significant disparities in participation. While Sri Lanka's 2005 elections had an overall turnout of 73.74 per cent, it was characterised by an extremely low participation by Tamils in the North and the East of the country. In India, voter turnout in the state of Bihar was about 43 per cent only, lower than the national average.

Political participation is further limited by the exclusion of women and minorities from the political process in some countries.

Exclusion of women

Women rarely receive the same political opportunity as men. Even though at least four South Asian countries have had influential female heads of government, women remain politically marginalised. Women have the right to vote, but despite constituting almost half the electorate, they do not occupy a significant proportion of seats in the region's parliaments. As is clear from table 8.2, a mere 4.9 per cent of the seats in lower houses of parliament were occupied by women in Sri Lanka; the corresponding ratio is 5.9 per cent in Nepal.

Many countries have introduced quotas to increase female representation. Recent electoral reforms in Pakistan have significantly raised female representation in the national parliament—to the extent that Pakistan finds itself in a position of having the highest percentage of women parliamentarians in the region (21.3 per cent), followed by the Maldives with 12 per cent.[7] Impressive gains in female political representation are also noted elsewhere in the region. In fact, all countries except Sri Lanka have witnessed a rise since 1997 in the percentage of seats held by women in the lower house.

Female representation is slightly better at lower tiers of government, such as the local government. In India, for instance, local governments reserve a third of their seats for local women. Since the recent electoral reforms, Pakistan's local governments maintain a similar ratio of female members in local governments.

There is clearly a need for mainstreaming women in the political process. Reserving a larger quota for female parliamentarians is a commendable step, but it is not enough. Even when elected to parliaments, women are sometimes poorly prepared to defend their interests. Their participation in parliamentary committees and floor deliberations often remains limited. The lesson: merely increasing the number of women elected to parliaments does not guarantee political empowerment. Genuine political participation requires a more fundamental change in the broader socio-economic milieu adversely affecting women. These include, for instance, gender disparities in social indicators, cultural backwardness, and patriarchal influences.

Figure 8.3 The degree of executive constraints in South Asia



Source: Henisz and Zelner 2001.

Table 8.1 Voter turnout in elections in South Asia

Countries	Number of elections for national political office until 1998	Voter turnout average for elections 1945-1998[6]	Voter Turnout last election
Bangladesh	6	56.0	75.59 (2001)
India	12	60.7	57.7 (2004)
Maldives	2	76.0	N/A (2005)
Nepal	5	63.7	65.79 (1999)
Pakistan	6	41.8	41.26 (2002)
Sri Lanka	10	60.5	73.74 (2005)

Source: IDEA 2005.

Table 8.2 Female representation in South Asian parliaments, 1997-2005

Country	Seats in lower house/single house held by women 1997 (per cent)	Seats in lower house/single house held by women 2005 (per cent)	Seats in upper house/senate held by women 1997 (per cent)	Seats in upper house/senate held by women 2005 (per cent)	Quota for female political participation
Bangladesh[8]	9.1	14.8	–	–	45 seats in parliament, 33% local bodies
Bhutan	2.0	8.7	–	–	–
India	7.2	8.3	7.8	11.6	33% local bodies
Maldives	6.3	12.0	–	–	–
Nepal	3.4	5.9	8.3	8.3	5% lower house, 20% local bodies
Pakistan	–	21.3	3.4	18.0	60 seats in national assembly, 33% local bodies
Sri Lanka	5.3	4.9	–	–	Draft bill: 33% local bodies

Source: IPU 2005.

Exclusion of minorities

South Asia is characterised by significant diversity on ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. These diversities are clearly an asset, especially in creating a rich and dynamic society. But without adequate political representation, this ethnic diversity can easily translate into dangerous fractionalisation that harms human security. Institutions and policies need to represent these different identities equitably so that a sense of ownership is preserved.

India has had relative success in preserving the faith of ethnic minorities in the political process. The same is not true for some other countries in the region. The Tamil minority in Sri Lanka effectively boycotted the November 2005 presidential elections. Ethnic minorities are not always adequately represented in national parliaments—and other institutions that affect political power. Baluchis in Pakistan are underrepresented in bureaucracy, armed forces, and the government at all levels, limiting their voice in national decision-making. The government's failure to release the 1998 census figures resulted in a probable under-estimation of Balochistan's population, thereby restricting their voting powers.[9] In India, nine states have a single seat in the Lok Sabha—which include Nagaland and Mizoram, states with a history of insurgencies, and Sikkim, and Pondicherry, which are among the poorest states. Even where minorities enjoy political representation, political and administrative interference from the central governments limits their political autonomy, shrinking space for independent decision-making.

Politics of patronage and recycled elitism

Despite changes on the political landscape, there has been a surprising permanence of vested political interests—through governments that are merely shifting coalitions of powerful families deriving their political influence from either land and money, or civil and military connections.

The existence of high levels of discretionary powers over the use of state resources contributes to the personalisation of political power and replaces institutional structures with arbitrary and whimsical modes of governance. This has also led to a patron-client relationship, where ordinary citizens are beholden to politicians for accessing basic public services—

services that they have a rightful claim to as citizens of the state.

Political power remains concentrated among narrow political elites, often dynastic families who raise their sons and daughters to positions of political eminence. Distinguished political lineage is a real asset for contesting elections in South Asia. India had one of the longest one-family rules in South Asia. Elsewhere, names from prominent political families continue to reverberate despite regime changes: the Bhuttos and Sharifs in Pakistan, the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and the wife of Zia ur Rahman in Bangladesh, for instance. Family ties have also played a significant role in the recent local government elections in Pakistan. When many powerful political figures stood disqualified under a law barring individuals without a bachelors degree from contesting elections, their kith and kin were advanced as alternative covering candidates to prevent political power from passing out of the family.

The truth is that in much of South Asia, political incumbents have an unfair advantage. For the non-elites, it is difficult to beat inherited political advantage, restricting executive competition of political mobility. The poor, thus, rarely have access to higher echelons of power. Even when political ties are weak within the family, access to land, big businesses and high offices in civil and military bureaucracy confers an undue political advantage on elites. Elections are thus often a means of recycling the same old elites. Who are the real players behind such unequal power structures in South Asia?

LANDLORDS: Thanks to the skewed patterns of land distribution, the rich peasantry in South Asia uses land to further its political capital. Feudal interests are well represented in the political structures of Pakistan, Nepal and some parts of India (such as the state assembly in Andhra Pradesh). Between one-half and one-third of parliamentarians in India and Pakistan are landlords. In Pakistan, wealthy landowners wield tremendous political influence in the parliament and the cabinet: traditionally, between one-third to two-thirds of the cabinets have been made up of landlords.[10]

INDUSTRIALISTS: Across the region, private money opens the door to political power. The political arena is marred by rising corporate influences, burgeoning costs of running elections, and an increasing criminalisation and corruption of the political life. The result: politics is pursued like a business, underpinned by a cold arithmetic of profitability. Once in political office, politicians recoup their financial costs of running elections—and too often with a generous return. Clearly, running an election has become a costly affair, making political office a preserve of the rich. In Pakistan in 1997, a parliamentarian spent, on average, about US $120,000 in order to get elected.[11] In 1996, big businesses were reported to have funded 80 per cent of a major party's finances in India.[12] The *Bhartya Janta Party* (BJP) in India contracted a US-American advertising company for its 2004 'India Shining' campaign, reportedly spending an amount worth US $100 million.

The 1989 election campaign in India 'was estimated to have cost US $6 billion, and yet every elected parliamentarian declared that they had spent less than US $1,235.'[13] Corporate financing of political parties is common even in well-developed democracies, but in South Asia comprehensive legislation to regulate these finances is often lacking or weakly enforced. In India, for instance, campaign funding is subject to legal limits that prevent candidates from spending in excess of Rs.1-2.5 million, depending on the size of the constituency. However, in practice, election costs normally exceed the legally prescribed limits, thanks to a legal loophole permitting expenditures by people other than the candidate, including election agents.

Party funds are sometimes shrouded in secrecy. No large party in India opens its accounts for independent audit. The excessive commercialisation of politics has blurred the distinction between

business and politics. In several countries, business interests are now well represented in national parliaments. In Pakistan, the share of businessmen in the national assembly and the cabinet has doubled since the 1980s.[14] The rising influence of private money is not innocuous. Money comes with strings: business donations are commonly used to secure important economic interests, often to the detriment of society's common good. In such an environment, the election process is reduced to an auction of potential political power and patronage, in the form of lucrative government contracts, licenses and permits.

THE CIVIL-MILITARY BUREAUCRACY: Another constraining influence on parliamentary sovereignty comes from bureaucratic interference, both civil and military. In most South Asian countries, the origins of current bureaucratic structures can be traced back to British colonial rule. These structures were devised to rule people and to consolidate British rule. However, these institutional structures have persisted after independence without adequate decolonisation. The result: bureaucrats are neither civil nor servants. In many countries, civil servants are not merely policy executors, but have also assumed the role of policy formulation. At least in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the bureaucratic involvement in politics remains high. When civilian institutions lack legitimacy, military increasingly occupies the civilian space. Bangladesh and Pakistan had been directly ruled by the military for half of their history.[15] By 1996, ten Pakistani prime ministers had been dismissed by seven heads of state, three of whom were generals and four senior bureaucrats.[16] In Pakistan, the military's involvement in civilian affairs has increased tremendously since 1999. At the beginning of 2001, about 175 serving and retired military officers held high-level civilian posts. [17] The political systems in India and Sri Lanka, however, have maintained relative civilian supremacy.

Even in democratic times, the military has indirectly interfered in the political process. Pakistan's premier secret intelligence agency, the ISI, has been notorious for its involvement in the creation of a major political alliance, the IJI, during the 1988 elections. Even in democratic India, internal conflicts are sometimes contained by military might, rather than the power of politics. India has on several occasions involved its armed forces in containing tensions in the states of Punjab, Assam, Kashmir, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur.

The failure of institutions

The origins of weak democratic governance can be ultimately located in the failure of political institutions. This is because political power remains unchecked without strong institutions. Democracy is much more than elections. It rests on a core set of well-functioning institutions: an efficient and able bureaucracy; military that functions under civilian control; legislatures that represent the poor; judiciary that is independent, fair and works at an arm's length from the executive; media that is independent from censorship, and security force that is democratic and accountable to people. This section will take a quick glance at the selected institutional failures in the region.

Legislatures

The existence of parliaments does not automatically guarantee the protection of rights and interests of ordinary people. In fact, weak parliamentary practices remain an important obstacle to human security in the region. Democratic traditions are most fragile in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. The manifestations are myriad: blurred domains between the parliament and bureaucracy, disruptive proceedings, erosion of parliamentary supremacy through continued military interventions, proliferation of presidential ordinances, defection of members from political

parties, powerless parliamentary committees and oversized cabinets. In many countries such as Pakistan, political parties espouse democracy without embracing democratic governance within their parties. Those elected in parliaments have poor educational records. 'In Sri Lanka, where adult literacy is as high as 90 per cent, three-fifths of parliamentarians are either matriculates or below.'[18]

Perhaps more importantly, ideological politics is on the decline. Criminalisation of politics has strengthened the disconnect between parliaments and people. Criminals use political offices as an instrument for preserving their privileges at the expense of subjugating the rights of common people. In Pakistan, politicians have been accused of power theft, refusing to pay their rents and horse-trading.

In India, which has an otherwise superior democratic record, corruption and criminalisation are abiding features of the political landscape. The evidence on political corruption is telling and indicates the continuing challenge of democratic reform.

- In the state of Bihar, about 124 candidates out of a total of 541 nominated candidates in 57 constituencies of Bhojpur and Magadh had a criminal record and 23 could not run for office and got their wives elected.
- As many as thirty-nine members of India's parliament in 1997 had criminal records against them, including kidnapping, rape and murder.
- The Vohra Report of 1995 found a clear nexus among crime syndicates, the police, bureaucracy, and politicians in states like Maharashtra and Gujrat. A former minister from Uttar Pradesh was reported to have distributed some thirty-eight crore rupees to bureaucrats, journalists, political associates, and friends between 1992 and 1995.
- In 1995, 180 out of the 425 member Uttar Pradesh assembly had criminal records, and elections in Bihar were contested by as many as 243 candidates against whom cases were pending in court. In 1998, nineteen ministers in the Uttar Pradesh government had criminal records.

Judiciary

Democratic governance is difficult to envisage without an independent and watchful judiciary. In particular, an independent election commission forms the linchpin of electoral democracy. For instance, the vitality of Indian politics crucially depends on the judicial activism touching a range of issues—from the separation of powers and hearing public interest litigation for protecting the human rights of poor people to upholding constitutional law. A famous illustration of this comes from a celebrated case in 1976 when the then prime minister of India tried to eliminate the use of judicial review in order to limit parliament's powers. Thanks to the fierce independence of India's judiciary, this attempt was botched. In several other parts of South Asia, however, the executive often dominates the judiciary. In Pakistan by contrast, the Supreme Court granted powers to a President in military uniform for amending the constitution.

With perhaps a partial exception of India, judicial systems in the region remain generally weak and inefficient. In the final analysis, the litmus test for judicial effectiveness is whether it protects the poor from various injustices and defends their democratic rights. It would not be wrong to say that judicial systems in the region fail to pass this test: the quality of justice is particularly poor for poor people. This is why evidence from perception surveys indicates limited public trust in the effectiveness of judiciary in ensuring human security. Findings from a governance survey conducted for *Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre* in 1998 showed that more than half the respondents in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan disagreed with the statement that the legal system was just and protective of their rights.[19] This is also confirmed by a more recent survey conducted for this

Report (see Appendix). Besides being unresponsive to people's needs, the delivery of justice in South Asia faces the following key challenges:

First of all, separation of powers between the executive and judiciary—an important institutional requirement—is not always ensured in countries other than India. Some partial attempts at reform have recently happened. In 2001 Pakistan abolished the offices of the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as the Executive Magistrate, who enjoyed both executive and judicial powers. The Bangladeshi government is reforming its judiciary to make the magistracy fully independent. But there is still a long way before judicial and executive powers are genuinely separated.

Secondly, the judicial systems are considerably backlogged with cases, resulting in long waiting times. Justice is often delayed—and, therefore, denied. Despite burgeoning populations, judicial systems are overburdened with cases. In many cases, people spend more time in pre-trial detention than if they would be convicted for the crime. Court delays increase the cost of seeking justice, reduce faith in the judicial process, and make justice inaccessible to the poor. The figures are alarming and point to the challenge of how far removed judicial systems are from the needs of ordinary people:

- For every 1,000 persons, there are about 24 cases pending in South Asian courts. On average, each judge has 2,170 pending cases to address. In South Asia, there are roughly ten judges for every million people.[20]
- In Bangladesh, cases take, on average, between five to twenty years; in Nepal and Sri Lanka, they frequently last over a decade. In 1995, of the 66,000 cases before the Supreme Court in India, 10,000 had been in court for over a decade.[21]
- In February 2004, more than two million cases were pending in about 13,000 district subordinate courts in India. About two thirds of these were criminal cases. About 30 per cent of cases in sessions courts have been pending for more than three years.[22]

Thirdly, low pays, high costs and rampant corruption make a mockery of the system. Judges are poorly remunerated: salaries of High Court judges in India are less than three times the average per capita income. Judges are, therefore, increasingly susceptible to bribes and hidden payments. A 1995 survey in India showed that 80 per cent of Indians felt that they ought to use influence or to pay bribes for seeing a case through. According to a recent Transparency International survey, close to 100 per cent of the people interviewed reported high levels of corruption in the judicial systems of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The corresponding ratio in Bangladesh was 75 per cent.[23]

Fourthly, far from ensuring legal protection, laws can often endanger human lives. For instance, many discriminatory laws in the region are obstacles in the delivery of justice. In Pakistan, the Blasphemy Law is sometimes abused to persecute minorities. During 2004, at least 25 people were charged under the Blasphemy Law in Pakistan, and at least six of them remained in detention at the end of the year.[24] In the post 9/11 scenario, containing terrorism has become a major pre-occupation—with important repercussions for human rights. The anti-terrorism laws have been used to claim emergency powers.

- India's Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act has been amended to incorporate several controversial provisions similar to the repealed Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) that had led to widespread human rights violations in the past. Indian security forces also continue to use the 1958 Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in 'disturbed areas', such as in large parts of the North-East. Several provisions of this Act violate international human rights standards, i.e. arresting people without

a warrant and allowing security forces to shoot to kill in circumstances where their lives were not in danger.[25]

- India's section 144 of the criminal procedure code 'empowers state-level authorities to declare a state of emergency, to restrict free assembly, and to impose curfews.'
- In May 2000, Sri Lanka promulgated new emergency regulations permitting authorities to restrict press freedom and freedom of association and 'allowed authorities to hold suspects in preventive detention for up to one year without charge, with a limited right to judicial review.' Between January to August 2000, the Sri Lankan authorities detained more than 2,819 people under emergency regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
- In Nepal, the Public Security Act (PSA) allows officials to detain suspects for up to six months without filing charges. As of late 2000, authorities had arrested some 5,866 suspected Maoists or alleged followers under the PSA since the beginning of the insurgency.
- In the Maldives, the penal code bans speech or actions that could 'arouse people against the government.'[26]

Police

Far from being viewed as guardians of liberty, the police is often seen as part of the problem, rather than as part of the solution. Physical torture, beatings, illegal detentions and other ill-treatments at the hands of police personnel are a common occurrence. Police and security forces are also routinely implicated in extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, fake encounters and custodial deaths.

- In Nepal, between 418-707 'disappearances' on the hands of security forces were recorded between the end of the ceasefire in August 2003 and 30 August 2004.[27]
- A recent Transparency International survey suggests that the police department is viewed as one of the most corrupt institutions in South Asia. 100 per cent of the people interviewed in India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan reported corruption in interactions with the police; the corresponding ratio was 84 per cent for Bangladesh.
- Disappearances due to civil war related violence have been a recurring concern in Sri Lanka: 'between 1987 and 1990 alone, some 20,000 people were reported missing'.[28] As a result of sweeping security laws, security forces were held responsible for at least 761 extra-judicial killings or disappearances between April 1995 and the end of 1999.[29]

Poor people are more likely to fall victims to police injustices. It comes as no surprise then that ordinary people are fearful and reluctant to seek police's help (see box 8.1). When public security is weak, ordinary citizens—especially those who can afford it—are forced to rely on private security. Behind this poor performance lay some fundamental institutional problems, including low pay, limited training, corrupt management, and politically motivated hiring.

Media and the new modes of communication

A free and independent media acts as an independent watchdog and a whistleblower. New modes of communication, especially the internet, has opened new vistas of holding the powerful accountable. Media freedom is restricted in many parts of South Asia. As table 8.3 shows, the *World Press Freedom Index* prepared for a total of 167 countries ranks South Asia at the bottom of the list. Perhaps with the exception of India and Sri Lanka, most countries score poorly on the index.

Media is sometimes explicitly barred from criticising the ruling elite. The Nepali Media Ordinance, for instance, bars criticism of the royal family and prohibits private radio stations to broadcast any news, regardless of the content. In

Table 8.3 Ranking press freedom in South Asia, 2005

Country	Freedom of Press Rank 2005	Freedom of Press Score 2005
India	106	27.00
Sri Lanka	115	33.25
Bhutan	142	51.50
Maldives	148	58.50
Pakistan	150	60.75
Bangladesh	151	61.25
Nepal	160	86.75

Source: Reporters Without Borders 2005.

Box 8.1 How do people view the quality of institutions?

Citizens across South Asia have little faith in the efficacy of public institutions. A perception survey conducted for this report reveals interesting findings. A common perception is that public institutions fail to deliver adequate services to the people, are unapproachable, and are generally perceived to be corrupt.

Reluctance in approaching law enforcement agencies—Between one-fourth and one-fifth of the respondents are outright fearful in approaching security agencies. More than half of the respondents in India (51.1 per cent), Sri Lanka (68.2 per cent) and Bangladesh (68.4 per cent) are either reluctant or fearful to approach law enforcement agencies. Pakistan has a slightly lower figure in this regard because of the smaller number of responses. However, Pakistani respondents are also least likely to feel confident (19.4 per cent).

How do you feel when going to law enforcement agencies?

(in per cent)

	Fearful	*Reluctant*	*Confident*
Bangladesh	26.6	41.8	31.6
India	23.5	28.0	48.6
Sri Lanka	19.8	48.4	30.4
Pakistan	19.0	16.5	19.4

Poor delivery of justice—Between 13.6 per cent (Pakistan) and 47.2 per cent (Sri Lanka) are of the opinion that the delivery of justice is poor. The corresponding figures for Bangladesh and India are 21.8 per cent and 36.2 per cent, respectively.

Corruption in public institutions—One of the major reasons for the disenchantment with institutions lies in the prevalence of corruption. Those who indicated unease in dealing with law enforcement agencies cite 'corruption and involvement of politics' as the main reason. A staggering 67.7 per cent of the respondents in Pakistan regard the judiciary to be corrupt. In fact, across South Asia all the major governance actors (judiciary, political leaders, bureaucracy, and police) are considered to be at least somewhat corrupt by more than half of the respondents. Everywhere except Pakistan, more than an overwhelming 90 per cent of the respondents feel that political leaders are at least somewhat corrupt. Only the army seems to enjoy some sort of integrity. Interestingly, this last statement is less true for Pakistan, where the army is heavily involved in politics and in civilian affairs.

On a positive note, in Bangladesh and Pakistan a significant share of the population (31.4 per cent and 48.6 per cent, respectively) believe that the problem of corruption has improved in the country. In India and Sri Lanka, on the other hand, more than 80 per cent believe that the situation has at least to some extent deteriorated in the last five years.

Has the problem of corruption worsened in the last five years?

(in per cent)

	Worsened	*Somewhat worsened*	*Improved*
Bangladesh	24.6	44.0	31.4
India	45.0	41.9	13.1
Sri Lanka	46.8	33.5	19.4
Pakistan	15.9	33.4	48.6

Perceptions about corruption in institutions



The above results are based on a perception survey conducted in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The methodology and sample sizes are explained in the Appendix. As indicated there, the distribution of the samples by location, gender, income size, and educational background varied among countries and was not necessarily representative of the population at large. The results thus reflect societal trends, but cannot claim scientific accuracy.

other countries, more subtle methods are employed to restrict press freedom—such as limiting government advertisements and news quota, coercing media owners, and harassing uncooperative firms with tax notices. In India, following an expose of official corruption by the internet news portal tehelka.com, an Indian investor in the website, FirstGlobal, was 'accused of government departments of a number of tax and regulatory infractions.' The company lost considerable business as a result.[30] Even when media is apparently free, there is a good deal of self censorship.

Despite these challenges to media freedom, some countries have made visible gains in media freedom. In recent years, the media in Nepal and Pakistan has vigorously criticised government policies. In Pakistan this was made possible by a significant growth in private television networks. The need for an independent media is especially heightened when a natural crisis hits a country. In the wake of the 2005 earthquake, the Pakistani media played an effective role in exposing government's inability to reach many of the quake-hit areas. In India, a new right-to-information law came into force in 2005, enabling people to have access to information held by the government.

Economic governance and human security

Like many other developing countries, countries in South Asia have experienced a host of macroeconomic ills during the previous two decades. In particular, fiscal indiscipline—of both the central and provincial governments—has been a core problem. These fiscal imbalances have generated multiple distortions, ranging from high public debt, high and variable inflation, and exchange rate distortions. Growth in debt as percentage of GDP has been more than the GDP growth rate in the last decade. Public debt in Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal accounts for more than 60 per cent of GDP, and domestic debt has exceeded 40 per cent of GDP. Misplaced priorities in public expenditures and a weak tax effort further compound these fiscal imbalances.

Recent empirical research has established that macroeconomic mismanagement is a direct outcome of poor governance. These perverse macroeconomic outcomes are merely symptoms; the deeper causes are institutional. This is because poor macro-economic performance is often due to wrong policy choices—choices that are adopted to suit the interests of a few.

Whether growth is pro-poor and sustainable is determined in large part by the efficacy of institutions. Since the late 1980s there have been sincere efforts across South Asia to reign in fiscal deficits and remove major economic distortions. The result: some countries in the region, most notably India, have achieved a decent growth record. But where growth has accelerated, the key challenge is how to sustain it. This is where institutions come in, since strong institutions provide solid foundations for high and sustainable growth.

Institutions also determine the quality and structure of growth—in other words, the extent to which growth is pro-poor. High levels of economic growth cannot be translated into commensurate gains in poverty reduction, unless fundamental institutional reforms are undertaken. It is difficult, if not impossible, to arrest poverty when taxation structures are regressive, public service delivery is inefficient, financial systems are burdened with non-performing loans, and land reforms are absent. The economic security of ordinary people is inextricably tied to issues of governance. This section will attempt to provide a quick overview of some of the central issues in this debate.

Macroeconomic symptoms, institutional causes

Consider fiscal deficits alone. They are not purely a macroeconomic problem, but are also deeply linked to poor governance. At the heart of the fiscal problem is a fundamental disconnect between resources

and expenditures. Social justice requires that the state should tax the rich and spend on the poor. This is not necessarily true for much of South Asia.

To start with, the effort for tax collection in South Asia remains weak, with the result that the region generates fewer resources internally to cover its expenditures. This is illustrated by low tax to GDP ratios: the average tax to GDP ratio is 10.4 per cent in South Asia, which is lower than the tax to GDP ratios for developing (15 to 20 per cent), high-income (24 per cent), and European countries (35 to 40 per cent).[31]

The taxation structures are inefficient, regressive, based on arbitrary exemptions, and encourage tax evasion. Four issues are worth mentioning in this regard.

Firstly, as mentioned before, the tax effort remains weak. South Asian states are generally unable to collect taxes from those who can afford to pay. It is scandalous that only 1 per cent of the population in South Asia pays direct income taxes. No more than 1-1.5 million people pay direct income taxes in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Even in India—a country with a sizeable middle class of 200 million—only about 8 to 10 million people pay direct income taxes.[32]

Secondly, when the state is unable—and perhaps, unwilling—to collect taxes from the rich, the burden of taxation falls disproportionately more on the poor. This is because an inability to raise direct taxes is compensated by a greater reliance on indirect taxes—taxes that hurt the poor more than the rich. Indirect taxes account for 80 per cent of total tax revenues in South Asia. From 1961 to 1991, the share of direct taxes has fallen by 1 per cent in India. In Nepal, the share of indirect taxes has remained stagnant for a long period. In Pakistan, the rise in direct taxes has come from rise in turnover and withholding taxes, which are regressive in nature because these taxes shift pressure to the end users. In Pakistan tax burden on the poor has increased by 10.3 per cent and has, in fact, declined on the rich by 4.3 per cent.[33]

Thirdly, the tax net fails to reach the politically powerful. Despite being a significant contributor to national incomes, the agricultural sector is exempted from taxation in many parts of South Asia, for example in Nepal. Even when taxes are levied, they exist only in name. Sincere efforts to tax agricultural incomes are often lacking in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and some states of India. In 1990, agriculture taxes contributed no more than 4 per cent to the direct taxes in South Asia.[34] There are also significant revenue losses due to various other tax concessions. The fiscal cost of such concessions is considerable—close to over 2 per cent of GDP in Pakistan and about 3 per cent of GDP in Sri Lanka.

Fourthly, thanks to widespread corruption in the tax departments, there is a great deal of tax evasion in South Asia. Lack of documentation, existence of untaxed sectors, and weak administrative capacity exacerbate the non-transparency of the tax system. Annual tax evasion in Pakistan stands at Rs. 152 billion, which is sufficient to meet the budget deficit without imposing any additional taxes. Tax evasion is more prevalent in urban areas, where almost 50 per cent of total urban income does not get reported. The estimates of tax evasion for India stood at 18 to 20 per cent of GDP in 1980.[35] But the situation has not fundamentally improved since then. Tax evasion continues to be a major headache for Indian policy-makers.

Those who are at the margins of the economy are also able to evade taxes. The black or informal economy is an important economic reality across much of South Asia. In Pakistan, the size of black market economy is over 51 per cent of GDP.[36] The size of black market economy in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka ranges between 25 and 30 per cent of GDP. Informal sector remains outside the domain of the tax system. Low fiscal incentives and higher fiscal cost of documentation discourage disclosure of economic activities of medium and small enterprises of the informal sector.

Public expenditures: misplaced priorities and low efficiency

Weak economic governance distorts public expenditure priorities and reduces the efficiency of public spending. Public expenditures are often diverted away from priority areas—such as social sectors and public investment—to defense, debt servicing and general government consumption.

'Social Deficit', defined as 'the low public spending on the social sector (health, education, clean drinking water, and sanitation facilities etc)', is a direct consequence of skewed government priorities, corruption and inefficiencies in the system in most of the South Asian countries and results in very poor quality public sector provision of basic services.

A major reason for the neglect of the social sector is the higher importance given to debt servicing, defence expenditure, and public administration. South Asian countries spend less on education, health, clean drinking water and sanitation facilities than they do on interest payments, the military and government salaries. The skewed priorities are evident in the figures for public expenditures on health and education versus military expenditure (see chapter 2).

In Pakistan, in the last ten years, public expenditure on education has declined from 2.6 per cent to 1.8 per cent while it has increased in other South Asian countries in the same period. In India, while government expenditures on education at the national level have increased from 3.7 per cent to 4.1 per cent, there are large disparities in public spending on education among states. Education outlays as a percentage of state GDPs range from 0.9 per cent in New Delhi to 7.5 per cent in Arunachal Pradesh.[37]

Health spending has not been a priority either. Public expenditures on health in all South Asian countries have remained around 1 per cent of GDP. Per capita health expenditures in all South Asian countries (both public and private) are also low. It has been estimated that lower-income countries would need US $30-45 per capita as the minimum amount needed to finance essential health services.[38] While in 2002, per capita health expenditures in India were US $30, Pakistan US $13, Bangladesh US $11, Nepal US $12 and Sri Lanka US $32. The per capita public expenditures on health are even lower and range between US $3 in Nepal and Bangladesh to US $16 in Sri Lanka. [39]

Non-productive expenditures have been on the rise. In Sri Lanka, military expenditure increased from 2.1 per cent of GDP to 2.7 per cent between 1990-2002. Debt servicing in India increased from 2.6 per cent to 3.4 per cent of GDP during the same period, it remained stagnant in Nepal at 1.9 per cent of GDP and decreased slightly in Pakistan.

Public expenditures are not only misdirected, they are also inefficiently utilised. Corruption and mismanagement of financial resources break the link between expenditures and outcomes. Even significant increases in social sector expenditures have failed to translate into favourable human development outcomes. Consider the Social Action Program (SAP) in Pakistan—multi-billion dollar experiment focused on the social sectors. The SAP was an 'unmitigated disaster', because of poor governance and weak institutional structures.

Corruption and inefficiencies in monitoring and administration of the social sector expenditures has negatively affected the quality of health, education, sanitation and provision of clean drinking water to millions of South Asians. The worst hit are the poor. It is predominantly the lower income groups that have to rely on public provision of education and health services. The low quality public education is a problem that exacerbates the cycle of deprivation by denying the poor access to education that can ensure economic returns. The rich can access these facilities from the private sector. Lack of funds and facilities makes public hospitals ill-equipped to deal with the

increasing burden of disease. The low quality of public healthcare provision results in a low utilisation rate of public services and increases dependence on the private sector. Since people from lower income groups cannot bear the expenses of costly private health facilities, they bear a greater burden of communicable and non-communicable diseases in South Asia.

Following figures compare the utilisation of public and private health facilities in South Asia:[40]

- According to the National Health Survey 1994, more than 75 per cent of the population uses private health facilities in Pakistan. Utilisation of private health facilities is 58 per cent in rural areas and 70 per cent in urban areas.
- In India, the share of private hospitals was 68 per cent in 1996.
- In Bangladesh, the number of private hospitals has increased from 164 in 1983 to 712 in 2001, while there were only 620 public hospitals in 2001.

The low utilisation of public health facilities is due to the low quality of services provided (as perceived by the people as well the reality on ground). The Human Development Centre's Perception Survey in 2005 reveals that more than half the respondents in Pakistan, almost 41 per cent in Sri Lanka, 34 per cent in Bangladesh and 27 per cent in India feel 'less confident' about the state of public health facilities in their area.[41] Absence of health providers, non-cooperative paramedical staff, and unhygienic environment of public hospitals also discourages utilisation of public health facilities in South Asia. Almost 35 per cent of primary health providers were absent in Bangladesh and in India 40 per cent of primary health providers were missing during 2002-2003.[42] Unchecked incidents of illegal alliances between public hospital doctors and drug stores lead to a shortage of drugs and equipment; in Pakistan, the provincial department of health in Lahore reported robbery of syringes worth US $0.8 million.[43] Misgovernance of the health system perpetuates the problem of poor quality health provision, since shirking behaviour among health workers goes unpunished.

The education sector is no different. Missing teachers, poor infrastructure, misuse of school land, and lack of monitoring and evaluation of activities all contribute to poor quality education being provided by the public sector in most South Asian countries. The better quality of education and higher future returns promised by the private sector schools drive people, poor and rich, away from public schools. Furthermore, many public schools located in remote and rural areas exist only on paper. A survey of public schools in Pakistan revealed that one out of every ten schools was a ghost school (without student registration, building, and teachers) and almost 50,000 teachers were untraceable. Similarly, one-quarter teachers of public primary schools were missing in a survey of public primary schools in India.[44] Also, 16 per cent of total primary school teachers surveyed were absent in Bangladesh.[45]

The problem of lack of infrastructure in the public schools is obvious: almost 30 per cent of public schools in Sindh (Pakistan) were without building, 34 per cent without electricity, only 15 per cent had water and 33 per cent had toilet facilities. On the other hand, in addition to having the basic infrastructure facilities, nearly 90 per cent of private schools had science and computer laboratories, auditorium, hostel facilities, and libraries. In such circumstances, higher dropout rates in public schools in South Asia are a natural outcome (see table 8.4), reflecting the lack of confidence in public school education.

There are several other ways in which poor governance can impair economic security. For shortage of space, we will concentrate on the critical role of land reforms, absence of well-developed financial systems, and corruption in the public sector.

Table 8.4 Percentage of children dropping out before grade 5, 2000-2001

Countries	Drop out Rates
Bangladesh	35
Bhutan	9
India	41
Maldives	2
Nepal	22
Pakistan	50
Sri Lanka	3

Source: MHHDC 2005.

The absence of land reforms

Many poverty strategies in South Asia have bypassed the poor. Poverty reduction merely remains a paper aspiration—a verbal commitment in poverty reduction strategy papers. An important deficiency of these anti-poverty strategies is their silence on the economic and political structures of power that breed and sustain poverty. In this regard, no reform is more central than the need to institute comprehensive land reforms in the region. A wealth of evidence from developing countries suggests that land reforms increase agricultural productivity and rural wages, and reduce poverty.

Land reform, tenancy rights and issues related to access to land fall squarely under governance issues. There has been a significant debate in the economics and sociology literature on the anti-poverty and growth effects of land reforms. Due to paucity of longitudinal and panel empirical data on land ownership, the issues could not be rigourously tested for, though the literature did provide some evidence of positive growth, equity and anti-poverty impacts of land reform. Besley and Burgess (2000) have provided strong evidence to bear on the debate. Working with panel data from 16 Indian states for the period 1958-1992, they show robust anti-poverty impacts of land reform measures. They looked at four policy initiatives within the area of land and access to land reforms: a) tenancy rights and obligations, b) role of intermediaries in the landlord-tenant relationship, c) effects of imposition of ceilings on agricultural land ownership, and d) steps to encourage land consolidation. They show that a) tenancy reforms ensured more balanced rights for tenants, and b) abolition of intermediaries from the landlord-tenant relationship had significant positive anti-poverty impacts.

Besley and Burgess (2000) argue that a significant proportion (10 per cent) of the poverty reduction impact of policies over the period 1958-1992 in India is attributable to policies under the rubric of land reforms. Furthermore, they also show that land reforms also lead to increases in agricultural wages through the general equilibrium impacts of land reform. This also works in favour of the poor agricultural workers.

Though land reforms are no longer on the agenda in most South Asian countries, given the significant anti-poverty impact that they can have, and given the fairly asymmetric landholding patterns that still exist in parts of Pakistan and India, the policy should remain an active option for South Asian governments.

Banks in chains

During much of the 1980s, the banking sector has been hostage to the budgetary demands of the state, especially meeting the financing needs of loss-making enterprises. The credit policy, such as the level of interest rate and volume of credits, was guided by the financing needs of the State. Domestic budget financing ranged between 4.5 and 5.5 per cent of GDP.

Lending to priority sectors—the rural sector, small and medium scale enterprises, for instance—was another prominent feature of the banking system. In India, 40 per cent of total advances of public banks were earmarked for such priority areas. Directed lending for priority sectors led to some important distortions. For one, partly for various kinds of financial leakages, a good deal of these directed resources failed to reach the intended beneficiaries.

The upshot of such interventions was reduced availability of credit for those who need it the most desperately, especially the private sector, which is dependent on bank finance for making new investments.

Perhaps, a more striking feature of banking systems is their vulnerability to political abuse. Politically motivated lending is a common occurrence in many countries of South Asia. The more politically connected you are, the more likely you are to obtain funding from public banks. Irregularities in the financial sector are a particularly acute problem in

Box 8.2 Do lenders favour politically connected firms? Evidence from Pakistan

Examining more than 90,000 firms involved in corporate lending in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002, Mian and Khwaja (2004) show that especially political connections play a significant role for access to loans and subsequent default. Compared to non-connected firms, those who enjoy political links receive 45 per cent larger loans despite the fact that their default rate on such loans is 50 per cent higher. This costs the economy an estimated 0.3 to 1.9 per cent of the GDP annually.

Interestingly, this political bias is only evident in government banks which are under considerable political influence as the top tier (chairman, president, and board members) is appointed by the government under the Banks Act of 1974. Internal rewards, punishments, and direct intervention by this top tier determine often the loan policy as well as how defaulters are eventually dealt with.

On the receiving end, about a third of firms have multiple politicians on their board, and for 11 per cent of the firms politicians even come from multiple parties. Electoral success by either the individual or their party led to increasingly preferential treatment in access to loans, resulting in a rent-seeking environment where politically connected firms have greater access to loans and default more literally 'because they *can* default.'

Some interesting facts are:

- Government bank loans to politically connected firms have an average default rate of 30.8 per cent.
- 24.8 per cent of government bank lending to politically connected firms is incremental loss due to corruption
- Total revenue lost from loan default (including non-political) is Rs. 34.3 billion annually, out of which Rs. 17.9 billion are lost through political corruption.

This link is in line with the general perception of involvement in politics being associated with financial gain, which has been corroborated by a 2004 survey of Pakistani parliamentarians. Interestingly, a lower degree of preferential treatment is evident for politicians from high voter-turnout constituencies, which indicates that electoral participation and accountability act as safeguards against corruption.

Source: Mian and Khwaja 2004.

Pakistan (see box 8.2). Evidence from the 1990s is instructive. About 90 per cent of the non-performing loans in Pakistan were captured by the top 100 defaulters. In Bangladesh, the top 20 defaulters owned 22 per cent of total defaulted loans.

Such widespread political abuse has damaging consequences for human security. For instance, money that could have financed profitable projects and generated more jobs was parked in foreign banks or dumped in unviable projects—projects that were conceived to fail.

Politically motivated lending leads to higher default rates and reduced banking sector profitability. The result: banks are in financial loss and develop a dangerous portfolio of non-performing loans (NPL). In 2002, the ratio of non-performing loans from total bank advances was 10 per cent in India. The corresponding ratio was about 25 per cent in Pakistan and close to 30 per cent in Bangladesh.[46] This compares unfavourably with many successful East Asian countries, where the similar NPL ratio is generally below 10 per cent.

Financial sector inefficiencies are even more alarming in government-owned banks, since they are more vulnerable to state intervention and political influence. The share of non-performing loans is especially high in state-controlled banks. In Nepal, NPLs in the two government-controlled banks had a share of 52 and 56 per cent in 2004. In Bangladesh, while the overall share of NPLs decreased from 41.1 per cent in 1999 to 20.9 per cent in 2004, nationalised commercial banks still carry a burden of 29.7 per cent of the NPLs. Similarly for Sri Lanka, the largest state-owned commercial bank had an NPL share of 17 per cent, although it aims to bring this share down to 9.7 per cent in 2008.[47]

A higher share of NPLs in total bank advances can lead to tighter regulations, which can restrict access of funds to smaller and unconnected firms. The NPLs can also weaken confidence in the local financial market.

The cost of corruption

Corruption is one of the most destructive consequences of weak governance structures. It deteriorates public service delivery, slows economic growth, increases poverty and deters investment. In short, it makes human lives more insecure.

Corruption takes a number of forms—bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, vote-buying, 'speed money' and embezzlement are all examples that are rampant in South Asia. Widespread discretionary powers in the hands of individuals and lack of transparency and accountability have allowed corruption to become institutionalised in South Asia (see box 8.3).

A recent survey carried out by Transparency International in five countries provides people's perception on the prevalence of corruption in public sector institutions. Ordinary people are forced to pay for services that the state has a duty to provide free of charge to its citizens and for which it is often the sole provider. Free education and healthcare are therefore a myth for large sections of the region's population. The perceptions for education and health sector corruption are especially revealing in the case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka. More than 90 per cent of the respondents in Pakistan reported paying bribes in interactions with the health and education providers. Such abuse hits those who are socially and economically disadvantaged the hardest (table 8.5).

Corruption in land administration is also rife. The percentage of respondents reporting corruption is especially high in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh: 98 per cent, 100 per cent and 73 per cent, respectively. The situation is perhaps worse in police and judiciary.

At a broader level, corruption also has a decidedly negative impact on economic growth. Corruption acts as an additional tax on investment. It escalates the costs of doing business and lowers the returns. The evidence is instructive:

Box 8.3 Selected evidence on public sector corruption

Recent surveys show that throughout South Asia, people are paying for goods and services which state institutions should provide free of charge. A recent Transparency International survey in Bangladesh led to some startling findings:

- 40 per cent of primary school students paid admission fee even though primary education is free;
- 26.4 per cent of outdoor and 20 per cent of indoor patients had to bribe doctors;
- 97 per cent of those who bought land paid a bribe in order to get their land registered;
- People who took a loan from a public bank had to wait on average for 108 days compared to 30 days with a private bank. 61 per cent had to pay a bribe in order to secure a loan from a public bank.

Moreover, Transparency International's examination of 1754 incidents of corruption, reported between January and December 2004, concluded that 71.9 per cent of those involved in corrupt activities were government officials. Despite mounting evidence on corruption, responsible officials were rarely held accountable. During the period reviewed, no administrative steps were taken against corruption in 56.3 per cent of the reports.

Corruption perceptions of public institutions vary by region, depending on the importance that local people attach to a particular sector. For instance, in predominantly agricultural areas, corruption was particularly prevalent in land administration. Where food supply was a major issue, there was a higher incidence of corruption in the ration sector. A recent Transparency International's survey from India provides interesting findings:

- About 8 per cent of the population was affected by corruption in the health sector, 5.3 per cent in the education sector, 5.9 per cent in the power sector, 4.8 per cent in the ration sector, and 2 per cent by police corruption.
- South India had a high incidence of corruption in the education sector, with 39 per cent of the respondents gaining admission through irregular processes, compared with 6 per cent in Eastern India.
- Corruption frequently involved a cash transfer, such as in 57 per cent of cases in the education sector and in 25 per cent of cases in the health sector.

Sources: Transparency International 2002a and 2005a.

Table 8.5 Perceptions of public sector corruption in South Asia, 2002

Countries	Education	Health	Power	Land admin.	Tax	Police	Judiciary
Bangladesh	40	58	32	73	19	84	75
India	34	15	30	47	15	100	100
Nepal	25	18	12	17	25	48	42
Pakistan	92	96	96	100	99	100	96
Sri Lanka	61	92	N/A	98	N/A	100	100

Note: Percentage of respondents reporting corruption in interactions with above sectors.
Source: Transparency International 2002b.

- In Pakistan, lower corruption levels could lead to a 28 per cent decrease in the implicit corruption tax.
- In India, current corruption levels mean that the implicit corruption tax on investment is almost 20 percentage points.[48]
- In Bangladesh, getting a trade license and a factory license for setting up a garment business would involve corruption costs that amount to 340 per cent of the estimated initial official costs (US $7,760 and US $2,291 respectively).[49]
- If corruption levels in India were reduced to those in Scandinavian countries, investment rates could increase annually by some 12 per cent and the GDP growth rate by almost 1.5 per cent each year.[50]
- And if Pakistan were to reduce corruption to Singapore's level, its annual per capita growth rate over the period 1960-85 could have been nearly two percentage points higher—implying per capita incomes almost 50 per cent higher than existing levels.[51]

In short, poor governance is a significant deterrent to private investment activity (see box 8.4). By hurting the private sector's potential for job creation, corruption can endanger the economic security of ordinary people.

Box 8.4 Governance and the investment climate

A favourable investment climate is essential for creating jobs for the poor. Governance issues play an important role in shaping the investment climate—thus directly affecting the economic security of people.

Factors that shape the investment climate are tied to issues of poor governance. *Corruption* harms investment by acting as an additional tax—by diverting public funds and by creating red tape. When it reaches the scale of grand corruption at the highest government level, it can distort policy-making and harm government credibility. *Patron-clientelism* skews policies and regulations in a way that benefits the clients (such as private firms) at the cost of unconnected firms. A *lack of policy credibility* prevents firms from making long-term commitments with predictable outcomes. Investors need to know whether policies are likely to change frequently or in what way regulations will be interpreted and implemented. This helps them to determine and minimise the risk involved.

The World Bank has recently made available a wealth of data on firm perceptions on investment climate. Private firms flagged lack of confidence in judiciary, corruption, policy uncertainty, access to finance and infrastructure bottlenecks as important constraints to the creation of a favourable investment climate (see figure below).

Firm perceptions on major constraints to investment



Source: World Bank 2005c.

- *Lack of confidence in courts*—to uphold property rights is a particularly important concern for investors. The confidence in judiciary is especially low in Bangladesh (83 per cent) and Pakistan (62.2 per cent), where it is perceived as the single most discouraging factor. Law and order concerns are also important. The prevalence of crime is seen as a deterrent by 39.4 per cent of investors in Bangladesh.
- *Corruption*—is perceived as an especially important investment constraint in Bangladesh, where about 97.8 per cent of the respondents reported paying bribes. This was followed by Pakistan and India, where 59 per cent and 37.4 per cent of the firm respondents reported paying bribes (not shown in graph). No wonder corruption is perceived as an important investment constraint in Bangladesh (57.9 per cent), Pakistan (40.4 per cent) and India (37.4 per cent)
- *Unpredictability in the interpretation of regulations*—is a major issue in India and Pakistan, where 64.1 per cent and 64.8 per cent of the respondents respectively cite it as a concern (not shown in figure).
- *Policy uncertainty*—Uncertainty in government policies can also adversely affect investment. More than 40 per cent of the respondents in both Bangladesh and Pakistan cite policy uncertainty as a major investment constraint.
- *Access to finance*—is perceived as a major investment constraint in Bangladesh (45.7 per cent) and Pakistan (40.1 per cent). The percentage of small firms that have access to a loan is roughly similar across Bangladesh (48.8 per cent), Bhutan (50 per cent), and India (51.1 per cent), but worryingly low in Pakistan (11.2 per cent) (not shown in figure).
- *Ineffective supply of electricity*—is a severe constraint to investment. Power outages are common across the region. This raises dependence on private provision of electricity, which is clearly more costly for firms. The result: frequent power cuts eventually lead to higher costs, reduced sales and lower profits. Again, the problem is more serious in Bangladesh and Pakistan. A staggering 73.2 per cent of firm respondents in Bangladesh have described electricity problems as a major deterrent to investment. In India, output losses due to power outages amounted to 11.6 per cent, with corresponding figures for Pakistan and Bangladesh as 6.7 per cent and 5.2 per cent, respectively.

By and large, investment climate concerns are particularly severe in Bangladesh and Pakistan. By contrast, India is perceived to have a relatively better investment climate. However, there is a considerable room for improvement, especially when India's investment climate is compared to its East Asian counterparts.

Appendix

A Survey of People's Perception of Human Security in South Asia: A Summary

In August 2005, a survey on people's perception of human security was carried out in four countries of South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The main objective of the Survey was to assess the perceptions of people on human security/insecurity in South Asian countries, by asking questions on economic, political, social and governance issues. The Survey looked at the broader issues of human insecurity, and more specifically with reference to different demographic and other dimensions (age, gender, education, income, religion, occupation, marital status, location).

A multi-stage sampling procedure was used for random selection of respondents within the target geographic locations. In this sampling process, the sample was drawn randomly from the population in different stages using a combination of simple, stratified, systematic and cluster random sampling. Cities, localities and clusters were randomly selected. Within these clusters, systematic stratification was used to reach the targeted number of respondents in each category. The Survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews. The sample was restricted to respondents aged 15 years and over. The majority of respondents were in the age group of 30-45 years. The survey was conducted mainly in urban and peri-urban areas, with under-representation of the rural population. This caveat should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

The sample consists of 3770 respondents in total: India (1001), Pakistan (1765), Bangladesh (500), and Sri Lanka (504). The minimum size of the sample from any country was fixed at 500 respondents, while the number was raised for India and Pakistan given their larger populations.[1] The data is not representative of the larger populations in the statistical sense. But it gives us good foundational knowledge about perceptions of human security, especially from categories that are specifically targeted.

The Annex table 1 summarises the profile of respondents with respect to their location, sex, age group, income and education levels.

The respondents were asked a total of 26 questions which were categorised in two parts. This appendix includes mainly the answers for Part I, which was titled 'Defining Security'.[2] The questions from Part II are briefly highlighted here or incorporated in the respective chapters of this Report.

The main findings of the survey are provided for each country below:

India

A sample of 1001 respondents was collected from India covering four major cities (Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, and Chennai) and their surrounding rural areas.

- Respondents in India defined security as 'ability to live free' (37 per cent), 'better law and order situation' (20.6 per cent), 'life and self security' (17.7 per cent) and around 5 per cent of the

1 The ease of data collection in the case of Pakistan allowed us to raise the number of respondents from Pakistan. This does not bias the results as we do country specific analyses too.

2 Part I included three questions: I) What does security mean to you; ii) List and rank 5 potential threats to your security and; iii) List top three factors that enhanced your sense of security in the past five years.

respondents defined security as 'strong defense system' and 'financial and job security' (Annex table 2).

- Majority of Indians perceived and ranked war as the first threat to their security (94.2 per cent). Other threats that are perceived as first threats include governance related threats such as police brutality (2 per cent), lack of political representation (1.4 per cent) as well as social threats of civil unrest (0.9 per cent) and ethnic violence (0.9 per cent) (Annex table 3).
- Improved housing and infrastructure facilities, better economic conditions, and health security were the major factors for enhanced security of Indians during the last five years. (Annex table 4)

Further analysis of data reveals that:

- Respondents felt fearful in interacting with the law enforcement agencies due to corruption (nearly 30 per cent), improper treatment (25 per cent), and almost 30 per cent of respondents felt reluctant going to law enforcement agencies due to fear of injustice. The respondents from lower education and income levels felt more reluctant to go to law enforcement agencies, compared with the respondents with higher levels of education and income.
- More than 80 per cent perceived that the problem of corruption had worsened/ somewhat worsened in the last five years. Only 13 per cent of respondents felt that the problem of corruption had improved over this period.
- Job insecurity is higher among the less educated, low-income earners, unskilled and self-employed respondents. More than half the respondents without education had fears regarding not being able to sustain a subsistence level standard of living. Over 60 per cent of respondents earning income of less than or equal to US $30 per month, and nearly half the respondents earning between US $31-US $60 had this fear.
- Almost 27 per cent of the respondents felt insecure in terms of health in their locality. Health insecurity was higher for respondents without education and with low incomes, and those living in rural areas.

Pakistan

Pakistan's survey was conducted in 14 major cities (Faisalabad, Gujrat, Hyderabad, Karachi, Lahore, Mardan, Multan, Nowshera, Peshawar, Quetta, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, Sahiwal, Sargodha, and Sukhur),

- In Pakistan, around two-thirds of the respondents defined security as 'life and self-security', followed by 'better law and order situation' (4.1 per cent).
- Robbery/burglary/dacoity was ranked as the main threat to the security of Pakistanis. (This was also true for the respondents in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. See Annex table 3). This was followed by the threats of civil unrest, terrorist attacks and lack of health facilities/insurance—each of these representing 3 per cent of the replies. Domestic violence was ranked as the fifth threat.

Further analysis of data in depth reveals that:

- Around three-quarters of the respondents felt totally or partially insecure in their jobs. Low-income groups and urban respondents had greater fear of job insecurity compared to their richer counterparts.
- Almost one-third of the respondents felt fearful when interacting with law enforcement agencies mainly due to fear of improper treatment (30 per cent), and injustice (17 per cent).
- Almost half the respondents felt that the problem of corruption has worsened/ somewhat worsened in the last five years.

- Over half the respondents felt dissatisfied with the health facilities in their areas, particularly in rural areas.

Bangladesh

Six major cities (Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Barisal, Khulna, Sylhet) were surveyed in Bangladesh and 500 people were interviewed.

- More than half the respondents defined security as 'life and self-security', 15 per cent interpreted security as 'the ability to live freely', 8.6 per cent as 'to live together peacefully', and only 6.2 per cent 'as having financial and job security'.
- Terrorist attack was ranked as the first threat to security by 17 per cent of the respondents, followed by robbery/burglary/dacoity (13 per cent), and police brutality (11.8 per cent). War was included among the top five threats that were ranked first in Bangladesh. Lack of justice was also ranked by 7.8 per cent of the respondents as the first threat to their security.
- More than 45 per cent rated improvements in police force and army as the first factor that enhanced their security, and more than 10 per cent graded decline in terrorist activities as the first factor.

Further analysis of data reveals that:

- One-fifth of the respondents felt job insecurity, which is a very large proportion compared to other countries. The fear of job insecurity was concentrated among the less educated, low income and unskilled workers. Job insecurity among urban respondents of Bangladesh was slightly higher than rural respondents.
- One-third of the respondents felt dissatisfaction with health facilities. Health insecurity was more pronounced for the low-income earners, and for the rural population.

Sri Lanka

A sample of 504 was drawn from 15 major cities of Sri Lanka (Kolonnawa, Colombo, Dehiwela, Panadura, Homagama, Kaduwela, Kandana, Negombo, Moratuwa, Ragama, Kandy, Kelaniya, Panchikawatte, Galle, and Katubedda).

- One-third of the respondents linked security to life security, and another one-third to the ability to live freely. Almost 10 per cent defined security as 'financial and job security'.
- War was ranked as the main threat, as more than one-quarter of the respondents ranked war as the first threat to their security. Robbery was the second major threat that was ranked first by 15.7 per cent of the respondents. Unemployment and inflation were also perceived as main threats by around one-tenth of the respondents.
- More than one-third of the respondents mentioned better government measures as the first factor enhancing their security over the last five years. One-fifth of the respondents referred to more freedom and 18 per cent placed better economic conditions as top security enhancement factor over the last five years.

Further analysis of data in depth reveals that:

- Over 80 per cent of the respondents felt that the problem of corruption has worsened/somewhat worsened in the last five years. More than one-third of the respondents felt fearful/reluctant when going to law enforcement agencies. One quarter feared injustice from law enforcement agencies and one-fifth had concerns about corruption. The reluctance and fear in going to law enforcement agencies was higher for low income and low educated groups.
- More than 20 per cent of the female respondents, and only 12 per cent of the male respondents, felt job insecurity. Job insecurity was felt more by

unskilled, self-employed and less educated respondents than the other groups.

- Over 40 per cent of the respondents were dissatisfied with the availability and quality of health facilities in their locality. Contrary to India and Bangladesh, health insecurity among urban respondents was higher in Sri Lanka.

Annex table 1 Sample profile by country

(%)

		India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka	South Asia
Rural/urban	Rural	20	10	20	20	16
	Urban	80	90	80	80	85
Sex	Male	49	61	50	55	56
	Female	51	39	50	45	45
Age of the respondent	15-17 Years	4	1	0	4	2
	18-29 Years	28	39	39	23	34
	30-45 Years	48	43	45	37	44
	More than 45 Years	20	17	16	37	20
Income level*	US$30 a month	8	2	5	7	5
	US$31-$60 a month	24	13	28	25	19
	US$61-$100 a month	27	25	24	34	27
	US$101-$149 a month	23	0	23	14	11
	US$150 or more	17	51	20	20	34
Education level*	No Education	2	7	16	1	6
	Primary completed (5 years)	11	10	22	9	11
	Secondary completed (10 Years)	47	46	34	83	50
	Higher Secondary	36	14	16	4	19
	Graduate	5	5	8	2	5
	Postgraduate	0	14	4	1	7

Note: *People who did not reply not included.

Annex table 2 Defining security

(%)

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka	South Asia
Life security and self security	17.7	64.9	53.8	33.9	46.8
Ability to live free	37.0	…	15.4	33.9	16.4
Law and order situation	20.6	4.1	2.0	3.6	8.3
To live together peacefully	…	…	8.6	1.2	1.3
Financial and job security	4.4	…	6.2	9.9	3.3
Strong defense system	5.2	…	0.4	1.8	1.7
Good health/Protection from diseases	2.7	…	5.0	1.0	1.5
Other	12.5	0.8	8.4	14.6	6.5
No response	0.0	5.3	0.2	0.0	2.6
Don't know	0.0	24.8	0.0	0.0	11.6

Annex table 3 Top five threats to security

(%)

	India	Pakistan*	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka
1	War (94.2%)	Robbery/burglary/dacoity (8.2%)	Terrorist attack (17%)	War (25.6%)
2	Police brutality (2%)	Civil unrest (2.9%)	Robbery/burglary/dacoity (13%)	Robbery/burglary/dacoity (15.7%)
3	Lack of political representation (1.4%)	Terrorist attack (2.9%)	Police brutality (11.8%)	Unemployment (9.7%)
4	Civil unrest (0.9%)	Lack of health facilities/insurance (2.9%)	War (9.6%)	Inflation (7.9%)
5	Ethnic violence (0.9%)	Domestic violence (2.6%)	Lack of justice (7.8%)	Flood (3.6%)

Note: *47 per cent of the respondents gave the answer as 'Don't know' and 26 per cent did not reply to the question.

Annex table 4 Top three factors that enhanced security in the last five years

(%)

	India	Pakistan*	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka
1	Improved housing and infrastructure facilities (27.9 %)	Family support (4.1%)	Improvement in police force, army, intelligence and rangers (45.6 %)	Government measures for security (33.9%)
2	Better economic condition (14.4 %)	Better economic condition (1.4 %)	Decline in terrorist activities (10.6 %)	Freedom (travel/war) (21.4 %)
3	Health security (9.9 %)	Decline in terrorist activities (1.1%)	Better law and order situation (8.8 %)	Better economic condition (17.9%)

Note: *58.6 per cent replied as 'Don't know' and 18.8 per cent did not reply to the question.

Notes

Chapter 1

1 Haq 1993.
2 Commission on Human Security 2003.
3 Haq 1995.
4 UNDP 1994.
5 UN 2004a.
6 ICISS 2001.
7 Commission on Human Security 2003.
8 Ibid.
9 UN 1993b.
10 For a discussion of these issues with respect to India and the Indian Constitution, see Dreze and Sen 1996, especially pp. 335-380. In India's case some of the issues have even been referred to courts for working out the obligations implied in the Constitution.
11 This is a generalisation and should be treated as such, allowing for significant variation in actual structures. We are only suggesting that the foundation is still the same, though facades might be very different.
12 Though from different points of view and for different arguments, Akbar Zaidi, Ayesha Jalal, and Shahid Javed Burki have all pointed this out.
13 See UNDP 2004a for some details.
14 Bengal and Kerala are examples. It might not be a coincidence that areas that were able to institute meaningful and effective land reforms usually also had quite developed, organised and influential left-leaning and/or communist/Marxist political forces.
15 See Jalal 1995.
16 Lack of skills means there are few asset specific investments that the individual worker or the firm need to make. Hence the firms need not spend much on retaining a person. This has been one of the criticisms of low-skill service sector jobs as well.
17 Sen 1998.
18 In this sense even wheat is a non-perishable item as it can be stored fairly successfully for over a year at least.
19 Commission on Human Security 2003.
20 As Dr Haq pointed out 'It is easier, more humane, and less costly to deal with the new issues of human security upstream rather than downstream. Did it make sense in the past decade to incur the staggering cost of US $240 billion for HIV/AIDS treatment when investing even a small fraction of that amount in primary healthcare and family planning education might have prevented such a fast spread of this deadly disease?' Haq 1995.
21 WHO and UNICEF 2005.
22 WHO 2005b.
23 MHHDC 2005.
24 MHHDC 2005.
25 Given the variability and level of oil prices, both Pakistan and India have been mulling alternatives. India has been investing heavily in buying oil reserves across the world, and Pakistan has started thinking of a) exploiting the coal deposits in Thar area, b) increasing the number of nuclear plants, and c) experimenting with wind generation. Oil/gas pipelines from Central Asia, Iran and the Middle East also remain options. All of these will have specific environmental consequences that need to be factored into the cost of the options now. And the costs on neighbours and the neighbourhood also need to be factored in.
26 Many countries including Bangladesh (16), India (16), Pakistan (16), and Bhutan (16) in South Asia allow recruitment of under-18s in the armed forces. But this is 'wrong' as a) legal voting age minimum is 18 in most places, and b) definition of child by (1989) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is up to 18 years (under ILO Convention No. 138 on Minimum Age for Economic and Food Security).
27 Kothari and Mian 2001 have presented all of these arguments in great detail.
28 Amartya Sen also made this point. He narrated the story of a Muslim daily-wage worker who had to look for work even when Hindu-Muslim riots were taking place, as he had no food or money at home to feed his children with. Sen 1999.
29 Domestic violence issues are addressed in the section on women, children and minority/marginalised groups.
30 Some portions of this section have been drawn from MHHDC 1999.
31 Bangladesh is ranked 158th on the 2005 CPI, out of 158 rankings. The ranks of other countries are: India is at 88, Nepal at 117, Pakistan at 144, and Sri Lanka at 78. For details see Transparency International 2005b.
32 See Khasnobis and Bari 2003.

Chapter 2

1 Stewart *et al*. 2001, Table 4.4, p. 72; Stewart 2003.
2 The definition of internal conflict used for the purposes of estimating the human costs of conflict includes all violent confrontations between two parties/groups within a nation state with more than one thousand casualties (includes direct and indirect deaths). Stewart *et al*. 2001, Table 4.3, p. 71.
3 Stewart *et al*. 2001, Table 4.3, p. 71.
4 Stewart *et al*. 2001, Table 4.5, p. 74.
5 These people are classified as 'Persons of Concern to the UNHCR' and fall under the various categories of refugees, asylum-seekers, returned refugees, internally displaced and state-less persons. UNHCR 2005a.
6 Stewart and FitzGerald 2001a, p. 70.
7 Stewart and Hayat 2002; Ahmed 2005 and IISS 2005.
8 Stewart and Hayat 2002.
9 The continued tension between the two countries is attributable to India's allegations of Pakistan's involvement in cross-border infiltrations and the latter's continued denial.
10 Stewart and Hayat 2002.
11 Rivers passing through the two countries, the main source of water for both, originate in the disputed territory of Kashmir and control of these resources is a source of tension between India and Pakistan. India, being an upper riparian state, is in a position of advantage, which is a cause for security concern for Pakistan.
12 Pakistan alleges that on completion the project would deprive Pakistan of 7000 cusecs of water per day and complete disruption for 26 days in the critical December-February period every year. Ahmed 2005.
13 Ahmed 2005.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 MHHDC 1997.
17 BICC 2003.
18 MHHDC 1997.
19 UNDP 2005.
20 Ibid.
21 SIPRI 2005c, Appendix 8A, Table 8A.1 and Table 8A.3.
22 Spending figures are in US$, at constant 2003 prices and exchange rates.
23 A study by Collier and Hoeffler 2002 has concluded that the level of military spending as a share of the GDP is strongly influenced by the spending of regional neighbours. The authors also conclude that domestic factors greatly influence the level of military expenditure as a share of GDP. A dictatorial regime will spend about 2 percent more on defence than a fully democratic government. One of the most powerful conclusions to come out of the study is that all countries would be better off if they jointly lowered military expenditures. Regional agreements on arms reduction can be instrumental in bringing this about. This suggestion comes with a caveat of transparency in military spending and trust among participants. Such agreements also have direct positive implications for the levels of arms availability in the region. As countries and societies become increasingly weaponised, the impact of increased military spending is felt on a much larger scale. The multipliers of changes in military spending are estimated at 1.57 for the initiating country and 0.95 for the regional neighbours. BICC 2003.
24 Production of arms in these countries has remained constant. BICC 2001, p. 43.
25 The Indian government has purchased tanks, fighter jets and aircraft carriers from Russia. BICC 1999, p. 43.
26 The index values should be interpreted as the percentage change in the level of military expenditures, armaments, armed forces and employment in arms production between the average around the cold war and the BIC3D index end year. Disarmament has a positive value while an increase in armaments is represented as a negative value. The index measures the size of military sectors in comparison to their average size during the years 1985 to 1993.
27 India's aggregate imports of large conventional weapons were worth US $8,526 billion for the years 2000-2004. While for Pakistan its aggregate imports were worth US $2,018 billion for the same period. SIPRI 2005a.
28 UNDP 2005.
29 MHHDC 1997.
30 Sarvananthan 2005.
31 Once this change was accounted for, the defence budget had actually risen by 10 percent.
32 Mian and Kothari 2001.
33 Small arms refer to hand-held weapons like assault rifles, carbines, pistols, and submachine guns.
34 Light weapons refer to easily portable crew-served weapons like heavy machine guns, bazookas, and light mortars.
35 Wezeman 2003.
36 Small Arms Survey 2005.
37 Klare 2005.
38 SIPRI 2005a.
39 Wezeman 2003.
40 Wezeman 2003.
41 Small Arms Survey 2005.
42 AI 2005b.
43 Two countries that have moved up are Rwanda and Eriteria but still remain in the lowest 15 on the HDI index.
44 Stewart and FitzGerald 2001b.

45 The protracted civil war in Sierra Leone is blamed on the vested interests that benefit from the diamond trade in the region. To counter the theory of greed is that of grievance. Political agendas and the use of violence to affect political change have been acknowledged as a cause of outbreak of civil unrest.
46 UNDP 2004a.
47 Stewart and FitzGerald 2001b, p. 6.
48 Human rights in international law are understood to be universal; that is persons are entitled to human rights simply by virtue of being human and not because of their particular citizenship, ethnicity, religion, gender or other specific attributes. Smith 1976.
49 So the proxies to use would be political participation, economic (assets, incomes and employment) and social access and situation (access to education, health services, safe water, housing etc. and vulnerability to poverty).
50 UNDP 2005.
51 Gurr 1993 has produced an index of political, economic and cultural disparities for 233 groups in 93 countries. These groups have either suffered systematically discriminatory treatment or were the focus of political mobilisation in defense or promotion of their interests. He finds that where there are large group grievances (i.e. major political, or economic differences and/or discrimination) together with strong identities, protest (violent and otherwise) is more likely. Violent protests tend to occur where expression of peaceful protest is suppressed. Strong identities are identified as those sharing a common language. Gurr's data gives strong evidence to support the view that horizontal inequalities are liable to lead to violence. Horizontal inequalities are the predisposing factor – other factors such as political suppression or accommodation are also clearly important. Gurr 1993.
52 The Tamils live in northern Sri Lanka and southern India and India has lent support in various capacities to the Sri Lankan government. Punjabis live on both sides of the Pakistan India border, Bengalis live on both sides of the India-Bangladesh border. Baqai 2000.
53 Between Muhajirs and others in the province of Sindh, in Balochistan and this polarisation has shattered the traditional fraternity between the Pushtoons and Balochs.
54 The roots for which can be found in Sri Lanka's colonial past; the British favoured the Tamils economically but this advantage was sharply reversed once the Sinhalese gained political power.
55 Sri Lanka inherited the 'unitary constitutional system based on the Westminster model from the British. The system is such that the largest ethnic majority is able to receive the most number of seats in the parliament and then take unilateral decisions that affect the smaller ethnic communities. Perera 2003, p. 403.
56 Although the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act was legislated almost immediately to counter the effects of the official language act, it did not become effective till 1966.
57 The trade and economic policies pursued by the government in the 1950s and 1960s and excessive state intervention (state controlled industry, agriculture, trade and banking) brought the economy to a standstill in the 1970s. Furthermore the state was characterised by corruption, inefficiencies, rent seeking and political patronage all of which contributed to economic slowdown and created a fertile ground for the emergence of political conflict. Abeyrantne 2004.
58 UNDP 2004b, p. 36.
59 UNDP 2004b.
60 MHHDC 1998.
61 MHHDC 1999.
62 Stewart and Hayat 2002.
63 UNDP 2002.
64 The Economist 2005.
65 The Baluch province comprises about 40 percent of the total area of Pakistan. According to the 1998 census, of the total population of 6.5 million, the Baluchi speaking persons account for 54.7 percent, Pushto speaking Pathans make up about 29.64 percent and the Sindhis about 5.58 percent of the total population. A comparison with the 1981 census reveals that the proportion of the Baluch population in Baluchistan has fallen by 2.3 percent (it was 57 percent in 1981) while the proportion of other ethnicities, the Pushto speaking Pathans in particular have increased. Bari 2004.
66 The region did not have a university as late as the 1970s. GOP 2004b.
67 The manufacturing sector accounts for 13.73 percent of total employment in the country, whereas in Baluchistan it only accounts for 4.32 percent of total employment. Bari 2004.
68 The number of successful development projects in Baluchistan is limited to the Pat Feeder Canal, the RCD highway and a number of industrial units at Hub Chowki. Also Gwadar and some other tribal areas, implementation of certain important canal projects like the Mirani dam. Phandis 1990.
69 The National Finance Commission (NFC) Award determines the share of the revenue pool that goes to each province from the federation. Under the NFC Award 1990, 80 percent of the revenue pool is divided amongst the provinces on the basis of population of each province according to the 1981 census. This amounts to the following shares: Punjab gets 57.88 percent, Sindh 23.28 percent, NWFP 13.54 percent and Balochistan 5.3

percent. The rationale behind using population as a criterion is that all citizens of Pakistan should be treated equally. But a critical drawback is that the population density is not the same across provinces and also the provinces are not starting from similar initial positions of service provision. Ignoring these technicalities makes the criterion discriminatory, and Baluchistan as a province suffers because of it. Bari 2004.

70 Many Nagas refer to their own region as 'western Nagaland' and close lying areas in Myanmar 'eastern Nagaland'.

71 The process of national consolidation brought all the issues of diverse ethnic identities, autonomy, economic and political empowerment and self-determination to a head. Political activity based on colonial models can be traced back to 1918.

72 UNPO 2005.

73 The Nagas have always been a fiercely independent people. They had a treaty with the British that guaranteed their autonomy and had existed as such during colonial times. At the time of independence, when India and Pakistan asserted their right for self determination, so did the Naga people, but were made to enter into a contract with India with a promise of self-rule within ten years. This promise never materialised and the Nagas have been at war with the central government since 1958. Phandis 1990.

74 IISS 2005.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 The country has thirteen official languages and two national languages – English and Hindi, understood only by about 33 percent of the population. Mahmood 2003.

78 In 1987, 320 people were killed in Hindu-Muslim riots. In 1989, there were major riots in Gujrat, Bihar, the Indian held Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bengal. Some 611 people died in these riots. In 1990, there were major riots in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujrat, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh where about 650 people died. Muslims are possibly the most oppressed of the minorities in India. Mahmood 2003.

79 Stewart and Hayat report that from a sample of rural households in Kerala Muslims accounted for 13 percent of the population and 10 percent of its income while receiving no pensions at all. Also Muslim infant and child mortality rates were higher, fertility rates are higher and education levels and incomes significantly lower than Hindus in Uttar Pradesh in addition to having no access to political power. Muslim literacy rates were lower, dropout rates higher and labour force participation rates lower in Bihar, Rajastan and two of three districts of Delhi. Stewart and Hayat 2002.

80 Korf and Silva 2003.

81 See table 2.6. In the midst of the armed conflict between government forces and Maoist rebels since February 1996, Nepal has witnessed over 10,000 deaths, virtual paralysis of all socio-economic activities, increasing numbers of orphans and internally displaced people, serious escalation in abuses of human rights and atrocities ranging from gratuitous abduction and murder to the recruitment of child soldiers. UNDP 2002.

82 This loss of entitlements helps evaluate the cost of conflict in terms of services disrupted and channels destroyed and to estimate the suffering of people by providing an assessment of services and incomes lost.

83 Stewart and FitzGerald 2001a, p. 74.

84 Stewart and Hayat 2002.

85 Korf and Silva 2003.

86 Korf and Silva 2003.

87 Perera 2003.

88 The Asia Foundation 2004, p. 9.

89 UNDP 1998b.

90 Stewart and FitzGerald 2001b.

91 Stewart and Hayat 2002.

92 The first documented incident of gang rape by security forces was recorded in 1990 in Srinagar. Since then investigations into incidents of gang rape in Pazipora (August 1990), Kunana Poshpara (Feburary 1991), Chak Saidpora (Oct 1992), Theno Budpathery Kangan (Septemeber 1994) and Aviisa (1997) have established rape as a form of collective punishment. Manchanda 2001, p. 79.

93 Stewart and FitzGerald 2001b.

94 UNDP 1998b.

95 Refers to capital expenditure.

96 Collier uses a comprehensive dataset of all civil wars during 1960-92 and a comprehensive model of the economic effects of civil war and post war period and finds that GDP per capita declines at an annual rate of 2.2 per cent during times of civil war (see Collier 1999). The decline comes partly from reduced production and partly through reduced capital stock through destruction, dissaving and outflow of investment capital. Ra and Singh 2005.

97 Stewart and Hayat 2002.

98 Korf and Silva 2003.

99 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by the Under Secretary of Humanitarian Affairs Mr Sergio Vieira de Mello describes Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) as 'forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and

who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border'. UNHCR 2005a.

100 Newman 2003.

101 Eighty percent of the population of Vanni, which is a conflict-affected area, has been displaced. Korf and Silva 2003.

102 When the governments in host countries close the camps the refugees are left with two choices; repatriation to Afghanistan or relocation to other camps. Which means a disruption of the fragile social network and economic support systems that the refugees had built. In 2005, the Pakistani government closed down over 30 Afghani refugee camps housing over 105,000 refugees in Islamabad and NWFP.

103 UNHCR 2005a.

104 UNHCR 2005b.

105 For the rural populations a combination of agricultural support, employment schemes and the provision of food in schools and clinics can achieve wide food access. A policy to stay away from is the immediate provision of food to refugee camps encouraging a move to the camps and resulting in mass displacement and increased pressures on strained government resources – human as well as financial. See Stewart and FitzGerald 2001b for more detail.

106 The nationwide de-worming of children, also organised during the same week, is aimed to reach over 2.8 million people. The measles vaccination campaign in villages in Humla district was taken so seriously by local people that every family with young children rushed to the vaccination centres set up at health posts. IRIN 2005.

Chapter 3

1 FAO 2000.

2 MHHDC 2003.

3 Sharma and Babu 2002.

4 Anderson-Per 2002.

5 MHHDC 2003.

6 Anderson-Per 2002.

7 Ibid.

8 ILO 2003.

9 Ibid.

10 Rahman and Sen 1997.

11 Anant *et al*. 1999.

12 OECD 2005.

13 Least developed countries were defined as those having annual per capita incomes of US $750 or less.

14 Hazell 2002.

15 Ibid.

16 GOP 2000.

17 FAO 2001.

Chapter 4

1 Commission on Human Security 2003.

2 Ibid.

3 Sen 1999.

4 Commission on Human Security 2003.

5 WHO 2004b.

6 Ibid.

7 UNICEF 2004.

8 MHHDC 2005.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 See Human Development Indicators, table 4, p. 209.

15 UNDP 2005.

16 MHHDC 2005.

17 MHHDC 1997.

18 UNDP 2005.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 GOP 1999.

26 Indiastat 2005.

27 UNDP 2005.

28 Indiastat 2005.

29 MHHDC 2005.

30 Ibid.

31 WHO and UNICEF 2005.

32 WHO 2005c.

33 WHO and UNICEF 2005.

34 One of the species of parasite that causes malaria.

35 Chloroquine, sulfadoxine–pyrimethamine.

36 WHO and UNICEF 2005.

37 WHO 2005e.

38 With the bite of this species of mosquito, malaria parasites are transmitted from infected to healthy people.

39 WHO 2005d.

40 WHO 2005e.

41 WHO and UNICEF 2005.

42 TB is a contagious disease. Like the common cold, it spreads through the air. When infectious people cough, sneeze, talk or spit, they propel TB germs, known as bacilli, into the air. A person needs only to inhale a small number of these to be infected. Most people infected with TB will never develop the active disease. However, those with compromised immune systems—the sick, malnourished, or people living with HIV—are particularly vulnerable. Left untreated, each person with active TB will infect on average 10-15 people every year. The best way to prevent TB is to treat and cure people who have it.

43 GFHTM 2005b.

44 GFHTM 2005b.
45 Kristofferson 2000.
46 Ibid.
47 Avert 2005.
48 Perry 2005.
49 Ibid.
50 MHHDC 2005.
51 Avert 2005.
52 MHHDC 2005.
53 Ibid.
54 UNAIDS and WHO 2004a.
55 MHHDC 2005.
56 WHO and UNEP 2004.
57 MHHDC 2004.
58 MHHDC 2004.
59 WHO 2002a.
60 UNAIDS and WHO 2004.
61 MHHDC 2004.
62 WHO 2005a.
63 UNICEF 2004.
64 The measles vaccination is given at nine months and is a useful indicator of immunisation during the first year of a child's life.
65 MHHDC 2005.
66 UNICEF 2004.
67 MHHDC 2005.

Chapter 5

1 UNEP 2004.
2 Ibid.
3 UNDP 1994.
4 UNEP 2002.
5 UNDP 1998a.
6 Chadha 1999.
7 GOP 2005b.
8 UNEP 2001c.
9 UNDP, UNEP, World Bank and WRI 2005.
10 World Commission on Water 1999.
11 Asthana and Shukla 2003.
12 The contamination is usually detected by measuring faecal coliform levels. Water of moderate quality has less than 10 faecal coliforms per 100 millilitres.
13 Agarwal *et al*. 1999.
14 Devkota and Neupane 1994.
15 GOP 2004a.
16 Nitrates are a soluble form of nitrogen.
17 UNEP 2001d.
18 SDPI 1995.
19 IIPS 2002.
20 Hyder and Morrow 2000.
21 Brandon 1995.
22 Rahman *et al*. 2003.
23 MHHDC 2005.
24 GOS 1994.
25 Steel *et al*. 1997.
26 World Bank 2002.
27 Haldar 2002.
28 The GBM basin stretches over an area of 1.75 million square kilometres with a population of approximately 600 million.
29 Karim *et al*. 1990.
30 Swain 1996.
31 WHO 2002b.
32 World Bank 1997.
33 GOI 2000.
34 GOP 2005b.
35 GON 1999b.
36 RGOB 1999.
37 GOI 1997.
38 CMIE 2000.
39 ADB 2001.
40 CII and SII 1996.
41 World Bank 2005b.
42 Particulate air pollution is characterised by particles small enough to be inhaled into the lungs.
43 Holdren and Smith 2000.
44 CPCB 2000.
45 GOI 2002.
46 Brandon *et al*. 1995.
47 PECC 2001.
48 Khwaja and Khan 2005.
49 Brandon 1995.
50 World Bank 1997.
51 Pandey and Basnet 1987.
52 Niraula 1998.
53 RGOB 1990 and 1998.
54 WECS 1997.
55 UNEP 2001b.
56 ADB 2001.
57 UNDP 2005.
58 World Bank 2005b.
59 GOI 1999.
60 UNDP, UNEP, World Bank and WRI 1997.
61 GOP 1998.
62 UNEP 2001c.
63 GOP 1998.
64 GOP 2005b.
65 Raut 1997.
66 Brandon 1995.
67 Shrestha and Joshi 1996.
68 ADB 2001.
69 WRI 2005.
70 Non-wood forest products comprise rattan, bamboo, resins, waxes, nuts, honey, spices and medicinal plants.
71 GON 1999a.
72 UNCHS 2001.
73 IFRC 2001.
74 UNDP 2004c.
75 IFRC 2001.
76 IPCC 2001.
77 WMO 2000 and NASA 2001.
78 The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement adopted in December 1997 in Japan. The Protocol sets binding targets for developed countries to address global warming. These countries are required to specifically reduce greenhouse gas emissions

by an average of 5.2 percent below the levels that prevailed in 1990.

79 Mcdowell 2002.
80 GOI 1995.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Chowdhury and Hussain 1981.
84 UNDP 2004c.
85 Tidal waves due to wind effects are called storm surges. Storm surge heights are directly related to cyclone intensity.
86 The United Nations Millennium Declaration was adopted by world leaders from 189 countries at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000.
87 The NEWS 2005c.
88 GON 2002.
89 Ibid.
90 Dr Mahbub ul Haq labels the environmentally sensitive national income accounts as the 'green GNP'.

Chapter 6

1 UNPD 2005.
2 MHHDC 1997.
3 MHHDC 2005.
4 Calculated using population data from UNPD 2005 and literacy data from UNDP 2005 for relevant age group i.e. 15 years and above.
5 See Human Development Indicators, table 6, p. 211.
6 India has 33 percent reserved seats in all local bodies. Pakistan has 17 seats reserved in the national assembly in addition to 17 reserved seats at the local levels. Bangladesh reserves 15 percent of total seats at the national parliament and 33 percent at the local bodies. Nepal reserves 5 percent of the seats at the lower house and 3 percent at the upper house in addition to 20 percent of the local bodies. Sri Lankan Cabinet has also approved the principle of reservation of one-third of the seats to women at the local level. UNIFEM 2005.
7 UNDP 2005.
8 See UN 1993a. The Declaration further list downs the forms of violence in Article 2 as a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; (b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; (c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.
9 UN 1993a.
10 UNIFEM 2003a.
11 GOI 2004.
12 HRCP 2005.
13 OMCT 2002.
14 See Nepal Research 2005 for the news reported on crime cases including rape, trafficking of girls and women.
15 Oxfam 2004.
16 Domestic violence includes any kind of violence by an intimate partner and/or by other family member(s) that occurs within or beyond the boundaries of the home.
17 UNFPA 2005 and WHO 2002c, p. 89.
18 Naveed 2003.
19 UNIFEM 2003b.
20 The survey includes 90,000 ever married women of the reproductive age (15-49) surveyed were at least once physically mistreated or beaten, mostly by their husbands, since the age of 15.
21 The surveys included 9,938 families that contain at least one woman aged 15-49 who has at least one child below 18 years of age in Bhopal, Chennai, Delhi, Lucknow, Nagpur, Thiruvanthapuram and Vellore.
22 ICRW and INCLEN 2000.
23 Ibid.
24 As cited in Human Rights Watch 1999.
25 Bates *et al*. 2004 also as cited in Bhuyia *et al*. 2003.
26 Bhuyia *et al*. 2003. The study included 190 ever-married women in six unions in rural Bangladesh. Mannan 2002 also found similar results after conducting a survey among married women below the age of 50 in Laximpur and Kushtia districts of rural Bangladesh. According to this survey, 46 per cent of women experienced physical and psychological violence and 54 per cent verbal abuse by their husband.
27 The study was conducted in 2002 among 1,186 women who were younger than 50 years of age from six villages in Bangladesh.
28 Includes only 3,130 women ever married women in her reproductive ages.
29 As cited in Naveed 2003.
30 As cited in MHHDC 2000 and Naveed 2003.
31 As cited in Naveed 2003.
32 WHO 2002c.
33 The survey was conducted by Sakshi, an Indian NGO. As cited in UNFPA 2003.
34 Oxfam 2004.
35 Ibid.
36 As cited in Naveed 2003.
37 The study included pregnancy outcomes of more than 1,000 women for a reference period of five years. As cited in Naveed 2003.

38 As cited in Naveed 2003.
39 Oxfam 2004.
40 As cited in HRCP 2005.
41 As cited in Naveed 2003.
42 GOI 2004.
43 BNWLA 2004.
44 As cited in Naveed 2003.
45 Hassan 1995.
46 Coomaraswamy 2005.
47 Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid recorded the number of honour killing cases as 790 for the first seven months of 2004. 97 per cent of these cases end up in murder. The majority of honour killing cases occur in Sindh (55 per cent), followed by Punjab (38 per cent). As cited in HRCP 2005.
48 As cited in Naveed 2003.
49 MHHDC 2004.
50 GOI 2004.
51 As cited in HRCP 2005.
52 BNWLA 2004, p. 33.
53 AASHA 2002.
54 UNIFEM 2002.
55 Fatal health impacts can be listed as homicide HIV/AIDS, maternal mortality, suicide. Non-fatal physical health impacts are permanent disabilities, injuries, headaches, asthma, irritable bowel syndrome, unwanted pregnancies, gynecological problems including infertility, sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, miscarriage, pelvic inflammatory disease, chronic pelvic pain and psychological impacts are depression and anxiety, fear, low self-esteem, eating problems, obsessive-compulsive disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, and self-injurious behaviour such as alcohol and/or drug use. UNICEF 2000a and WHO 2002c.
56 World Bank 1993.
57 Mayhew and Watts 2002.
58 WHO 2002c.
59 As cited in Naveed 2003 and also available in UNFPA 2003.
60 Gunasekera 2003.
61 As cited in Naveed 2003.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 The data includes 91 women who experienced violence during one year prior to the survey and who can remember her experience in detail. ICRW and INCLEN 2000.
67 As cited in Naveed 2003.
68 MHHDC 2000, p. 76.
69 These include CEDAW, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (Article 12), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (Articles 7-9), Covenant against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984, Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, 1974.
70 Article 25(2). GOP 2005a.
71 See Article 27 and 28 of the Constitution. GOB 1996.
72 The separation of the public from the private sphere where women are concerned is outlined in Section (2) of Article 28 of the Constitution: 'Women shall have equal rights with men in all spreads of state and public life.'
73 The countries having these special provisions are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
74 MHHDC 2000, p. 78.

Chapter 7

1 UNICEF 2004.
2 See Human Development Indicators, table 4 and 5, p. 209-210.
3 ILO 2002b.
4 C182 list the worst forms of child labour as 'a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances; c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children'. ILO 2005b.
5 ILO 2002a.
6 The data related to child labour in India can be obtained from various sources. However, the harmony among these is quite bleak and the data cannot be compared. For example, according to National Sample Survey Organisation in 1999-2000 there were 10.4 million children working in India. As cited in ILO 2004c.
7 GOI 2005a.
8 As cited in GOI 2002.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 GOP, ILO and IPEC 1996.
12 ILO 2004e.
13 GOB 2003c.
14 ILO 2004b.
15 Gilligan 2003.
16 GOS 1999.
17 Ibid.
18 GOM 2001.
19 Lieten 2001.
20 Gilligan 2003.

21 ILO 2004a.
22 Belser *et al*. 2005.
23 ILO 2004g and Quami Yak Jahti 2004.
24 Global March against Child Labour 2005b.
25 United States Department of State 2005a.
26 ILO 2005a.
27 As cited in Srivastava 2005.
28 United States Department of State 2005b.
29 IPEC 2005.
30 These surveys include: Child Labourers in Surgical Instruments manufacturing in Sialkot; Child labourers in Glass Bangle Industry in District Hyderabad; Child Labourers in Deep Sea fishing, Sea food Processing and Ship Breaking in Gadani Area in Balochistan; Child Labourers involved in Rag Picking; Child Labourers in Tanneries in District Kasur; Child Labourers in Coal mining industry in district of Chakwal, Nowshera and Shangla.
31 ILO 2004g.
32 GOB 2003b.
33 GOB 2004a.
34 GOB 2003a.
35 GOB 2004b.
36 As cited in SPARC 2005.
37 Catalla *et al*. 2003.
38 Mukherjee and Central Department for Development Studies 2003.
39 United States Department of State 2004b and 2005c.
40 According to United States Department of State 2005c, India and Pakistan are the source, transit and destination, Bangladesh is source and transit, and Nepal and Sir Lanka are source countries for the children and women trafficked internationally.
41 ILO 2004g.
42 Ibid.
43 Global March against Child Labour 2005b.
44 Global March against Child Labour 2005a.
45 Save the Children and WGASAE 2005.
46 Global March against Child Labour 2005c.
47 Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel (Palestine), Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan. Manoharan 2003b.
48 UNICEF 2005c.
49 Manoharan 2003a.
50 CWIN 2005.
51 BICC 2001 and 2004; Brett and Specht 2004 and CSUCS 2004.
52 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 recognises the right to free and full consent to a marriage as a basic right and states that men and women of full age have the right to marry freely (Article 16 (1) and (2)). CEDAW besides stating that free and full consent of both women and men is necessary in entering into marriage, requires state parties to specify a specific age for marriage to take necessary measures to prevent early marriages Article 16 (2).
53 UNICEF 2005b.
54 See Article 24(3). UNICEF 2005a.
55 UNAIDS and WHO 2005.
56 Ibid.
57 UNICEF 2005f.
58 Articles 24, 28 and 32 covers health, education and employment of children, respectively. For additional details see UNICEF 2005a.
59 GOI 2005b.
60 Children (Pledging of Labour) Act, 1933; Employment of Children Act, 1938; The Factory Act, 1948; the Employment of Children (Amendment) Act, 1949; the Plantation Labour Act, 1951; the Mines Act, 1952; the Factories (Amendment) Act, 1954; the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958; the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961; the Apprentices Act, 1961; the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966; the Employment of Children (Amendment) Act, 1978 and the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986.
61 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 465/1986. ILO 2004c and GOI 2005a.
62 MHHDC 2003.
63 Embassy of India, Washington, D.C. 2005.
64 ILO 2004c and GOI 2005a.
65 GOP 2005a.
66 GOP 2002.
67 Mines Act, 1923 defines minimum age for working in mines as 15 and also requires medical fitness certificate; Employment of Children Act, 1938 defines minimum age for workshops as 12 years and minimum age for railway and ports as 15 years; Tea Plantation Labour Ordinance, 1962 defines minimum age for tea gardens 15 years; Factories Act, 1965 defines minimum age for working in the factories as 14 (also requires medical fitness certificate) and prohibits the usage of dangerous machinery by the children below the age 18; Shops and Establishments Act, 1965 defines the minimum age for working in shops and other commercial establishments as 12. ILO 2004b.
68 ILO 2004b.
69 GON 2005b.
70 ILO 2004d.
71 UNDP 2004b.
72 GOS 2005a.
73 Ibid.
74 ILO 2004f.

Chapter 8

1 UNDP 2002, p. 87.
2 UNDP 2002, p. 58.
3 UNDP 2002, p. 57.
4 Collier 2000.
5 UNDP 2002, p. 14.
6 IDEA 2005.
7 Figures from UNDP 2005.
8 Bangladesh: In 2004, the number of seats in parliament was raised from 300 to 345, with the addition of 45 reserved seats for women. These reserved seats were filled in September and October 2005, being allocated to political parties in proportion to their share of the national vote received in the 2001 election.
9 MAR 2005.
10 Shafqat 1999.
11 Ibid.
12 As cited in MHHDC 1999, p. 48.
13 MHHDC 1999.
14 Shafqat 1999.
15 MHHDC 1999, p. 49.
16 MHHDC 1999.
17 Freedom House 2005.
18 MHHDC 1999, p. 49.
19 MHHDC 1999, p. 116. Also see the Technical Appendix.
20 MHHDC 1999, p. 66.
21 Ibid.
22 Law Commission of India 2005.
23 Transparency International 2002a.
24 AI 2005a.
25 Ibid.
26 Country Reports from Freedom House 2002.
27 AI 2005a.
28 Freedom House 2002.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 MHHDC 1999.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Nasim and Akhlaque 1992.
35 MHHDC 1999.
36 Iqbal *et al*. 1998.
37 MHHDC 1998.
38 MHHDC 2004.
39 WHO 2005a.
40 MHHDC 2004.
41 Perception Survey of South Asia 2005 (for details see Appendix).
42 Chaudhury *et al*. 2005.
43 CRCP 2001.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 ADB 2004.
47 ADB 2005.
48 Gandhi 1997.
49 World Bank 1996.
50 Gandhi 1997.
51 Wei 1998.

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Note on Statistical Sources for Human Development Indicators

The human development data presented in these annex tables has been collected with considerable effort from various international and national sources. For the most part, standardised international sources have been used, particularly the UN system and the World Bank data bank. The UNDP and World Bank offices made their resources available to us for this Report.

Countries in the indicator tables are arranged in descending order according to population size. While most data has been taken from international sources, national sources have been used where international data has been sparse. Such data has to be used with some caution as its international comparability is still to be tested.

Several limitations remain regarding coverage, consistency, and comparability of data across time and countries. The data series presented here will be refined over time, as more accurate and comparable data becomes available. In particular, policy-makers are invited to note the following deficiencies in the currently available statistical series and to invest sufficient resources to remedy these shortfalls:

Generally, the latest data is not available for several indicators. Some statistical indicators date back ten years or more. Analysis of the current economic and social situation is greatly handicapped in the absence of up-to-date data.

Time series are often missing for even the most basic data as population growth, adult literacy, or enrolment ratios. An effort must be made to build consistent time series for some of the important indicators.

In certain critical areas, reliable data is extremely scarce: for instance, for employment, income distribution, public expenditure on social services, military debt, foreign assistance for human priority areas, etc.

Information regarding the activities of NGOs in social sectors remains fairly sparse.

It is time for policy-makers to make a significant investment in the collection and analysis of up-to-date, reliable, and consistent indicators for social and human development. If development is to be targeted at the people, a great deal of effort must be invested in determining the true condition of these people.

It is hoped that the various gaps visible in this annex will persuade national and international agencies to invest more resources and energy in investigating human development profiles.

1. Basic Human Development Indicators

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Total estimated population (millions) 2003[a]	1,071	152	137	26	20	2.1	0.3	1,408T	5,119T
Annual population growth rates (%) 1998-2003[b]	1.6	2.6	2.1	2.3	0.8	3.0	3.0	1.8	1.6
Life expectancy at birth 2003	63	63	63	62	74	63	67	63	65
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 2003	61	49	41	49	90	47	97	58	77
Female literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 2003	48	35	31	35	89	…	97	45	70
Combined 1st, 2nd and 3rd level gross enrolment ratio (%) 2002/03	60	35	53	61	69	49[c]	75	57	63
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 2003	63	81	46	61	13	70	55	63	60
GNI per capita[d] (US$) 2003	540	520	400	240	930	630	2,350	525	1,280
GDP growth (%) 2002-03	8.6	5.1	5.3	3.1	5.9	6.7	9.2	7.8	5.2
GDP per capita growth (%) 2001-02	7.1	2.6	3.4	0.8	4.7	3.9	6.8	6.1	3.9
GDP per capita (PPP US $) 2003	2,892	2,097	1,770	1,420	3,778	1,969	4,798[e]	2,682	4,359
Human Development Index (HDI) 2003[f]	0.602	0.527	0.520	0.526	0.751	0.536	0.745	0.587	0.694
Gender-related Development Index (GDI) 2003[g]	0.586	0.508	0.514	0.511	0.747	…	…	0.571	…

Notes: a: Population figures for 2003 are taken from UNDP 2005, (Medium Variant). b: The population growth rate has been calculated by using the formula {[(new value/old value)^1/n]-1}*100. c: Data is estimated by UNDP. d: Gross national product (GNP) has been replaced by Gross national income (GNI). e: Data refer to 2002. f: The Human Development Index (HDI) has three components: life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, comprising adult literacy, with two-thirds weight, and a combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio, with one-third weight; and income. Any significant difference in the HDI for the South Asian countries is due to change in methodology for calculating the index. Please refer to UNDP's Human Development Report 2004. g: Gender-related Development Index (GDI) adjust the HDI for gender equality in life expectancy, educational attainment and income.

Source: Rows 1,2: UNPD 2005; Rows: 3,4,5,6,7,12,13: UNDP 2005; Row 11: MHHDC 2005 and UNDP 2005; Rows 8,9,10: World Bank 2005a,b.

2. Trends in Human Development

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
GNI per capita (US$)a									
— 1973	130	130	80	90	230	…	…	126	880[b]
— 2003	540	520	400	240	930	630	2,350	525	1,280
GDP per capita (PPP, US$)									
— 1960	617	820	621	584	1,389	…	…	648	790
— 2003	2,892	2,097	1,770	1,420	3,778	1,969	4,798[c]	2,682	4,359
Human Development Index (HDI)									
— 1960	0.206	0.183	0.166	0.128	0.475	…	…	0.204	…
— 2003	0.602	0.527	0.520	0.526	0.751	0.536	0.745	0.587	0.694
Life expectancy at birth (years)									
— 1960	44	43	40	38	62	37	44	44	46
— 2003	63	63	63	62	74	63	67	63	65
Gross enrolment ratio for all levels[d]									
— 1980	40	19	30	28	58	7	…	37	46
— 2002/03	60	35	53	61	69e	49	75[e]	57	63
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above)									
— 1970	34	21	24	13	77	…	91	32	43
— 2003	61	49	41[f]	49	90	47	97[f]	58	77
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)									
— 1960	144	139	151	212	90	175	158	144	137
— 2003	63	81	46	61	13	70	55	63	60
Fertility rate									
— 1960	6.0	7.0	6.7	6.0	5.4	6.0	7.0	6.1	6.0
— 2003	3.0	5.0	3.4	4.2	2.0	5.0	5.3	3.3	2.9
Underweight children (% under age 5)									
— 1975	71	47	84	63	58	…	…	69	40
— 1995-2003	47	38	48	48	29	19	30	46	27

Notes: a: G□World Bank
d: Indicator is calcul□
f: Estimate produced by UNESCO Institution for Statistics for 2002.

Source: Row 1: World Bank 2005a,b; Rows 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7: UNDP 2005; Rows 8, 9: UNICEF 2004.

3. Education Profile

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Adult literacy rate (%)									
— 1970	34	21	24	13	77	…	91[a]	32	43
— 2003	61	49	41	49	90	47	97	58	77
Male literacy rate (% age 15 and above)									
— 1970	47	40	47	22	86	…	…	47	55
— 2003	73	62	50	63	92	61[b]	97	70	82[b]
Female literacy rate (% age 15 and above)									
— 1970	19	5	9	3	68	…	…	17	32
— 2003	48	35	31	35	89	34[b]	97	45	70
Primary enrolment (%) gross									
— 1970	73	40	54	26	99	…	…	68	76
— 2002-03	99	68	96	119	112	73[c]	131[d]	96	103
Secondary enrolment (%) gross									
— 1970	26	13	…	10	47	2	…	25	…
— 2002-03	50	23	47	61	86	5[c]	49[c]	47	63
Combined enrolment for all levels (%)									
— 1980	40	19	30	28	58	7	…	37	46
— 2002/03	60	35	53	61	69	49	75	57	63
Percentage of children reaching grade 5 (2001-02)	84	…	54	65	98	91	…	81	…
Public expenditure on education (as % of GDP)									
— 1960	2.3	1.1	0.6	0.4	3.8	…	…	2.0	2.5
— 2000-02	4.1	1.8	2.4	3.4	1.3[e]	5.2	3.9[e]	3.6	4.1[e]

Notes: a: Data refer to 1985. b: Data refer to 2000. c: Data refer to 1993. d: data refer to 1998. e: Data refer to 1998-2000.
Source: Rows 1, 6, 7: UNDP 2005; Rows 2, 3, 8: MHHDC 2005 and UNDP 2005; Rows 4, 5: MHHDC 2005 and World Bank 2005a,b.

4. Health Profile

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Population with access to safe water (%)									
— 1990-96	81	60	84	44	46	58	96	78	71
— 2002	86	90	75	84	78	62	84	85	79
Population with access to sanitation (%)									
— 1990-96	16	30	35	6	52	70	66	22	29
— 2002	30	54	48	27	91	70	58	35	48
Child immunisation rate (% of children under age 1)									
— Measles 2003	67	61	77	75	99	88	96	68	75
— DPT 2003	70	67	85	78	99	95	98	72	76
Physicians (per 100,000 people)									
— 1990-2004[a]	51	66	23	5	43	5	78	49	…
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)									
— 2000	540	500	380	740	92	420	110	516	440
Contraceptive prevalence rate (% of women aged 15-49)									
— 1995-2003[a]	47	28	54	39	70	31	32	46	60
Prevalence of anemia in pregnant women (%)									
— 1985-2000[a]	52	37	53	65	39	30	…	50	57
Pregnant women receiving prenatal care (%)									
— 1995-2003[a]	60	43	40	28	98	…	…	55	…

Notes: a: Data refer to most recent year available.
Source: Rows 1, 2, 4: UNDP 2005; Rows 3, 5, 6: UNICEF 2004; Row 7: IIPS 2002, MHHDC 2004 and World Bank 2004; Row 8: World Bank 2005a,b.

5. Human Deprivation Profile

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Population below income poverty line (%)									
— US $1 a day 1990-2003[a]	34.7	13.4	36.0	37.7	7.6	…	…	32.3	…
— National poverty line 1990-2002[a]	28.6	32.6	49.8	42.0	25.0	…	…	31.4	…
Population without access to safe water 2002									
— number (millions)	147.6	14.9	33.5	4.1	4.4	0.8	0.0	205.3T	1,071T
— as a % of total population	14.0	10.0	25.0	16.0	22.0	38.0	16.0	14.8	21.0
Population without access to sanitation 2002									
— number (millions)	738.1	68.4	69.7	18.6	1.8	0.6	0.1	897.3T	2,385T
— as a % of total population	70.0	46.0	52.0	73.0	9.0	30.0	42.0	64.8	52.0
Illiterate adults 2003[b]									
— number (millions)	279.9	37.8	51.1	8.0	1.5	0.6	0.0	378.9T	…
— as a % of total adult population	39.0	51.3	58.9	51.4	9.6	53[c]	2.8	42.1	27[d]
Illiterate female adults 2003[b]									
— number (millions)	182.8	23.1	29.1	5.1	0.9	0.4	0.0	241.4T	…
— as a % of total adult female population	52.2	64.8	68.6	65.1	11.4	66[c]	2.8	54.8	30.4
Child malnutrition (weight for age) 1995-2003[a]									
— % of children under the age 5	47	38[e]	48	48	29	19	30[f]	46	27
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)									
— 2003	87	103	69	82	15	85	72	86	88
People living with HIV/AIDS adults (% age 15-49)									
— 2003[g]	0.9	0.1	<0.20	0.3	<0.10	…	…	…	1.3

Notes: a: Data refer to most recent year available during the period specified b: The number of illiterate adults has been calculated as a percentage of total adult population (15 and above). Illiteracy rates are taken from UNDP 2005. c: Data refer to 2000. d: Data refer to 1998. e: Data refer to 1993-2001. f: Data refer to 1995-2002. g: Median of intervals is reported here.

Source: Rows 1, 2, 3, 7, 8: UNDP 2005; Row 4, 5: MHHDC 2005 and UNDP 2005; Row 6: UNICEF 2004.

6. Gender Disparities Profile

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Female population 2003									
— Number (millions)	521.09	73.66	66.75	13.13	10.02	1.02	0.15	685.82T	2,519.88T
— As a % of male	95	94	96	102	97	97	94	95	97
Adult female literacy (as % of male)									
— 1970	41	35	35	12	80	…	…	40	…
— 2003	65	57	62[a]	56	96	…	100[a]	64	84
Female primary school gross enrolment (as % of male)									
— 1970	64	37	48	20	92	6	107	60	79
— 1998-2002[b]	84	74	101	87	99	76	99	85	91
Female 1st, 2nd and 3rd level gross enrolment ratio (as % of male) 2002/03	88	72	104	83	102	88	101	88	87[c]
Female life expectancy (as % of male)									
— 1970	97	99	97	97	103	104	95	97	103
— 2003	102	100	101	99	108	104	99	102	105
Economic activity rate (age 15+) (female as % of male)									
— 1970	43	11	6	52	37	52	35	37	53
— 2003	50	44	76	67	56	65	80	52	67
Female professional and technical workers (as % of total)									
— 1992-2003[b]	…	26	25	…	46	…	40	27	…
Seats in parliament held by women (% of total)									
— 2004[d]	9.3	20.6	2.0	6.4	4.9	8.7	4.8	9.7	…
Gender-related Development Index (GDI) 2003	0.586	0.508	0.514	0.511	0.747	…	…	0.571	…
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 2003	…	0.379	0.218	…	0.370	…	…	0.307	…

Notes: a: Estimated by UNESCO for 2002. b: Data refers to most recent year available. c: Data refer to 2001/02. d: As of March 2005.
Source: Row 1: UNPD 2005; Rows 2, 6,7, 8, 9, 10: UNDP 2005; Rows 3, 5: UNICEF 2004; Row 4:MHHDC 2005 and UNDP 2005.

7. Child Survival and Development Profile

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Population under 18 2003									
— number (millions)	415	74	65	12	5.7	1.09	0.16	572T	1,924T
— as a % of total population	39	49	48	46	29	53	51	41	38
Population under-five 2003									
— number (millions)	119	24	19	3.7	1.5	0.35	0.05	168T	553T
— as a % of total population	11	16	14	14	7	17	16	12	11
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)									
— 1970	127	117	145	165	65	156	157	144	109
— 2003	63	81	46	61	13	70	55	63	60
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)									
— 1970	202	181	239	250	100	267	255	235	167
— 2003	87	103	69	82	15	85	72	86	88
One-year-olds fully immunised against tuberculosis (%)									
— 1980	14	9	1	43	63	9	8	13	…
— 2003	81	82	95	91	99	93	98	83	85
One-year-olds fully immunised against measles (%)									
— 1980	1	3	2	2	0	18	30	1	…
— 2003	67	61	77	75	99	88	96	68	75
Births attended by trained health personnel (%)									
— 1995-2003[a]	43	23	14	11	97	24	70	38	59
Low birthweight infants (%)									
— 1998-2003[a]	30	19	30	21	22	15	22	29	17
Children (aged 10-14) in the labour force (% age group 10-14)									
— 2003	11	14	27	40	1	55[b]	6[b]	13	12

Notes: a: Data refer to most recent year available. b: Data refer to 2001.
Source: Rows 1, 2: UNICEF 2004; Rows 3, 4, 5, 6, 7: UNDP 2005; Row 8: UNICEF 2004; Row 9: MHHDC 2005 and World Bank 2005a,b.

8. Profile of Military Spending

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Defence expenditure (US $ millions, 1999 prices)									
— 1985	7,207	2,088	308	22	214	…	…	9,839T	189,727T
— 2003	12,570	3,360	600	90	570	…	…	17,190T	210,900T
Defence expenditure annual % increase (1985-2002)[a]	3.1	2.7	3.8	8.1	5.6	…	…	3.1	0.6
Defence expenditure									
— (as a % of GNP) 1985	2.5	5.1	1.3	0.7	2.6	…	…	3.0	7.2
— (as a % of GDP) 2003	2.3	4.1	1.2	1.5	2.5	…	…	2.4	2.5
Defence expenditure (as % of central government expenditure)									
— 1980	19.8	30.6	9.4	6.7	1.7	…	…	21.3	…
— 2003	14.2	23.9	12.8	8.6[b]	13.6	…	…	15.0	12.6[b]
Defence expenditure per capita (US$, 1999 prices)									
— 1985	9.4	22.0	3.1	1.3	14.0	…	…	9.9	52.0
— 2003	11.7	22.1	4.4	3.4	27.9	…	…	12.2	41.0
Armed forces personnel (no. in thousands)									
— 1985	1,260	484	91	25	22	…	…	1,882T	16,027T
— 2003	1,205	610	126	63	152	5	…	2,161T	13,300T
Employment in arms production (000's) 2003	170	50	…	…	…	…	…	220T	2,769T
Aggregate number of heavy weapons 2003[c]	10,210	5,510	580	50	560	…	…	16,910T	210,191T

Notes: a:The growth rate ha□
ships, combat aircrafts, tanks and artillery that country possesses. The index is a calculation based on the aggregate number of heavy weapons.
Source: Rows 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8: BICC 2005; Row 3: World Bank 2005a,b; Row 4: MHHDC 2005 and World Bank 2005a,b.

9. Profile of Wealth and Poverty

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Total GDP (US$ billions) — 2003	600.6	82.3	51.9	5.9	18.2	0.7	0.7	760T	6,982T
GDP per capita (PPP US$) — 2003	2,892	2,097	1,770	1,420	3,778	1,969	4798[a]	2,682	4,359
GNI per capita (US$)[b] — 2003	540	520	400	240	930	630	2,350	525	1,280
Income share: ratio of highest 20% to lowest 20% 1995-2000[c]	4.9	4.8	4.6	5.9	5.1	…	…	4.9	…
Population below income poverty line (%)									
— US $1 a day (1993 PPP US$) 1990-2003[c]	34.7	13.4	36.0	37.7	7.6	…	…	32.3	…
— national poverty line 1990-2002[c]	28.6	32.6	49.8	42.0	25.0	…	…	31.4	…
Population below income poverty line (%) 1995-2000[c]									
— urban	24.7	24.2	36.6	23.0	15.0	…	…	25.7	…
— rural	30.2	35.9	53.0	44.0	27.0	…	…	33.3	…
Public expenditure on education (as % of GDP) 2000-02[c]	4.1	1.8	2.4	3.4	1.3	5.2	3.9	3.6	4.1
Public expenditure on health (as % of GDP) 2002	1.3	1.1	0.8	1.4	1.8	4.1	5.1	1.0	…
Gross capital formation (as % of GDP) 2003	24	15	23	26	22	47[d]	…	23	25
Gross domestic savings (as % of GDP) 2003	22	16	18	14	16	…	…	21	27
Industry value added (as % of GDP) 2003	27	23	26	22	26	37[e]	…	26	35
Tax revenue (as % of GDP) 2003	9	11	8	9	14	8[d]	21[d]	9	…
Exports (as % of GDP) 2003	14	20	14	17	36	22[f]	85	15	35
Total debt service (as % of exports of goods, services and net income from abroad) 2003	18.1	16.8	8.3	10.0	7.8	4.7[f]	3.5	17	17.6
Total net official development assistance received 2003									
— US$ millions	942	1,068	1,393	467	672	77	18	4,638T	65,401T
— as % of GDP	0.2	1.3	2.7	8.0	3.7	11.1	2.5	0.7	3.0
Total external debt (US$, billions) 2003	113.47	36.35	18.78	3.25	10.24	…	…	182T	2,554T

Notes: a: Data refer to 2001□
d: Data refer to 1998. e: Data refer to 2000. f: Data refer to 2002.

Source: Rows 1, 4, 5, 8, 13, 14, 15: UNDP 2005; Rows 2, 7: MHHDC 2005 and UNDP 2005; Rows 3, 6, 10, 16: World Bank 2005a,b; Rows 9, 11, 12: MHHDC 2005 and World Bank 2005a,b.

10. Demographic Profile

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Population (in millions)									
—1960	442	50	51	9	10	1.0	0.1	563 T	2,070 T
—2003	1,071	152	137	26	20	2.1	0.3	1,408T	5,119T
Population growth rate (annual %)									
—1960-70	2.3	2.8	2.6	2.0	2.4	1.8	2.0	2.4	2.5
—1970-80	2.2	2.6	2.8	2.6	1.7	2.0	2.7	2.3	2.2
—1980-90	2.1	3.6	2.1	2.6	1.6	2.2	3.2	2.3	2.1
—1990-95[a]	1.9	2.4	2.3	2.5	1.2	1.1	3.1	2.0	2.1
—1995-2000[a]	1.8	2.5	2.0	2.4	1.0	2.2	2.8	1.9	1.9
—2000-05[a]	1.6	2.0	1.9	2.1	0.9	2.2	2.5	1.6	1.7
Population doubling date (at current growth rate)									
—2003[b]	2047	2038	2039	2036	2080	2035	2031	2047	…
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 live births)									
—1970	40	43	46	42	29	42	40	41	42
—2003	24	36	29	33	16	35	36	26	24
—% decline (1970-2003)	40	16	37	21	45	17	10	37	43
Crude death rate (per 1,000 live births)									
—1970	17	18	21	22	8	22	17	17	20
—2003	8	10	8	10	7	9	6	8	9
—% decline (1970-2003)	53	44	62	55	13	59	65	52	55
Total fertility rate									
—1960	6.0	7.0	6.7	6.0	5.4	6.0	7.0	6.1	6.0
—2003	3.0	5.0	3.4	4.2	2.0	5.0	5.3	3.3	2.9
—% decline (1960-2003)	50	29	49	30	63	17	24	46	52
Total labour force (in millions)									
—1980	300	29	40	7	5			382T	1,678T
—2003	473	56	71	12	9	…	…	620T	2,589T
Female labour force (in millions)									
—2003	154	17	31	5	3	…	…	210T	1,046T
Percentage annual growth in labour force									
—1990-2003	2.1	2.7	2.1	2.2	2.0	…	…	2.2	1.7
Unemployment rate (as % of labour force)									
—2000-2004[c]	…	7.7	3.6	…	8.4	2.9	2.0	5.9	…
Employment by economic activity (%) 1995-2002[c]									
Agriculture									
—Female	…	73	77	…	49	…	5	73	…
—Male	…	44	53	…	38	…	18	48	…
Industry									
—Female	…	9	9	…	22	…	24	10	
—Male	…	20	11	…	23	…	16	16	
Services									
—Female	…	18	12	…	27	…	39	16	
—Male	…	36	30	…	37	…	55	33	

Notes: a: Data □
b: Compound growth rate f□
rate of 2000-2005 is used. c: Data refer to most recent year available.

Source: Rows 1, 2, 3: UNPD 2005; Rows 4, 5, 6: UNICEF 2004; Rows 7, 8, 9: World Bank 2005a,b; Row 10: ADB 2005; Row 11: UNDP 2005.

11. Profile of Food Security and Natural Resources

	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia (weighted average)	Developing Countries
Food production net per capita — 2004 (1999-2001=100)	98.5	100.3	96.4	101.1	92.5	83.7	102.1	98.5	106.0
Food exports (% of merchandise exports) — 2003	11.0	10.0	8.0	…	21.0	23[a]	79[b]	10.7	11.0
Food imports (% of merchandise imports) — 2003	6	10	20	…	14	21.5[a]	22.8[b]	7.9	8.0
Cereal production (1,000 metric tons) — 2004	233,360	30,509	39,232	7,591	2,541	97	0	313,330T	1,273,299T
Cereal imports (1,000 metric tons) — 2003	8.6	158.5	3,985.3	58.9	1,037.2	35.5	37.8	5,321.8T	…
Cereal exports (1,000 metric tons) — 2003	8,986.0	3,513.4	0.4	3.9	7.9	0.3	…	12,511.9T	…
Forest production (1,000 cu. m) 2004									
— Roundwood	322,667	28,278	27,976	13,962	6,340	4,612	…	403,835T	2,019,004T
— Fuelwood	303,839	25,599	27,694	12,702	5,646	4,479	…	379,959T	1,598,803T
Crop production index (1999-2001=100) — 2002-04	97	100	104	107	98	…	…	98	107
Land area (1,000 sq. km) 2002	2,973	771	130	143	65	…	…	4,082T	99,300T
Land use									
— Arable land (% of land area) 2002	54.4	27.8	61.6	22.4	14.2	…	…	51.0	11
— Permanent cropped area (% of land area) 2002	2.8	0.9	3.1	0.7	15.5	…	…	2.8	1.1
Irrigated land hectors (as % of cropland) 2000-2002	33.7	81.1	52.0	35.4	33.1	…	…	40.6	22.3
Average annual deforestation (%) 1990-2000	-0.1	1.5	-1.3	1.8	1.6	…	…	0.011	0.3
Total renewable resources per capita cu. m 2003	1,185	350	761	8,029	2,600	…	…	1,198	6,441
Annual fresh water withdrawals									
—as % of internal resources[c]	39.7	299.2	13.9	14.6	19.6	…	…	63.2	7.0
—(billion) cu. m 1987-2003	500.0	155.6	14.6	29.0	9.8	…	…	709T	2,471T

Notes: a: Data refer to 1994. b: Data refer to 1997. c: Withdrawals can exceed 100 per cent of total renevable resources where extraction from non-renevable aquifers or desalination plants is considerable or where there is significant water reuse.

Source: Rows 1, 4, 5, 6, 7: FAO 2005a; Rows 2, 3: MHHDC 2005 and World Bank 2005a,b; Rows 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14: World Bank 2005a,b.

KEY TO INDICATORS

Indicator	Indicator table	Original source
A, B, C		
Access to,		
safe water	4	UNDP
sanitation	4	UNDP
Armed forces personnel	8	BICC
Birth rate, crude	10	UNICEF
Births attended by trained health staff	7	UNDP
Birthweight, low	7	UNICEF
Cereal,		
exports	11	FAO
imports	11	FAO
production	11	FAO
Contraceptive prevalence rate	4	UNICEF
Crop production index	11	WB
Children reaching grade 5	3	UNDP
D		
Death rate, crude	10	UNICEF
Debt,		
total external	9	WB
servicing	9	UNDP
Defence		
armed forces personnel, total	8	BICC
expenditure,		
annual % increase	8	BICC
as % of central govt.		
expendute per capita	8	WB
as % of GDP	8	WB
as % of GNP	8	WB
total	8	BICC
Deforestation, average annual	11	WB
E		
Economic activity rate,		
female as % of male	6	UNDP
Education expenditure, as % of GDP	3, 9	UNDP
Employment by economic activity		
agriculture female, male	10	UNDP
industry female, male	10	UNDP
services female, male	10	UNDP
in arms production	8	BICC
Enrolment,		
combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level, gross	1, 2, 3	UNDP
combined 1st, 2nd & 3rd level gross,		
female as % of male	6	UNICEF
primary level, gross	3	WB
primary level, gross		
female as % of male	6	UNICEF
secondary level, gross	3	WB
Exports, % of GDP	9	UNDP

Indicator	Indicator table	Original source
F		
Fertility rate	2, 10	UNICEF
Female professional & technical workers	6	UNDP
Food		
as a % of merchandise exports	11	WB
as % of merchandise imports	11	WB
net production per capita	11	FAO
Forest production (1,000 cu.m.)		
fuel wood	11	FAO
round wood	11	FAO
Freshwater withdrawals	11	WB
G		
GDP,		
growth rate	1	WB
per capita, PPP US$	1, 2, 9	UNDP
per capita growth	1	WB
total	9	UNDP
Gender empowerment measure	6	UNDP
Gender-related Development Index	1, 6	UNDP
GNI per capita	1, 2, 9	WB
Gross capital formation	9	WB
Gross domestic savings	9	WB
H, I, J		
Health expenditure,		
public, as % of GDP	9	UNDP
HIV/AIDS,		
among adult population	5	UNDP
Human development index	1, 2	UNDP
Illiterate,		
adults		
percentage of total adult population	5	UNDP
total	5	UNDP
females,		
percentage of total adult population	5	UNDP
total	5	UNDP
Immunisation,		
children		
DPT	4	UNICEF
Measles	4	UNICEF
Income share: ratio of top		
20% to bottom 20%	9	UNDP
Industry, value added % of GDP	9	WB
Infant mortality rate,	1, 2, 7	UNDP
K, L		
Labour force,		
annual growth rate, average	10	WB
child	7	WB
female	10	WB
total	10	WB
Land area	11	WB
Land irrigated, as % of cropland	11	WB

Indicator	Indicator table	Original source
Land use		
arable, % of land area	11	WB
permanent cropped area, % of land area	11	WB
Life expectancy at birth,		
total	1, 2	UNDP
female as % of male	6	UNICEF
Literacy rate,		
adults	1, 2, 3	UNDP
female	1, 3, 6	UNDP
as % of male	6	UNDP
male	3	UNDP
Low birth weight	7	UNICEF
M, N, O		
Malnourished, children under-five	5	UNDP
Maternal mortality		
ratio	4	WHO,UNICEF,UNFPA
Measles, one-year-olds fully immunised	7	UNDP
Mortality rate,		
infant	1, 2, 7	UNDP
under-five	5, 7	UNDP
Overseas development assistance received,		
as percentage of GDP	9	UNDP
total	9	WB
P, Q, R		
Physicians, per 100,000 people	4	UNDP
Population,		
doubling date	10	UNPD
estimated		
female	6	UNPD
female to male ratio	6	UNPD
growth rate, annual	1, 10	UNPD
total	1, 10	UNPD
under-five	7	UNICEF
under 18	7	UNICEF
Poverty,		
absolute, children living in income, people living below		
US $1 a day	9, 5	UNDP
national poverty line	9, 5	UNDP
rural	9	WB
urban	9	WB
Pregnant women, received		
prenatal care	4	WB
with anemia	4	WB
Renewable freshwater resources, per capita	11	WB
S		
Safe water,		
access to	4	UNDP
percentage without access to	5	UNDP
Sanitation,		
access to	4	UNDP
percentage without access to	5	UNDP
T, U, V		
Tax revenue, as % of GDP	9	UNDP
Tuberculosis,		
one-year-olds immunised against	7	UNDP
Unemployment rate	10	ADB
Under-five mortality rate,	5, 7	UNDP
Underweight, children	2, 5	UNICEF
W, X, Y, Z		
Weapons, number of heavy	8	BICC
Women,		
pregnant		
prevalence of anemia	4	WB
receiving prenatal care	4	WB
professional & technical workers	6	UNDP
seats held in parliaments	6	UNDP

Key to source abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
BICC	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
MHHDC	Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNPD	United Nations Population Division
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization